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
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RICHARD PARKS BLAND.

# “AN AMERICAN COMMONER”


THE LIFE AND TIMES OF  
RICHARD PARKS BLAND

A STUDY OF THE LAST QUARTER OF THE  
NINETEENTH CENTURY

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN AND  
PERSONAL REMINISCENCES BY MRS. RICHARD PARKS BLAND

WILLIAM VINCENT BYARS  
EDITOR

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HON. WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN.

## MR. BRYAN'S INTRODUCTION.



RICHARD P. BLAND combined, in a rare degree, those qualities which are essential in the successful public servant. He was, in fact, an ideal representative of the people. He was honest with himself and with his fellows; he was industrious and devoted himself conscientiously to his work; his habits, his tastes and his ambitions were such as to protect him from the temptations which hover about those who are conspicuous in public life; he had convictions deep and controlling; his ideas were high and pure; he had the ability to present and defend his views with clearness and force—his eloquence being the eloquence of one who knew what he was talking about and meant what he said; and he had the courage to express his opinion and stand by it, regardless of the consequences which might follow to himself.

Measuring all questions by the fundamental principles which underlie our government, his career was remarkably free from the inconsistencies which have so often marred the lives of great men. He was reared among the plain people and was their faithful friend and champion; he never partook of the lotus fruit which makes the recipient of a public trust forgetful of those who confer it.

He was democratic in the broadest sense of the term; he had implicit confidence in the capacity of the people for self government and an abiding faith that they would, in the end, solve aright every social and political problem.

He was a pioneer in the great struggle for the restoration of bimetallism and for two decades led the silver fight in the House of Representatives. That he was correct in the position he took on the money question is evident from the fact that for twenty years after he gave his name to

the coinage law of 1878 all political parties in the United States continued to promise the restoration of bimetallism, differing only as to the means of securing the desired result; and when the gold standard was openly espoused by the republican party, it was defended, not upon the ground that the original demonetization of silver was wise, but upon the ground that new conditions had arisen.

Mr. Bland was with his party on every public question and was prominent in the fight within the party which resulted in the adoption of the Chicago platform. If the nomination had been given merely as a reward for public service he would have had no competitor for the honor. Whether his nomination would have brought victory to the party in 1896 is a question which can not now be determined, but certain it is that no aspirant for a public office ever manifested less disappointment over the result or gave to his successful rival more earnest and sincere support.

Mr. Bland's life was a success. He did not amass a fortune. But he measures life by a low standard who estimates success by the dollars either received or saved. Many, without possessing real merit, have secured great wealth by inheritance or by accident; while many have saved by dwarfing themselves, stinting those dependent upon them, and withholding from society that contribution which is due from the more favored to the less fortunate.

He left his impress upon the age in which he lived and gave back to society full compensation for all the honors he received. To the members of his party his life was an inspiration; to his immediate family it is an inheritance more valuable and more permanent than lands or bonds.

"A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches; and loving favor rather than silver and gold."

WM. J. BRYAN.



## EDITOR'S PREFACE.



BETWEEN 1872, when Mr. Bland entered politics, and 1899, when he made his last speech in Congress, a revolution had taken place in American politics as great as that which followed the candidacy of Andrew Jackson as the first representative of the states west of the Alleghenies. To force this revolution Mr. Bland contributed, no doubt, more than any other single man in the public life of his generation. As a result of it the Civil War combination in politics, under which the control of the country frequently depended on buying enough "floaters" to constitute the balance of power in a few city wards in one or two "pivotal states," was broken forever; Civil War sectionalism ceased to be the decisive factor in national elections; the Northwestern states which had been admitted to assure the continued supremacy of the Republican party, turned upon it and defeated it, and the narrow issues of local and sectional animosity were superseded by issues of enduring and fundamental principles, involving the progress of the United States as a whole and of the world at large.

No history of this movement has been written. Its results have scarcely been suggested and its ultimate meaning has hardly been suspected. Mr. Bland, who most fully represented the forces which are still at work to complete—perhaps in wholly unexpected ways—a work which seems to have reached its first great climax in his lifetime, has been looked upon by some as a mere specialist and by others as a narrow sectionalist and partisan. The object of this book is to study and make more generally intelligible the great forces he represented—by virtue of which, without attempting to grasp power, he made the ballots which elected him to represent an agricultural district in Missouri, more formid-

able to European and other opponents of republican institutions than the whole military power of North America could have been made in the past or than it is ever likely to be made in the future.

No one man and no combination of men, however great in statesmanship, could have produced the revolution in the West which showed itself first in what was called derisively the "Rainbow-Chasing Movement" to change the political attitude which Illinois, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas, and other northwestern states had occupied since the Civil War. It is only through the slow processes of evolution that such great changes come. It is a fact, however, that the possibility and immanency of this change became apparent in advance to a few men who worked with Mr. Bland to force it, expecting that its final result would necessarily be a division of the "Solid South" as well as of the "Solid West," and hence a complete re-alignment of both parties. Whatever charges prejudice may prefer against men who are governed in politics by such motives, that of being "narrow partisans," "sectionalists" or "mere specialists" will not be entertained against them at the bar of history.

Taking Mr. Bland as the strongest and most effective representative among public men of the great forces, compelling the world-wide movement in which the United States are a factor at the opening of the twentieth century, it is the duty of every American to understand him and the popular impulses back of him.

Especially is it the duty of his opponents, for if in their advocacy of their own political and economic ideas they misunderstand and underestimate his meaning, it will be at their own risk. All the forces of steam and electricity which made the vast region west of the Mississippi a factor in the civilization of the world, were factors in the work to which Mr. Bland devoted himself as the representative of the rights and of the power of the "direct producer." When in the United States, the party of "property rights" and that of "manhood rights" are opposed with no more

evidence of mere sectionalism than appeared in the struggle between Henry Clay of Kentucky and Andrew Jackson of Tennessee as party leaders, it will be understood by those who take the trouble to understand politics at all, that this was the consummation of Mr. Bland's life work and the necessary result of his economic principles.

To study the conditions under which he worked, the forces he represented, the people for whom he strove, the struggle for mastery between class and class, the slow development of the high purposes, by which individual purposes, if they be antagonistic to progress, are overruled—this and not eulogy or mere partisanship is the governing motive of the present volume. Mr. Bland will speak for himself in his public speeches and in the history of his connection with coinage legislation prepared by himself and found among his papers. The material for the study of his private life has been contributed chiefly by his widow, Mrs. Virginia E. Bland, and by his intimate friends and associates, but I wish to express my obligation to public men in all parties who have responded to my request for reminiscences of his connection with the great events in which some of them were his opponents. I hoped in undertaking the work of preparing this volume to make such a study of the governing realities of the history of the last quarter of the nineteenth century as might be valuable to students of public affairs for at least the first quarter of the twentieth. If this were too bold a hope for any one working under my limitations, I can feel at least that the idea itself has in it too much inherent worth to be discredited by even the most inadequate attempt to realize its possibilities.

W. V. B.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

## CHAPTER I.

Western Leadership in the First and Last Quarters of the Nineteenth Century.—The Flux and Reflux of Civilization.—The Individualism of the Plain American and the Spirit of Progress.—Culture and Degeneracy in Reactionary or Stationary Communities.—The Impulses of Progress as they Operate Through Representative Men Upward from the Undegenerate Mass.—Western Conditions and Impulses as Benton Represented Them.—European Atavism and Degeneracy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.—Jackson and Benton as Factors in Political Revolution and Advance.—Sensual Neurosis and Political Convulsion.—The Moral Advance Represented by the Individual Character and Life of Bland.

---

## CHAPTER II.

“There is the East—there is India.”—Benton’s Prevision of the Results of Opening the Trans-Mississippi West.—Benton and Bland as Vehicles of World-Moving Ideas.—The Constructive Impulses of the People Greater than the Destructive forces of Civil War.—Bland as a representative of the Meaning of the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century.—Western America and Europe.—American Plowmen and American Railroads against Malthus.—The Nineteenth Century and the Future.—Bland as a Transmitter of Popular Impulses.—The Feudalism of Land and of Corporations.—The New England Village and The Virginia Estate in Sociology.

---

## CHAPTER III.

The Aristocracy of Land and the Oligarchy of Trade Against the Liberty and Development of the Individual.—John Randolph on Manhood Suffrage.—The American Ideal of Decentralization.—Its Precedents in Athens, Venice and in England under Elizabeth.—New England and Virginia of the Eighteenth Century.—Government Under the Highest Possible Civilization.—Government for the Control of the Producer by Distributors or Non-Producers.—Its Operations During a Century of American Politics.—The Tu Quoque Struggle Between Holders of Corporation Privilege and Agricultural Producers Using Slave Labor.—From Benton and Jackson to General Benjamin F. Butler.—Diversion and Change of Subject in Politics.



## CHAPTER IV.

Moral Insanity and Intellectual Disturbance on the Battle Field and in Politics.—The Spirit of Civilization and the Theory that Trade is War.—The American Idea of the Last Quarter of the Eighteenth Century as it Inspired Europe in 1848. The Rally of Toryism and the Coup d'Etat.—The Crimean War and the Growth of Reaction.—D'Israeli and the Dealers in War Debts.—Growth of Imperialism From the Coup d'Etat to the End of the Century.—Hedonism of the Militant and Speculative Classes.—Bland's Higher Education.

## CHAPTER V.

Expansion and Imperialism under the First Grant Administration.—A Strong Government with Imperial Power to Annex and Govern Weaker Peoples Proposed for the United States by International Financiers.—Their Objective Point the Perpetuation and Increase of the War Debt and the Control of a Currency of Corporation Paper Based On It.—The Moral and Intellectual Habits of General Grant.—Weaknesses Which He Struggled to Master.—His Heroism at Mount MacGregor Not Developed by the Politics of His Administration.—General Taylor on the Depraved Morals Created by Civil War.—The Constitution as a Bit of Old Parchment.—Abandoned Men and Lost Women as Factors in Government.—General Benjamin F. Butler as a Representative of the Power to Control Men Through Their Own Evil.—Worship of the "Anglo-Saxon Race" as a Moloch.—The Inferno of Which the First Expansion Movement was a Symptom.—The Demonetization of Silver Effected as a Result of It.

## CHAPTER VI.

The Gold Conspiracy and Black Friday.—Banker Henry Clews Describes the Means Used to Control General Grant.—Champagne and a Pleasure Party.—The Treasury as a Factor in Speculation.—The Rothschilds in American Politics.—The Belmonts as their Agents and Representatives.—Capitalizing a Revolution.—The Isthmian Canal Speculation Under Grant and its Connection with Coercive Expansion.—The Imperialistic Plot Against Puerto Rico, San Domingo and Cuba.—Orville Babcock as an Envoy Extraordinary.—History Which Repeated Itself Under the McKinley Administration.—The Liberty of the Innocent Against the Safety of the Guilty.—The Governing Motive of Civilization.—Blaine on Civil Rights.—Plutocracy as an Insanity.—The Law of Perfect Liberty.—Thurman, Bland, Greeley and Sumner.—Government by Garrison.—Lord Kitchener and His College at Khartoum.—The Civilization of Southern Negroes and the Anglo-Saxonism of Fraudulent Bondholders.—International Plutocracy and Murder as a Fine Art.

## CHAPTER VII.

Thurman and Sumner Against "The Man on Horseback." The Attempt to Align the South for Imperialism Fails.—The Ideas Represented by Greeley and Bland Against the Forces Behind Grant and Longstreet.—The Work of Thurman and Black in Checking Imperial Centralization of Power Prepares the way for Bland.—The Liberal Republican and Democratic Fusion Movement of 1872 Against Militarism Draws Bland into Politics.—How he came to be Nominated for Congress.—The Influence of a Missouri Fence Corner in Shaping the Course of International Politics.

---

## CHAPTER VIII.

The Superiority of "Business" to Party.—Plutocratic Attempts to Provide Issues for Both Parties.—The Object of "Expansion" Under Grant Accomplished in the Demonetization of Silver and the Control of the Currency.—Sumner Denounces Imperialism and Forces an Open Debate on the Annexation of the West Indies.—"A Dance of Blood" Proposed by the Speculative and Non-Productive Classes.—How History Repeated Itself in 1898.—General Grant's Arguments for Imperialism Used Against Bland by Imperialists in Missouri.—Thurman's Speech Against "Expansion."

---

## CHAPTER IX.

The Republican Party Revolutionized under Grant.—Sumner is Driven out of it.—Seward, Greeley and Sumner Die Heart-Broken.—Blaine's Tribute to Sumner.—The use of Subconscious Memory in Politics.—Militant Commercialism Called to Account for the Fall of Seward, Sumner and Greeley.

---

## CHAPTER X.

The Issue and Control of the Currency a Vital Prerogative of Sovereignty.—Benton Fails to Secure a Direct Issue with the Non-Productive Classes.—Abuses of the Control of the Currency by State Banks Flagrant.—Bland Renews Benton's Interrupted Work Against Corporation Sovereignty in the Issue of the Currency.—The Party of Commercial Imperialism in the United States and the Policies of Warren Hastings.—The Threat of the Fusillade as a Factor In Economic Discussion.—"Bluffing" as a Political Method in America.—Statesmanship and the Poker Habit.—The Realities of Hate and Passion Behind the Theatrical Threats of Professional Politicians.—Stirring the South to Resistance.—Bland and Alexander H. Stephens Consult on Means of Preventing an Outbreak.—Butler's Attack Answered at the South by Deep Disturbance.—Im-

morality in all Parties and in all Sections.—The Radicalism of Demagogues in the Black Belt.—International Commercialism and the Trade for the Control of the American Treasury.—Bland on Cox and Randall.

---

## CHAPTER XI.

Mr. Bland Describes the Struggle of the Democratic Minority Against the Force Bill and the Civil Rights Bill.—The Roll Call on a Motion to Adjourn as the Last Resort of Constitutional Government.—The Fight of 1875 in Congress to Control the Presidential Election of 1876.—The Scott Subsidy and the Attempt to Control Distribution through an Increase of Tariff Taxation.—The Senate allows the Force Bill to Fail.

---

## CHAPTER XII.

Mr. Bland Reviews his Own Connection with the Struggle for American Popular Control of American Mints and the American Treasury.—Currency Legislation from the Demonetization Act of 1873 to the Bankers' Panic and the Renewed Struggle for Demonetization in the Last Decade of the Century.—How "the Crime of 1873" was Perpetrated.—Mr. Bland Appointed to the Committee on Mines and Mining.—The Banks Bill and the First Sixteen-to-One Free Coinage Bill.—The Silver Commission of the Forty-Fourth Congress.—The Bland Free Coinage Bill and the Allison Amendment.—The Hayes Veto and the Votes of Messrs. McKinley, Carlisle and Others to pass the Bill over it.—The Demand of the Bondholders for the Privilege of Issuing and Controlling the Currency.—The London Bankers and their New York and Western Agents Raid the Treasury, Contract Credits and Compel Panic as a means of Securing a Currency of Corporation Notes for the Public and the Payment of their own Bonds in Gold.—England Demonetizes Silver in India to aid Them.—At the Parting of the Ways with Wall Street.—Mr. Bland Forces the Issues Which Compelled the Chicago Platform and the Campaign of 1896.—He Points out the only Possible Course for the Democratic Party in the Future.

---

## CHAPTER XIII.

The "Whirling Dervish of the Market" as a Factor in Public Affairs.—Henry Demarest Lloyd and Richard Brinsley Sheridan on the Speculative Use of the Coercive Power of Government.—"The Meanness of the Pedlar and the Profligacy of the Pirate."—Trade as War.—Commercial Use of the War-Making, Debt-Making and Tax-Levying Power of the People.—Can Selfishness be "Enlightened?"—The Question of Forcing Unselfishness by Law.—Socialism or Coerced Co-operation.—Bland as a Representative of Free Co-operation and Unrestricted Development.—Increasing Honesty and Liberality in Trade.—"Laissez Faire" as a

Policy of Unsundering Resistance to Restriction, Obstruction and Oppression.—The Foundation Principle of all True Political and Social Economy the Observance of the Right of Individual Growth and of Fuller Expansion for the Constructive Powers of Common Humanity.—Liberty Impossible for the Unjust.

---

## CHAPTER XIV.

Speculative Plutocracy from 1873 to 1893.—The "Whirling Dervish" as a Promoter of Panics.—The Gold Corner and "Black Friday" Panic Under Grant not an Isolated Incident.—Emotional Insanity as a Result of Moral Disturbance Due to the Speculative Habit.—Beginning of Trusts Under Grant.—The Standard Oil Trust.—Conservatism in Administration Under Hayes no Check to the Growth of Plutocracy.—The Attempt to Regulate the "Commune of Capital."—Use of the Law-Making Power by "Practical" Politicians to Blackmail Law-Breaking Corporations.—The Land Grabbing Spirit in its Relations to Speculative Monopoly.

---

## CHAPTER XV.

The Fundamental Principle of Plutocracy Manifested in Debt Inflation Accompanied by a Demand for a Contraction of the Supply of Cash Issued by Government.—Mr. Bland's Consistency.—Debt Inflation Described by Henry Clews.—Speculative Banks as Holders of Inflated Stocks and Bonds.—The Character of Fiske as Described by William Walter Phelps.—The Imperialistic Movement and the Demonetization of Silver in 1900 a Part of the Logic of What Fiske Represented.

---

## CHAPTER XVI.

Superiority of Plutocracy to Party Illustrated by Mr. Jay Gould.—He Demonstrates His "Soundness" by Opening His Safe.—Influence of New York Safe Deposit Vaults in Missouri Politics.—The Growth of Corporate Inflation Accompanied by an Increase of Irresponsibility in Politics.—Banks, Railroads and Boards of Trade as Necessary Agencies of Civilization.—Production and Distribution the Legitimate Ends of all Business Activity.—Result of the Speculative Spirit in Missouri Politics.—The Attempt of Gambling and Railroad Rings to get Something for Nothing. Regulation of Railroad Rates Accompanied by a Complete Absence of Regulation for the Power to Issue Stocks and Bonds Against the Credit of General Business.—Rings and the Ruthlessness of Speculative Politics.—Abuse of the Courts Against the People.

## CHAPTER XVII.

The Democratic Party in Missouri as Bland Represented it.—The Idea Which Has Given it Coherence and Efficiency.—The Only Motive Which Can Justify Men of Higher Intelligence in Taking Part in Politics.—Bland and the Courage of Leadership.—Frank P. Blair and His Pistols.—Bland's Steadfast Patience.—The Supreme Test of Fitness for Success.—Bland as the Type of the Highest Possibilities of Missouri Character.—The Military Idea in Missouri Politics.—Growth of Plutocratic Combinations.—Bland and the Transmississippi West Overthrow Malthusianism.—The Struggle for the Largest Possible Production and the Freest Possible Distribution.—Attempts of the Speculative Element to Control in Missouri.—Marmaduke's Epoch-making Stand for Principle.

---

## CHAPTER XVIII.

“Who Owns the West?”—The Beginnings of a Great Political Revolution.—Western Mortgages and the “Bloody Shirt.”—How Hon. John James Ingalls Retired From Public Life.—A Ten Dollar Fac-Simile and its Far-Reaching Sequences.—The Law of Maximum Production Against Oligarchic Restriction.—The Work of D. M. Grissom in Journalism Complementing that of Mr. Bland in Congress.—Non-Resident Ownership of Productive Bases.—The Centralization of Values and the Demand of Non-Residents for Political Control.

---

## CHAPTER XIX.

The Balance of Power in the Electoral College Passes to the Northwest.—Modifications of the Sectional Issue Which Had Been Forced by the Mexican Conquest.—Robert Toombs on the Domestic Consequences of Aggression Abroad.—The Sword as a Title to Territory.—Toombs and Stephens of Georgia Isolated Under Polk's Administration in their Attempt to Prevent Civil War.—Their Opposition to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.—Toombs Accepts War as an Inevitable Result of the Annexation of Mexican Territory and Becomes a Radical Secessionist in 1850.—The South Changes Front in 1889 and Abandons the Struggle for Sectional Equality in the Electoral College.—President Cleveland's First Administration as it Provoked Political Revolution.—“Expansion,” the Nicaragua Canal, the Annexation of the West Indies, and the Nullification of the Constitution as Discussed by Mr. E. V. Smalley in 1880.—Effect of the Civil War on Constitutional Interpretation.—The Republican Reaction Against Grant.—Mr. Cleveland as a Representative of the “Better Element.”

## CHAPTER XX.

The Fundamental Reality of American Politics.—International Combinations of Corporations and Maximum Coercion in America.—The Demand for Bonds as a Means of Endowing Families, Suspending the Natural Laws of Redistribution and Creating Hereditary Oligarchy.—Restraint of Trade by Tariff Laws not Earnestly Opposed Under the First Cleveland Administration.—No Vital Reform of Any Kind Possible While the Electoral College Represented Civil War Sectionalism.—President Harrison as a More Extreme Federalist than Mr. Cleveland.—His Mistake of Judgment in Proposing New Measures of Coercion Against Southern Planters While Western Farmers Were Using Unmarketable Breadstuffs for Fuel.—“Cheap Money,” Dear Collateral, and Wasted Wealth.—Speculation in Money at the Expense of Agricultural Exports.—Enormous Interest Rates on Call Loans During the “Crop Moving Season.”—The “Calamity Howl,” Its Causes and Its Results.

## CHAPTER XXI.

“The Rainbow Chasing Movement” Begins.—Its Object the Restoration of Constitutional Government Based on the Principles of 1788.—“Winning Without New York,” an Incident of It.—Mr. Cleveland’s Whig Policies Revive the “Fierce Democracy” of the Jackson Epoch.—Revolt Against Wade Hampton in South Carolina and Ingalls in Kansas.—The Northwest as the Hope of America Against “Floaters in Blocks of Five.”—Illinois as a Keystone State.—The Surrender of the Presidency to New York the Only means of Breaking the New York and Indiana Combination.—“The Coat and the Cloak” Both Given up Successfully In Practical Politics.—Results of Forcing Issues for Principle.—Henry George and His Supporters Reinforce Mr. Bland on the “Farm Mortgage Census.”—The Issue in Illinois.—“Rainbow Chasers” Not Prejudiced Against Mr. Cleveland or New York.

## CHAPTER XXII.

Mr. Cleveland’s Second Term.—His Attempt to “Restore the Hegemony of New York” Forces His Party to Repudiate Him.—He Defeats Tariff Reform by Supplanting it With a Manufactured Issue Against Bimetallic Coinage.—Mr. Cleveland’s Thoroughgoing Whiggery and His Dislike of the Vulgus.—He Attempts to Isolate Mr. Bland in Missouri.—How a National Combination Was Broken by the Assault of a Single Newspaper.—Mr. Bland Boomed for President in Missouri.—Mr. Cleveland’s Missouri Supporters in Congress Driven to Cover.—Bland Defeats the Oates Bankruptcy Bill.—The Real Meaning of “Tariff Reform” as Mr. Cleveland Represented It.—He and His Friends



Dictate the Protectionist Plank in the Report of the Platform Committee at Chicago in 1892.—It is Rejected by the Convention.—The Standard Oil Company, the Sugar Trust and the Banks as a Political Combination.—Federalism and the Illinois Strike.

---

### CHAPTER XXIII.

The Financial Policies of Plutocracy and John Law as Their Prophet.—Turgot and Quesnay as Representatives of Sanity and the Principles of Progress.—Mr. Bland's Work Justified by the Strictest Standard of Turgot.—"Hands Off! Let the World Move!"—The Bankers' Panic and Its Causes.—The Tendency to Maximum Production as a Law of Nature and the Fact of Minimum Distribution as a Result of Plutocratic Oligarchy.—Political Economy in Its Last Analysis.—Vest on the Sherman Anti-Trust Law as Humbug.—"Frying Out the Fat" of Lawbreaking Combinations.—Trusts in no Danger From the Collectors of Campaign Funds.—Mills and Factories Closed by Restriction and Under-Distribution.—Necessary Collapse of Restrictive Systems in the Presence of Natural Maximum Production.

---

### CHAPTER XXIV.

"The Right Thing from the Right Man at the Right Time" as the Decisive Factor in History Making.—Mr. Bland Writes a Letter and Sees a Reporter.—Who Shall Bolt: Bland or Cleveland?—Why and How Mr. Cleveland Was Induced to Bolt.—He Himself Forces 16 to 1 Coinage as an Unavoidable Issue.—His Objections to Being "Elected Without New York" in 1892.—His View of "Rainbow Chasing" as Sectional and Dangerous.—Mr. Bland Consummates the Work of the Rainbow Chasers With an Interview Defining the Vital Issues of the Chicago Platform.—The Stand Made Against International Control of the American Treasury Forces the Republican Party to a Change of Base in 1896 and to Open Alliance With English Imperialists in 1898.

---

### CHAPTER XXV.

Bland as a Leader of a Forlorn Hope.—Forced into the Presidential Contest as the Only Man on Whom the Democratic Party Could Reorganize.—His Candidacy a Matter of Duty.—His Nomination not Expected on Account of His Residence in a Former Slave State.—Popular Demonstrations During His Lecturing Tour.—Missouri Conventions at Pertle Springs and at Sedalia.—Formation of Bland Clubs in Missouri.—His Attitude Towards the Presidency.—Falsity of Assertions that He Was "the Victim of Treachery" at Chicago.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

The Chicago Platform Against a Corporation Currency and Federal Invasion of the Province of the States.—These Sections Forced by Mr. Cleveland's Attempt to Undo the Results of the Campaign of 1892 so as to Restore the New York-Indiana Balance of Power.—Great Determination Shown by Mr. Cleveland in This Attempt.—Cleveland and Bayard Compared.—Bayard an Anti-Federalist.—The Democratic Party at its Last Gasp When Restored by the Chicago Platform.—The Balloting for President at Chicago.—Mr. Sewall as a Compromise on the Platform.—The Action of the Convention Deliberate.

---

## CHAPTER XXVII.

Charles A. Dana on Bland as the Only Statesman in the American Public Life of the Last Quarter of the Century.—Contrast Between Bland's Manners and Those of Fashionable New York.—He Visits New York with Mr. Bryan in 1896.—Conditions Existing in New York at That Time.—Great Intellectual and Defective Moral Force in the New York Governing Class.—Solidarity of Wealth in 1896.—Starvation in the Presence of Undistributed Fruit and Breadstuffs.—Foreign Dictation in New York Politics.—Will the City be Forced to the Second Place?—Its Possibilities of Progress.—Its System of Free Co-Operation Probably the Best in the World.

---

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

Mr. Bland's Years of Greatest Achievement.—The Climax of a Great Career Comes in 1898.—His Stand Against Imperialism.—The Spanish War Used to Turn the Flank of Chicago Platform Democracy so as to Demonetize Silver.—Issues Precipitated by the Teller Resolution.—Sanford B. Dole as the Agent of the Imperialistic Movement.—The Hawaiian Government Employs Sub-Agents to Attack Mr. Bland's Rear.—Hawaii and Cuba Discussed Before the Spanish War.—Far-Reaching Influence of the Standard Oil Company and the "Sugar Trust."—The Attempt to Shape the Policies of Both Parties so as to Prevent an Issue Against Imperialism.—Mr. Bland Forces Open Fighting.

---

## CHAPTER XXIX.

The Spanish War as a War for the Suppression of the Cuban Republic.—Mr. Bland Forces Issues With President McKinley and Compels Him to go on Record.—Recognition of the Cuban Republic Openly Opposed by the Administration.—



Its Anxiety to Begin War Leads it to Fire on Merchant Vessels Before War is Declared.—“A War for Humanity” Converted into a Movement for Imperialism.—Failure of an Attempt to Turn Missouri Democrats Against Mr. Bland.—The Flag of the Cuban Republic Torn Down at San Luis.—Open Declaration of the Plan to Suppress the Cuban Republic by Garrison Government.—Benevolent Assimilation in the Philippines.—What the Flag Meant for Mr. Bland.—His Work for Higher Civilization Finished.

---

## CHAPTER XXX.

Mr. Bland's Early Home in Kentucky.—The Stock From Which He Sprang.—His Life as an Orphan Boy on a Farm.—At the Plow in Summer and at School in Winter.—He Emigrates to Missouri and to California.—His Life in the Mines.—Cooking and Washing for Orphan Children.—He Studies Law and Returns to Missouri.—His Characteristics as a Lawyer.—His Work Before Election Boards Under the Drake Constitution.—Judge C. C. Bland's Reminiscences of His Mother.

---

## CHAPTER XXXI.

Mr. Bland's Boyhood in Kentucky.—Mrs. Bland Investigates and Interviews His Kinsfolk and Old Neighbors.—Shorthand Report of an Interview Between Mrs. Bland and Mr. Bland's Uncle, Mr. Frank Nall, of Ohio County, Kentucky.—How Mr. Bland Got His Characteristics.—His Truthfulness as a Boy.—The Fights He Was Forced Into.—He is Tempted to Become a Preacher.—Stops Driving Oxen and Decides to use His Intellect.—The Use of Beech Limbs by His School-Master.—The Questions He Debated as a Boy.—His First Speech and the Reputation it Made Him.—Life on No Creek in the Days of Henry Clay.

---

## CHAPTER XXXII.

### MRS. BLAND'S REMINISCENCES—I.

Mrs. Bland Writes Her Reminiscences of Mr. Bland's Home Life.—Their First Meeting When She Was a Schoolgirl.—Mr. Bland as a Confirmed Old Bachelor in Love for the Second Time.—He Tells Mrs. Bland of His Romance at Nineteen.—The Girl in White Apron and Sun Bonnet Who Died After Marrying to Please Her Parents.—Mr. Bland Corresponds With Mrs. B.'s Father.—The Story of a Threatened Elopement.—At Washington Under Grant.—Southern Pianos as Presents.—Mr. Bland's Love of Children.—His Domestic Habits.—Sitting up all Night on His Last Night in Congress.—His Last Illness and Death.

## CHAPTER XXXIII

## MRS. BLAND'S REMINISCENCES.—II.

Mr. Bland's First Speech in Congress and the Piute War.—He Favors Impeaching Grant.—Disappointed at Cleveland's Defeat in 1888.—Crisp's Defection From Bimetallism.—"Those Whom They Can't Bribe They Get Drunk."—Mills Begs Support and Sheds Tears.—Cleveland's Second Administration.—Alarm Over the Coxe Army.—Closets Filled With Loaded Rifles.—Clubs and Government Grass.—Mr. Bland's Indignation.—Mr. Bland's Lecture Tour in the West.—His Acquaintance With Mark Twain.—The Chicago Convention.—What He Said During its Progress.—His Trip to the East and His Visit to Mr. McKinley.—His Logical Mind and His Faculty of Foresight.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

## THE FINAL WORD.

This Volume as a Prophecy of Progress.—Evolution a Slow Growth.—Intellectual Development Dependent on Moral.—The Sense of Justice Mr. Bland Represented.—No Justice Without Freedom, No Freedom Without Justice.—The Sympathy of Genius for Universal Aspiration.—Political Economy and the Law of Kindness.—The Greatest Development of Civilization Still in the Future.

# SPEECHES

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## COLONIAL IMPERIALISM AND THE SPANISH WARS.

(Complete Text from the Official Report of the Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives, June 13, 1898, the House Having Under Consideration the Joint Resolution—H. Res. 259—to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.)

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## ENGLISH PLUTOCRACY AND THE LIBERTIES OF THE WORLD

(Mr. Bland's Last Speech in Congress, Delivered in the House of Representatives on the Army Reorganization Bill, January 30, 1899).

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## IN FAVOR OF LIBERTY FOR ALL MEN.

(Peroration of a Fourth of July Address, Delivered at Lebanon, Missouri, in 1873).

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## "THE PARTING OF THE WAYS."

(Delivered in the House of Representatives Saturday, August 12, 1893, in Protest Against the Bill—H. R. 1—to Repeal a Part of an Act Approved July 4, 1890, entitled "An Act Directing the Purchase of Silver Bullion and the Issue of Treasury Notes Thereon and for Other Purposes.")

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## GOVERNMENT BY INJUNCTION AS A MODE OF IMPERIALISM.

(Delivered in the House of Representatives, July 16, 1894, Against a Resolution Endorsing the Cleveland Administration.)

## A STAND IN TIME OF PANIC.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives Supporting a Motion to Strike out the Enacting Clause of the Oates Bankruptcy Bill.—Dec. 8, 1893.)

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## EUROPEAN CONTROL AT WASHINGTON.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, March 31, 1897.)

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ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION DUE TO ARBITRARY  
POWER AND CIVIL WAR.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, June 25, 1882.)

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## AGAINST BUREAUCRATIC PRIVILEGE.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, June 25, 1882, Opposing a Civil Pension Bill.)

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## FRAUD AND FORCE IN GOVERNMENT.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, January 26, 1877.)

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AGAINST CERNUSCHI AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVEN-  
TION IN AMERICA.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, April 7, 1886.)

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## MAKESHIFTS AND COMPROMISES.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, January 8, 1895.)

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## LAWS TO PROTECT THE STRONG AGAINST THE WEAK.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, January 25, 1883.)

## STOCK JOBBING CONTROL OF THE TREASURY.

(From a Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives, February 25, 1893.)

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## AGAINST BANK NOTES AND FIAT PAPER.

(From a Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives, June 22, 1882.)

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## BIMETALLISM AND BONDED DEBT.

(Delivered in the House of Representatives, January 31, 1898, in Support of a Resolution (Concurrent Resolution No. 22) Declaring all bonds of the United States Payable in Gold or Silver at the Government's Option and that to Restore the Coinage of Silver is not in Derogation of the Rights of Public Creditors.)

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## EVILS OF USING CORPORATION NOTES AS MONEY.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, May 13, 1882, on the Bill to Enable National Banks to Extend their Corporate Existence.)

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## THE DEBT PAYING POWER OF WESTERN PRODUCTS.

(An Address to the Senate Committee on Finance, Delivered in 1897, to a Delegation of New York Bankers.)

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## MASONRY AND ITS SECRET CHARITIES.

(From an Address on Masonry Delivered at Lebanon, Mo., June 24, 1870.)



# AN AMERICAN COMMONER

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## CHAPTER I.

Western Leadership in the First and Last Quarters of the Nineteenth Century.—The Flux and Reflux of Civilization.—The Individualism of the Plain American and the Spirit of Progress.—Culture and Degeneracy in Reactionary or Stationary Communities.—The Impulses of Progress as they Operate Through Representative Men Upward from the Undegenerate Mass.—Western Conditions and Impulses as Benton Represented Them.—European Atavism and Degeneracy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.—Jackson and Benton as Factors in Political Revolution and Advance.—Sensual Neurosis and Political Convulsion.—The Moral Advance Represented by the Individual Character and Life of Bland.



IN THE first quarter of the nineteenth century, as in the last, the west asserted its power in the union unexpectedly and decisively. In each case the disturbance of existing commercial and economic conditions resulting was followed by temporary political reaction, but study of the forces which make disturbance unavoidable will leave no room for doubt that in its effects both of flux and reflux the change was a necessary incident of progress.

From the admission of Missouri in 1821, until Mr. Bland's death in 1899, the strong individuality with which its people supported their own governing principles, gave the state a decisive influence in the gravest crises of American history.

To be able to see how closely this individuality approximated in its manifestations the civilizing forces of the world at large and, even at the expense of self-satisfaction, to understand clearly its lines of divergence, is to be better able to understand the Americanism of the nineteenth century than has been possible while the spirit which resulted in and emanated from the Civil war has hampered the logical processes of the American intellect.

Nothing is so valuable as knowledge of reality. No other knowledge is permanently valuable without it. The extent to which the human mind is capable of deceiving itself or satisfying itself with knowledge of phenomena, the better to avoid the temporary discomfort of recognizing the vital truths of progress, is only less remarkable than the extent of the power it is capable of exerting when once inspired by the consciousness that it has become the vehicle of some truth necessary for the world's advancement.

All that is heroic in the character of the typical American has been the result of such a consciousness. The motto on the great seal of the United States: "*Novus Ordo Saeclorum*" was inspired by the sublime hope which made the first quarter of the nineteenth century in America one of the most memorable periods in the history of the world. The most illiterate axeman of western pioneer civilization had in him the consciousness that he was a part of a force which he believed was to regenerate the world. Samuel Houston, reading Homer by the firelight in a Tennessee cabin and so preparing himself for leadership at San Jacinto, had in him at once the sublimity of the American ideal and its incongruity with existing facts. Bred among the Cherokees, skilled in the craft both of their savagery and of Caucasian civilization, proud, violent, revengeful, capable of the utmost degradation of alcoholic intoxication, he was capable nevertheless of becoming the vehicle of that great exterior force of progress through which humanity in the individual is ennobled and strengthened for the uplifting of humanity in the mass. Ideas, slowly gathering strength from century to century; having in them the cumulative power of the divine self-sacrifices of the martyrs of progress; made potent by the blood of the Rumbolds, the Vanes, the Sidneys of the vanguard of liberty, entered the souls of rude and common men, governed in their previous lives by the common impulses of merely animal humanity, and uplifted them to heights of self-sacrifice, of heroism, of leadership to which in their own right and by virtue of their own individualistic forces they were incapable even of aspiring.

It is a fact too vital to be left out of consideration, that in a most impor-



tant sense, civilization is an individual affair. It can come in the mass only as it comes in the individuals composing the mass. In individuals, it can come only as an evolution of that which is inherent in each of them—which is indeed the vital and essential part of individual existence. Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is heroic in the character of any man, whom we may study as the type of a family, a clan, a people or a race, is potentially a part of his nature and, as it is educated and evolved, it asserts itself as the potency of his nature. But from the beginning of recorded history, the evidence it offers is overwhelming that the brutal, the merely negative forces of human nature will tend always with cumulative power to prevent the development of the potential good in individual lives unless the individual desire to express it is vitalized by an extraneous force, which can be most conveniently characterized here as the spirit of civilization. Individuals, families, clans and peoples become permanently effective only as they are capable of responding in action to the impulses which this spirit gives them. It is not always most effective in communities where literature, art and science seem most advanced. Indeed it happens periodically that in such communities, the machinery of progress falls into the hands of a class of well-meaning people, who derive large revenues from modes of social organization they fear to have changed. This form of conservatism from which no section in the United States, and no part of the world has been free in the past, explains why in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the forces of progress can be seen operating with full energy only in those parts of America where social organization was as yet inchoate. Men who were incapable of appreciating the niceties of the art, the literature, the philosophy of the European civilization of the time of Madame de Maintenon or Madame Pompadour—men who spelled inaccurately, whose literary education had depended on the Bible and Plutarch's Lives, men born in cabins and swaddled in homespun, were yet capable of advancing the guidons of civilization and of holding the van of progress under the hottest fire of reaction.

It is the law of progress in all times and countries that it must depend on such men in every supreme crisis. Every considerable advance in culture is necessarily accompanied by an increase in the means of gratifying luxurious intellectual and animal appetites. With every high development of the merely intellectual and esthetic side of human nature, we must have also its concomitant of moral and intellectual degeneracy, which must finally vitiate the governing motives of social organization in every community in which material progress and esthetic development are reckoned on the one hand or the other, as the highest good.

When this point has been reached, the hope of higher civilization lies in the common humanity of the race, which, if rude and undeveloped, is unspoiled by the customs of those who have committed what for communities, peoples and races is the unpardonable sin of so abusing the opportunities given by the highest development as to impel themselves backward towards the moral plane of primitive brutality.

It would be misleading to assert and unscientific to suppose that even in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the west was free from individual degeneracy. It was frequently and strikingly illustrated, as in the case of men of high esthetic development who left civilization in disgust, to lead the life of trappers on the frontier, or even of "renegades" and "squaw-men" among the Indians. This seemingly hopeless reaction operated in such cases as the final test of ability to survive under the only conditions for which such natures had become morally fit. We see everywhere in history, this process of regeneration for the individual degenerates of stationary or reactionary communities. In every great period of disturbance which impels men to abandon levels, either higher or lower than that for which they are fit, the same mercifully beneficent law operates inflexibly to save all who, in spite of degeneracy, have in them elements of fitness for survival.

The primitive west necessarily attracted individuals of this class and necessarily regenerated to a greater or less extent such of them as it did not

obliterate. But they were never typical of its pioneer class; nor, either in their sins or their still surviving virtues, did they stand at any time for what the west has stood for in the history of the nineteenth century—the irresistible evolutionary forces of development in a people, moved consciously by the animating power of an ideal higher than the highest civilization the world has ever attained.

Taking Benton's work as the prophecy of Bland's, we can find suggestions in Benton himself of all the great strength of the popular ideal he represented and all the inevitable incongruity, individual and popular, between that ideal and the reality of the times.

Believing theoretically in the right of manhood to absolute freedom, hating aristocracy with all the force of his intellect, Benton was in actual life as much an aristocrat of the militant type as any German grand-duke of the period of the hundred years war or as any sachem among the Indian tribes of New England and Virginia in the eighteenth century. Himself, indeed, as it has been said of him, "lofty and sour to those who loved him not," he rejected absolutely in set terms as emphatic as he could make them—and in the fullest good faith—the theory that superior intellect superior birth, superior wealth, superior goodness, superior advantages of any kind whatever, can give any man, any community, any people the right to dominate any other. Holding this through life, he not only defended slavery as an existing institution but held himself ready to challenge and shoot in a duel any one who with an approximation to his own overbearing habits of intellect, should assert against him opposing opinions on any subject whatever.

In this he was not singular, but typical. We find exactly the same habits of mind illustrated in the most notable and characteristic acts of Andrew Jackson's public career as they were in his private life. It was because he and Benton were men of strong individuality and at the same time fully representative of the best popular impulses of their times that they could feel no sense of inconsistency between professions which repre-

sented their deepest beliefs, their highest hopes, and practices which expressed the effect on their individual lives of the temporary conditions through which their world was passing. Whether they were shooting at each other in Nashville or working together in complete harmony at Washington for the overthrow of the United States bank, Benton and Jackson were equally sincere and equally representative of the popular spirit of the west of their times.

Convinced that all men ought to be free at any cost and hating despots with all the force of his strenuous nature, Jackson's confirmed habit of attempting to punish patriotically as enemies of America and of mankind all who ventured to oppose him, laid him constantly open to attacks from Clay, Webster and Calhoun as being himself a despot of the most aggressive type. He could never have realized the possibility of truth in such attacks, if for no other reason than that he was debarred from doing so by the completeness of his realization that the power he exercised was not used in his own right but as the representative of the masses of the people who loved him because they saw in him not only their strength but the faults which condemned them individually to social and political inferiority—permanent always, in America as elsewhere, except as those who can not themselves overcome it, can create some leader strong enough to represent their cumulative force.

Such leaders were Jackson and Benton in the west of the first half of the century. Such a leader was Bland under the less primitive conditions of its last quarter.

Between the moral character of Benton and Bland there is neither occasion nor room for comparison. Bland represented not only in his theories, but in the actual average of his private and public life a civilization higher than his times. By virtue of his individual moral force, he will finally become a factor in civilization more energizing than Benton ever has been or ever can be. But it is with the study of the times rather than of the men created by them, that we must first concern ourselves in order to be

able to understand the work of leaders or the generations which produce them.

We ought not to shrink from the fact that in Benton's time the "upper classes" in the west were characterized by both the militancy and the land-hunger of the sixteenth century. Great bodies of western land had been distributed on what was identical in principle with the feudal system of rewarding military service with land titles. The legal difference consisted chiefly in the fact that such titles in the nineteenth century were forfeitable to the sovereign power only for non-payment of taxes and not as in the middle ages for failure to respond when called on for militia service. No able-bodied landholder of military age could have lived an endurable life in the west, however, had he refused to respond to such a call in 1812 without an obviously sufficient disability. Threatened both by the savagery of primitive America and the forces of the higher social organization of Europe, the west of that day was intensely militant. Democratic in theories and social customs, the states of the west, at the time when Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri constituted it, were dominated politically by a military aristocracy consisting chiefly of intensely democratic militia colonels. The impulses of the merely civil order were represented politically, as far as they were represented at all, by lawyers, who found themselves, unable to keep standing room in politics except as they were able to reenforce their civilianism by military titles. Jefferson who hated snakes and professional soldiers with impartiality was the idol of the Seviars, the Bentons and Jacksons who thought no more of exchanging shots in political rivalry than the Launcelots of the mediaeval phase of the same social condition did of breaking a spear for honor and amusement on meeting at the cross roads. From such social conditions we must expect all the inconsistencies of incomplete self-consciousness. Sometimes such inconsistencies will be ludicrous and often they will be painful as they force themselves on the notice of those who have shared them. But with them, and often operative through them, we have the



greatest force of civilization always at work—the courage which comes from the inspiration of some great world-idea, capable of overcoming individual inertia and of supplanting individual selfishness with devotion, not merely to country but to humanity.

This courage in America saved the modern world from reaction to worse than mediaeval conditions. The Puritan revolution in England, although in the minds of such men as Pym, Vane, and Hampden it stood for the beneficence of high and constructive ideas, became a mere negation, and when Richard Cromwell succeeded to the protectorate, its negative quality was fully apparent. The reaction which followed influenced the civilization of the world indescribably for the worse. The “better elements” of English society, including the ecclesiastical machinery of the political church became not merely corrupt but depraved. The virtue of women and the honor of men was equally vendible and equally cheap. Sensuality, complete and bestial, in the typical individual of the governing class, was accompanied, as it invariably is, by increasing readiness to resort to violence as a mode of government and by insensibility to the sufferings of its victims. The morals which degenerate Rome had borrowed from fallen Greece—which Greece in its turn had assimilated for its ruin from the ninth circle of the hell of Asiatic vice, appeared in England and worked beneath the surface of aristocratic society until it was putrid. Bestial drunkenness, habitual even among typical representatives of the political ecclesiasticism of the period, was one of the least shameful of the vices which characterized the degeneracy of the times. Aristocratic England, and the aristocratic Europe of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries prepared the way thus for the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars—which except for such a preparation would have been impossible and too completely illogical to be conceivable.

As a result of the chaos in Europe, growing out of the Napoleonic wars, Louisiana, a territory including Missouri, was added to the domain of the United States. An immediate revolution was thus effected in Amer-

ican political conditions, but in spite of one more inconsistency added to those which already impeded the intellectual operations of American thinkers and idealists, the high and noble theory of liberty which saved the nineteenth century world from the atavism of the second half of the seventeenth was not abandoned. The degeneracy of the aristocratic classes of England and of Continental Europe, emboldened American Democrats to declare the hopelessness of improving the world through government by "the better element," and nowhere was this declaration made with greater faith in its inherent truth than in the Missouri of the third decade of the nineteenth century. This was the beginning of the "Jacksonian" epoch in American history—a period of revolutionary change not less far-reaching than that which has followed the Civil war.

Except for the Louisiana purchase and the admission of Missouri, the Jacksonian epoch might have been impossible, but it is probable that it would have been long postponed and the country might have passed through it as a period of slow and imperceptible change. The admission of Missouri forced an immediate revolution in existing politics by giving the west a balance of power which until then had been exercised by the middle states of the Atlantic seaboard.

Under John Adams the west consisted only of Kentucky, admitted to the Electoral College in 1792, and Tennessee, admitted in 1796. Through Jefferson the Northwest Territory was added to the national domain, but on Jefferson's motion slavery was abolished in it and when Ohio, Indiana and Illinois were admitted as "free states," the existing equilibrium though obviously threatened was not disturbed. In 1824, however, when Jackson joined issues with John Quincy Adams, the west consisted of Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Missouri, lying together so as to form a solid block on the map of the new Union, which for more than two generations they were destined to control, for better or worse.

Drawn together by the community of interest incident to their situa-

tion, they were kept apart not only by the accidental persistence of slavery in Tennessee, Kentucky and Missouri, but still more by the divergence of habit between colonial New England and colonial Virginia; between habits derived by heredity from rural and village life in England, between the strong individualistic tendencies of the yeoman's life and the communal trend of the society shaped by town and village life. The Northwest Territory, settled in its southern counties from Virginia and further to the northward from New England, still shows as it must long show, the line of demarcation between the two civilizations. As an incident of the sectionalism of slavery at the south and of the extension of corporate privilege at the north, they ceased to be complementary the one to the other as it is natural that they should be, and became for the time being fiercely antagonistic. Had it been otherwise, the influence of this great block of states might have been sufficient to decide without struggle much of that which has been decided at a cost too great to be thought of without poignant and lasting regret. It is useless to regret, however, except as it enables us to understand, and the matter of greatest importance in the politics of our present and future, is to understand the governing forces by which the existing Union began to be controlled when it first came into existence. That as it now exists, it dates not from 1776, but from the Louisiana purchase, the conquest of California, the consequent repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the resulting surrender at Appomattox, needs only to be stated to be self-evident to every one whose attention to the isolated facts of American history has been sufficient to enable him to make a correct generalization.

Jefferson's idea that Missouri entered into the Union as a sovereign state, free to withdraw from it under the constitution as interpreted by the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, was comfortable to him intellectually and morally. It enabled him to rid himself of the repulsive thought that in buying the territory he was buying the people also. He could reassure himself against fears for his ideal by the thought that he had merely



purchased the liberty of the people of the territory from European despotism and that at their own discretion they were to form republics absolutely free, independent, self-governing and sovereign—in the Union or out of it. It was great comfort to him, no doubt, to denounce as “enemies of the human race” those who sought to “limit the sovereignty” of Missouri as those whom Mr. Bland opposed after the Spanish war sought to limit the sovereignty of Hawaii, Cuba and Puerto Rico. In his own mind Jefferson remained consistent with the theories of the Declaration of Independence to the end, but when the issue he foresaw in 1820 came on the admission of California and Kansas, it was evident that the logic of the facts was against the Union of sovereign states in which he believed and it was decided at Appomattox that such a Union never existed—that it never shall exist! The belief in it, however, was a factor in the history which was made when Missouri was admitted to the Union and it is too important to history to be overlooked—especially by those who wish to understand the intellectual attitude Mr. Bland retained through his political life from the time he opposed Grant in 1872 to the end when the same issues had recurred in 1898 with added emphasis.

Under Jackson when Calhoun, radically opposed to Jefferson on the fundamental principle of government by consent and denying openly that law, in order to be just must be representative, attempted to enforce the Jeffersonian hypothesis that the states were self-governing and sovereign, Jackson threatened to hang him as a traitor and by doing so, really decided that in 1861 the seceding states should be coerced back into the Union, that slavery should be abolished in 1863 without regard to its recognition by the constitution and that in 1866 the Union, north and south, should be reconstructed on the new basis which General Butler represented in 1872—not so much by what he advocated as legislation as by the realities of the political forces back of his almost unimaginable and frequently unintelligible astuteness.

The greatest crises in the history of the United States can not be fixed

by an exact date, but as far as it is possible to limit them so, they may be considered as reached (1) in 1776, when the Declaration of Independence was adopted; (2) in 1800, when the federalists were defeated by Jefferson on the issues of the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions against the Alien and Sedition Laws; (3) in 1828, when the west, represented by Jackson, with Benton as the premier of his policies, asserted its balance of power as a controlling force; (4) in 1872, when "original abolitionists" who actually believed in the principles of individual liberty through which the republican party had been first organized, rallied to defeat republican candidates who in their view represented the threat of imperialism and military government; and finally in the decade between 1890 and 1900 when the western states reasserted themselves more strongly than they had done since Jackson—thus preparing the way for the campaign of 1896, for the Spanish war and that new movement for imperialism and a closer assimilation of American and European institutions against which Bland contended when he opposed the coercion of Puerto Rico and military control in Cuba, with a view to its annexation.

These crises must be kept in mind and their relation to each other must be understood, if the work done by Mr. Bland and the times in which he did it are to be understood. In 1776, in 1800, in 1828, in 1860, in 1872 and again from 1890 to 1900, the real issue of politics was the control of the police power of the government as a means of controlling the supply of money and commodities. As the survival of the actual slave-ownership in America was incidental merely, and as it has been disposed of as a fact, it should be set aside except as it belongs to the merely phenomenal politics of the periods considered. From the time Wilberforce made his first speech against the Liverpool merchants who indorsed and eulogized the slave trade slavery was so obviously an anachronism in Europe and America that it can not now deserve to be treated as an actual economic condition. The permanent realities of our politics remained throughout the struggle over slavery exactly what they are still, what they always will be—the issue of

the extent to which the coercive power of the government through legislation enforceable by police and soldiery, should be used in controlling the supply of commodities and money.

Mr. Bland believed at all times in minimizing this coercive control and he so far represented the governing idea of a developing civilization in this belief that were the "Tu Quoque" argument not always available in politics, the twentieth century would have been inaugurated as was the nineteenth by some splendid and world-compelling triumph for the idea that civilization means the least possible coercion—that "the government is best which governs least"—that kindness, forbearance, reason, persuasion should be the mode of civilization rather than the cannon of the navy and the bayonets of the standing army.

What the "Tu Quoque" argument means, history shows when Missouri, with Benton in the Senate, asserted the demand of the west for popular control of the currency; for the issue of money only by government and for the least possible restriction by government of the supply of commodities.

The demand for the abolition of slavery became so pressing that under James K. Polk, issues were wholly changed and by the conquest of Mexican territory to be organized as slave states, the west was alienated from the support of the south in all that for which Benton and Jackson had stood. Considered merely as a piece of "practical politics," the "expansion" by the invasion of Mexico and the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was the worst blunder of modern times. It cost the ruin of the south, the disorganization of the Democratic party, and, for the direct producer of the south and west, the loss of the control of the economic policies of the federal government—which means everything. The nomination of Lewis Cass involved no recession from policies which necessitated disaster. Though it seemed to put the agricultural northwest at the front, giving it the balance of power which the west assumed under Jackson, it really did nothing more than make a false pretense at a time when hypocrisy was not only

futile but absurd. Cass was thrust aside, the issue on slavery recurred between north and south and the permanent realities of American politics did not reappear until, largely as a result of what Mr. Bland achieved and represented, the northwest took the lead against European policies in the last decade of the century.

That in the time of Bland as in that of Benton, the influence of the west was exerted to save the civilization of the world from reaction, becomes clear whenever an impartial and sufficiently thorough examination of the facts is made. But it does not follow that there is occasion either for boasting of the past or presumption in the future because of it. The western social life Benton represented had the supreme merit of being evolutionary, but the merciless extermination of the Indians, the immense quantities of alcohol used in trading and consumed by Caucasians during the pioneer period, and the habit of imperiousness which belongs to individualism educated through militancy, had on the class which controls conventions and decides what is or is not "practical politics" all the effects of a neurosis, subjecting them to the influence of sudden impulses of passion or appetite and operating as a disease of the will to cripple them in their usefulness as representatives of popular ideals and aspirations.

When we recall the fact that many of the speeches which did most to force the Civil war, were made by habitual drunkards or by men incapable at important crises of resisting the temptation to incapacitate their brains by overstimulation; when we look into the private life of men revered north and south almost as demigods, and see how their lack of self-control made them and the country which condoned their self-indulgence a victim of the wild and erratic gusts of disordered passion which belong to the pathology of nervous lesion from alcoholization, we need not be fanatical opponents of intemperance to appreciate how great has been the moral advance shown in the contrast between such lives and the even more completely representative life of Bland—a man who, though he had through life the unspoiled sensitive nerves of childhood, could work

waist-deep in water in the mines of the far west, live among desperadoes and Indians and finally spend a quarter of a century in the public life of a period of demoralized politics, retaining always the balance, the self-poise, the sobriety, the simplicity, the good judgment and the courage which are natural traits of undegenerate manhood.

Considering some periods of history, it is hard to escape the false conclusion that human life itself under its most favorable conditions is a disease. The latter half of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries was such a period in England and in Western Europe. The widespread habits of neurotic sensuality, showing itself most openly in an epidemic of alcoholism, had not exhausted its force in the first quarter of the nineteenth. The nervous stress incident to such crimes of violence as the Napoleonic wars inevitably perpetuated as an epidemic the habitual and diseased resort to alcoholic stimulation, and in America, related tendencies postponed the return to natural habits.

In the west, however, as early as the first decade of the nineteenth century, there was a strong reaction against the results of heredity from the degeneracy of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe. The "plain people" of the entire west, under the eloquence of preachers who scarcely less fiercely than Whitefield himself, warned them of the destructive effects of indulging reactionary impulses, were stirred to the depths of their natures by the desire for individual progress and for the uplifting of humanity. Moral purpose, always present as a latent force, developed in them until it called into play that for which the west has been most admirable even when its detractors have held it least admirable in everything else—the courage of individual initiative. For the people, for the race which develops this quality, and with it the rectitude of purpose which alone can make it effective, such individual initiative is the supreme virtue through which salvation comes in every great crisis where without it, reaction would be certain. This courage, this moral force, this heroic ability to advance singly and to stand unsupported for an ideal, higher than that of contemporary

moral and intellectual inertia, has always characterized the really representative American of all sections, but it has especially characterized the plain American of the unpretentious, unspoiled, unartificial type Bland so well represented in his public and private life.

The effect of such initiative, acting now with and now against the logic of events, we are about to study in attempting to get at the realities of the last quarter of the nineteenth century that we may be the better able to adapt our intellectual processes to the necessities of the twentieth.





WILLIAM McKINLEY.



GROVER CLEVELAND.



THOMAS A. HENDRICKS.



THOMAS B. REED.





## CHAPTER II.

"There is the East—there is India."—Benton's Prevision of the Results of Opening the Trans-Mississippi West.—Benton and Bland as Vehicles of World-Moving Ideas.—The Constructive Impulses of the People Greater than the Destructive forces of Civil War.—Bland as a representative of the Meaning of the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century.—Western America and Europe.—American Plowmen and American Railroads against Malthus.—The Nineteenth Century and the Future.—Bland as a Transmitter of Popular Impulses.—The Feudalism of Land and of Corporations.—The New England Village and The Virginia Estate in Sociology.



THE history of progress is a history of great ideas, taking hold on the minds of men and compelling them to action. In science, in art, in literature, in religion, in politics, the efficient man is always the man who has assimilated intellectually and morally, some great, slowly-developing truth which has grown from mind to mind and from century to century, compelling one generation after another to a more nearly complete consciousness of itself and of its relation to the world's future.

Such an idea, taking hold on the mind of Thomas H. Benton, compelled him to become one of the master forces of his generation, a prophet of the future of the Trans-Mississippi west and of its influence on civilization. In 1849, when the actual conditions of 1900 would have seemed incredible, had they been imaginable, Benton—his intellect quickened by his faith in the capacity of the masses for progress—pointed westward to the Rocky Mountains and exclaimed: "There is the East! There is India!" This sentence, which has been inscribed on the pedestal of his statue in St. Louis, was the most notable utterance of his life, and its importance appears when it is considered in its connection. Anticipating the results of opening the country west of the Mississippi River by railroads connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, Benton said:

"We live in extraordinary times and are called upon to elevate our-

selves to the grandeur of the occasion. Three and a half centuries ago the great Columbus, the man who was afterwards carried home in chains from the new world he had discovered—this great Columbus in the year 1492 departed from Europe to arrive at the east by going to the west. It was a sublime conception! He was in the line of success when the intervention of two continents, not dreamed of before, stopped his progress. Now in the nineteenth century, mechanical genius enables his great design to be fulfilled. In the beginning and in barbarous ages, the sea was a barrier to the intercourse of nations. It separated nations until mechanical genius invented the ship which converted the barrier into a facility. Then land and continents became an obstruction. The two Americas intervening have prevented Europe and Asia from communicating in a straight line. For three centuries and a half this obstacle has frustrated the grand design of Columbus. Now in our day mechanical genius has again triumphed over the obstacles of nature and converted into a facility what had long been an impassable obstacle. . . . A conveyance being invented which annihilates both time and space, we hold the intervening land! We hold the obstacle which stopped Columbus. We are in line between Europe and Asia. We have it in our power to remove that obstacle—to convert it into a facility for carrying him to his land of promise and of hope with a rapidity, a precision and a safety unknown to all ocean navigation. A king and queen started him upon this grand enterprise. It lies in the hands of a republic to complete it. It is in our hands—in the hands of the people of the United States of the first half of the nineteenth century. Let us raise ourselves up! Let us rise to the grandeur of the occasion! Let us complete the grand design of Columbus by putting Europe and Asia into communication—and that to our advantage, through the heart of our country! Let us give to his ships a continued course unknown to all former times! Let us make an iron road and make it from sea to sea, states and individuals making it east of the Mississippi and the nation making it west! Let us now in this convention rise above everything sectional, personal, local! Let us beseech the national legislature to build a great road upon the great line which unites Europe and Asia—the line which will find on our continent the Bay of San Francisco on one end, St. Louis in the middle and the great national metropolis and emporium on the other—a line which shall be adorned with its crowning honor—the colossal statue of the great Columbus whose design it accomplishes, hewn from the granite mass of a peak of the Rocky Mountains, the mountain itself the

pedestal and the statue a part of the mountain, pointing with outstretched arms to the western horizon and saying to the flying passengers: "There is the East! There is India!"

This is a definite and valid expression of the greatest and most beneficent thought that moved the American mind during the generation in which Benton was so conspicuous a figure. Since the beginning of the Republic, the American idea of peaceful progress, operating through justice and helpfulness to elevate the world, had moved no one more deeply than Benton must have been moved before it could have been possible for his mind to take such hold upon the deepest reality of his generation—the constructive thought which, in spite of the selfishness and spitefulness of merely negative politics, forced the world forward and gave the United States a far more compelling influence at the end of the century than could have been imaginable at the beginning.

To examine adequately the operations of this constructive thought, greater in itself than the mind of any man, of any people, of any race, is to become capable of ridding ourselves of the spirit of self-glorification on the one hand and antagonism and negation on the other. It is essentially the spirit of civilization and it operates through the intellect of individuals and of peoples; but no race, no people, no individual can represent it except through a governing sympathy with its essence of justice.

To learn from the consideration of our past how far as a people and as individuals we have been capable of representing the impulse of constructive justice is to have the clearest possible insight into the realities of our present and the possibilities of our future. This knowledge, inspiring and potent as it must be always to those who are willing to make a right use of it, can be attained in no other way so well as by an adequate understanding of the life of some really representative man who at the expense of all other qualities has been governed by a sense of justice, essentially inherent but evoked and made efficient by sympathy.

By the simplicity of his character; by his freedom from the feeling of

superiority which so hampered Benton; by his plainness and directness—above all by his personal goodness, Richard P. Bland became in his generation more thoroughly than any man had been in the generation which produced Benton, a representative of the power latent in such unspoiled manhood as that of the “embattled farmers” of Lexington and Concord, who in their day were workers of a revolution great enough to make possible the yet greater revolution in the economy of the world produced by the American workers of the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

The plowmen of the Trans-Mississippi west exerted in the year of Mr. Bland’s death an influence in the affairs of the world greater than that of all its standing armies and navies. Benton thought only of the influence of the west in realizing the idea of Columbus by bringing east and west together through a paradox by which the distance between them would be made a figure of speech. Bland as he represented the constructive impulses of the west, stood for the power which, through its own productiveness of food supplies had made possible in England the continuous increase in population which has demonstrated the falsity of the repulsive theory of Malthus that without war, plague, and famine to decimate the unfavored, the “favored classes” can not exist in comfort.

This increasing productiveness of the west, accompanied by similar results of development in South America, Australia, and Russia, is by far the most important fact of the nineteenth century. It forced to the defensive, not merely the aristocratic landholders of England, but the still more powerful class which controls the financial and commercial policies of the British Empire, of Europe, and finally of North and South America—as far as it is possible for North and South America to be controlled by the intelligence and skill of militant commercialism in Europe.

So great has been the ignorance of the realities of American politics necessarily produced by the passions of such a civil war as ours, that we have only begun to suspect the meaning of the constructive forces which have worked below the surface of our base and corrupting politics, to make

possible for the people of the United States and of the world, a fuller realization of their always limitless possibilities of efficiency and happiness.

The study of the conditions, and popular impulses which made Mr. Bland a force in national and international politics is so well worth while for the twentieth century that it may justly be called a fundamental requisite for the comprehension of whatever is comprehensible in the nineteenth. It ought to convince us that the origin of world-forces is in the people and that only through the utmost possible freedom of development for all the peoples of the world, can the world's highest possible civilization be attained. This was the idea which made Mr. Bland a representative man. If in studying its development we become capable of being moved as he was by a compelling sympathy for the weak in their longing for intellectual and moral strength; in their struggling; in their aspirations for calmness; in their hope of justice and their anxious expectation of liberty, then we may learn not merely to understand his actual significance in his generation, but to see the impulse which produced him clearly at work in the present as the controlling force of the future!

The middle ages produced in Europe generally and in England especially, two parallel developments of feudalism—that of privilege in land granted by the sovereign power and that of corporate organization employing certain delegated powers of the sovereign.

Both developments were a result of natural causes and both have operated as modes of progress. It is not possible here to define the limits beyond which they become reactionary, but dealing with them both as existing facts of the colonial civilization of the eighteenth century out of which grew the American conditions of the nineteenth, we can understand them as the causes which first defined the issues of division in our politics.

In New England during the eighteenth century, the village life of England gave its organizing impulse to society and shaped both political and commercial systems. In remote New England villages of the present day, we can still see the effects of this impulse in their almost communal



method of life. Individual ownership is rigidly established and maintained, but the dwelling houses are often built directly on the village street so that their front doors open on the outside world and establish with it the most direct and permanent connection possible. The training developed from such conditions favored organization as strongly as conditions in Virginia and the states settled from Virginia favored individual initiative—sometimes through organization, but often at the expense of it.

Virginia in the eighteenth century represented the landholding impulses which had governed the militant classes of England since the Norman conquest. Social standing was based on land and the desire for "broad acres" so dominated society that it was one of the controlling factors in the movement which settled the southwest and opened to civilization the vast territory acquired by the Louisiana purchase. The system, tending always to separate families by such distances between homesteads as necessarily minimize communal life, fostered the individual intellect at the expense of compact social organization. The result was the production of individual intellects superior to system and to circumstance—such intellects as that of Jefferson, who seeing in the desire for extensive holdings of land an obstacle to progress struck at the roots of the existing social order in Virginia by laws enacted to make effective his declaration that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."

He intended thus to prevent one generation from transmitting as a hereditary privilege the advantages conceded to its more efficient workers in order to make their efficiency possible. As far as landholding in Virginia and the states settled from it was concerned, he succeeded. Landholding under the conditions he forced was no longer a reliable vehicle for the transmission of class privilege or for conserving clan advantage. The feudal system of land tenure was destroyed in the house of its friends. Virginia sacrificed the possibilities of organizing the Union in the only way which could have perpetuated its peculiar social order. The colonial landholding class as the "estates of the realm" ceased to exist as a result of

Virginia leadership and little by little, privilege sought perpetuation through grants of the sovereign power, delegated for the purposes of corporate organization.

The Bland family in Virginia represented during colonial times the landholding idea and they developed under it the same marked individual character which showed itself in Washington, Jefferson and Edmund Randolph. Blands of the second generation after the revolution in social and economic conditions of Virginia produced by the Jeffersonian idea, found themselves in Kentucky—no longer with “baronial possessions” but with an approximation to such a farm as in the third generation Mr. Bland himself owned and tilled in Missouri. The Civil war having destroyed the last vestiges in America of the feudal system of agricultural production, Mr. Bland found himself a representative of the producer’s right to exist and to develop under conditions created by the vast, the unprecedented, the world-wide growth of co-operative organization through feudal grants perpetuated under the system which produced first the guilds of the middle ages, then the free cities of Flanders and Germany and finally the Hanse league as a prophecy of the modern East India and South African companies and of the contemporaneous use of the police and war-making powers of government for commercial purposes.

Fully realizing the odds against all he stood for in such a contest, Mr. Bland did his work with the unostentatious strength of the man who feels the ineffectiveness of his own forces and appeals to the omnipotent power which operates through the sense of duty in the individual and in the mass.



### CHAPTER III.

The Aristocracy of Land and the Oligarchy of Trade Against the Liberty and Development of the Individual.—John Randolph on Manhood Suffrage.—The American Ideal of Decentralization.—Its Precedents in Athens, Venice and in England under Elizabeth.—New England and Virginia of the Eighteenth Century.—Government Under the Highest Possible Civilization.—Government for the Control of the Producer by Distributers or Non-Producers.—Its Operations During a Century of American Politics.—The Tu Quoque Struggle Between Holders of Corporation Privilege and Agricultural Producers Using Slave Labor.—From Benton and Jackson to General Benjamin F. Butler.—Diversion and Change of Subject in Politics.



WHEN Mr. Bland entered national politics in 1872, the issues were essentially the same as in 1856 when Benton was forced out of public life by his defeat for the governorship of Missouri. Civil war was an episode involving no actual change of the enduring conditions of evolution and offering no real check to the always inherent and imminent tendency towards reaction.

The Democracy of individual liberty overthrew in Virginia the colonial aristocracy for which John Randolph stood during the third decade of the century when he unsuccessfully opposed changes of the state constitution intended to base government on manhood rights rather than on property.

Randolph declared that with the right of suffrage extended to all males of voting age, statesmanship would become impossible and the science of government would be reduced to keeping a tally. To this, those who held with Jefferson replied that the people of any country must govern themselves in order to be justly governed and that it is always safer to trust them at their worst than it is to trust at their best those who allege their own superiority as a title to rule others. This declaration of principle nec-

essarily abolished slavery in the United States by its own force and from the Missouri Compromise of 1821 to the campaign in which the leaders of the Abolition agitation turned on and denounced Grant, events as they were developed by the action and reaction of the great forces of politics, merely declared and demonstrated what is now obvious as from the first a foregone conclusion.

The Jeffersonian ideal was one of the largest possible individual liberty, developing civilization through such "local self-government" as that of Athens in the time of Pericles, Venice under the Doges and England in the time of Shakespeare. Those who held the ideal represented by Jefferson wished to see in the world the largest possible number of independent and sovereign states, living together in peace, trading together without restriction, developing through gradual improvement, each its own remedy for its own abuses, and evolving each its own literature, its own art, its own science, controlled only by the moral and intellectual unities of the highest possible freedom under the highest possible civilization. They dreamed of leagues between such sovereign states for common defense and only for common convenience. Standing armies were to be abolished and all the machinery of coercive militarism was to be made obsolete by the increasing willingness of men, themselves free, to concede to all others the full measure of self-government they claimed for themselves. Individual evolution, local development, non-intervention, the least possible force at home, the closest possible approach to the absolute zero of violence abroad—all this was hoped for as a result of the American civilization which was to be developed by individual liberty, local self-government and a federal government acting only as a "department of foreign affairs." The incompatibility between such a theory and the fact of slavery was probably clearer to Jefferson himself than to almost any one else in his generation, but he hoped that under liberty, the slow growth of intellectual and moral self-consciousness would be the sufficient—as he believed it to be the only effectual—remedy for wrongs due to a lack of development.

From the presidential campaign of 1800, when the Federalist party was disorganized by Jefferson's impetuous attack, until 1899, when Bland made his last protest against the same Federalism as it was evoked and made potent by the military ardor resulting from the war with Spain, the modes of merely negative politics in the United States have been characterized by the utmost simplicity, strictly parallel with the simplicity which underlies the apparent complexity of political economy.

The producer can be controlled (1) by the control of his person; (2) by the direct control of his product; (3) by the control of the medium used in exchanging his product. The first method is that of primitive and savage times. It has never been economically efficient nor reliably remunerative. The second belongs to advancing civilization and the third is most effectively operative only where the intelligence of selfishness has received its highest possible training.

In American politics from 1800 to 1860, every attack from the southern states on the rapid development of northern corporations, seeking grants of sovereignty or landowning privilege from state or federal governments, was answered by a counter attack on slavery. From 1866, when Andrew Johnson was impeached, until the closing year of the nineteenth century, the presence of the lately enfranchised slaves and their descendants at the south made inevitable the perpetuation of the same methods.

The first issues were joined when Jefferson attacked the advocates of a permanent national debt and denounced the issue and control of currency in any form by private corporations. He himself foresaw the Civil war only in 1820, when the issues were defined unmistakably by the struggle over the admission of Missouri, but he had long ago made such results inevitable when, supported in his theories of absolute liberty and justice chiefly by the hereditary landowners and slaveholders of the south, whom he himself had crippled politically, he forced a radical issue with the banks and manufacturing corporations of the northeast.

Conservative as he was in his methods ; anxious as he was to postpone every crisis ; clearly as he saw that the success of every attempt at liberty must depend on the slow development of a more nearly perfect popular appreciation of justice, he could hardly have done less than he did in challenging with the banks of issue the bitter and prolonged contest which did not end, but simply developed a new phase when Benton was defeated for governor of Missouri in 1856—which, indeed, was as far as ever from ending in 1898 when Bland gathered together the slight remaining forces of his fast waning vitality to protest against the leadership of those who wished to initiate “occupation by force of arms” as a mode of government abroad, the better to perpetuate at home that system of exercising delegated sovereignty through corporation boards, against which Jefferson had planned and Jackson had fulminated.

When in a letter to Robert Morris, Hamilton had declared that “a national debt if not excessive will be to us a national blessing,” he had suggested the corner-stone of the magnificent structure of commercial and financial organization which in the nineteenth century was to exercise a power in centralizing wealth and perpetuating it in the control of family and class, greater than primogeniture and entail had even approximated through class and clan ownership in the middle ages.

Politically an evolutionist before Herbert Spencer, a non-interventionist before Bright, a free-trader before Cobden, Jefferson himself invoked the forces which were to defeat, at least in the politics of phenomenon during the nineteenth century, the brilliant promise of the Republicanism of the eighteenth. Ready at all times to make practical compromises in mere detail, and working methodically to postpone every threatening crisis, Jefferson, before his own election to the presidency, made no compromises of principle. He attacked the intrenched commercial feudalism which characterized Pennsylvania, New York and New England as strongly as he did the baronial agricultural system of colonial Virginia. The result was far-reaching.

With the abolition of entail and of primogeniture as principles in the transmission of land from one generation to another, slavery in the agricultural system of the southern states remained as the only obvious manifestation of incompatibility between existing conditions and Jeffersonian ideals. But for America, as for any other country of the world, such a standard is only to be realized even approximately by the slow and painful processes of repeated failure to be justified when measured against it. Attacking landed feudalism at the south and securing the general acceptance of his theories of landholding, Jefferson overthrew the decadent system of agricultural feudalism chiefly through the force of the reaction of his unsuccessful attack on what under the influence of steam, was to become the characteristic mode through which nineteenth century resistance to his ideals expressed itself.

It must have been as obvious to Jefferson as it is now that government or corporation securities representing permanent interest-bearing debts are a means of transmitting wealth, and of founding and perpetuating governing families and classes, compared to which the power to entail land and to transmit it only to the eldest son was a mere clumsy device of semi-civilization.

Not willing that the sacrifice of the colonial aristocracy of Virginia should be made in vain, Jefferson attacked the extension of corporation privilege at all points. In a letter to Albert Gallatin in 1803, he declared the Bank of the United States as a bank of issue an institution "of the most deadly hostility existing against the principles and form of our constitution." Instead of the notes of the bank, he proposed, so long as paper money was necessary and unavoidable, "letting the treasurer give his draft or note for payment at any particular place, which in a well conducted government, ought to have as much credit as any private draft or bank note."

Writing to Gallatin again in 1809, he declared that the success of the attempt to increase the national debt to its former size would "commit the country to the English career of debt, corruption and rottenness, closing with revolution."



In such expressions as these, he defines the essential issues of the politics of a century. From time to time the issue shifted until the privileges of manufacturing corporations, claiming protection under a tariff levied to prevent competition, were the chief point of attack, but politics in America have only become desperate and full of the threat of revolution when there has been a really radical issue on the question of issuing and controlling the money supply.

As Jefferson defined the issue against the control of the producing classes by banks of issue and holders of certificates of national and other indebtedness, the agricultural producers of the country, especially of the southern states, responded with enthusiasm, while the already great and rapidly growing financial and commercial organizations of the northeast retaliated by formidable attacks on slavery. Wilberforce had already defined the issue in England as Jefferson himself had defined it in America. The attempt at emancipation and colonization, made by the followers of Jefferson at the south, might have succeeded but for the hostility incident to growing sectionalism and the widely divergent institutions of the north and south. As it was, every attack made by southern idealists and philanthropists on the growing abuses of the corporation system at the north, increased the facilities of expression for philanthropic zeal in behalf of the immediate abolition of slavery. It is impossible to conceive that any one impelled by the forces of sectionalism governing our politics from 1800 to 1860, should have been fully conscious of their realities. On each side earnest and intelligent men followed the line of least resistance in attempting to make effective their hope of improving the world. In 1820, when Missouri applied for admission to the Union, it was as easy for Tennesseans to oppose the evils of corporation control in Massachusetts as it was for Massachusetts reformers to see the evils of slavery in Tennessee. But even at a period so remote as that at which Benton and Jackson had their street duel, it was one thing to recognize the crying nature of an evil at home and quite another thing to find means of protesting easily and effectively. The deepest secret of the practical politics of sectionalism in America

has lain in giving or withholding from disinterested philanthropy the facilities it must have before it can nationalize its influence. Thus for twenty years after the Civil war, the managers of the republican party whose principles tended strongly to favor the suppression of the sale of intoxicants, used their utmost skill in attempting to deny adequate expression to prohibition sentiment, while democratic managers, bound by party principle to oppose prohibition, really did everything possible to keep the sentiment alive and to give it effectiveness in republican states—especially in New York and Indiana where the presidential elections of more than a decade appeared to depend on it.

By the same rule when Benton began his attack on the United States bank, northern philanthropy began to find more adequate and convenient means of expressing what was essentially a just objection to the perpetuation of slavery; and as issues were more sharply defined against oligarchic control of money and supply through the abuse of the corporation system, the demand for the abolition of slavery, without regard to the convenience of the slave-owner became more insistent and more fierce.

Conditions had not changed in 1873, when Mr. Bland first took his seat in Congress. The visible issue in national politics was about to shift to the control of money and commodity supply, with the certainty that agricultural producers in the western as well as in the southern states, would again unite as they had done under the leadership of Jackson and Benton. With a skill and persistence, impossible for a man of less acute, active and unrestrained intellect, General Benjamin F. Butler, on behalf of the organized capital of the country, parried by forcing issues on the Civil Rights bill and Federal control of southern elections.

It is said that a blacksmith once, when asked why he had tied a small cord on the upper lip of a horse he was about to shoe, replied that he wished to "give him something else to think about."

The history of all that is most hostile to American progress has been made through the application of not wholly dissimilar devices for creating a diversion or changing the subject.



## CHAPTER IV.

Moral Insanity and Intellectual Disturbance on the Battle Field and in Politics.—

The Spirit of Civilization and the Theory that Trade is War.—The American Idea of the Last Quarter of the Eighteenth Century as it Inspired Europe in 1848. The Rally of Toryism and the Coup d'Etat.—The Crimean War and the Growth of Reaction.—D'Israeli and the Dealers in War Debts.—Growth of Imperialism From the Coup d'Etat to the End of the Century.—Hedonism of the Militant and Speculative Classes.—Bland's Higher Education.



THE CIVIL war was a moral insanity manifesting itself through deep-seated intellectual disturbance and perpetuating it. Actual and organized violence ceased with the surrender at Appomattox, but the moral and intellectual realities of Civil war conditions did not. The politics of the generation which fought the war were inspired by the same spirit and directed by the same intellectual processes which kept the armies in the field and governed their operations.

The spirit of civilization consists fundamentally in a desire to extend to all others the advantages we ourselves enjoy. The spirit of reaction towards primitive racial conditions shows itself in a determination to take and keep every possible advantage. Wherever this spirit gains sufficient strength to control the intellectual modes of an individual or national intellect, we have in political economy, the practical application of the theory that "trade is war" and, as it is presumed to mean taking the largest possible advantage of everyone else, that the largest possible armies and navies are necessary for its extension.

The reaction towards this crude and undeveloped mode of thought manifested itself strongly among the hereditary aristocracy and financiers of Europe immediately after the failure of the German revolution of 1848. That hopeful movement for constitutional government deeply influenced France, Spain, Italy and Hungary. One immediate and notable result was the great increase in the population of the United States, due to the emigra-

tion of European constitutionalists. Our period of greatest national growth dates from the temporary failure of European admirers of our eighteenth century institutions to establish them in Europe at a time when this country itself was about to undergo its strongest reaction from them. This movement in Europe—the direct result of the American spirit of the eighteenth century, was destined to be one of the decisive factors in perpetuating our possibilities of progress, in spite of the destructiveness of the spirit which governed our national life during the Civil war generation. Mazzini, Garibaldi, Cavour, Hecker, Castelar, and Kossuth were intellectually as truly Americans of the last quarter of the eighteenth century—the golden age of Americanism—as were Washington, Franklin, Samuel Adams, Madison and Jefferson. It was most fitting that America should become the heir of all they had failed to do for Europe and that their work, in a generation when the hand of every American was against every other, should have done so much to perpetuate those high results of civilizing ideals which might otherwise have been lost to us during the dominance of the idea that the greatest man is he who in war, politics, or business can take the largest possible advantage of the largest possible number of people.

This idea which moves the primitive statesman and financier of Polynesia to insert a fishbone in the gristle of his nose and to tattoo the star of an order of merit on his breast to indicate the number of his fellows he has killed and eaten, gained such strength among European military and aristocratic orders, as well as among the financial and speculative classes in 1848-49, that the Coup d'Etat of Louis Napoleon was welcomed as the presage of a new millennium of world-wide reaction. It was followed by the Crimean war of 1853-56, forced by the same class in order to revive the spirit through which alone it is possible for any class to perpetuate itself without giving a fair and full return for all it receives from co-operative society.


Our own Civil war and the political period which followed it were a part of the same reaction which reached its apparent climax in Europe in



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1888, when Bismarck carried through the Army bill and made permanent for the rest of the nineteenth century the condition of the Coup d'Etat, the Crimean war, the Civil war in America and the Franco-Prussian war in Europe.

All these apparently disconnected events were a part of the same movement. As a result of it the hereditary aristocratic "whig" or liberal element of England, represented in the eighteenth century by such men as Chatham and Burke, gave place in the control of English politics to men representing the new feudalism of the financial and commercial corporation—chiefly to the holders of British and other war debts. The shrewdness, the indirection and the unrestrained desire to take all possible advantage of everyone, represented by the statesmanship of D'Israeli and his principals, became thus the governing factor in the international movement of the last quarter of the nineteenth century and, as a result of it, the century closed with a period of world-wide, if necessarily transitory reaction.

That this spirit with its results was the governing spirit of the world in the last half of the nineteenth century is not to be believed. It was merely the dominating spirit of politics; and even in politics—which is nothing more nor less than the struggle to gain possession of the police and military power of organized society—it was stoutly resisted and measurably held in check. If at every forward step of its advance, plutocratic Toryism found a hundred traitors ready to sell the ideals they professed, it never failed to find, guarding the Thermopylae passes of the world's future, men of simple lives and steady purpose, who if they were only partly conscious of the sublimity of the contest and of their own part in it, were accustomed to do their duty first and to think of the consequences to themselves afterwards. Such a man was Mazzini in Europe. Such a man was Bland in America.

We are now about to examine into the processes of growth by which such men become fitted for work which few in their generations under-



stand—of which they themselves are conscious rather in the rectitude of their purposes than in the adequate conception of the results necessarily proceeding from it.

Civilization in the United States and in the world at large is indebted to Mr. Bland chiefly for his work in forcing a complete revolution in the "practical politics" of the United States involving the abandonment of the issues of Civil war and such a realignment of American parties as will finally result in checking the Tory reaction in Europe forced by Louis Napoleon, D'Israeli and Bismarck as representatives of universal coercion.

Representing in political economy the fundamental rectitude of the idea that coercive government should interfere as little as possible with trade (exchange and the medium of exchange) Mr. Bland was inspired in all his work as a political economist by a governing belief that all men ought to be free and that the largest possible liberty necessarily involves and produces the highest possible civilization.

The saying of Sterne that a bad life and a good belief are troublesome neighbors which must finally part company if only for quietness' sake, applies in politics as fully as it does in religion. The man whose political principles are not inherently a part of his own nature, will repudiate them with that facile unscrupulousness, which but for the simplicity and directness of such uncorrupted Americanism as was represented by Mr. Bland, would be the most striking characteristic of American politics.

It is because Mr. Bland's public life was so completely a product of evolution; because he was so thoroughly what he professed to be; so characteristically and essentially a representative of the American life which at last will control the future, that he has an importance to the student of history not surpassed by that of any representative man of his generation in Europe or America.

During the last quarter of the century the new name of "Hedonism" came to be applied to an old mode of life and intellectual sensation—using that awkward phrase as more accurate in such a connection than "thought."

The worship of comfort as the supreme good, whether it be professed or merely practiced without profession, produces in political and social life the conditions against which Mr. Bland's life was a persistent struggle. For this struggle which made him one of the chief factors in the progress of the twentieth century, he was fitted by an education, moral and intellectual, which made him in everything the simple reality of what he appeared to be. He was born on a Kentucky farm which after his father's death sold for only a few hundred dollars. But seven years old when his father died, he soon took his place at the plow, helping to till the farm for his widowed mother and working on neighboring farms for six and seven dollars a month, schooling himself, undergoing all possible hardships of life and taking them as a matter of course, without complaint and without discouragement. If he had by heredity the traits of the colonial aristocracy from which he was descended, he had by assimilation the simpler, stronger, sublimer life of the everyday American who, in a country where it is intended that it shall never be more than "three generations from shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves," is finally to possess the earth by virtue of the same fitness into which Bland was thus educated. Some idea of what his education meant in detail, may be gained from incidents of his life in the mining regions of California and Nevada, where he went when not quite twenty-one years of age.\*

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\*As the study of Mr. Bland's relations to his times and to the meaning of the present and future will take precedence of further consideration of his private life, the reader will find useful for reference in ensuing chapters, the following chronological summary, revised from a published sketch prepared from facts supplied by Mr. Bland's family during his lifetime.

1835-72—Richard Parks Bland was born in Ohio county, Kentucky, August 19, 1835. His father was Stouten Edward Bland, a native Kentuckian; his mother was Margaret, a daughter of Richard Parks Nall, of Kentucky. The Blands were among the earliest settlers in Kentucky. The family mostly sprung from Col. Theodoric Bland, who was on Washington's Staff in the Revolutionary war. Mr. Bland's father was educated for a Presbyterian minister, but owing to poor health, became a farmer, and was a farmer when he died in 1842. His mother died seven years later in Kentucky. There was no patrimony left to the family, and young Bland worked during the summer for six and seven dollars a month to procure the means to school himself during the winter. At the age of eighteen he attended the Hartford, Kentucky, Academy and took a teacher's course one year. He taught two terms of school in Ohio county, Kentucky, one term in Wayne county, Missouri, and in 1855 went to California. He remained in California, Nevada and Colorado ten years, teaching school and studying and practicing law, and serving



"While out west, Mr. Bland had many ups and downs," Mrs. Bland writes in her reminiscences of him. "At one time he was very ill at the mines and after using all his money before recovery, was obliged to return to San Francisco. He walked all the way from the mines and had a relapse as a result of going out too soon. He once told me that the reason he never learned to play cards was because he got so disgusted with card-playing out west. He said there was so much fighting and killing over cards that he never wanted to learn. He also said that a man was obliged to defend himself or he would be thought cowardly and killed. He added that when the bullies at the mines found out he would not drink and play cards, they tried to whip him but could not, as he could pick up and haul out heavier loads from the shafts than any other man in the mines. He worked in the shaft, taking shifts and often working all day or night standing in water up to his waist. He often talked of his skill in cooking gained at the mines, saying he could boil potatoes and make bean soup better than any of us."

Before going to California, Mr. Bland had taught school in Wayne county, Missouri, where he went from Kentucky in 1854. In Wayne county he made his home with his aunt, the wife of Robert Fulton with

one term as treasurer of Carson county, Utah, now the state of Colorado. While teaching school he pursued and completed his law studies in the law office of R. B. Mayes, in Nevada county, California, now the state of Nevada. In 1860 he was admitted in the United States District Court in Utah territory. Returning to Missouri, in 1867, he resumed the practice of law at Rolla, Missouri, where he remained three years. Then he moved to Lebanon, Missouri. In 1873 he married Miss Virginia Elizabeth Mitchell, daughter of General E. Y. Mitchell, of Rolla, Missouri. He left six living children, four boys and two girls.

1872-76—In 1872 Mr. Bland, nominated by the Democrats for Congress in the Fifth Missouri District during the Grant-Greeley campaign, was elected to the Forty-third Congress by 800 majority over Col. A. J. Seay, Republican. Mr. Blaine was Speaker of the House of Representatives in the Forty-third Congress. During the discussion of the currency question at this time Mr. Bland spoke in advocacy of the bill to increase the greenback circulation, and in opposition to the system of national banks. It was during this (the Forty-third Congress) that the historic filibustering scene occurred, led by Randall, for the purpose of defeating the "Force Bill." In this Mr. Bland took an active part, and with his democratic colleagues remained in the House in continuous session for more than sixty hours. He was re-elected to the Forty-fourth Congress. It was during this Congress that the discovery was made of the act demonetizing silver. Mr. Bland was chairman of the Committee of Mines and Mining, and reported from that committee the first bill for the free coinage of silver that had been reported after its demonetization. This bill was "filibustered" in the House of Representatives for nearly three months, and in that way its consideration was prevented in the first session. On the re-assembling of the Forty-

whose family and Mr. Fulton's nephew, Mr. John R. Patterson, now of Pattersonville, Missouri, he went to California, where he gained so much of the experience which was to identify him with the developing life of his country. Of this period of his life Mr. Patterson writes:

"On November 14, 1855, Robert Fulton with his family, Mr. Bland and myself, left Wayne county for California, via New Orleans and the Nicaragua route, landing in California about the middle of December following. Mr. Bland and myself went to what were known as "the middle mines," camping there together through the winter, doing our own cooking, washing and mending. We used prepared flour, branded on the sack "Self-rising," and after emptying the sacks, we used them for patching our mining clothes—always turning the lettered side with the words "Self-rising" outward so that it would show on the patch. In the spring of 1856 Mr. Bland went to the northern mines and remained there for some time. When the silver excitement broke out in Nevada, he went to that country, locating at Virginia City. While working in the mines, he studied law and began practice while in Nevada, chiefly in Virginia and Carson Cities. As the result of severe sickness, he was obliged to go to California for his health and though he returned to Nevada after recuperating, it was not long afterwards that he left the Pacific coast for Missouri. I write hoping these facts of his life in the west may help towards a better understanding of a man who was surely "self-rising"—the Commoner who as he climbed

fourth Congress he again brought up the bill, and it passed the House by a two-thirds majority, but was never considered in the Senate. During this Congress (the Forty-fourth) the Silver Commission was authorized by an act of Congress. On the part of the Senate there were appointed on this commission Senators Jones of Nevada, Boutwell of Massachusetts, and Bogy of Missouri; on the part of the House Gibson of Louisiana, Willard of Michigan, and Mr. Bland. This committee made the "Silver Commission Report."

1877-9—Mr. Bland was re-elected to the forty-fifth Congress. Mr. Hayes was inaugurated President, and called an extra session of the Forty-fifth Congress, which met November 18, 1877. Some two weeks after the meeting of this Congress, Mr. Bland introduced a bill which, amended in the Republican Senate and passed, is known as the Bland-Allison act.

1879-81—During the Forty-sixth Congress the questions relating to "Troops at the Polls and Reduction of the Tariff" were most prominent. Mr. Bland took an active part in opposition to interference with local self-government; and in advocacy of reduction of tariff taxation.

1881-3—In the Forty-seventh Congress (Republican) the tariff question and the question of re-chartering the National banks were most prominent. Mr. Bland spoke in favor of immediate tariff reform and against the bill providing for the re-charter of National banks.

1883-5—In the Forty-eighth Congress Mr. Carlisle was Speaker of the House of Representatives, and had been elected as such upon the tariff issue against Mr. Randall. Mr. Bland took an active part in the support of the Morrison bill, reducing tariff taxation.

the hill of life gained steadfast footing at every advance."

It is worth while to emphasize here the fact that the quiet humor which governed Mr. Bland when as a very young man, he patched his mining overalls with the "self-rising" brand of the flour sack outwards, never left him. Fanaticism and humor are incompatible. The man who can work all night, standing in water up to his waist in the accomplishment of his life-purposes, may appear fanatical to those who believe that their own special comfort is the special object of the universe, but the steadiness of purpose which comes of such high education may be accompanied by the utmost reasonableness and gentleness. When in Nevada in 1860, the Piute Indians raided the settlements and carried off a number of prisoners, Mr. Bland was one of the rescuing party. As they pursued they were shocked and exasperated to find along the trail the mangled remains of prisoners, butchered by the Indians. In the skirmish which followed when the Piutes were overtaken, Mr. Bland "fired at an Indian and saw him fall," but this experience was so far from giving him the militant spirit that it remained in his mind only as material for amusing children—of whom he was always very fond. He taught his own children and his favorites among other children in the neighborhood of his home the Piute

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1885-9—In the Forty-ninth Congress an effort was made to repeal the act of 1878, providing for the coinage of silver. Mr. Bland as chairman of the Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures in opposition to this repeal bill, reported a bill for free coinage and defeated the proposition to suspend the Bland Law of 1878 by more than a two-thirds vote. In the Fiftieth Congress Mr. Bland took an active part in the advocacy of the Mills tariff bill.

1889-98—In the Fifty-first Congress, the first held after Mr. Harrison became President, the principal questions related to the McKinley tariff and the Sherman law. Mr. Bland opposed the McKinley bill, and probably made more speeches against it than any other member of the House during its consideration. He offered a free coinage amendment to the Sherman bill. Regarding the bill as a makeshift and not in harmony with the true theory of bimetallism, he voted against it.

In 1893 he made the "Parting of the Ways" speech which was decisive in shaping the issues of the campaign of 1896. In 1898 he led the fight against imperialism, subsidies, a permanent national debt and corporation control of the currency.

The principal contests in which Mr. Bland engaged during his Congressional career were against imperialism in 1872-6; in favor of the restoration of bimetallism; in favor of the freedom and equality of the states and of the principles of individual liberty; in opposition to protective tariffs and to all forms of protective taxation; in favor of facilitating and cheapening distribution through the improvement of interstate waterways and by checking railroad monopolies; in opposition to the control of the currency by national bank corporations, and in opposition to military garrisons to annex Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines.

war dance and war whoop to their great delight. "The Indian war dance was a favorite pastime with the children," writes Mrs. Bland. "In the evening after dinner Mr. Bland would stamp and sing a kind of war whoop, and the children would dance as he sang. He used to say that when we were in rented rooms in Washington, he could not have the war dance for fear people would think we were crazy. We rented houses for about ten years, however, and he got so he would not live in rented rooms. We lived in some very stuffy, small houses as rents were high in Washington, but in them he could play with the children as he pleased. He used to get out and run races with them and he was never happier than when on the floor with three or four children climbing over him. They often made so much noise that I would have to go out and leave them to themselves. He was as gentle, kind and affectionate as any woman and his love for home was so great that except to get his mail and attend to absolutely necessary business he hardly went to town at all."

In illustration of the practical operations of his natural kindness, it is pertinent to mention in this connection that shortly after they reached California, Mr. and Mrs. Fulton both died, leaving their three small children orphaned, with no friend except Mr. Bland, himself a friendless and almost penniless youth. He did with all simplicity what it was natural for him to do under the circumstances, caring for the orphans, cooking for them and washing their clothing with his own hands. Some desirable literary accomplishments Mr. Bland sacrificed to the insistent demands of education of this kind, but the orphan boy of twenty-one washing the clouts of orphan children in a western mining town which had no universities, no literary societies, no libraries, got nevertheless that very highest education which is the essence of all that is great in literature and in civilization.

It ought not to remain possible for anyone to misunderstand Mr. Bland's methods and purposes when to such suggestions of what he really was it is added that in the first great struggle against corporation control of the currency he showed the same steadiness of purpose he did in

working in water waist-deep in western mines—and at greater cost to himself, as in spite of his robust constitution, the struggle which followed the Bland-Allison act cost him a hemorrhage and a period of subsequent prostration from which he never recovered.

## CHAPTER V.

Expansion and Imperialism under the First Grant Administration.—A Strong Government with Imperial Power to Annex and Govern Weaker Peoples Proposed for the United States by International Financiers.—Their Objective Point the Perpetuation and Increase of the War Debt and the Control of a Currency of Corporation Paper Based On It.—The Moral and Intellectual Habits of General Grant.—Weaknesses Which He Struggled to Master.—His Heroism at Mount MacGregor Not Developed by the Politics of His Administration.—General Taylor on the Depraved Morals Created by Civil War.—The Constitution as a Bit of Old Parchment.—Abandoned Men and Lost Women as Factors in Government.—General Benjamin F. Butler as a Representative of the Power to Control Men Through Their Own Evil.—Worship of the "Anglo-Saxon Race" as a Moloch.—The Inferno of Which the First Expansion Movement was a Symptom.—The Demonetization of Silver Effected as a Result of It.



WHILE the Civil war was powerless to check the evolutionary work of the positive forces of civilization, it demoralized the country not less in the northern states than in the states actually fought over at the south. The political and social conditions at Washington which followed it were indescribably bad. In suggesting them, General Richard Taylor, an uncompromising whig, paraphrases Bunyan: "The things seen by the Pilgrims in a dream were at this Vanity Fair visible in the flesh:—'all such merchandises sold as houses, lands, trades, places, honors, preferments, states, lusts, pleasures and delights of all sorts, as bawds, wives, husbands, children, masters, servants, lives, blood, bodies, souls, precious stones and what not.' The eyes of the inspired tinker had pierced the darkness of two hundred years and seen what was to come. The martial tread of hundreds of volunteer generals, just disbanded, resounded in the street. Gorged with loot, they spent it as lavishly as Morgan's buccaneers after the sack of Panama. Their women sat at meat or walked the highways, resplendent in jewels, spoil of southern matrons. The camp-followers of the army were here in high carnival, and in character and numbers rivalled



the attendants of Xerxes. Courtesans swarmed everywhere, about the inns, around the capitol, in the antechambers of the White House and were brokers for the transaction of all business. . . . Others, too numerous and too insignificant to particularize, were seen. These were the cuttle-fish of the party whose appointed duty it was to obscure popular vision by clouds of loyal declamation. As Sicilian banditti prepare for robberies and murders by pious offerings on shrines of favorite saints, these brought out the altar of the 'Nation' and devoted themselves afresh whenever Credits Mobiliers and kindred enormities were afoot, sharpening every question of administration, finance, law or taxation on the grindstone of sectional hate."

Coming as this does from an educated whig of the school of Clay and Webster, a member of the "gentleman's party," a son of the whig president who was elected as a result of the Mexican conquest which forced the Civil war, it has a high value as an illustration not only of conditions actually existing but of the spirit which produced them.

In judging such conditions, we can escape radical injustice only by keeping in mind the radical infirmities of human nature. When General Taylor had occasion to call on Thaddeus Stevens, Mr. Stevens told him with the utmost frankness that he "wanted no restoration of the Union under the Constitution," which he called "a worthless bit of old parchment." The white people of the south, he said, "ought never again to be trusted with power for they would inevitably unite with northern copperheads and control the government."

To prevent the "government"—that is the power to control the supply of commodities and money—from being administered by "southern rebels and northern copperheads," the negroes at the south, acting under the supervision of white managers, were put in charge of a sufficient number of state governments to control the Senate and the Electoral College.

It must have been expected by those who did this that the negroes would be greatly the sufferers by it and these sufferings were made the



means of distracting attention at the north from vital questions of reform. "Earnest, credulous women," writes General Taylor, "had their feelings lacerated by stories in which they as fondly believed as their foremothers in Salem witches. As crocodiles conceal their prey until it becomes savory and tender and ripe for eating so the radicals kept these dark corpses to serve up to the public when important elections approached or some special villainy was to be enacted by the Congress. . . . Doubtless there were many acts of violence. When ignorant negroes, instigated by pestilent emissaries, went beyond endurance, the whites killed them and this was to be expected. The breed to which these whites belong has for eight centuries been the master of the earth wherever it has planted its foot. A handful conquered and holds in subjection the crowded millions of India. Another and smaller bridles the fierce Caffre tribes of South Africa. Place but a score of them on the middle course of the Congo and they will rule unless exterminated. And all the armies and all the humanitarians can not change this until the appointed time arrives for Ham to denominate Japhet."

In order to understand the politics of 1872 and Mr. Bland's subsequent action as it developed the politics of 1900, it is necessary to read this comprehensive statement of conditions—not as those conditions impressed General Taylor on the one hand or "earnest and credulous ladies" on the other, but as they appealed to General Benjamin F. Butler, as the author of the Civil Rights bill and as the representative of the economic and political realities back of that measure. At about this time and for two decades afterward, there traveled through the country from newspaper office to newspaper office one of those enthusiastic philanthropists whose intellects in time of some great public insanity fail to recover after the worst strain of passion is over. The wreck of his intellect, however, had not deprived him of the use of his moral faculties and in every newspaper office he visited, he was accustomed to leave a communication signed "J. N.," demonstrating that, in the war and after it, both sides were really

right if they could only be induced to see it. On such a point as this he might have said that General Taylor was right in objecting to the way southern negroes were used by financiers in London and New York as a means of controlling the currency and managing the war debt while the "credulous ladies" of New England were right in being shocked at the killing of negroes or any one else in the supposed interest of Caucasian or any other putative civilization. The intellect of this moralist and philosopher was unequal to the task of deciding why no one else could understand this. It seemed so clear to him that both sides were right and neither wrong that he traveled backwards and forwards from the Atlantic to the Pacific, proclaiming it and announcing the coming of the time when "the veil would be lifted" and every one would see as he did.

If, after having considered the intellectual processes of this representative of extreme intellectual feebleness, we study the methods of General Butler as they illustrate the operations of the subtlest and most thoroughly enfranchised intellects of the period, we can understand how such men as General Taylor—men of strong moral character, wide reading and essential rectitude of purpose—became powerless to direct the course of events or even to choose their own.

To General Butler as an agent of the world-controlling policies of the wholesale dealer in those infernal passions which manifest themselves financially as war debts, General Taylor at the south and "earnest, credulous women" in New England who lectured as the representatives of "higher law," were alike subjects to be operated on and controlled through their prejudices. It may be said of General Butler, certainly without very grave injustice and probably with essential accuracy that in politics he "neither feared God nor regarded man." The most essential characteristic of his political methods was his ability to control men through the repulsion of their hatred and dislikes. A few great and wise men know how to control others through the love of goodness, natural if often latent in all men. Another class, believing in self-interest as the only permanent

force in politics, but frequently unwilling to violate their own sense of decency too grossly, appeal to "enlightened selfishness." A still larger class in American politics offers its own sympathy with the moral and intellectual vices of the people as its qualification for leadership and title to confidence. It seldom happens that our political conditions give a field for the successful employment of such extraordinary talents as those of General Butler, who found as much enjoyment in threatening such aristocratic southern whigs as General Taylor with the chimera of "negro equality" as he did in outraging the sensibilities of the clerical and professional classes, the decorous "Brahmins" of New England, by pretending to demonstrate to the world that it was a Massachusetts amusement to tan the skins of paupers who presumably had died of neglect in the almshouses of that model commonwealth.\*

Keenly intellectual, aware of his own failings and with an almost diabolical knowledge of the worst side of human nature, restrained by no sectional prejudice; firmly convinced that at bottom one man, black or white, is as bad as another; capable of finding keen enjoyment in the observation of those acute sufferings men inflict upon themselves under the reactions of outraged pride; not really cruel, but a humorist rather than a soldier or a statesman, and by his humor scarcely less than by his intellectual habits, freed from the sympathies and moral restraints which so largely influence other men, General Butler became, through the defeat of the liberal republican movement of 1872, the foremost representative in Congress of the powerful international corporate interests which during this period operated through both parties by such indirection as he was better able to represent than any other man in the public life of his generation.

It is a fact, now self-evident, that the managers of the great international banking and other corporations which held the southern agricultural interests in check by such measures as the Civil Rights bill and the

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\*See report of Tewksbury almshouse investigation.

Federal Election laws of that period, generally agreed with General Taylor that it is part of what has since been called "the white man's burden" to "rule unless exterminated." The movement which took shape in the last ten years of the century as "expansion" and imperialism, had been planned before the campaign of 1872 and undoubtedly its object was then as afterwards to establish a "party of property" which would be as strong at the north as at the south. But when bonds held in vaults of English and eastern banks were defiantly repudiated as fraudulent by southern landholders whose property they almost if not quite confiscated, it was not feasible to perfect a party organization, controlled north and south alike, by the incorporated capital which the war had centralized in the cities.

Mr. Bland agreed with Horace Greeley and differed with the financiers represented by General Butler in believing in "liberty for all men, whether they be red, black, white, olive or tawny-colored." He used this language in his Fourth of July address at Lebanon in 1873, and he never changed—least of all when he spent one sleepless night after another in defeating the attack on southern landholders and agricultural producers, which General Butler led in the Forty-third Congress—with keen enjoyment for himself and unmistakable disaster to what was for the time being his party.

Entering public life in 1872, as a supporter of the Greeley movement, Mr. Bland was always a democrat—never in any sense a "liberal republican;" but he was in full accord with Mr. Greeley in believing that civilization is only a reality in the measure in which it increases liberty and that the values produced directly from the earth by labor must be the base of all others. Throughout his public career, he was consistent in holding these fundamental principles while Mr. Greeley never followed them as far as free trade or the de-centralization of power which they involve.

In 1872, however, it was clear to everyone of Mr. Greeley's intellectual rank, that the essence if not the actual form of republican institutions was about to be sacrificed by the holders of securities representing federal and state debts and the greatly inflated capital of the speculative corporations,

which had been organized as an expression of the reckless and fraudulent spirit produced by civil war. While the southern states were being controlled and reconstructed as military departments, it was made clear to them between 1866 and 1870 as it was afterward between 1896 and 1900, that if they would join in this movement, their reconstruction would be accepted as complete and their "loyalty to the restored Union" never afterwards questioned.

This new "era of reconciliation" was to be inaugurated by the revival under Grant of the "expansion" which under Polk and Buchanan had been the direct and unmistakable cause of forcing into immediate and irresistible action all the greatly diverse and not until then convergent causes which, when convergent, made civil war unavoidable.

The first step towards achieving a "manifest destiny" of world empire for "the Anglo-Saxon race," with its bonded debt—for government by standing armies, offensive navies and military garrison—held by the combined financiers of England and America, was the annexation of the West India islands. One of the issues of the campaigns of 1856 and 1860 was the charge that the south wished to seize these islands to be admitted as slave states. Stephen A. Douglas, when his position on slavery in the territories had become untenable, had sought to keep his standing as a presidential candidate by urging a movement for fulfilling what was called "manifest destiny," in which north and south were to be united for the acquisition of such desirable territory as could not be defended by its owners. This movement did not save Mr. Douglas from being forced out of politics and its radical inconsistency with his theories of "local self-government" involved in what was called "squatter sovereignty" is sufficiently obvious. The formation of new states from purchased territory had been justified by southern statesmen with the assertion that such states were not imperial provinces, but sovereign commonwealths, in a Union based only on consent and formed only to promote their convenience and guard their rights. In 1869, when invited to join in a new expansion




movement, the southern states were suffering under the demonstration of the inadequacy of their idea of state sovereignty. General Grant himself represented more fully than any other man the hypothesis that the Declaration of Independence and the Kentucky resolutions as interpreted at Appomattox, mean that sovereignty vests finally in the commander who, having men enough under him to enforce his decisions, is most persistent in moving on the works of those who dissent from him. Governed, themselves, by military garrisons, the southern states were not tempted to join in extending the system to the West Indies, to Canada or to Mexico at a time when believers in "state's rights" were being reminded (as they were by General Sherman himself) of their obligations as "paroled prisoners."

It is true that many of the younger generation at the south did believe that the power of the south in the Union could be best restored by a foreign war, but at this period and afterwards, as long as they lived, men whose views on the control of money were as diverse as those of Allen G. Thurman and Thomas F. Bayard were always ready to join the representatives of the Americanism of New England in thwarting the expression of the spirit of violence.

In times of great political disturbance, the strongest intellect is wholly inadequate to comprehend what the passage of time and the development of its involved results makes self-evident as the governing causes of events. Men can be justly judged as individuals only as it appears that they were governed in their relations to events by a moral sense arising from a governing love of rectitude and the continuous habit of attempting to realize it in action.

In judging the events of this period, no one who wishes to understand the play of the great constructive and destructive forces of politics, can afford to base his judgment on mere sympathy with the contestants on one side or the other. General Grant, on whose attitude throughout this whole period so much seemed to depend, had an almost infallible judgment of how many men it would be necessary to sacrifice in order to drive a given





G. G. VEST.




JOSEPH W. BAILEY.



JOHN G. CARLISLE.



W. B. ALLISON.



number of enemies, with good rifles and steady aim, from an intrenched position. Such a word as "judgment," however, is not applicable in attempting to define the mental operation through which he adjusted himself to political conditions. His history, morally, is a tragedy of struggle against the appetites which had mastered his youth and almost destroyed him. He never yielded to them wholly, and at supreme crises of his career he could assert himself against them and become self-mastering and self-determining. President Lincoln, who after he had passed middle age, was one of the most thoroughly self-controlled men in American history, knew the strength and the weaknesses of General Grant's character so well that he was not afraid to sum his opinion in such advice as he gave a cabal which attacked General Grant on account of his intemperance during the Civil war—to "get some of Grant's whiskey." Nor can this weakness of his character, vital as it was and necessary as it is to take it into account, be used in support of any claim of partisan or sectional superiority. We will see that the first decisive struggle against the imperialism of the period was won under the leadership of Mr. Thurman; yet the tradition—no doubt inaccurate and unreliable except as it suggests the habits of the time—is that when the crisis came and everything depended on Mr. Thurman, he overstimulated himself to such an extent that it was doubtful whether he would be able to keep his feet in the Senate chamber long enough to deliver his protest. When we reflect that life itself, considered in its physical manifestations, is a process of oxidation; when we remember that the nerves of those who accomplish most for others are inevitably the most fretted by the corrosion of the chemical reactions which make possible the activities of physical existence; when we know that under the calm or phlegmatic exterior of men of great achievement, there is the latent consciousness of the sum of all the suffering it has cost them, we can not afford to judge them by their weaknesses. The man who, however blindly, follows at his own expense, the impulses of his sense of duty, is to be judged by the positive good he has achieved—not by his negations. When

we do consider these, when we judge the evil in the greatest and strongest nature by the consciousness of the evil in our own, we can the better understand why after such self-judgment, Lincoln, aware of sharing and being acted on by all the forces of a period of delirium, should continually repeat: "O why should the spirit of mortal be proud."

While it is not advisable for the student of political phenomena to give exclusive attention to their ethical values—since if he does he is likely to become unintelligible, probably to himself and certainly to others—yet nothing is more a practical reality in politics than the moral springs of action. The physiology of their manifestation requires their intelligent consideration. Considering the physiology of Civil war politics, we can not avoid seeing everywhere the symptoms of deep-seated nervous disorder, manifesting itself in many forms of hysterical action and sometimes approximating dangerously the fixed delusions which constitute permanent insanity. Hate, the desire to do others harm, to take advantage of them for their oppression, can not be indulged by any individual or any people without a nervous strain which in its reaction, leaves the entire nervous system disordered. The attempt to repair by stimulants the nervous waste thus superinduced is almost inevitable and it will be impossible for the scientific observer, when he comes, to advance into the physiological investigation of the politics of that period without finding traces of alcoholization at every step.

It is necessary to say this not only to avoid what might otherwise seem a partisan or sectional attack on General Grant, but because it is a fundamental truth of American morals. That the course of events was determined conclusively by the weakness of this man or that, or any number of men is not to be believed—at least not as a part of the hypothesis governing the present attempt to make the events of this period more intelligible. That hypothesis involves the assumption that the course of events is finally determined by the good that is in individuals and peoples—not by the merely negative qualities through which they bring suffering

on themselves and others. Hence the real Grant of American history is, under that hypothesis, the man who, at Mount MacGregor, dying of cancer caused by the cumulative nervous strain of his whole life, won control of himself, higher consciousness of himself, fuller charity for his friends and his enemies, fuller tolerance for the infirmities of all mankind. That is the permanent reality of the man. But the Grant of 1870 to 1880—of "The Man on Horseback" decade—was the least heroic of men. Mr. Bland judged him well in judging him with the utmost charity. "In company with the Missouri delegation, or a part of them," he writes (December 5th, 1873), I visited the White House and called upon the president. He seems to be eating and drinking a little too much. Otherwise, I liked Grant's appearance very well. I believe him to be a better man than our party gives him credit for."\*

Around the Grant of 1870, who ate and drank and smoked a little too much; who wanted a little too much power and a little too much money, were men who in their own vernacular had "thrown off the limit." The holders of the war debt, which in 1870 stood at nearly two and a half billion dollars (\$2,480,672,427 at the close of the fiscal year), were largely international operators, caring little or nothing for the sectional hatreds of America except as means of realizing larger profits for themselves and nothing at all for American institutions except as obstacles to their control of the country. Co-operating with them, more through sympathy than through full consciousness of their plans, were the holders of a large part of the speculative debt of American corporations—by this time so great that if expressed in figures at all they would be unintelligible. The million had become the unit for these operators, engaged in what has been called "financing the future of the country"—that is, in trying to sell what they did not own, to market values as yet uncreated and to raise cash by mortgaging the products of the labor of children still at school or then unborn, who in the twentieth century must deal with the problems of

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\*From a letter to Mrs. Bland.

economic wrong and social injustice thus created or perpetuated.

The mode through which the political managers representing these policies, proposed to carry them out was twofold—that of aggression abroad through “expansion” and coercion, or the threat if it, at home; intended to compel the agricultural producers of the southern states either to accept the new order of things through actual bargain or through the fear of “negro domination.” The immediate object to be accomplished under the cover of this agitation was the control of the issue and supply of money and of the supply of commodities produced at home or imported. The white people of the south, not yet able to see the only possible solution of “the negro question” in the fullest possible expression of their own moral superiority, were inexpressibly shocked and alarmed by the overwhelming assault made on them with the unfortunate negro as the agent of it; but governed by the sum of individual and inherited virtues, they refused to submit, to compromise or to trade. Relying too much on merely intellectual superiority, and inclined too much to follow such leaders as General Taylor in the worship of a foul, bloody and at last impotent Moloch called “the Anglo-Saxon race,” they inaugurated nevertheless a campaign of passive resistance which, considered for what it really was—a measure of sectional war—was superior to the tactics of the leaders of their own or of the conquering Federal armies in the field. The future historian will find much that is repulsive in it as he will find much that is repulsive in Sherman’s march to the sea or Sheridan’s campaign in the Valley of Virginia. He will study it in its connection with the Civil war and will judge it as not merely a result but as actually a part of the war. That a sectional war was ever expedient; ever unavoidable, ever necessary in the United States; or that any positive good ever came because of it—it is no part of the purpose of this chapter to admit. It is enough to assert here, not for the sake of convincing but merely to indicate the standpoint from which the politics of the Civil war period is being judged, that the actual progress of the human race in the nineteenth century will probably



appear on examination to have been retarded more by the Civil war in America than by any other overt act of reaction whatever. As a result of the war in America, the control of the machinery of productive civilization, an inheritance of the race from the disinterested genius of all time, passed into the hands of a constantly decreasing number of men who, co-operating with the holders of war debts, entrenched themselves as a governing class both in Europe and America.

While the south was fighting desperately against "bayonet rule and negro domination;" while such "original abolitionists" of the north as Horace Greeley, Seward and Charles Sumner were dying heart-broken and deserted, protesting with their last breath against militarism and imperialism, the actual government—the government which means control of production and exchange—was revolutionized and the controlling forces in American politics became international. A single feature of this great change was the demonetization of silver in 1872—the year in which Mr. Bland entered politics in support of the Greeley campaign against imperialism.

## CHAPTER VI.

The Gold Conspiracy and Black Friday.—Banker Henry Clews Describes the Means Used to Control General Grant.—Champagne and a Pleasure Party.—The Treasury as a Factor in Speculation.—The Rothschilds in American Politics.—The Belmonts as their Agents and Representatives.—Capitalizing a Revolution.—The Isthmian Canal Speculation Under Grant and its Connection with Coercive Expansion.—The Imperialistic Plot Against Puerto Rico, San Domingo and Cuba.—Orville Babcock as an Envoy Extraordinary.—History Which Repeated Itself Under the McKinley Administration.—The Liberty of the Innocent Against the Safety of the Guilty.—The Governing Motive of Civilization.—Blaine on Civil Rights.—Plutocracy as an Insanity.—The Law of Perfect Liberty.—Thurman, Bland, Greeley and Sumner.—Government by Garrison.—Lord Kitchener and His College at Khartoum.—The Civilization of Southern Negroes and the Anglo-Saxonism of Fraudulent Bondholders.—International Plutocracy and Murder as a Fine Art.



IN 1870, it was not possible for General Grant or any one else to understand the full meaning of the movement which followed the Civil war. As far as he understood himself and his generation at all, Grant was an American, a believer in American institutions and all the freedom compatible with West Point views of social order. He was plain in dress and speech and probably felt pride rather than shame in having supported himself by cutting cordwood for the St. Louis market. But among those who were nearest to him and by whom he was most deeply influenced, reverence for material success, for power, for rank, for money and its manifestations in splendid and luxurious living, was a controlling force. This was so thoroughly understood by the "financiers" of the time that it was habitually taken into account, not only in shaping public policies but in such minor operations as the gold conspiracy of 1869 which resulted in "Black Friday." In his "Twenty-Eight Years in Wall Street," Mr. Henry Clews, the New York banker—certainly not a witness who can be suspected of undue prejudice against such diplomacy as financiers consider a business necessity—has

given a succinct and intelligible though cautious account of how General Grant was played upon at that period of speculative conspiracies. Mr. Jay Gould had originally associated with him in his plan to control the American gold supply, Stern Brothers, of London, probably representatives of one or more of the great international operators who during this epoch succeeded in imposing Mr. Belmont, of New York, their American agent, on the democratic party as a national manager. It was proposed to convince General Grant that it would be patriotic financiering to hold as much gold as possible in the treasury "in order to promote the export movement of grain and cotton." In carrying out this plan, General Grant was induced to become the guest of a party of financiers on an excursion to the Gilmore Peace Jubilee in Boston. The subject was broached by Mr. Gould in connection with the usual "refreshments." "It was a feast of reason" writes Mr. Clews,\* "and those who have imagined that it was all flow of soul on that festive occasion do scant justice to the intelligence that was at the bottom of the deep design of the nocturnal excursion planned by Gould, Fisk and Company." After this excursion, the combination communicated with General Grant through Mr. Abel R. Corbin, of whom Mr. Clews writes: "Mr. Abel R. Corbin came in quite handy at this juncture to help further the designs of Mr. Gould. He was a man of fair education and considerable experience both in business and politics. He had been a lobbyist in Washington for some years. He was well-informed on financial matters, a pretty good writer and could talk like a book. His wife was a sister of Mrs. Grant and he had a good opportunity for reaching the presidential ear when he was employed to the best advantage."\*

This will suggest the political methods of a time when the attempt was being made to control the policies of both parties in the United States as a means of controlling the national and international movement of money and trade. The attempt was made to frame the issues on which parties should divide so as to amuse or to frighten the masses of the people with

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\*"Twenty-Eight Years in Wall Street," by Henry Clews.

fictitious issues while the objects of plans laid in London and New York bank parlors were being attained. It is possible now to see clearly the motives which governed such diplomats in rallying to the defense of "Anglo-Saxon civilization" at the south against attacks which they themselves had promoted in advance. The same phenomenon was seen again in 1898 when, as a means of reviving through republican administration at Washington the "expansion movement" of the Grant administration, the London banks and their associates in New York and other American cities, operated through agents in democratic committees to prevent democratic platforms from declaring against the control of Puerto Rico, Cuba and Hawaii by military garrisons maintained as a preliminary to assuming their "consent" to annexation. It is scarcely a mere coincidence that the estate left by Mr. August Belmont, who, under General Grant was imposed by his principals, the Rothschilds, on the democratic party as a campaign manager, was represented in the movement of 1898 to displace Mr. Bland from democratic leadership. In connection with the "expansion" movement of 1898 and 1899, it is interesting to quote an authority so well informed as Mr. Clews on what the elder Belmont represented during the epoch of attempted expansion under General Grant: "August Belmont," he says,\* "came to New York comparatively poor and is now (1887) worth millions. As a representative of the Rothschilds in this country, he has for many years held a high position in the financial world. . . . He was born in the Rhenish Palatinate sixty-eight years ago. His father was a man in well-to-do circumstances who sent him when he was thirteen years old to become an apprenticed clerk to the Rothschilds in their Frankfort house. . . . In 1837, the famous house, recognizing the promising field for investment in this country, sent young Belmont to New York as their agent, a position he held until 1858 when he became their American correspondent and general representative, and this responsible post he has held ever since. . . . He has always been a staunch democrat and for several years was chairman

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\*Page 595, "Twenty-Eight Years in Wall Street."

of the democratic national committee." The meaning of the Rothschild influence in international politics is suggested, seemingly without unfriendliness by Mr. Clews in the thirty-eighth chapter of his *History of Wall Street*—a chapter this summary of which as he gives it in his table of contents will be enough for present quotation:

"The Rothschilds: Beginning of the Financial Career of the Great House of Rothschild. The Hessian Blood Money the First Foundation of their Fortune. How the Firm of Five Original Brothers Was Constituted; Nathan the Greatest Speculator of the Family; His Career in Great Britain and How He Misrepresented the Result of the Battle of Waterloo for Speculative Purposes; Creating a Panic on the London Stock Exchange; His Terror of Being Assassinated."

This ought to be enough to suggest to the reader the character of the influences which Mr. Bland opposed in his own and in the republican party from 1872 until his death in 1899. He did not change and with that clearness of vision which can come only from honesty of purpose, he saw the realities from which the attention of so many others was distracted by the commonplace and often imbecile pretenses of the agents of fraud.

In excusing General Grant, it is often demonstrated in his behalf that at the climax of the gold conspiracy of 1868, he caused the treasury to sell gold on the "bear" side of the market. There is no present occasion either to blame or to vindicate him in such a connection. It is important to fix attention on the central fact that at this period, the United States Treasury was one of the great speculative forces of the world and that its control was the political objective of the speculative and usurious class which has controlled the Bank of England since the Napoleonic wars. It is not necessary to inquire why gold is held out of circulation by the treasury to increase prices at one time or thrown on the market at another with the avowed purpose of lowering them. The speculative character of treasury management, the fact that as the rule of national campaigns since the Civil war, the control of the treasury has been hypothecated in advance of

presidential elections to national banks controlled from New York, London, Berlin and Paris—this is the point of vital interest if we are not to lose the political meaning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, as it showed itself in reaction at the close.

On the tenth of October, 1868, a revolution was inaugurated in the island of Cuba. It is believed that both this movement and the similar one of nearly twenty years later were “capitalized” in New York, not with any intention of allowing the Cubans to establish a republic as they hoped to do, but for the purpose of taking possession of the island in the interest of speculative syndicates as soon as Spain had been dispossessed. This was planned again in 1896 and 1897, and in 1898 the attempt was made to control the democratic party in favor of methods already matured for carrying it out through the republican administration. The presumption is strong on the evidence that the same plan had been matured in 1868 in connection with the Isthmian canal and railroad speculations of that epoch. The control of the cane-sugar and superfine tobacco supply was in itself a sufficient inducement, even had there existed no plan for using the new patriotic expansion movement as a means of diverting public attention from the inauguration of a “strong government” with an army large enough to prevent the possibility of failure in the workings of the proposed system of currency and taxation.

The ultimate fate of Cuba, however, did not become the actual issue in the expansion movement under Grant. A year after the Cuban revolution began, the president sent his private secretary, Orville Babcock, to San Domingo to arrange for the annexation of that island. Mr. Babcock negotiated a treaty similar in its methods to that offered at the time Hawaii was about to be seized. The result, as it retired Charles Sumner from republican leadership and forced Allen G. Thurman forward in the democratic party, would have been of primary importance even if the



treaty had not been part of the imperialistic movement for the control of money and commodity supply.

Under cover of the discussion thus provoked, supplemented by vigorous and highly artistic torture of the "paroled prisoners" of the south, silver was demonetized and the currency contracted—not with the consent, but undoubtedly with the tacit assent of not a few real but timid opponents of internationalist control of the American treasury who afterwards professed to be surprised at what had been done. The general public, which in 1898 was harangued by hired orators in favor of "expansion," which a month after the demonetization of silver in 1900, still had its attention artistically focused on a discussion of the system to be used in taxing Puerto Rico and other territory held by military garrison, knew little or nothing of the realities of politics in 1872 and 1873, and it was not until Mr. Bland forced it that the attention of those most vitally interested was turned to the real meaning of the "crime of 1873."

As in 1898, General Fitzhugh Lee and General Wheeler were put at the front to hold the attention of the south while southern and western regiments were carefully selected to do the worst work of garrison control in the West Indies and Hawaii, and of actual butchery in the Philippines, so from 1868 to 1872, the ex-Confederate element of the south, under plans no doubt devised if not actually originated in London banks, were offered amnesty and promotion in consideration of their allegiance to a proposed empire. A bill offering a general amnesty to all political offenders—except a sufficient number to prevent the sectional issue from being lost—was part of the machinery used for scene-shifting purposes by the able stage-managers of the period. When the south failed to respond, this exhibition of magnanimity became still more artistic. If we remember that to such operators the control of commodity and money supply means everything, we can understand that the purpose to be achieved consisted in distracting public attention from real issues, and that though the consent of the south to the contemplated revolution would have been convenient it

was not vital. When the south refused "reconciliation," the same purpose of controlling public attention was achieved through the renewed threat of coercion. There is something eternally memorable in the ingenuity with which the white people of the south were tortured and threatened—not by the people of the north but by ingenious financiers—chiefly for the purpose of exciting them to outbursts of passion which would postpone the discussion of economic reforms. After the refusal of the south as a whole to follow General Longstreet and other leaders who had been won over in good faith to the "plan of reconciliation," the "Civil Rights" agitation was renewed with telling effect. Aspiring young colored men of good ability and the best intentions were brought forward to make magnanimous speeches, forgiving, in the Congressional Record and the newspapers, the wrongs of their race, asking pardon for all "ex-rebels" except a few of "the worst traitors," pleading that their former masters should be allowed to take the oath recanting rebellion and in the same connection, demanding the passage of the law making it an offense for hotel-keepers, owners of theatres, public school teachers, railroad owners and those who control other like public or semi-public institutions to take steps for separating the races. Mr. Blaine in his *Twenty Years in Congress* (Volume II, page 513), illustrates this with his usual placid astuteness of statement:

"The democrats," he says, "were now to witness an exhibition of magnanimity in the colored representatives which had not been shown towards them. When the amnesty bill came before the House for consideration, Mr. Rainey of South Carolina, speaking for the colored race whom he represented, said: 'It is not the disposition of my constituents that these disabilities should be longer retained. We are desirous of being magnanimous. It may be that we are so to a fault. Nevertheless we have open and frank hearts to those who were our former oppressors and task-masters. We foster no enmity now, and we desire to foster none, for their acts in the past to us or to the government we love so well. But while we are willing to accord them their enfranchisement and here to-day give our votes that they may be amnestied. . . . we invoke you gentlemen to show the same kindly feeling toward us, a race long oppressed, and in demonstration of this humane and just feeling, I implore you to give sup-

port to the Civil Rights bill we have been asking at your hands, lo these many days!"

It is not necessary to stop to inquire whether such ingenious inventions for exciting anger of the white people of the south originated in any given instance with the speaker who assumed responsibility for them. They were a part of the politics of a time when the infernal passions of hate and covetousness acted and reacted upon each other. The hot blood of violence made success easy for plans of wrongful acquisition, carefully devised in the cold blood of fraud. The governing motive of civilization, kindness, helpfulness, the love of fair play, the underlying sense that increasing liberty is the necessary and only possible expression of justice, never ceased to operate and the world never ceased to move forward, but surface conditions of the time were such that every reactionist, every self-convicted believer that the liberty of the innocent is incompatible with the safety of the guilty; every one who had already acquired or who expected to acquire at the expense of others, wealth, position, or any other form of the delegated power of co-operative society, rejoiced in the belief that such conditions as had not existed since the middle of the eighteenth century could be re-established with all the increase of possession and power made possible for the intellectual "pervert" by the great increase in the creative resources of civilization, resulting from the natural evolutionary processes of the healthy human intellect. In insane cunning, in impotent planning to turn back the progress of civilization and in the audacity of their mistaken hopes of coming into immediate control of the world, those victims of mental disorder who are made monomaniacal by craving for the luxury and the power which the possession of large sums of money gives, were never more insistent on making their worst vices, their most criminal insanities, their most futile imbecilities, a part of the permanent record of the world's history than they were at the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In the closing years of the century, we have had another signal exhibition of the same spirit, but it could not

have surpassed if it could have equalled in the cunning of its indirections, in its recklessness of the worst injustices, in its readiness to shed blood as a means of facilitating commercial and financial cheating, that which manifested itself from 1868 to 1880.

There is no desire here to arraign a class without exception or to make a sectional or partisan plea of confession and avoidance. What is attempted is the examination of human nature as it manifests itself not only through the moral and intellectual diseases so often obvious as temporarily the governing forces of politics, but as it shows itself in its underlying rectitude of intention, in its sympathy with what no force and no fraud can prevent from becoming at last the law of politics, of production, of distribution, of co-operative human activity in all its forms—the law of perfect liberty under which every man born into the world has a supreme, an absolute and in the end an omnipotent right to express to the utmost limit of his own intention all the good that is in him.

To sympathize with intellectual and physical sufferings due to the intellectual and physical diseases of all men of every class, of every estate, of every country is obviously a duty and is logically a necessity. The only higher claim on any human intellect is that of duty to the general principles of progress, the deep moral truths of intellectual and physical existence, through which alone such sufferings can be minimized. It is not possible for any man to free himself from his sympathies and his prejudices so as to be able to judge justly those events of which he himself and those he loves have been a part. It is not easy even to attempt it, but as far as the attempt is possible, it is made here in what is said of the politics of this crucial period.

The object of primary interest in taking note of the surface phenomena of the time, is the remarkable fact that the plans of commercial imperialism reacted by forcing together at once the ex-slaveholders of the south and the original abolitionists of the north—classes which, each in its own way, represented the highest possibilities of individual initiative. This

could not have been foreseen by those who planned the campaign of 1872 and it is one of the factors which are still working for their defeat. When we examine more closely into the character of such men as Thurman and Bland, Greeley and Sumner, it will become clear as a part of the logic of the situation, but in the politics of Grant's first administration, nothing was clear—the future of America seeming to have become a necessary part of “the frightful welter” created by militant commercialism in Europe.

Under the effects of the continually urged threat of “negro domination” supported by the presence of military garrisons, and realized in the imposition of ruinous taxes made permanent by extravagant issues of state bonds, the south was in danger of anarchy much worse than that which existed during the progress of actual fighting in the Civil war. That this was averted is largely due to the good sense and good conduct of the negroes themselves. More easily influenced by suggestion than the whites, many negroes might be induced temporarily to antagonize and to attempt to control white people whose intellectual superiority they recognized. But as a rule when left to themselves, they had a cheerful and respectful toleration of what they regarded as wrong in others, which if it were realized generally in the operation of highly developed intellects, would soon inaugurate whatever millennium is possible on earth. While it was seldom possible to induce them to vote the democratic ticket at this period, they were accustomed to listen with deferential politeness to the opinions of white democrats, parrying, with a tact possible only for habitual courtesy, all attempts to draw them into argument for which they felt themselves unequal. Having their tendency to vote the republican ticket as an acquired instinct, they had inherent in them the instincts of good nature and tolerance, acquired through the habitual submission of enforced service under a system whose evils their submission and docility had turned to their advantage. Had they not had too often the vices of slavery with its virtues; had not their intellectual development been checked; had they been freed without war and without the period of hate and terror



which followed it, they might have become, without even temporary reaction, a highly civilized and productive people, co-operating industrially with the white people of the country to the greatest possible advantage. As it was, the desperate struggle of Civil war politics, putting them between two fires, subjected their fundamental virtues to a most crucial test under which it is a matter of course that there should be shown many instances of individual degeneracy to the original condition of the race. It is a fact, however, that the average of the race in 1900 is, as it was in 1870, superior to such "civilization" as Lord Kitchener illustrated in founding a college at Khartoum immediately after he had butchered there by bayonetting as they lay on the field, more than a thousand wounded who had fallen in heroic if unintelligent resistance to policies proposed by English holders of fraudulent Egyptian bonds—representative of the same class who from 1866 to 1876 deliberately forced on a dozen great American commonwealths issues which but for the good nature of the negroes and the saving sense of justice in the white people would have made the south an inferno. The possibilities of what might have been are so obvious that they are too repulsive to be allowed to force themselves on imagination, but the reality itself was so bad that for every section of the Union another half century of development, moral and intellectual, will scarcely suffice to undo the work of demoralization begun during that decade.

When the organized wealth of the world was being directed through all the power of trained and highly intellectual fraud, to overthrow American institutions, the first stand against it was made by the northern abolitionists of 1856 whose radicalism, answered by the radicalism of secessionists at the south and exaggerated by the moral cowardice and intellectual inertia of advocates of conquest and coercion in support of an alleged manifest destiny had forced the Civil war.

The result, however, depended finally on the conduct of devoted lovers of American institutions among the former slave-holders of the south, now ruined and proscribed. It does them simple justice to say that the Amer-






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ica of the future will owe chiefly to them the preservation of whatever shall remain of the institutions depending on the original constitution. They will not be eulogized here. Had they been capable in 1850 of the same self-control and self-repression they showed as a class when driven to the wall in 1870; had they followed the theories of the Declaration of Independence when Mexico was at the mercy of the overwhelmingly superior forces of the United States, the realization of the possibilities of beneficence inherent in the principles of American liberty might not have been postponed to the twentieth century and the blood and struggle, the reaction and oppression of the last half of the nineteenth might have been made impossible. But beaten as they were, ruined as they were, attacked as they were from all quarters with all possible opprobrium, they showed among all their failings, the splendid virtues of fortitude, of unsundering confidence in the future and of loyalty to the Constitution of 1788 as it had been interpreted by the generation which had transmitted it to them. They belonged to a class and to a generation too prone to violence, too impatient, too apt to strike first and hear afterwards, but when the time of supreme trial came for them, they showed their supreme virtue. They could neither be bought nor bullied; and if in holding their own against desperate odds, they kept much they might have improved themselves by losing, they kept the world's future with it.

## CHAPTER VII.

Thurman and Sumner Against "The Man on Horseback." The Attempt to Align the South for Imperialism Fails.—The Ideas Represented by Greeley and Bland Against the Forces Behind Grant and Longstreet.—The Work of Thurman and Black in Checking Imperial Centralization of Power Prepares the way for Bland.—The Liberal Republican and Democratic Fusion Movement of 1872 Against Militarism Draws Bland into Politics.—How he came to be Nominated for Congress.—The Influence of a Missouri Fence Corner in Shaping the Course of International Politics.



THE events of the last decade of the nineteenth century show that in 1870 Mr. Bland was one of four men who were to exert a decisive influence in preventing the military spirit evoked by the war from destroying civil government. Charles Sumner, by making the first determined stand against General Grant's plan for the annexation of San Domingo, directed the attention of original Free soilers and abolitionists to a danger greater than any they could anticipate from relaxing their opposition to southern democrats. Allen G. Thurman was a Virginian by birth, and intellectually the heir of the Virginia school which, after the adoption of the Constitution, had checked Hamilton by forcing its amendment. He had voted for the Wilmot proviso against slavery in the territory acquired by the Mexican conquest. This vote he had cast as the representative of an Ohio district, but he represented also the Virginia abolitionists of the eighteenth century, whose initiative in the Ordinance of 1787 made Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin free states, with an influence which the crisis, when it came, showed to be decisive. He took his seat in the United States Senate on March 4, 1869, and by joining with Sumner against Grant, made it impossible for the imperialists to control the democrats of the south, and west; to create a diversion through General Longstreet or to secure that tacit assent to their policies which their secret service agents in 1898 described as "pairing."

Horace Greeley, a Whig by association and by intellectual habit, was fundamentally an individualist with the same governing sympathy for the world's actual producers which gave Mr. Bland's life its direction. The "Granger Movement," for which Mr. Greeley was so largely responsible, had the same intention as the de-centralizing movement with which the Gracchi attempted to save the Roman republic. Through it Mr. Greeley set in motion forces which were effective in energizing the work done by Thurman and Jeremiah Black against corporation imperialism from 1876 to 1888, and which in the last ten years of the century, made it possible for Mr. Bland to force issues against those who, in both parties, were conspiring to repeat the tactics of the Grant administration—that is, to make a fundamental and revolutionary attack on American institutions, and after thus exciting intense alarm, to compromise with the timid by demonetizing silver, assuring themselves the continued control of the currency and perpetuating their hold on the taxing power in connection with a perpetuation of the bonded debt through schemes of conquest, canal building, naval increase, colonial dependencies and anything else likely to serve their purposes.

Mr. Bland, who was to play so important a part in preventing the work of Sumner, Greeley and Thurman against corporation imperialism from being undone, was, when the fight opened, an unknown country lawyer. He had returned to Missouri from California in 1867, and had begun practicing law at Rolla with his brother, Charles C. Bland, afterwards Judge of the St. Louis Court of Appeals. This partnership was dissolved by his removal to Lebanon in 1869, where his vigor of intellect, his fearlessness in supporting his political principles and, no doubt, his freedom from a Union or Confederate war record contributed to make him a desirable congressional candidate for the democratic and liberal republican fusion movement, with which, in 1872, Missouri responded to the work done in the Senate by Thurman and Sumner. B. Gratz Brown and Carl Schurz for the republicans, Frank P. Blair and John S. Phelps for the democrats



were its responsible managers in Missouri. Mr. George W. Bradfield of Lebanon, Missouri, one of those who induced Mr. Bland to take part in it, gives this account of his entrance into national politics:

"In October, 1869, the St. Louis and San Francisco railroad was extended from Arlington to Lebanon, and with the extension a number of business men and their families came to Lebanon, established homes and entered into various business pursuits. Among the number was Richard P. Bland, attorney. He came to stay, and we have good reason to know that no political aspirations prompted the step. He was devoted to his profession and his sole object was to secure a permanent location and make his way in it. At this time, party machines were in a demoralized condition. The defeat of John S. Phelps for Governor in 1868 had discouraged the democrats and the republicans were divided into what were called 'radicals' and 'liberals.'

The liberals under the leadership of Hon. R. W. Fyan, began an organization of their forces, and in 1869, established a newspaper and placed the editorial department in the hands of an ex-Confederate and disfranchised democrat. The battle soon became interesting. In 1870 the liberals made a proposition to the democrats to take the fight off their hands—the democrats to give them entire control of state matters, retaining for themselves the control of local affairs. The proposition was accepted, carried out in good faith, and culminated, after a bitter fight, in the election of B. Gratz Brown for governor by a majority of 41,089 votes, the democrats having a majority in both branches of the legislature.

In this contest, at the solicitation of democrats and liberals, R. P. Bland entered politics as a democrat and took a vigorous part in the campaign.

The success of the liberal movement in Missouri in 1870 had attracted the attention of the whole country and in the "presidential year," 1872, democratic organs urged that the same policy should be pursued in the national campaign. In the national democratic convention held at Baltimore the policy was accordingly adopted by the nomination of Horace Greeley for president and B. Gratz Brown for vice-president—both liberals.

In the meantime Congress, in apportioning Representatives among the States under the census of 1870, gave Missouri one additional representative. The members of Congress from Missouri though pleased with the gain of one member, were satisfied with existing districts and did not wish them disturbed.

The legislature which had the matter in charge was equal to the occasion. They determined to make the new district out of the counties which



had none of the sitting members or old democratic leaders in them. To this end they established what they named the Fifth district, composed of Jefferson, Franklin, Gasconade, Osage, Maries, Crawford, Phelps, Pultaski, Wright, Ozark, Douglas, Howell, Texas, Dent, Shannon and Laclede—sixteen counties, which in 1870 had given Brown for governor 4,432 majority.

The district had a picturesque appearance on the map of the state. Two of the counties were on the Missouri river; one on the Missouri river whose boundary line extended to the boundary line of three counties in Illinois; two on the boundary line of Arkansas, and two others were but a few hours' ride from the Indian Territory and the state of Kansas.

As soon as the formation of the new district was made known, the selection of a candidate to represent it became the chief topic of conversation among its people, and a number of names were suggested. In Laclede county, the home of Mr. Bland, Josiah Ivey was the first who suggested his name to the editor of the "home organ." He and the editor went accordingly to Mr. Bland's office to confer with him on the subject. The announcement of the object of our visit took him by surprise, but it was finally agreed that a representative committee of democrats and liberals should be appointed to confer with him. The active leaders of both parties were consulted and selected Capt. J. T. Talliaferro, Josiah Ivey, Harrison Attaway, Hugh McGowin and G. W. Bradfield as the conference committee. They called on Mr. Bland, and after a full conference he agreed to announce himself as a candidate for representative subject to the action of the democratic congressional convention at St. James.

A joint convention of liberals and democrats of Laclede county was held to appoint delegates to the congressional convention of the Fifth district and Messrs. Harrison Attaway, J. T. Talliaferro and George W. Bradfield, democrats, were chosen as delegates, with Messrs. David Steinberg, R. C. Barrows and Alfred Case, liberals, as alternates.

The delegates and alternates, and a number of outsiders, the most prominent among whom were Messrs. Hugh McGowin, R. P. Goodall and Josiah Ivey from Laclede county, reached St. James the evening before the convention was to be held. They found the opposition there in full force, occupying as headquarters every room that could be obtained.

It was soon ascertained that all the candidates were on hand; that Bland was in the lead; that his friends were there for the single purpose of nominating him and that they had no second choice. As they had no place to meet to perfect a temporary organization, it was finally decided that when night came they would meet in the corner of a rail fence some little distance from any highway and place sentinels to keep off intruders.

His delegates promptly met at the appointed place. Organizing for prudential reasons, they selected W. H. McGowin of Howell county as temporary chairman of the convention and unanimously resolved that the nomination of Mr. Bland should be made by a delegate of one of the counties which had no candidate in the field—Mr. Bland himself to select the delegate.

The Methodist church was tendered the convention for holding its meetings, and at the time named in the call the delegates and alternates met in the church in full force—every county being fully represented. Chairman McGowin called the meeting to order, briefly explained its object and appointed the committees. After a recess, the committee on credentials made their report which was unanimously adopted. The committee on organization recommended Doctor John Hyor of Dent county as chairman of the convention, which was unanimously adopted. The Doctor was escorted to the chair and thanked the convention for the honor conferred upon him. The Bland delegates selected Harrison Attaway to see that the Bland men were on hand at roll call and George W. Bradfield to tally the votes cast.

On the roll call of counties for nomination of candidates for Congress, Col. Crews, of Franklin county; Senator Morse of Jefferson county; Colonel Wingo of Dent county; Ed. Seay and Doctor Headlee of Phelps county, and J. H. Graham of Wright county were put in nomination. When the county of Laclede was called, Elder Michal Johnson of Maries county, an ex-Confederate colonel, arose and nominated Mr. Bland, George W. Bradfield of Laclede county seconding him.

After two or three ballots, in which Mr. Bland took and kept the lead, it was apparent that the opposition could not form a combination and that by a determined effort the Bland forces could win. Attaway had prepared for the effort. He and Bradfield had agreed that when the votes cast reached the point where the solid vote of Maries county would decide the contest, Bradfield was to give a certain signal. The ballot commenced and progressed with but little change until the county of Shannon voted for Bland. The critical point was reached, the signal was given, Maries county voted solid for Bland and he was nominated.

The republicans nominated Hon. Andrew J. Seay, against him. Bland made a vigorous campaign, visited all the counties in the district, roused the democrats and carried the district by 1,154 majority.\*"

The unadorned simplicity of Mr. Bradfield's narrative can not fail to commend itself to the Livy who shall study the Rise, as well as the

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\*From reminiscences contributed for this work by Mr. George W. Bradfield.

Gibbon who shall write the Decline and Fall, of the "Anglo-Saxon Empire." He will see, if he has learned the art of reading between the lines, that the men who managed Mr. Bland's entrance to public life, though they had never been to London or Berlin in their lives, had *savoir faire* enough as international diplomats to use a moonlight meeting in the corner of a Missouri rail fence to set in motion international forces which Lord Salisbury and Baron Rothschild have not yet demonstrated their ability to control.

## CHAPTER VIII.

The Superiority of "Business" to Party.—Plutocratic Attempts to Provide Issues for Both Parties.—The Object of "Expansion" Under Grant Accomplished in the Demonetization of Silver and the Control of the Currency.—Sumner Denounces Imperialism and Forces an Open Debate on the Annexation of the West Indies.—"A Dance of Blood" Proposed by the Speculative and Non-Productive Classes.—How History Repeated Itself in 1898.—General Grant's Arguments for Imperialism Used Against Bland by Imperialists in Missouri.—Thurman's Speech Against "Expansion."



THE immediate object of the movement for imperialism under Grant was attained. The national debt was perpetuated; its holders through the demonetization of silver and the substitution of notes based on the debt and inflating it, were given control of the currency; and the control of the taxing power was perpetuated in the hands of the class which had been enriched by the restriction in distribution, the artificial scarcity and the unnatural demand incident to the destructiveness of civil war.

Those who accomplished this were only incidentally partisans. It is their habit to work through both parties and they did not cease to do this when, as a result of their plans, the republican party was unexpectedly divided and issues forced which worked an almost complete re-alignment of both parties.

The issue was forced in the Senate on December 20, 1871, when Charles Sumner openly broke with the Grant administration, declaring that it was attempting "to commit Congress to a dance of blood."\*

The Senate had already rejected a "treaty" negotiated between Orville Babcock and a "General" Baez, who had proclaimed himself and several of his friends the government of San Domingo and had been "recognized" for the purposes of the treaty. The subject was revived by a resolution introduced by Senator Morton of Indiana, providing for a com-

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\*See Congressional Record, December 21, 1871.

mission to visit San Domingo and by a resolution of Mr. Sumner calling on the president for information "to show what European powers, if any, propose to acquire jurisdiction over the island."

Senator Edmunds, speaking for the administration and outlining its policy, proceeded to feel his way to the temper of the Senate, seeking to discover what it would do when acting openly on a proposition to "resent foreign intterference" in the whole of the West Indian archipelago. After explaining that it was a distinctively American doctrine not to permit an enlargement of European influences in the West Indies, he proceeded to enlarge the scope of the issue, before the Senate, from San Domingo to the West Indies as a whole and incidentally to Central America. "Certainly," he said, "if there be any distinctively American doctrine upon which the people are supposed to be a unit, it is that we shall not permit European interference or aggression (beyond existing conditions which the faith of treaties and public law do not permit us to interfere with) or the enlargement of the domain of that species of interference in governments in this great tropical archipelago, of which I have spoken. Therefore, information in respect to any of these islands, in respect to their capacity to support a free, industrious and self-governing population is of interest to the people of the United States. I say this with reference to Cuba as well as San Domingo; Hayti, the other end of the island, as well as Dominica, St. Thomas or whatever the island may be—as to the people who inhabit all those islands, there must always be a centering and absorbing interest—they taken as a whole lying in that great Mediterranean sea of the Western hemisphere, connecting us with the Isthmus of Panama and our great coast on the Pacific."

This utterance, so eminently characteristic of Mr. Edmunds in what it suppressed as in what it suggested, evoked an instant and characteristic reply from Sumner.

Bold intellectually and morally; honest in his methods of thought, candid in expression, despising fraud in all its forms, a representative New

England gentleman of the Brahmin class, intellectually and socially an aristocrat; but politically as extreme in his republicanism as Danton or Desmoulins, the Senator from Massachusetts justified his whole career to posterity by his answer. It was he who, when the conquest and dismemberment of Mexico were about to be undertaken, had delivered the appeal for peace and justice which, under the title he gave it, "The True Grandeur of Nations," will be his best monument for posterity. It was he again who, at the crisis of the Kansas-Nebraska debate, had expressed his contempt for Stephen A. Douglas in terms which almost exhaust the capacity of decent English for vituperation. And now the third time, at the close of his career, he was tested. The real issue in each case was the same. As it was Douglas, who in 1850-60, proposed an era of conquest and violence abroad to avoid the settlement of domestic issues, so it was Grant now—Grant as president with complete control of party machinery, and power to drive out of politics any republican who opposed him.

No one knew this better than Sumner. But he had the gentleman's scorn of cheating and cowardice, and if the pride of the gentleman—the indignation he feels at all the mean and knavish forms of injustice and oppression—could bring salvation to the world, Sumner might have been the herald of a new and higher civilization as he rose to reply to Edmunds.

"Mr. President," he said, "the resolution before the Senate commits Congress to a dance of blood. It is a new step in a measure of violence. Several steps have already been taken and Congress is now summoned to take another. . . . Sir, others may do as they please. Others may accept this policy. I will not. . . . I object to this proposition because it is a new stage in a measure of violence which, so far as it has been maintained, has been propped by violence. I use strong language but only what the occasion requires. As a Senator, as a patriot, I can not see my country suffer in its good name without an effort to save it. The negotiation for annexation began with a person known as Buenventura Baez. All the evidence



official and unofficial, shows him to be a political jockey. . . . Ever since the signature of the treaty, and especially ever since its rejection, Baez has been sustained in power by the presence of our naval force. Such I aver to be the fact. I state it with all the responsibility of my position and with full conviction of its truth. I ask you to do as I have done—to go to the State department and Navy department and read the reports there on file. . . . Baez has been treated as you fear Bismarck may treat Louis Napoleon. You call him president. They call him down there, dictator. Better call him emperor and then the parallel will be complete. He is sustained in power by the government of the United States that he may betray his country. Such is the fact and I challenge any senator to deny it.”

This speech is as clearly responsible for forcing the liberal republican bolt of 1872 as that of George William Curtis in the Chicago convention was for the “Mugwump” bolt against Blaine, or as Bland’s “Parting of the Ways” speech was for the issues of 1896 against foreign control of American mints and the American treasury. The power of a single man, accustomed to use his intellect as the vehicle of his moral force, has seldom had more adequate illustration than in these three speeches, delivered by men so unlike in everything except their fundamental rectitude of purpose and their deep-seated detestation of knavery.

Sumner was at once attacked by Senator Morton of Indiana, who, as he became possessed by the subject, showed himself incapable of the indications and suppressions which had characterized Mr. Edmunds. “Mr. President,” he said, “the annexation of San Domingo will come, I prophesy here to-night that it will come. And with it the annexation of Cuba and Puerto Rico.”

This bold declaration left nothing to the imagination. Taken in connection with that of Mr. Edmunds, it showed that the imperialism which sought control of the taxing power and the treasury under Grant was identical in methods with that which Mr. Bland opposed in Washington

and in Missouri in 1897, 1898 and 1899.

In 1898 when it was obvious that a primary object of the expansion movement was the refunding of the national debt as the base of a corporation paper currency substituted for coin and coin certificates, Mr. Bland found himself opposed in Missouri by political experts working to force the "expansion" movement, as was done under Grant, so as to withdraw public attention from the workings of the plan for treasury control and financial revolution. The issues forced ostentatiously against Mr. Bland were the acquisition of Puerto Rico by "force of arms," the annexation of Cuba by garrison control, an indefinite increase of the navy and the digging of the trans-isthmian canal.

At the time the "expansion debate" was forced on the country under Grant, it is no doubt a fact that the bill to demonetize silver and control the bonded debt and the paper currency of the country had already been drawn, and passed backwards and forwards in duplicate between New York and London. Three years after the expansion movement began, the demonetization bill passed Congress while the "new issues" were being fiercely debated. Mr. Bland entered national politics during that contest, and two years after its renewal in 1898—a year after he had made his last stand in opposing it—the new demonetization bill passed and the parallel was completed—even to the loud denunciation of their own work, to which agents of the conspiracy resorted in both cases.

While this is unmistakably apparent now, it could not have been intelligible in 1870 to any beyond a select circle of capitalists and their confidential dependants in politics. It is not probable that knowledge of it was sufficiently definite in the mind of Allen G. Thurman to have been one of the factors influencing him in supporting Sumner against Grant. It was natural that he should do so, not merely because he was a partisan and it was an opportunity for occupying an impregnable position, but because he was fundamentally an honest man—honest intellectually and practically, accustomed to making the fundamental principles of morality


the standard of his action. He was a democrat and a conservative while Mr. Sumner was a federalist and a radical, but both were courageous and honest men. Being so, they understood each other and worked together to defeat what both saw was an intended "Coup d'Etat." Thurman's rejoinder to the attacks on Sumner from the republican side showed a deep insight into the meaning of the movement of American politics during the century. It was unanswerable.

"Mr. President, I shall occupy very little of your time," he said in opening. "My purpose in rising is chiefly to put on record, in the fewest possible words, the grounds of my opposition to the annexation of San Domingo, and rather to state propositions than to make an argument. But before I do that, I wish to notice remarks which have fallen from senators in the course of this debate. A stranger who should have come into this chamber in the last two hours, unacquainted with the subject under discussion and listening to the speeches that have been made, would naturally have come to the conclusion that it is once more the field of an impeachment trial—that at this time it was not a president of the United States who was being arraigned, but a senator of the United States, the senator from Massachusetts. The senator from Michigan (Mr. Chandler) was pleased to tell the senator from Massachusetts that when he came to train this little body of democrats here, it would not be a very difficult undertaking—that there were not so many of them but that he would be able to dress the line without great military genius. When the senator made the remark my memory took me back eighteen years to the memorable year 1852. There was a presidential election that year. There were two candidates—the whig candidate, General Winfield Scott; the democratic candidate, General Franklin Pierce. They stood upon platforms that in one particular had no essential difference whatever—platforms that have been proclaimed ever since the year 1861 to have been pro-slavery—platforms that denounced in almost the same language and with precisely the same meaning any agitation whatever of the subject of slavery or the

abolition thereof—which denounced it as unpatriotic in anybody whatsoever in any part of this republic to seek to disturb, by any agitation whatsoever, that status of slavery which existed in the southern states. Upon that platform the two great parties went to battle in that year 1852. There was one man in the Senate of the United States that day—and but one—who repudiated both platforms and would stand upon neither—who repudiated both candidates and would vote for neither. That man was Charles Sumner. I see him standing in the senate then without a single follower. He had no ten men, the number of democrats here now, to dress into line then. He had no one but himself. And I have lived to see the day when sixty senators of the republican party, the senator from Michigan among them, were following in his footsteps with the most implicit obedience. I have seen that which I never expected to see. I have seen the man who repudiated your candidate of 1852 who spit upon your platform then, at the head of your column for nearly ten years in the Senate of the United States. Where then were you who now talk of nothing but freedom? Where then were you who now boast of the enfranchisement of the African race? Where then were you who are now so ready to denounce any man that ever stood up for the institutions of the country or at least sought to prevent the country from being ruined by their disturbance? Where were you, republican senators, in 1852, when the senator from Massachusetts stood, if not solitary, at least alone? Where were you? One half, or nearly so, voting for Franklin Pierce and the rest for Winfield Scott.”

## CHAPTER IX.

The Republican Party Revolutionized under Grant.—Sumner is Driven out of it.—Seward, Greeley and Sumner Die Heart-Broken.—Blaine's Tribute to Sumner.—The use of Subconscious Memory in Politics.—Militant Commercialism Called to Account for the Fall of Seward, Sumner and Greeley.

N INTELLECT and in moral force, Sumner and Seward rank with Lincoln as the three greatest men among the founders of the republican party. Horace Greeley, who comes next after them, is next only after a long interval. It is a fact of much historical significance that all three died under Grant's administration—repudiated by the party they had founded, and in disgrace as far as it could disgrace them. Seward died at Auburn, New York, October 10, 1872; Greeley at his country place in Westchester county, New York, November 29, 1872, and Sumner at Washington, March 11, 1874.

The details of Greeley's death are sufficiently well known and it is only pertinent here to add to them that the charge of mental incapacity, preferred against him when he was being forced out of the control of the paper he had founded, would have been sufficiently proven, in the minds of some New York and London capitalists, by his stubborn refusal to support their policies and by his "agrarianism." It is not infrequently the habit of political managers of the class Mr. Greeley antagonized, to prefer the charge of mental aberration against those they can not control—and they are not rendered the less, but rather the more, prone to do so from the fact that they themselves are often victims of hysteroid diseases of will and judgment, manifesting the chronic nervous disorders which are incident to ungoverned appetites and violent desires gratified at the expense both of individual well being and the rights of others. It was by men of this class that Mr. Bland was habitually assailed as "a crank."

The small but powerful class which decreed that Seward, Greeley and

Sumner should be driven out of politics has no such moral reservations and limitations as govern the normal man. It has little hesitation in sacrificing human life at wholesale or retail for commercial advantage—to keep up the price of corporation stocks or to prevent their own control of money and trade from being alienated. “The red republicans” of the Reign of Terror in France illustrated a similar enfranchisement of highly developed intellect from moral restraint. They reasoned that in a single war planned by financiers and holders of governmental privileges, from 100,000 to 500,000 lives had sometimes been deliberately sacrificed in attaining an object which the statesmanship thus illustrated had concluded to be desirable. Hence the Terrorists argued, that if by cutting off in a year the heads of several thousand of their most pronounced opponents, they could establish their own theories of liberty and justice, the world would be greatly the gainer.

Such reasoning, however logical it may be from its premises, is certainly a symptom of moral insanity and no intellectual flexibility which accompanies it can prevent its reaction upon itself. In 1899 and 1900 when the questions of the Greeley campaign again recurred, the same symptoms showed themselves as a class disease, illustrated in the use of the United States army “to move the hemp crop”<sup>\*</sup>—the moving consisting of a sudden attack on its producers and the killing of a sufficient number of them in their fields through the use of the latest improved projectiles, to make the rest willing to abandon or surrender their product. That the men who are accustomed thus to act, consider such processes normal and reasonable is probable, but their opinions are not always fully concurred in even by their own political associates.

Next to Sumner and Seward, James G. Blaine ranks as the greatest intellect of the later republican party. Had he been governed by the high purposes of Seward or the moral inflexibility of Sumner, he might have been greater than either—greater indeed than any other statesman

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<sup>\*</sup>See Associated Press report from Washington and Manila. December to March, 1899-1900.





W. M. STEWART.



FRANCIS M. COCKRELL.



ROGER Q. MILLS.



JOHN SHERMAN.



of the Civil war period. Naturally magnanimous, a lover of justice and a hater of oppression by instinct, he revolted against the policies of which Sumner was the victim, and although he did not have the stern force of character to stand as Sumner stood, he admired him greatly and finally put on record his vindication.

"The opening of the Forty-second Congress on the fourth of March, 1871, was disfigured by an act of grave injustice," writes Mr. Blaine.\* "Charles Sumner was deposed from the chairmanship of the committee on Foreign Relations—a position he had held continuously since the republican party gained control of the Senate. The cause of his displacement may be found in the angry contentions to which the annexation of San Domingo gave rise. Mr. Sumner's opposition to that project was intense and his words carried with them what was construed as a personal affront to the President of the United States—though never so intended by the Massachusetts senator. . . . The removal of Mr. Sumner had been determined by a caucus of republican senators and never was the power of the caucus more wrongfully applied. . . . For his fidelity to principle and his boldness in asserting the truth at an earlier day, Mr. Sumner was struck down in the Senate chamber by a weapon in the hand of a political foe. It was impossible to anticipate that fifteen years later, he would be even more cruelly struck down in the Senate by the members of the party he had done so much to establish. The cruelty was greater in the latter case, as anguish of spirit is greater than suffering of body. In both instances Mr. Sumner's bearing was distinguished by dignity and magnanimity. He gave utterance to no complaints, and silently submitted to the unjustifiable wrong of which he was the victim. That nothing might be lacking in the extraordinary character of the final scene of his deposition, the democratic senators recorded themselves against the consummation of the injustice. They had no co-operation from the republicans. The caucus dictation was so strong that discontented republicans merely refrained from voting."

As in Sumner's action, checking Grant, we have the explanation of the "liberal republican" movement which made a radical change in the republican party and repulsed militant commercialism for the time being, so in this expression from Mr. Blaine appears, if only vaguely, the deep, under-

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\*Twenty Years in Congress, pp. 503-6.

lying causes which worked to defeat the Grant third term movement of 1880.

It has been sometimes assumed that Mr. Blaine was moved to antagonize the third term movement merely by his own ambition, but the reasoning which leads to such conclusions is inadequate. Even in men who are weakest or most timid morally,\* the sense of justice is a determining faculty—one of the great faculties separating men from the lower animals. The other is memory. Animals, of the orders lower than mankind, are certainly able to reason at any given time on any given set of conditions to the full extent of all their faculties, but their faculties are severely limited by the limitations of their memories. As memory increases, as consequently the intellect of which it is a faculty becomes able to store up and co-ordinate a larger number of facts from past observation and experience, the reason increases in its power of analysis and synthesis. The influence of the individual who approximates the norm of moral sanity increases proportionately.

This is perhaps the most important single fact of politics. The barbarian, accustomed to gratify his appetite at once, and habitually unwilling to deny himself the immediate indulgence of his passions of acquisitiveness or destructiveness, can think only of the immediate advantage which he sees it is possible for him to take of those who are not on guard against his superior cunning and his lack of self restraint. For the immediate advantage which he can take of those who are unprepared to resist him, he sacrifices not only their rights but his own future well-being and often if not always his ultimate safety.

In the memory of every one who is higher in the scale of civilization than those who use their advantage of others for injustice, it is a law of the evolution of mind that the sense of this injustice must inhere with a tenacity bearing a definite relation to the moral and intellectual strength of the individual. In such minds the sense of justice operates through memory

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\*Old English, "weakest;" Modern English, "wickedest."

with cumulative force in behalf of others, and at every great crisis of politics they are impelled by all their own essential subconscious forces to use for the benefit of those not so strong as themselves, the slowly accumulating force of will which they have exerted in the condemnation of acts of injustice they lacked the strength of will or the ability to prevent. Even in men whose wills are weakest, the memory has the same inevitable tendency to reinforce and make efficient the sense of justice. They may not be energized by the sincerity of Bland, the moral sturdiness of Thurman or the boldness of Sumner, but unless they are hopelessly corrupt, their memories are working ceaselessly, above or below the level of their consciousness, to impel them to a just and at last decisive judgment of the crimes which are inevitably incident to the attempts of the cunning and the powerful to control the machinery of government for their own advantage.

## CHAPTER X.

The Issue and Control of the Currency a Vital Prerogative of Sovereignty.—Benton Fails to Secure a Direct Issue with the Non-Productive Classes.—Abuses of the Control of the Currency by State Banks Flagrant.—Bland Renews Benton's Interrupted Work Against Corporation Sovereignty in the Issue of the Currency.—The Party of Commercial Imperialism in the United States and the Policies of Warren Hastings.—The Threat of the Fusillade as a Factor In Economic Discussion.—“Bluffing” as a Political Method in America.—Statesmanship and the Poker Habit.—The Realities of Hate and Passion Behind the Theatrical Threats of Professional Politicians.—Stirring the South to Resistance.—Bland and Alexander H. Stephens Consult on Means of Preventing an Outbreak.—Butler's Attack Answered at the South by Deep Disturbance.—Immorality in all Parties and in all Sections.—The Radicalism of Demagogues in the Black Belt.—International Commercialism and the Trade for the Control of the American Treasury.—Bland on Cox and Randall.



HE long struggle made by Benton against the use of corporation tokens as currency had been only partly successful under the democratic party from 1830 to 1860. The demand for a coin currency had been urged by Benton not on account of any attachment to coin as a fetish, but as a means of restoring to the people the exercise of one of the most vital prerogatives of their sovereignty.

Whoever controls the currency and the taxing power is sovereign, no matter what the form of government may be. It was for the life of republican institutions that Benton, resisting corporation sovereignty in the control of money, opened the fight which Bland made with even greater force after him.

At the time Benton's work was interrupted by civil war, the passion of which broke his influence and retired him from politics, he had never succeeded in forcing the issues logically. As a result of compromise, the power of issuing credit tokens to circulate in lieu of cash, once exercised by the Bank of the United States, had been transferred to banks chartered



by the states—which, while never less rapacious than the bank of the United States had been, were frequently more fraudulent and generally more reckless. They had only the one advantage, that they could not so readily be controlled by foreign dealers in public debt and by currency brokers such as those who during the Civil war took advantage of the necessities of the federal government to impose on it their control of the currency under the national banking system—a system so devised as to give holders of United States bonds in London, Paris, and Berlin power to issue American currency and to exercise in all parts of the country a prerogative which all publicists agree carries sovereignty with it to those who hold it. As the price of the continued existence of the government, President Lincoln and the Congress supporting his administration, were forced to delegate the better half of the national sovereignty to a class of men whom the President himself and Salmon P. Chase, his secretary of the treasury, had been trained to view with profound distrust.

No sooner had the war ceased than the real republican element of the party—the men who actually hated government by force or by extorted privilege, began to strive even more strenuously for a reconstruction of the government at Washington than for that of the state governments at the south.

The retirement of Sumner, Seward, and Greeley, followed in each case by death, was the end of the republican party which had forced the war as a protest against slavery.

The party which succeeded it and showed its impulses under Grant was a party of commercial imperialism whose ideal government was that which, when established by Warren Hastings and his associates, had transformed England from a limited monarchy to an empire, controlled by the holders of the debt created by the military operations necessary for its maintenance.

When Mr. Bland reached Washington in December, 1873, to begin his work in Congress, these commercial imperialists, under cover of the

expansionist agitation for the annexation of the West Indies, reinforced by such measures as the Civil Rights bill and the "reconstruction" measures at home, had demonetized silver and assured to themselves the control of the currency and the taxing power for a generation.

Being without a "war record" and having a knowledge of conditions at both the south and west such as was hardly possible for any other public man of his time, Mr. Bland became naturally the advocate of southern and western producers against the attempt to restrict production and distribution to a basis adjusted to the fancied necessities of class control of money and supply.

In 1896, Mr. Theodore Roosevelt declared that a number of those who were advocating Mr. Bland's theories of public policy might be advantageously "stood up against the wall and shot." This view, rather symptomatic than sectional, governed the policies which prevailed in Washington in 1873. There was a certain amount of blood-thirstiness in it, but much more of what is sometimes called "bluffing"—the Homeric habit of loud talking illustrated in those primitive heroes who, as champions of their respective sides, stand between the lines, magnifying each his own party and vilifying or threatening the other. So great is the effect of mere atavism in politics, that perhaps such situations as that of 1873 will never be fully understood until the present arbitrary divisions between the sciences, necessary as they are for classification, are abandoned. When every man who attempts to become a publicist begins by studying anthropology from the time politics and political economy consisted largely of the science of catching and preparing men for actual food, it may be much easier to understand all that was behind General Butler when, as the representative of the element which had demonetized silver, he urged the Civil Rights bill and similar measures to engage public attention until the passage of time should make it more easily possible for the agents of the revolutionary act to escape responsibility for it. It was a time of the loudest and most ferocious talking possible. Much of it was due to actual

hatred, but much more was merely representative or atavistic. There is no room to doubt the sectional animosities of the people at this time. Otherwise every question of political economy would have approached its settlement through evolution. But, as for all the evil passions of mankind, the philosopher's stone has been found; as hatred and malice, blood-thirstiness and the spirit of violence among peoples are inevitably transmuted into fraud and oppression in the governments they create, it happened that back of all the false pretense of the period at Washington there was a reality of actual diabolism which was only to be overcome gradually by the inherent virtues of the people. The average politician of that period, republican or democrat, might lose all real feeling against the political antagonist with whom in private he drank or against whom he "bluffed" at poker—a game which, under the Grant administration, was as much a part of the politics of Washington as were the open proceedings of Congress itself. It was at poker that statesmen practiced themselves, in "passing" or in "bluffing," and it was at poker, too, that they learned how little the strength of the cards held in actual politics has to do with the result of the game. A favorite method of bribery was to allow the person to be purchased to win the purchase money by "bluffing." For this reason and others, the game became a mode of political education in such repute that it was popularized among the governing classes in England by a treatise written by one of President Grant's ministers plenipotentiary. He, however, was not responsible for the introduction of American "cocktails" which occurred at about the same period of "Anglo-Saxon unification." Between poker and cocktails, in private, the average politician of the period, "bluffing" in politics as over his cards, was the more ready for loud and ferocious talk in public. Much of it was theatrical and in a rude way artistic. In exceptional cases, such as that of General Butler, it was the height of art with little or no passion in it. But back of it were fierce popular hatreds, stirred to flame by calculating covetousness, and in the south there was a terror of the future which made logical action difficult

and expressed itself from time to time in desperate acts of protest. Such acts of unreason were anticipated by the leaders on both sides. "I think the radicals are trying to get up as much offensive legislation as possible so as to drive the southern people to resist that they may use the army there in the next presidential election," wrote Mr. Bland in 1875.\* "We will do all we can to prevent it. I called on A. H. Stephens of Georgia and had a long talk with him on political matters. This seems to be his idea also."

In politics the course of every party is finally determined by its extremists, and at this time Louisiana, South Carolina, and the "black belt" of Arkansas presented conditions which invited the attention of party managers, and speculative financiers interested in developing the extreme radicalism of southern objection to the results of "reconstruction." While such democrats as Mr. Bland, and Alexander H. Stephens were planning to prevent outbreaks in these states, General Butler and his principals were working to provoke them, and they were too often met more than half way by local demagogues in the "black belt," cunning enough to know that so long as politics remained sectional they could compel the support of the democrats in such states as Missouri, Tennessee, Georgia, and Virginia where the governing motive of politics was a desire to minimize violence, and restore so much of the old Union as was possible, or could be made possible under the new conditions. There has never been a time in American politics when the atrocity and the falsity of human nature were all massed on one side or confined to one section.

"Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra."

Such calculating and fictitious radicalism as that represented at this period by General Butler had its analogue at the south in men who, when conditions invited it, as in 1896-98, were as ready to change party as he. Like him, they had their own peculiar virtues, and their own individual claims to fitness for survival, but they were like him also in looking on

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\*Letter to Mrs. Bland from Washington, January 13, 1875.

politics as a science involving a knowledge of what is worst and basest in human nature and necessitating habitual appeal to it. If it is fortunately true that such habits of thought and action are characteristic neither of Massachusetts nor Louisiana, it is true that in every state in the Union the social demoralization and political corruption due to civil war greatly increased the number and the influence of such men—men whom the student of politics, cultivating calmness of thought and the habit of reservation in statement should be slow to describe publicly as scoundrels, no matter how, for the sake of strict scientific accuracy, he may classify them in his private categories. Among such men, greatly increased everywhere by civil war, the commercial imperialism of 1866 to 1876 found its ready instruments as it did once more when, from 1896 to 1900, it was seeking means of undoing Mr. Bland's work, and of controlling the democratic party organization in Missouri and elsewhere against him.

The stand taken by Sumner and Seward in the east, by Brown, Schurz and Blair in Missouri, and finally by Horace Greeley in the campaign of 1872, checked imperialism for a generation, but to those who saw only the surface phenomena of the time, the defeat of Greeley seemed to be a conclusive indorsement of the policies he opposed. The currency was accordingly put on an "international" basis, and the policies of the campaign of 1872 were accentuated for 1876. General Butler was kept at the front with his Civil Rights bill, and a still more radical measure for military control of elections. While the atmosphere of New York City, and of Washington was fetid with the reek of political scandal; while in politics, national, state and municipal, the public was plundered by "rings" of every description, while the public domain, and the public treasury were being surrendered to an unscrupulous and desperate plutocracy, wholly foreign in idea to America, and to a considerable extent foreign in actual residence, the issues of civil war sectionalism were kept alive by attacks on the pride and prejudices of a people conquered, and stripped to the skin. The thinking American of southern birth who, forced to choose between



the principles represented on one side by Charles Sumner and on the other by Jefferson Davis, would unhesitatingly choose those of Sumner, may be, from Sumner's own standpoint, the more fully justified in the utmost detestation for policies which deliberately wrung the human heart to increase the percentage of banking profits, and which the better to control the taxing power, cunningly impelled the passionate and the ignorant to violence and bloodshed.

The contest over the election and Civil Rights bill grew more intense as the presidential year approached. "Mr. Bland told me that six members of the House died as a result of the strain of the fight over the Civil Rights bill," writes Mrs. Bland.† Mr. Bland's letters at this period were written hurriedly in the brief intervals of the struggle, but even in their most hasty and disconnected annotations of the time, they have a lasting value as illustrations of the intensity of the contest.

It was the policy of the New York bankers, and the protected interests of Pennsylvania to contest on the democratic side the issues which they forced on the republican. In pursuance of this policy they supported S. S. Cox and Samuel J. Randall, both patriotic men of many admirable qualities, representing interests which at times were more conflicting than those of the north and south. Mr. Cox represented a constituency largely controlled by newspapers and banks, capitalized in whole or part in London. This capitalization was used in the interests of the gold standard but in favor of a lower tariff which would admit English goods. The Pennsylvania constituency represented by Mr. Randall was equally in favor of the gold standard, but was opposed to any tariff which would admit English goods. It was on the division between these interests, with Mr. Daniel Manning to represent the banks and the London "international currency" interest in the control of the treasury, that the democratic party was allowed to seat President Cleveland in 1885.

Both Mr. Randall and Mr. Cox were strong and sincere men, largely

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†Reminiscences of Mr. Bland written for this book.



representative in their public work of sectional and class interests, but even in their representative capacity, accustomed to assert their own individuality, Mr. Cox was largely instrumental in the preliminary work of demonetizing silver, and Mr. Randall did more than anyone else, perhaps, to make an approximation to free trade impossible for the nineteenth century. But though they were thus radically opposed to Mr. Bland, he showed his usual candor of intellect and kindness of heart in speaking of them. In a speech of April 19, 1880, on the death of Mr. Cox, he said:

"When I first came to Congress in 1873, I found Mr. Cox a member of the House. He had served many terms prior to that. I had never met him before. His reputation at that time as an orator was world-wide; consequently I was anxious to meet him and hear him speak. My admiration for the man grew upon me as I became more familiar with him. The Forty-third Congress to which I have alluded gave many occasions for the display of his oratory, wit and humor. Mr. Blaine was speaker. Gen. Butler of Massachusetts was then the acknowledged leader on the republican side.

"Gen. Butler, with all his great ability and pertinacity, pressed what were then known as the Force bill and the Civil Rights bill. He succeeded in passing the Civil Rights bill, but through the dilatory tactics of the democratic party, led by Mr. Randall of Pennsylvania (whose death, but a week ago we were called to mourn), with Mr. Cox as our great champion in debate, the Force bill was defeated. Justice requires me to say in passing that the strict impartiality shown by Mr. Blaine, the speaker, during this memorable contest excited the highest warmth of admiration from his political opponents. In that fight there were two great men and great characters brought more prominently than before into public notice. These were Samuel J. Randall and Samuel Sullivan Cox.

"My service here with Mr. Cox began in the Forty-third Congress, and was continuous except in the Forty-ninth Congress while he was minister to Turkey. I was fortunate enough to have a seat by him for two years. In this way I learned to know him as a friend. From overwork and cares incident to public life I was in failing health. Mr. Cox took great interest in my case. He gave me the benefit of his advice and experience for he was never robust himself. His amiable disposition threw a halo of sunshine around his companions. As my health was gradually restored, I used to tell him it was all due to his cheerful company and bouyant temperament.

"Mr. Cox loved the Union for the Union's sake. His voice and his vote were potential in the war for the Union. When resistance to the Union ceased, his 'cause of war' ceased. He had no resentments. His voice was raised for peace and amnesty. He labored to restore the Union by constitutional methods.

"The unhappy people of the south in their struggle for restored liberty under our constitution had no truer or abler champion than he. The idea of state government taught by Jefferson, that we now call 'home rule,' was a cardinal principle with him. No man living or dead did more in those halls than he to cement our people in the sublime principles of union and justice.

"His great victories were achievements of intellect, the trophies of valor won in the arena of debate. His walks were the walks of peace; his ambition was tempered by justice and mercy. His boundless sympathy took in loving embrace the oppressed everywhere. His smile was the delight of his companions. In it was the well-spring of a perpetual youth. He approached the allotted three score and ten, yet had he lived a century he would have died young. Neither age nor physical infirmity could wrinkle his sunny face, quench the fire of his eye, or blight the evergreen in his soul.

"Our ideas associate the better world beyond with peace and joy, mirth and song. If this be true, death for him was only the lifting of the thin veil separating time from eternity. As he left this, so he stepped upon the other shore. There was no change."

As Mr. Bland could say this so readily and sincerely of men from whose opinions on vital issues of political economy he dissented so radically as he did from Messrs. Cox and Randall, it is certain that he would wish to have equal concessions made to the sincerity and patriotism of many of the republicans whom, with Cox and Randall, he opposed in the bitter sectional struggle of the times. To many of them, as individuals, no less praise is due than to Mr. Cox and Mr. Randall, but back of the party struggle of the times were the great issues of progress and reaction of popular government against oligarchy. These are not sectional, but for the time being, they can be made to appear so—as they were in 1875 when the masses, north and south, believed they were supporting the fundamental principles of popular government, in what appears now with certainty to have been a struggle forced by plutocratic influences. This was

only vaguely suspected in 1875, however, and it is because they were written from the standpoint of 1875 rather than of 1900, that these extracts from Mr. Bland's letters to Mrs. Bland, given in the next chapter, have their greatest historical value.

## CHAPTER XI.

Mr. Bland Describes the Struggle of the Democratic Minority Against the Force Bill and the Civil Rights Bill.—The Roll Call on a Motion to Adjourn as the Last Resort of Constitutional Government.—The Fight of 1875 in Congress to Control the Presidential Election of 1876.—The Scott Subsidy and the Attempt to Control Distribution through an Increase of Tariff Taxation.—The Senate allows the Force Bill to Fail.



THE letters which follow were written by Mr. Bland to Mrs. Bland, generally in the intervals between roll calls in the House during the "fillibustering" which gave the more conservative republicans of the Senate an opportunity to evade the direct issue of systematizing and perpetuating the use of the army at the polls:

### A MINORITY WITH ITS BACK TO THE WALL.

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"We are now fillibustering on the Civil Rights bill, Butler having reported a new one; we are moving to adjourn, and making all kinds of motions so as to stave it off. I expect we will be here all day and all night. We have taken three votes on the roll call to adjourn, and now have another. The excitement is getting greater all the time. The galleries are full of fifteenth amendmenters, and all other kinds of people. I sent you a Record of yesterday showing the vote on the amendment to the Constitution. It was defeated—two-thirds not voting in the affirmative. I have just stopped and voted aye to adjourn. This is the fourth vote. 'Old Ben' looks smiling, and I suppose will call for his dinner again.\* It looks like fighting now, and I suppose we will have it from now on till the adjournment. This is the 27th of January—only one more month. I am so glad to see the days pass—these 'long days.'"

\*During the progress of the "fillibustering" General Butler had ordered his dinner served at his desk in the House.

## ROLL CALLS AS A LAST HOPE.

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"Ever since I wrote yesterday we have had a continuous roll call, so that for twenty-four hours I have not slept, nor been absent, but have answered every roll call. The atmosphere in the House would kill a mule in time, and if we are not all made sick it will be a wonder. We have no expectation of any change before Saturday night at 12:00 o'clock, and then we will quit for Sunday. This will be four days and nights without rest. I do not know how we will manage it, but will have to get some sleep or we can not hold out. It is a question of physical endurance. The radicals have three to one, and can rest each other. In this foul atmosphere about one hundred Africans slept all night in the lobbies, and I suppose thought every vote would bring them their 'civil rights.' 'Old Ben' got pretty well worn out, and has gone to take a rest to be ready to-night, I suppose, and—well I have stopped again to vote for the fiftieth or hundredth time to adjourn, since yesterday. The roll goes on and on, and will, I suppose, until Sunday. I hear them sighing all around me, and they are a sleepy looking set. I have just passed between two tellers for calling the ayes and noes for adjournment. The roll goes on again, so we have three motions now pending—one to adjourn now, one to adjourn over till Friday, and one until Saturday, and have to call the roll on all of them, which will take over an hour. When we get all these calls, then we go through the entire process again and again, and we will do so until a physical breakdown overcomes one side or the other. Give my love to little Virgie, and kiss her for papa. My whole heart to her and mamma. I am too tired to write more."

## ONE HOUR'S SLEEP IN FORTY-SIX.

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"This is Saturday, the 30th, and I am glad the month is about out. I wrote two notes, not letters, yesterday. I wrote the first and mailed it about 10:00 o'clock in the morning; half an hour afterward we adjourned and I wrote another, or tried to, but was so sleepy and tired and nervous that I could not write, and went home, and slept about three hours before night, then got up and walked around awhile, and went to bed about half-past nine, and got up about nine this morning, so I feel refreshed, and am well and all right. I don't think I am hurt much, though I am sore about

the muscles. We had a session of forty-six hours, and I slept only about one hour during that time. I was on hand at about every roll call. It will take all day to read the Record. We wore the radicals out."

### READY FOR MORE FILLIBUSTERING.

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"The House adjourned Saturday, and I have had plenty of sleep and rest, and am ready for more fillibustering, if necessary. The radicals say they will amend the rules as to present the Civil Rights bill next week. If they do, then they will pass the bill. Well, we will have to let them take the responsibility, and I expect they will pass it in some shape, but not in the terms of the Senate bill. We whipped them, made them adjourn at any rate, and that was quite a victory, though it cost us the loss of two nights' sleep, and we were almost whipped ourselves when the adjournment came. I never felt so glad to hear the House adjourn before."

### THE RULES AMENDED.

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"The radicals have succeeded to-day in so amending the rules as to prevent fillibustering, and now they can pass anything they please. I suppose that in a day or so they will pass the Civil Rights bill, and end that controversy. Let them pass it, for it will hurt them more than anyone else, in my opinion. The galleries are crowded full, and back of me there are about five hundred negroes. It is suffocating."

### THE FORCE BILL.

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"This is Monday, and what may come up before we get through, I can not tell, but I expect some mischief. Now you have got the papers showing all about the excitement over the Civil Rights bill. I have written you most of the matters of interest connected with it. We are threatened now with legislation to put the south under Grant's military rule. It is hard to tell where the radicals will stop, for the last elections have so enraged and alarmed them that they seem entirely desperate. The lobby is full, and all kinds of schemes are on foot to get money from the treasury.





STATUE OF ANDREW JACKSON.



PEACE MONUMENT.



STATUE OF LAFAYETTE.



ARLINGTON, FORMER HOME OF GEN. R. E. LEE.

SCENES IN AND NEAR WASHINGTON.



I have no doubt that we will have an exciting time from now on, and the people are watching very closely what takes place here."

### VINDICTIVE AND DIABOLICAL MEASURES.

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"The republican caucus has agreed on the most vindictive and diabolical measures possible for the overthrow of the southern states, and to carry the next presidential election. Nothing but a united and full democratic delegation can possibly prevent their success. We are on the tariff bill to-day, and it causes great excitement, for it proposes largely increased taxation for the purpose, no doubt, of getting money to maintain a large standing army in the south. The truth is, the country is in imminent danger from the revolutionary intentions and acts of Grant and his party."

### A STORMY TIME EXPECTED.

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"We were on private bills yesterday most of the time, and nothing of note transpired. After Saturday the ten days for suspension of the rules will begin, and from that time on I expect we will have night sessions and a stormy time generally. I am so glad February is half out. It begins to look short now. I have a desperately mean pen, but don't know if I am not writing better with it than I would with a good one. Beck is said to be getting on very well with his broken arm, and will soon be out again. Wood (Fernando) looks as dignified and fine as ever. Holman still fights appropriations, and is called the 'Watch dog of the Treasury.' The Missouri delegation are very quiet this session, making no speeches. I may make one yet, though it is doubtful, for I think it about as well to wait till next winter."

### A VOTE AGAINST SUBSIDY.

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"We had a vote to suspend the rules in favor of Tom Scott's Texas Pacific Railroad to-day. I voted against the radicals, and have incurred the displeasure of the St. Louis Republican. I expect all the St. Louis

papers will take me to task for my vote, but I can not help it for I am opposed to all subsidies. It would help St. Louis, but I do not think it right to tax the people for the benefit of private corporations. I am certain I voted right, and that ends it. We will have night sessions most of the time from now on, but I don't care for that, for it helps to pass the time."

## CONTROLLING THE PRODUCER THROUGH HIS PRODUCT.

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"The tariff bill passed last night. It may not pass the Senate, but I expect it will. I have great hopes that we will get through without any more oppressive legislation for the south, yet the Grant radicals are determined to force it if possible."

## A SLEEPLESS STRUGGLE.

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"I hope you will pardon me if I do not write a long letter this time. I have been in the House since yesterday at 10 o'clock. We are all on the 'southern force bill,' and have beat the radicals so far by fillibustering. We have gained one day on them and are still at the fight. I have not slept at all, and am quite uneasy and nervous. A certain number of democrats have to stay here without sleep or rest to make the fight, as some of the others shirk and go off. Those of us who stay will endure as long as physical endurance will last, and fight it out. The picture I sent you of the 'dead lock' on the Civil Rights bill is a pretty good representation of the House then, as well as now, and will answer both cases quite as well. You need not be uneasy about me, for I think I can stand it as long as any radical, and it will not make me sick. I will take the best care of myself I can."

## STILL THE FORCE BILL.

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"We had a hard time over the southern force bill, as I wrote you yesterday, and it is not over yet. We adjourned last evening about 5 o'clock, and I went to bed at six in the evening, and got up at seven this morning; so I had a good rest. We will begin the fight to-day again, and continue

it as long as a dilatory motion can be made. We may be in session all night again; in fact we will have but little rest from now on, day or night, till adjournment. One great trouble of these night sessions is the injury to the eye. The light is so brilliant at night that with the loss of sleep it almost invariably hurts the eyes. My eyes were in a bad condition last night, and they are a good deal inflamed this morning, so much that it hurts them to read and write."

### AN INCREASE OF GRAY HAIRS.

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"This is Saturday, and I am glad the time draws near for adjournment. We are still on the southern force bill, and may be all night again. We did not have to stay up last night, of which I am glad, for it tells severely on our health and comfort, and you will find that I have got many more gray hairs than when I left. At least I think so, and feel so. We have had a desperately hard time of it, and the weather has been so bad that it has been very trying on us. There is hardly a member who is not suffering from complaints brought on by so much loss of sleep and confinement. The galleries are much crowded to-day. We will have a warm time of it on this bill. If we can keep it from being reported to the Senate till Monday, it will be defeated, but I fear we will not be able to do it."

### THE SENATE FAILS GRANT.

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"We filibustered all day yesterday, and up to 12 o'clock last night, when the southern force bill passed. One object, however, was accomplished, for we desired to keep it from passing so as to be reported to the Senate before Monday, and we did so, for the Senate got tired waiting, and adjourned. That will defeat it in the Senate for they can not get it up in time to pass it. So we have killed the main bill for the reelection of Grant or some other radical. The Civil Rights bill has passed the Senate, and will be a law, but it is of very little consequence compared with the one we have killed by timely filibustering."

### MR. BLAND THREATENED WITH CENSURE.

(From an undated letter of 1875, to Mrs. Bland.)

"I send Record. On page 21 you will find where they sought to censure me for not voting so as to make a quorum. No business could be

done unless a quorum voted. The democrats refused to vote so as to prevent any business pertaining to the southern force bill from being done. Clements wanted to make me vote, and Butler wanted to make Randall of Pennsylvania vote, but they could not succeed, for that required a quorum also. I would have been expelled before I would have voted, and by that made a quorum to pass the bill."

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1875.

(To Mrs. Bland.)

"We had a session nearly all last night, and I suppose we will have but little sleep until we adjourn, you must excuse this short letter. I am worked down, and very tired. I hardly know what I write."



## CHAPTER XII.

Mr. Bland Reviews his Own Connection with the Struggle for American Popular Control of American Mints and the American Treasury.—Currency Legislation from the Demonetization Act of 1873 to the Bankers' Panic and the Renewed Struggle for Demonetization in the Last Decade of the Century.—How "the Crime of 1873" was Perpetrated.—Mr. Bland Appointed to the Committee on Mines and Mining.—The Banks Bill and the First Sixteen-to-One Free Coinage Bill.—The Silver Commission of the Forty-Fourth Congress.—The Bland Free Coinage Bill and the Allison Amendment.—The Hayes Veto and the Votes of Messrs. McKinley, Carlisle and Others to pass the Bill over it.—The Demand of the Bondholders for the Privilege of Issuing and Controlling the Currency.—The London Bankers and their New York and Western Agents Raid the Treasury, Contract Credits and Compel Panic as a means of Securing a Currency of Corporation Notes for the Public and the Payment of their own Bonds in Gold.—England Demonetizes Silver in India to aid Them.—At the Parting of the Ways with Wall Street.—Mr. Bland Forces the Issues Which Compelled the Chicago Platform and the Campaign of 1896.—He Points out the only Possible Course for the Democratic Party in the Future.

BY R. P. BLAND.

(In 1895, Mr. Bland delivered a series of lectures in the south and west, reviewing currency legislation from the demonetization of silver in 1873 to the repeal of the silver purchasing clause of the Sherman act under the second Cleveland administration. In preparing himself for these lectures, he wrote a paper which was found by Mrs. Bland among his other papers after his death. It gives from his own standpoint and as a result of his own experience and observation, a resume of the history of twenty years of currency control. As the control of the currency and the taxing power was the real issue of the sectional demonstration of 1875, which followed the demonetization of silver in 1873, Mr. Bland's own reviews of two decades of currency legislation is given here as vital for an understanding of the reality back of the false pretenses of politics. What follows in this entire chapter is from his manuscript.)



TO COMPREHEND the silver question, and the battles fought in Congress for the free coinage of silver for twenty years, it is necessary to begin with the act of 1873—the act which demonetized the standard silver dollar. From the passage of our first mint act in 1792 until the demonetization act of 1873, the standard silver dollar, 371 1-4 grains of pure silver, was the unit of account or standard of value. The amount of pure silver in this dollar was never altered, whereas the gold dollar had been twice changed. For over eighty years and up to 1873 the standard silver dollar, as now coined in pure silver was the unit of our coinage. The act of 1873 was entitled "An act revis-

ing and amending the laws relating to the mints and the assay offices and the coinage of the United States." This act contains in all sixty-seven sections and deals with the management of the mints and assay offices. The title of the act and the context indicate its sole purpose to be to amend details relating to the management of mints, assay offices and the coinage. There is nothing whatever in the title of the act giving notice that its purpose was to displace the old silver unit and to put in its stead the gold dollar as the unit of value; nothing to indicate a purpose to prohibit the coinage of the old silver unit that had had the right of free coinage at our mints and full legal tender from the foundation of the government up to that time. Notwithstanding the act contains sixty-seven sections in all, there was no important change in the law relating to the mints and assay offices and the coinage, excepting that part prohibiting the coinage of the standard silver dollar and substituting the gold dollar for the silver dollar as the unit of account. In further proof of the surreptitious nature of this revolutionary change from the silver unit to the gold unit—from the law providing for the free coinage of both gold and silver to the law that prohibited the coinage of any full legal tender money except gold—it is only necessary to refer to the manner in which this important change in our monetary system was brought about. The change could have been made in a few words and in one section had the authors of the bill gone to work openly to accomplish their purpose; but instead of that, the work of demonetization was done by piecemeal, by indirection and evidently in a stealthy manner. The sections that aid this are sections 14, 15, 17, 20 and 21. Section 14 provides that the gold coin of the United States shall be a one dollar piece, which at the standard weight of 25 8-10 grains shall be the unit of value. There is nothing in the title of the act to indicate such a purpose as this and before this section occurs, and this change is made, there are thirteen other sections preceding it, dealing only with the management of the mint. Section 15 provides that silver coins of the United States shall be a trade dollar; a half dollar, or fifty cent piece: a

quarter dollar, or twenty-five cent piece; a dime, or ten cent piece; and that the weight of the trade dollar shall be 420 grains troy. It further provides that these coins shall be a legal tender at their nominal value for any amount not exceeding five dollars in any one payment, putting the trade dollar and the fractional coins on the same level as to legal tender, limiting them all to five dollars only. It will be noted that the silver dollar, 371 1-4 grains pure silver, or 412 1-2 grains standard silver, which had been coined freely up to that time was dropped from the list of silver coins; yet, the work was not quite done and before the accomplishment of their purpose, it was necessary to conceal the object by putting in the intervening section (section 16) relating to minor coins, or nickels and coppers. Then comes section 17, which completes the work begun in section 15. Section 17 provides that no coins either of gold, silver or minor coinage, shall hereafter be issued from the mint other than those of the denominations, standards and weights herein set forth. Section 15 had set forth the silver coins authorized to be struck at our mints, purposely leaving out the silver dollar; so that section 17 clinches the work by inhibiting the coinage of any silver pieces except the coins named in section 15. Section 14, above quoted, had already provided for the coinage of the gold dollar piece as the unit of value; a quarter eagle, or \$2.50 piece; a \$5 piece, or half eagle; an eagle, or a \$10 piece; and a double eagle, or a \$20 piece. Section 20 provides that any owner of gold bullion may deposit the same at any mint to be formed into coin or bars for his benefit, giving free and unlimited coinage to gold. Section 21 provides that the owner of silver bullion may deposit the same at any mint to be formed into bars or into dollars of 420 grains troy, designated in this act as trade dollars, and no deposit of silver for other coinage shall be received; thus absolutely inhibiting all coinage of full legal tender standard silver money. The trade dollar was not made a legal tender except in sums of \$5, being put on the same plane with fractional or subsidiary coin, while gold was made the unit of value and given unlimited coinage at our mints. While it is evident from the manner in

which this revolution in our monetary system was accomplished, that it was done in an indirect and stealthy manner, yet it was the most important and far-reaching legislation on money ever enacted by our government. Even the trade dollar was finally struck from the list of coins. By the act of July 22, 1876, the coinage of the trade dollar was suspended, except that it could be coined in the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, while its legal tender character was repealed. The act of February 9, 1887, authorized the retirement and recoinage of the trade dollar by exchanging standard silver dollars for all trade dollars at that time outstanding, prohibited its further coinage and ordered its recoinage into standard silver dollars. The act of February 12, 1873, was passed in the closing days of the last session of the Forty-second Congress. I was first elected to Congress in November, 1872; the term of service began on the fourth of March, 1873, not quite one month after silver was demonetized. The Forty-third Congress assembled in regular session in December, 1873, about ten months after the passage of the act demonetizing silver. James G. Blaine, of Maine, was chosen speaker of the House. During the whole Forty-third Congress the silver question was not alluded to. Both Congress and the country were entirely ignorant of the effect of the act of February 12, 1873. Mr. Blaine himself, who, at the time of the passage of the act of 1873 was speaker of the House, a few years afterwards stated in the Senate that he was not aware of the effect of the act demonetizing silver. The Forty-third Congress, however, very elaborately considered the currency question. At that time neither gold or silver were in circulation; but little attention was paid to coin money by Congress or the masses of the people. Only an interested few, money dealers and bondholders, seem to have been let into the secret of the change in our system of coinage effected in 1873. We were on a paper basis; consequently the discussions of the currency question related entirely to the greenback circulation. The Forty-third Congress passed what was commonly called at that time the Inflation Act. This act increased the greenback circulation to four hundred

millions of dollars, but was vetoed by President Grant. This so-called "Inflation Act" was passed during the first session of the Forty-third Congress and was intended to meet the difficulties of the country at that time—an attempted retirement of the greenbacks having produced alarm in the country and brought on a disastrous panic. At the last, or short session, of the Forty-third Congress, the resumption law, so called, was passed, providing for the resumption of specie payments to take place on the first day of January, 1879. This law gave power to the secretary of the treasury to sell the character and description of bonds authorized by the act of July 14, 1870, known as the Refunding Act. These bonds were payable in coin of the standard value of that date, July 14, 1870. The standard coins of July 14, 1870, were the silver dollar as the unit of account, having full legal tender power and free coinage; and also the gold dollar and its multiples as now coined. These bonds were based upon the bimetallic system of free coinage of gold and silver at the ratio then prevailing of 15.98 to 1 (commonly called 16 to 1), and the ratio at which we have subsequently coined over four hundred millions of silver standard dollars. It is under the authority of the resumption law that the power is still claimed to exist to sell bonds for resumption purposes and under this alleged authority our late bond sales took place. It will be seen, that in the Forty-third Congress, the law was passed, the purpose of which was ultimately to retire the greenbacks and go to a coin basis. Congress, prior to that had prohibited the coinage of anything but gold as a full legal tender money, so that the act of 1873, passed in the Forty-second Congress, demonetized silver and the act passed in the subsequent Forty-third Congress, providing for the resumption of specie payments, was evidently intended to compel a resumption of specie payments on the single gold standard of payments.\* Thus the Forty-third Congress adjourned, leaving on the statute books the law of the Forty-second Congress demonetizing silver, and the law of the Forty-third Congress requiring the resumption of

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\*This is a point of fundamental importance.



specie payments in 1879. These two acts, had no intervening legislation occurred, would have necessarily forced the country to resumption on the single gold basis. I was elected to the Forty-fourth Congress. The House of the Forty-fourth Congress being Democratic, elected Mr. M. C. Kerr, of Indiana, speaker. I was appointed chairman of the committee on mines and mining. This committee did not have charge of the coinage question proper; but General Banks, of Massachusetts, a member of the House, introduced a bill and referred it to our committee. The object and title of his bill was to "utilize the product of the gold and silver mines of the United States." The bill provided for the deposit of gold and silver bullion with various assay offices and authorized the issuing of certificates of deposit thereon—these certificates showing the weight and the fineness of the bullion deposited. The holders of the certificates to be paid in bullion of the weight and fineness and of the kind and amount deposited, on presentation of the certificate. These certificates were not made money or a legal tender for any purpose. No provision was made in the bill for the coinage of the bullion. In fact the government was made a mere depository for the bullion and was not to become the owner. The idea of the author seems to have been that the certificates would have gone into use in mercantile transactions without having any legal tender power. The committee on mines and mining was composed of the following members: Richard P. Bland, of Missouri, chairman; Jacob Turney, of Pennsylvania; Milton J. Durham, of Kentucky; Allen Potter, of Michigan; N. Holmes O'Dell, of New York; Randall N. Gibson, of Louisiana; Alexander Campbell, of Illinois; James L. Evans, of Indiana; William Woodburn, of Nevada; Lucian B. Cosswell, of Wisconsin; and John R. Lynch, of Mississippi. About the time that this bill was referred to our committee, the silver question was being discussed in Congress and especially in the Senate. I am not informed as to how the secret of the act of 1873 was found out, or who first discovered the mischief wrought by it. I can say, however, that the first information I had of the



demonetization of silver came from Senator Bogy, of Missouri. Whether he was the first in Congress to unearth this infamy, I do not know; I can only say that possibly others may have discovered it before him. The first great speech, upon the subject in either House was made by Senator Jones, of Nevada, in the Senate during the first session of the Forty-fourth Congress. It was one of the ablest speeches made at that or any other time upon this subject and it attracted world-wide attention. In the meantime the committee on mines and mining took up the Banks Bullion bill, and after several weeks' consideration reported it back to the House with a free coinage provision. The bill as thus amended was reported back to the House, providing for the free coinage of silver into standard silver dollars at the exact ratio of 16 to 1. The idea was to make it exactly 16 to 1. The ratio, prevailing at the time silver was demonetized was 15.98 to 1, which as stated before, is still the legal ratio. Our committee was not a privileged committee; that is, we were not authorized to report at any time for consideration. Our only opportunity for consideration was during what was called "the morning hour." At a stated time each morning committees were called in their order for bills for consideration. When a bill was called up in the morning hour, only one hour was allotted for its consideration. If not disposed of during the hour it went over and was called up again in the morning hour of the next day, and so on from day to day until disposed of. This bill was called up in the morning hour, but no vote could be reached on the bill because of "fillibustering" motions. A motion to adjourn and a roll call on this motion would consume at least half an hour. Another motion would be made for a recess and a roll call on that would consume at least another half hour. Thus two roll calls consumed the whole hour, defeating a vote on the bill. The bill was thus "fillibustered" for about three months, until the final adjournment of the first session of the Forty-fourth Congress in August, 1876. The chief actors in these obstructive tactics were A. S. Hewitt, of New York, and Eugene Hale, of Maine. The Presidential election took place in Novem-

ber, 1876, and also the election of members to the Forty-fifth Congress. I was elected again as a member of the Forty-fifth Congress. The Forty-fourth Congress held its last or short session, beginning on the first Monday in December, 1876. The over-shadowing question during that session was who had been elected President of the United States, and the great contest between Mr. Tilden and Mr. Hayes was fought out during this session. About a week after the assembling of the last session of the Forty-fourth Congress and on December 13, 1876, I offered as a substitute for the Banks bill and the amendments, a bill for the free coinage of silver into standard silver dollars, 371 1-4 grains pure silver, or 412 1-2 grains standard silver, thus restoring the old dollar at the old ratio—the dollar that is now in circulation. This substitute was adopted by the House and the bill passed. It was sent to the Senate, but was never taken up or acted upon in the Senate. It was during the first session of the Forty-fourth Congress that the Silver commission was authorized, by joint resolution, August 5, 1876, to inquire into the silver question and the money question generally. This commission as organized, consisted of John P. Jones, Louis V. Bogy and George S. Boutwell, of the Senate, and Randall L. Gibson, George Willard and Richard P. Bland on the part of the House; with experts from private life, William Groesbeck, of Ohio, and Prof. Bowen, of Massachusetts. George N. Weston, of Maine, was appointed secretary. This commission investigated the subject of the demonetization of silver, making an exhaustive report to Congress on March 2, 1877. The Forty-fourth Congress adjourned without having finally acted upon the silver question, and the subject-matter went over until the Forty-fifth Congress. Mr. Hayes was inaugurated President and called an extra session of the Forty-fifth Congress to meet on the fifteenth of October, 1877. Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, was elected speaker of the House. On November 5, of this special session, I moved the suspension of the rules and had passed a bill for the free coinage of silver, which was substantially the same as the House had passed in the Forty-fourth Congress. The

bill went to the Senate and Mr. Allison, from the committee of finance in the Senate, reported it back, striking out the free coinage part and inserting a provision for the purchase of not less than two million nor more than four million dollars, worth of silver bullion per month, and requiring the bullion to be coined into silver dollars provided for in the House bill. The bill as thus amended, passed the Senate and finally passed the House. It was vetoed by President Hayes, but was passed over his veto in both Houses on the twenty-eighth of February, 1878, thus becoming the law commonly known as the "Bland-Allison Act." The free coinage bill as it passed the House received more than a two-thirds vote.\* It will be observed in the record as given that the following prominent public men voted for the free coinage bill as it passed the House: Mr. Cannon, of Illinois, a member elect to the Fifty-fourth Congress; Mr. Carlisle, of Kentucky, afterwards secretary of the treasury under Mr. Cleveland; Mr. Foster, of Ohio, secretary of the treasury under Mr. Harrison's administration; Mr. Herbert, afterwards secretary of the Navy; Mr. McKinley, afterwards governor of Ohio (and President of the United States); Mr. Mills, of Texas, afterwards senator from that state; and Mr. Morrison, of Illinois, afterwards inter-state commerce commissioner. The fact that most of these gentlemen, if not all of them, subsequently changed their views upon this question should be attributed to the uncertainty of human opinion and of the action of public men; for surely silver restoration is as meritorious and is as necessary now as it was then.....

Congress passed a concurrent resolution declaring that, under the law of the United States, bonds issued under the refunding act of July 14, 1870, and the resumption act of July 14, 1875, were payable at the option of the government in standard silver dollars, 412 1-2 grains, or in gold coin without violation of public faith. This resolution was passed in the Senate by yeas 43, nays 22. In the House this concurrent resolution

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\*It required two-thirds to suspend the rules and pass it.

passed, yeas 189, nays 79, thus settling, beyond controversy, so far as the people's representatives in Congress were concerned, that we have no public debt whatever that is not legally payable at the option of the government in the standard gold and silver coins now struck at our mints. This fact must be taken into account as it was taken into account at the time when the question of the ratio was under consideration. Our debt was based upon a bimetallic system consisting of gold and silver, with the free coinage of both at the ratio prevailing in 1870—the present legal ratio 15.98 to 1, commonly called 16 to 1. The fact that hostile legislation has depressed and depreciated silver bullion, as compared to gold bullion, is met and answered by the other fact that the demonetization of silver has caused the appreciation of gold, and has made the difference between the bullion value of gold and silver. It is obvious that the repeal of this legislation will restore the position held by gold and silver at the time both had free coinage at our mints, and that both can be coined at this ratio without doing injustice to anyone. The relative value of the two coins now in circulation is that of parity, and this parity would be maintained as to all the coins that would be put into circulation under the bimetallic system of free coinage at the present ratio.

The next contest fought over silver was of a minor character, relating to the retirement and recoinage of the trade dollars. In the Forty-sixth Congress, a free coinage bill was reported by A. J. Warner, of Ohio. This bill was debated and considered for some days and finally passed the House May 24, 1879, yeas 114, nays 97. The bill was never acted upon in the Senate. The next fight occurred after the election of Mr. Cleveland in 1884. In Mr. Cleveland's first message, after he was elected President, sent to the Forty-ninth Congress in which Mr. Carlisle was speaker, he strongly insisted upon the repeal or suspension of the coinage of silver under what is called the Bland-Allison act. There was great pressure brought to bear on Congress to secure the repeal of this act. The demand for the repeal of this act came from the same sources that had opposed the

restoration of the coinage of the standard silver dollar, and that had continuously demanded the repeal of the Bland-Allison act. It originated in the bank and bondholding circles of New York, the chambers of commerce and boards of trade of that city. With the metropolitan press on the eastern seaboard demanding the repeal of the silver law, an effort was then made to create an alarm throughout the country. Indeed a semi-panic feeling had been brought about by the clamors of the money changers in New York and throughout the east, so that when Congress met in December, 1885, the whole country was roused upon the silver question. It was declared by the gold standard people that any further coinage of the standard silver dollar would bring disaster to the country. On April 8, 1886, a vote was taken on a proposition to suspend the coinage of silver dollars. The proposition was overwhelmingly defeated by a vote of 84 in favor of suspension and 201 against it; and a free coinage bill offered by myself was defeated by a vote of 126 for and 163 against it. Thus ended the effort to stop the coinage of silver; and thus also terminated the endeavor to create a panic, for after it was ascertained that it was impossible to suspend the coinage of silver, the gold standard people ceased their croaking and the country went on as usual. The next battle fought was after the election of Mr. Harrison as President; and in the Fifty-first Congress. This Congress met on the first Monday in December, 1889; Mr. Reed, of Maine, was elected speaker of the House. The first vote taken in this Congress was on June 5, 1890, in the House of Representatives, on the bill known as the Windom Silver Bullion Purchase bill. Mr. Conger, the chairman of the committee of coins, weights and measures, offered a substitute for the Windom bill. The Conger bill was also a bullion purchase bill, not a free coinage bill. I moved to recommit this bullion purchase bill, with instructions that the committee on coinage, weights and measures report back to the House a free coinage bill. This motion was defeated, yeas 116, nays 140; and the substitute offered by Mr. Conger was then passed, yeas 135, nays 119. Among the



members who voted for free coinage at that time, and were afterwards members of the next House (the Fifty-fourth Congress), were Mr. Abbott, of Texas; Mr. Allen, of Mississippi; Mr. Bankhead, of Alabama; Mr. Blanchard (afterwards a senator from Louisiana); Mr. Catchings, of Mississippi; Mr. Clark, of Alabama; Mr. Cobb, of Alabama; Mr. Craine, of Texas; Mr. Crisp, of Georgia; Mr. Culbertson, of Texas; Mr. Dockery, of Missouri; Mr. Herman, of Oregon; Mr. Lester, of Georgia; Mr. McCreary, of Kentucky; Mr. McCrea, of Arkansas; Mr. Richardson, of Tennessee; Mr. Robinson, of Louisiana; Mr. Sayers, of Texas; Mr. Stockdale, of Mississippi; Mr. Tarsney, of Missouri; Mr. Tucker, of Virginia; Mr. Turner, of Georgia; Mr. Washington, of Tennessee, and Mr. Wheeler, of Alabama. The Conger bill was sent to the Senate, and while the bill was pending in the Senate, Mr. Plumb, of Kansas offered an amendment for the free coinage of silver which was agreed to, yeas 42, nays 25. When this free coinage bill was sent to the House and a vote taken on it (June 25), it was defeated by a vote of 135 yeas to 152 nays. A conference committee was appointed on the part of the two Houses. A majority of this committee agreed to a bill authorizing the purchase of four million five hundred thousand ounces of silver bullion every month, and the issuance of treasury notes in payment for the bullion so purchased. This bill passed both Houses and became what is commonly known as "the Sherman law." The total amount of silver purchased under the Sherman act, as given by the director of the mint in his annual report for the year 1894, was 168,674,682.53 ounces of fine silver. This report shows that there has been coined of this bullion 38,531,143 silver dollars. The amount wasted by the assay offices and sold as "sweeps" was 63,570.37 ounces fine silver, leaving a balance on November the first 1894 of 138,809,681.28 ounces fine silver. The coining value of the bullion in the treasury, according to this report, is 179,471,103 dollars, which shows a gain or seigniorage of \$54,369,719.36. According to the report of the director of the mint referred to, we had coined up to





CHAMP CLARK.




ADLAI STEVENSON.



HENRY M. TELLER.



J. B. WEAVER.



November 4, 1894, under what is known as the Bland-Allison act 378,166,793 standard silver dollars; and under the act of July 4, 1890, or what is called the Sherman law, \$38,531,143; and out of the trade dollar bullion we had coined \$5,078,472, making the total coinage of the standard silver dollars to that time (November, 1894), \$421,776,408. The amount of standard silver dollars coined since that time will not greatly change the above total.

The next battle of the silver question was at the second session of this Congress, the Fifty-first. Senator Stewart, of Nevada, moved to lay aside the Federal Election bill, then pending in the Senate, and to take up Free Coinage bill, Number 4675. To this bill Mr. Vest, of Missouri, offered a substitute for free coinage, which was agreed to, yeas 39, nays 27. This free coinage bill came to the House and was referred to the committee on coinage, weights and measures. After protracted delay in the committee, Mr. Conger, the chairman of the committee, reported the bill back with an adverse recommendation and no further action was taken. The next (Fifty-second) Congress, assembled the first Monday in December, 1891 and elected Mr. Crisp, of Georgia, speaker of the House. There was a great contest over the silver question, at the first session of this Congress, pending the Presidential election. The Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures reported a free coinage bill, which was taken up and considered by the House for three days, and on the evening of the third day, I moved the previous question on its final passage. Mr. Burroughs, of Michigan, moved to lay on the table. On this motion, the vote was 148 for tabling the bill and 148 against it. The speaker voted against tabling the bill, making the vote stand for tabling 148 and 149 against it. "Fillibustering" was then resorted to by motions to reconsider the vote to table the bill, motions for adjournment and for recess. These motions were interposed until it became evident that no vote could be had on the bill without a cloture rule. The House, at a late

hour of night, adjourned with the understanding that the committee on rules would bring in a cloture rule for the purpose of bringing the bill to a final vote. No such rule, however, was reported and no final vote was taken upon the bill at that time. In the Senate, however, during this session, and in July, 1892, they took up and passed a free coinage bill by a vote of, yeas 29, nays 25. This bill was sent to the House and referred, on July 5, to the committee on coinage, weights and measures. The coinage committee reported the bill back to the House with the recommendation that it should pass. The committee on rules brought in a cloture rule for the purpose of compelling a vote upon this bill; but the resolution was defeated by a vote of 136 yeas, 154 nays. This defeated the consideration of the bill and no further attempt was made to pass it. The Presidential election of 1892 took place immediately after the adjournment of the first session of the Fifty-second Congress, and resulted in the election of Mr. Cleveland over Mr. Harrison. Immediately after the election of Mr. Cleveland, the anti-silver forces of the country organized for the purpose of securing the repeal of the purchase clause of the so-called Sherman law. The bankers and bondholders of this country, aided and supported by the bankers and bondholders of Europe, deliberately set to work to bring on a stringency in the money market and to raise a hue and cry against silver as the cause of the pressure. The "financiers" of London induced the Government of England to suspend the free coinage of silver for India. This was done early in the summer of 1893, and evidently for the purpose of affecting legislation in this country on the silver question. No sooner had the British Government suspended free coinage of silver in India than this fact was seized upon by the gold standard people in this country as a further excuse for making war on silver here. This fight on silver caused great consternation throughout the country and the world. To give a further "object lesson," as it was called—to teach the people the bad effects of silver coinage, the banking institutions of England and of this country began a systematic process of

hoarding money, drawing in their loans and refusing advances to their customers, thus precipitating what was called—and properly called—a bankers' panic. Probably it was not intended to bring about such a severe panic as ensued, but the people generally became alarmed, not because they were afraid of silver or silver money, or that they distrusted our money in any sense. On the contrary, in their eagerness to possess their own money and hold it safely they made a run on the banks and withdrew their deposits, showing that it was the banks they were afraid of and not the money of the country. These runs upon banking institutions caused many to fail and wide-spread and disastrous panic ensued. The "object lesson" was now complete. England had done her part in stopping the coinage of silver in India. The banking institutions of this country and the eastern metropolitan press had terrorized the people into a general panic. The President called Congress together amid all this excitement and demanded in his call the repeal of the Sherman law which he attacked as the sole cause of all monetary difficulties in the country. Congress assembled in special session, under the call of the President, on August 7, 1893. The President's message to Congress demanded the unconditional repeal of the Sherman law, insisting that with that law wiped from the statute books prosperity would again come to the people. This was the most critical time for silver and silver legislation since the demonetization act of 1873. The friends of silver in this country and the world knew that the suspension of the free coinage of silver in India, coupled with the suspension of all purchases and coinage in this country, would contract the currency throughout the world, cause panics in the silver market and force a further divergence between the relative value of gold and silver. The friends of bimetallism also knew that this war on silver would necessarily make a great demand for gold and thus send gold up in the market. Should gold be the sole standard of valuation, the advance of gold, which is but another name for the depreciation in the price of all property, except mortgages, bonds and taxes, would be ruinous to the country.

Mr. Wilson, of West Virginia, on August 11, 1893, introduced a bill "to repeal a part of an act approved July 14, 1890, entitled 'An act directing the purchase of silver bullion and the issuing of treasury notes thereon, and for other purposes.' " This bill provided for the repeal of so much of the Sherman law as authorized the secretary of the treasury to purchase monthly four million five hundred thousand ounces of silver bullion and issue treasury notes in payment for the bullion. To this bill, which under an order of the House, was debated for two weeks, I offered a substitute, submitting a free coinage proposition at various ratios beginning with 16 to 1 and going up to 17, 18, 19, and 20 to 1. To set forth the truth of the history of this fight for the repeal of the Sherman law, it is necessary to say that the friends of free coinage had no hopes of securing the enactment of a free coinage law. It was well known that Mr. Cleveland would veto such a bill. It was vainly hoped, however, that we could secure some amendment to the repeal bill that would either result in the defeat of the bill or greatly mitigate the consequences of the repeal. Hence, while we were in favor of the free coinage of silver at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1, we did not hesitate to offer and vote for ratios up to 20 to 1, believing that any amendments to a bill of this character would result in the defeat of the repeal. Again, it was desirable to test the sincerity of those who were fighting silver coinage at the present ratio, by compelling them to vote for free coinage at a greater ratio, or to show the insincerity of their professed friendship for bimetallism. The result of this experiment showed that practically the only real friends of bimetallism were those who advocated and adhered to the justice of free coinage of silver at the present legal ratio. The vote for free coinage at 16 to 1, or the present legal ratio, showed, yeas 125, nays 227; for free coinage at 17 to 1, yeas, 100, nays 240; 18 to 1, yeas 102, nays 239; 19 to 1, yeas 105, nays 239; at 20 to 1, yeas 122, nays 222. It is shown by this record that the strongest proposition before the House was for free coinage at the present legal ratio; that no gains were made by any attempted change



of the ratio, but on the contrary it weakened the coinage proposition. After all free coinage propositions were voted down, I offered a further amendment restoring the law of February 28, 1878. On this proposition the yeas were 136, nays 223. After all amendments were voted down, the repeal bill passed the House by a vote of 239 yeas, and 108 nays. This extraordinary proceeding and extraordinary vote against silver was one of the most remarkable transactions that ever took place in the American Congress. Impartial history would show that this result was secured by methods as deplorable as they were extraordinary. The moneyed power of this country and Europe had sought to bring the people and their representatives into complete subjection. Debtors everywhere were threatened with the pressure of foreclosures and bankruptcy; the owners of money absolutely refused relief to the people. A corner on money had been established; business was prostrated in every section of the land; a reign of terror was thus brought about. Resolutions were formulated in blank in Wall Street and telegraphed to the various chambers of commerce and boards of trade throughout the country (to be adopted), demanding the repeal of the purchase clause of the Sherman Act. The vast private debt existing throughout the country was pressed for collection, and when debtors went to the banks to secure loans to meet their obligations, they were coolly told that it was not safe to loan money until the repeal of the purchase clause of the Sherman Act. It was insisted by the money lenders that so soon as this act was repealed money would be plentiful, that it would be loaned without stint and that prosperity would immediately return. This pressure induced the people to petition Congress for the repeal of this act, and the result of it all was an overwhelming vote in the House for its repeal. The bill went to the Senate; there it met with a stubborn opposition, for at the time the bill passed the House and went to the Senate, it was well known and understood that a majority of senators were opposed to the repeal; but the same pressure was used to force the bill through the Senate which was resorted to in the House.

All offers of compromise were spurned and unconditional repeal was demanded. Without it, the money that was hoarded and cornered would have been held until an impoverished people were brought into subjection and compelled to yield. The repeal bill that passed the House was sent to the Senate and reported substantially, as it passed the House on August 28, by Mr. Voorhees, the chairman of the finance committee. The bill was taken up and debated in the Senate and various amendments were offered to it and voted down. It finally passed the Senate with some slight amendments reported by the finance committee on the thirtieth of October. The House agreed to these amendments and the bill finally passed the House of Representatives on November the first, and was approved by the President on the second day of November, 1893. The debates that took place in the House and Senate on this bill constituted what was probably the ablest and most prolonged discussion of the money question that ever took place in any parliamentary body. The friends of silver predicted then precisely what has taken place. They predicted a great appreciation of gold, a depreciation of prices, hard times and business stagnation, as the result of silver demonetization. These things came to pass. The friends of gold monometallism insisted that the repeal of the purchase clause of the Sherman act, the declaration made in favor of eliminating silver as standard money and for the change to the gold standard of payments, would restore confidence throughout the country, invite an inflow of gold and bring universal prosperity. Just the reverse occurred. We were compelled to sell bonds\* to the amount of \$162,000,000 soon after the repeal in order to check the flow of gold from our shores and to maintain the single gold standard. People everywhere have been out of employment and business prostration generally prevailing; unrest and discontent with this legislation still exists, and the great masses of the people believe to-day that their only hope for future prosperity is a full and complete restoration of silver coinage. The gold monometallists

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\*"To sell bonds"—i. e., to borrow money, thus putting the gold standard itself on a credit basis.

have given the people an object lesson indeed—one they will not forget—an object lesson that has been the best education in favor of bimetallism that could possibly have been given.

The next great contest came in the House of Representatives in the first regular session of this same Congress. This fight occurred on what is commonly called the "Seigniorage Bill." This bill provided for the coinage of all silver bullion held in the treasury, purchased under the provision of the Sherman act; that the seigniorage or gain arising from the purchase of this bullion, amounting to about \$55,000,000, should be first coined and used in payment of public expenses; that after the coinage of the seigniorage, the remainder of the bullion should be coined as fast as possible, and the coin used for the purpose of redeeming the treasury notes issued for the purchase of the bullion. This bill was taken up February 7, 1894, and debated for several days, but when an attempt was made to bring the House to vote upon the bill, filibustering motions were resorted to, led by Mr. Tracey, of New York and Mr. Reed, of Maine; and the bill was thus tied up in the House from February 7, until the twenty-eighth of that month, when the committee on rules reported a rule cutting off all filibustering motions, bringing the House to a direct vote. This rule was adopted and a vote compelled upon the bill and its amendments. The House voted down various amendments and motions to recommit and finally passed the bill by a vote of yeas 168, nays 129. The bill went to the Senate March 5, 1894; and was taken up and passed precisely as it passed the House, the vote in the Senate being yeas 44, nays 31. This bill was vetoed by the president and taken up in the House April 4; and on a roll call to pass the bill, notwithstanding the objections of the president, the yeas were 144, nays 114. The constitution requiring two-thirds to pass a bill over the veto of the president, the bill failed. The first session of this Congress adjourned without further action on the silver question. Before the re-assembling of the Fifty-third Congress the first Monday in December, 1894, in the short session the bankers and money

brokers of Wall Street and Europe set to work to bring pressure on Congress to compel the retirement of greenbacks, and the utter degradation of silver, by issuing bonds payable specifically in gold. The national banks and the so-called state banks under national control, which in reality would be national banks if they exist at all, under what is called "the Carlisle plan," commenced to rid the treasury of its gold as an "object lesson" to show the necessity of wiping out all paper money, greenbacks, silver certificates, and in effect, standard silver dollars as money—insisting that all these forms of money were but obligations on the treasury to be payable in gold on demand; that therefore to prevent these demands on the treasury for gold, all forms of our money should be withdrawn and funded into bonds except gold and bank notes.\* The relation this fight had to the silver question is apparent. The bond holders and money lenders of this country and Europe are determined, if they can possibly bring it about, to compel this government to abandon its sovereign power of coining money and issuing it by the treasury itself, except gold, and to turn over to bondholders and banking corporations of Europe, the control of the volume of our money. These various propositions, however, were defeated one after another. So that the question now remains for the people to determine in their future elections for President and Congress which system shall prevail; that is to say, whether we are to have the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver—the money of our Constitution, the supply of which must come from the people's government—or whether we are to abandon the bimetallic system and enter upon a system that contemplates nothing but gold as legal tender money, and bank notes issued by corporations to supplement it. This is the future fight on the money question, and that question now is paramount to all others and the voters must take sides for one system or the other. In reviewing the history of the battles on the money question in Congress for the past twenty years, a true story can not be told without alluding to the political situation during that

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\*See Act of 1900.

time. Unhappily our great contests in presidential elections heretofore have been fought out upon "war issues," growing out of our unhappy civil strife. It is known that the people of the south—a great agricultural community—have been from the commencement steadfast sympathizers and friends of silver coinage. So it may be said of the southwest and our great gold and silver producing regions, but these forces have not found a way to make their combined strength effective. In all the great battles in Congress on the silver question the force of circumstances has made opponents of those who should have been friends. The southern people, while enthusiastic for silver, have had that sympathy and enthusiasm clouded by the dread of Force bills or Federal interference with their right of local self-government. Doubtful as to whether their safety depended on alliance with New York and the east for protection in their local rights, or whether to follow where nature led them, they have hesitated on the threshold of victory for silver. Fortunately, however, in their great battle over the Force bill in the Senate, the senators of the west, and especially of the gold and silver mining states, in their opposition to this measure, which resulted in its final overthrow and defeat, gave assurance to the people of the south that their political reliance, both for the safety of their home institutions and their prosperity on economic questions, should be the west. We do not intend to draw sectional lines further than those who insist on the single gold standard have forced upon us this situation. The great money centers of the east, whose banking institutions are dominated, if not owned and controlled, by European banking houses, have forced the people of the west and the south, in self-defense, to make war upon their system of finance. The day has now come when war issues can no longer dominate our politics. The great political battles of the future will be fought on economic questions. The battle of the standards is the greatest battle to be fought in this country and the world over. The enslaved masses of the old world, look naturally to this free people to lead the way. This vast country of ours of forty-four independ-



ent states, with a population of seventy millions of people, increasing at the rate of more than a million annually, is strong enough to maintain its own monetary system, to open the mints to the free coinage of gold and silver, and thus again restore, not only to ourselves, but to the world, the old order of things by which gold and silver circulated side by side, aiding and supporting each other in giving labor employment and effecting the exchanges of commerce. In conclusion, attention should be called to the fact that heretofore no president of the United States, since 1873, has been a friend of silver. Mr. Hayes vetoed a limited coinage bill. It is well known that every president since has been hostile to free coinage and would veto any such bill if sent to him. This has had the effect of discouraging Congress in all these great contests. I have reason to believe that silver would have long ago been restored to its old place in our system of money had there been a president of the United States favorable to it. The battle to be fought and the all important point to gain is to secure a president who will sign a free coinage bill if sent to him; who will not use the power and patronage of his office to prevent such a bill coming to him, but on the contrary will give encouragement to such legislation. If we can once secure such a president, the battle is won.



## CHAPTER XIII.

The "Whirling Dervish of the Market" as a Factor in Public Affairs.—Henry Demarest Lloyd and Richard Brinsley Sheridan on the Speculative Use of the Coercive Power of Government.—"The Meanness of the Pedlar and the Profligacy of the Pirate."—Trade as War.—Commercial Use of the War-Making, Debt-Making and Tax-Levying Power of the People.—Can Selfishness be "Enlightened?"—The Question of Forcing Unselfishness by Law.—Socialism or Coerced Co-operation.—Bland as a Representative of Free Co-operation and Unrestricted Development.—Increasing Honesty and Liberality in Trade.—"Laissez Faire" as a Policy of Unsurrendering Resistance to Restriction, Obstruction and Oppression.—The Foundation Principle of all True Political and Social Economy the Observance of the Right of Individual Growth and of Fuller Expansion for the Constructive Powers of Common Humanity.—Liberty Impossible for the Unjust.



CHILDREN yet, writes Mr. Henry Demarest Lloyd, "we run everything we do—love or war, work or leisure, religion or liberty—to excess. Every possibility of body and mind must be played upon until it is torn to pieces as toys by children. Priests, voluptuaries, tyrants, knights, ascetics—in the long procession of fanatics a newcomer takes his place. He is called 'the model merchant'—the cruelest fanatic in history. He is the high priest of the latest idolatry—the self-worship of self-interest. Whirling dervish of the market—self, friends, family, body, and soul, loves, hopes, and faith—all are sacrificed to seeing how many turns he can make before he drops dead."

These are extraordinary sentences, written by a man of unusual powers after an analysis of the commercialism which operated during the quarter of a century which elapsed between the demonetization act of 1873 and that of 1900.

The same idea has been even more forcibly expressed by Richard Brinsley Sheridan. Taught by Burke to abhor militant commercialism as tyranny in its worst form, he asserted the force of his intellect against the tendency of the English aristocracy of his day to change the base of its

privileges from the feudalism of land-tenure to that of the corporation system.

"There is something," he said of the East India Company, "in the frame and constitution of the company which extends the sordid principles of their origin over all their successive operations, connecting with their civil policies and even with their boldest achievements the meanness of a pedlar and the profligacy of pirates. Alike in the political and military line could be observed auctioneering embassadors and trading generals. And thus we saw revolution brought about by affidavits; an army employed in executing an arrest; a town besieged on a note of hand—a prince dethroned for a balance of account! Thus it was that they exhibited a government which united the mock majesty of a bloody sceptre and the little traffic of a merchant counting-house—wielding a truncheon in one hand and picking a pocket with the other."\*

These sentences, like those of Mr. Lloyd, are intended to apply as the expression of a demand for exact justice against a system. They are not mere rhetoric. Within their limitations they are a scientific expression of a fundamental truth of morals and of social economy.

If it is necessarily true that "trade is war" in another form; if the theory which governed American speculation and the politics depending on it from 1860 to 1900 is the true theory of the economy of distribution, then there is no need to go beyond Sheridan and no possibility of going beyond Lloyd to find the reality of individual character and of political policy during this half-century of commercial use of the war-making, debt-making, taxing and money-issuing power.

If it is true, as was once asserted in the United States Senate by a representative of the policies against which Mr. Bland contended, that trade is a matter of taking the largest possible advantage, then those who use the coercive powers of government for trade purposes have no appeal from such judgments as those of Lloyd and Sheridan; for it is by their own standards that they are condemned.

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\*World's Best Orations, Vol. X, 3943.

Such a theory of trade, shows its absurdity, as soon as it is critically examined. All fair trade is the distribution of wealth from the producer to the consumer in the way that gives the largest possible advantage (1) to the producer, (2) to the distributor, and, (3) to the consumer. If there is no cheating, no taking advantage by private fraud and coercion, or by the far worse fraud and coercion which is exercised through government, all are benefited by a process without which neither society nor liberty in society, nor evolution through liberty could exist at all.

Two radical mistakes are made by holders of opposing theories. One is that it is safe to trust "enlightened selfishness." The other is that selfishness which can not be checked by government in individuals can be controlled by giving it expression through government.

As men can become enlightened only in the measure in which they cease to be selfish, the first theory of trade regulation rests on a fault of definition. The latter half of the nineteenth century has been characterized by the highest intelligence shown in trade. But no one who will examine the results of political commercialism will say that this intelligence involved enlightenment or that its exercise could have educated any other than those reactionary faculties in the individual which make for his final destruction.

The contending theory of trade—one apt to be held by men of benevolent disposition and poetic temperament, is equally a result of illogical definition; for the government on which they rely for the suppression of selfishness is itself necessarily an expression of selfishness to the extent it attempts to coerce co-operation or to regulate co-operation by coercion further than is necessary to prevent fraud or violence.

No system of government which could be devised, no theory of economy which could be applied through it, would stand the strain of results necessarily proceeding from the spirit of ruthlessness, of rapacity, of recklessness which governed the speculative and non-productive commercialism against which Mr. Bland's whole life was a protest. In contrast to

its spirit, he opposed his own moderation of speech, his gentleness of temper, his unwillingness to take even the smallest advantage where the greatest was possible, his inflexible adherence to principles and his habitual refusal to force issues to an extreme of destructiveness.

The spirit he represented in politics showed itself in trade also; and in trade as in politics it has its manifestation in all the constructive results of the century. Every man who gave another willingly a fair return of service for service done was a part of its enormous forces. These forces—the natural, evolutionary forces of free co-operation, are superior to all coercive government and the measure in which they are able to find expression through an increase in the world's moral sense, is necessarily the measure of the suppression of the coercive powers of government.

While we can not avoid apprehension because of the results of the past and the menace for the future due to the increase in the intelligence of those who apply themselves to trade without moral restraint, it is clear that as trade means the distribution of the necessities and comforts of life, it involves the willingness of a continually increasing number of men to give a fair return for what they take from others. There is a smaller but also a constantly increasing class which in every trade, sees its own highest interests in giving a quality of product representing a higher skill and intelligence than that represented by the labor of those it is supplying. Where it is a question between losing a little and cheating a little there is undoubtedly an increasing number of "model merchants" who would rather lose a little, and a still larger number who would rather not trade at all than to cheat at all. These are not the "whirling dervishes of the market" so picturesquely described by Mr. Lloyd. Unfortunately the sane and honest often confound themselves with the dervishes when issues are forced they have not had time to understand. Had it been otherwise, Mr. Bland's work might have advanced America far into the twentieth century during his own lifetime. As it was, we see that intelligence, greatly increasing in the speculative and usurious classes,

took advantage of its power not to express "enlightened selfishness," but to attempt class monopoly of the results of the disinterested work of scientists, scholars, and the non-acquisitive classes of all ages—results which in the nineteenth century showed themselves in an unprecedented increase in productive machinery, in an unanticipated revolution in distribution, effected through steam and electricity, and in an increase of the intelligence represented by the average labor product of the world such as no other century had ever realized or even promised as far as its promise could be understood.

The control of these almost infinite advantages of civilization was the question always urged against Mr. Bland by the advocates of restriction. The meaning of his whole life-work, of his every measure and his every utterance, is that this control belongs to the people alone—that it is a part of their sovereign power, and that no assumption of their own sovereignty against them can bind them to submit. It was in this that he was formidable in spite of his gentleness and conservatism and for this in him, the times called.

The positive forces of determined and unsundering resistance to injustice are a part of evolution, through increasing freedom of co-operation. All forms of coerced co-operation (slavery and its variants) have been necessarily supported by law, and it is a necessary effect of the workings of the principles of free co-operation for which Mr. Bland stood, to oppose the perpetration of injustice by law.

The "Laissez Faire" for which he stood did not mean letting wrong alone in its control of the forces of government, but actively opposing it; wresting the law-making and law-executing power from it, and establishing natural conditions—conditions under which the positive forces of goodness, of fair play, of helpfulness, of productiveness, of the inherent, inappeasable desire of the human race to express in concrete forms of use and beauty its innate sense of fitness, may find for itself the largest possible liberty of expression. Under conditions of liberty, of peace, of


freedom from the restrictive and repressive influences of fraud and violence, the sense of order and harmony impressed on the human mind by the order and harmony of the universe, must of itself result in raising any sept of the human family to the plane of intelligent creativeness which evolved the Parthenon of ancient times as it did the steam engine and the electric motor of modern.

In the measure in which men become free and just with a government which will not interfere with them or oppress them—which will have no other function than that of enforcing justice—in that measure the highest possible productiveness, the freest and widest possible distribution of all products of intelligence will necessarily result. But no matter what the system, no matter how great the opportunity, the sense of justice is the vital factor of productiveness as it is the necessary basis of free co-operation. No constitution, no system of finance, no creed, no code of laws or of ethics however exalted, can be efficient beyond the limitations of the efficiency of the sense of justice governing the mass of co-operative society at any given time.

Because the American sense of justice had been so deeply disturbed by civil war; because, in subjugating the southern states to restore the Union and enfranchise the negroes, both north and south had been demoralized; because, at length as a result of this demoralization, the power of government was used by the class which Mr. Lloyd calls the “whirling dervishes of the market”—because of this, and not because of liberty, the speculative and unproductive classes in America and the world came into a fuller control in the last half of the nineteenth century than they had exercised since the first half of the eighteenth.

Had the currency been under popular control; had production and distribution been unchecked; had the power of the government been used to protect universal rights instead of special interests, the development of the transmississippi west—an event of lasting importance to the human race—would not have necessitated a fierce political struggle to prevent





STATE, WAR AND NAVY.



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the holders of its mortgages and the consumers of its products from usurping permanent control of its vast creative forces for their own purposes of restriction and obstruction.

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## CHAPTER XIV.

Speculative Plutocracy from 1873 to 1893.—The "Whirling Dervish" as a Promoter of Panics.—The Gold Corner and "Black Friday" Panic Under Grant not an Isolated Incident.—Emotional Insanity as a Result of Moral Disturbance Due to the Speculative Habit.—Beginning of Trusts Under Grant.—The Standard Oil Trust.—Conservatism in Administration Under Hayes no Check to the Growth of Plutocracy.—The Attempt to Regulate the "Commune of Capital."—Use of the Law-Making Power by "Practical" Politicians to Blackmail Law-Breaking Corporations.—The Land Grabbing Spirit in its Relations to Speculative Monopoly.



HE Whirling Dervish of the Market," to whom the reader has been introduced by Mr. Lloyd, is the fact of most momentous importance in the financial, the commercial, the political life of the generation which followed the Civil war in America.

In the great panic of 1893, forced by the speculative managers of national banks as a means of demonetizing silver and perpetuating the national debt, interest on call loans in New York City was forced up to two per cent a day. The non-producers who are at one time the agents or at another the victims of such crimes are equally insistent that they alone are fit to determine the financial policies of the country, but no one who has seen them at times when they are expressing with least reserve their own deepest reality, will be in doubt of the meaning or the accuracy of the phrase, "whirling dervishes" as it applies to them.

The gold corner and consequent panic under Grant which was an incident of the policies of speculative commercialism was not an isolated incident. It was a typical result of a panic-producing system, necessarily manifesting the fraudulent intent to get something for nothing—to take without giving—to use law, government, commercial and social organization, the church, the schools and colleges, the whole machinery of co-operative civilization for purposes of obstructing production and distribution

so as to force the payment of fraudulent tolls to non-producers.

At times when this spirit manifests itself at its climaxes, the scene on the exchanges of St. Louis, Chicago or New York gives an immediate explanation of all that is worst and most demoralizing in our politics. The most dangerous element of society is seen without restraint. The mob around the call board and in what is strikingly called "the pit" shows symptoms of more violent dementia than is seen in the insane asylums. They crowd each other hither and thither, pushing, jostling, scrambling as only the fiercest animals scramble when food is thrown them. Their ejaculations, cries and shrieks show the most intense emotion, uncontrolled except by the desire to take advantage of those with whom, individually and collectively, they are struggling. The confusion is anarchical and expressive of the latent fierceness of the primitive animal nature not less than is that of the average riot due to labor strikes where, too often in the same spirit and by what too closely resembles the same methods, the attempt is being made to control the markets.

This anarchy, this madness, this dire disease under which men cease to be moral beings, is economically a manifestation of the same desire to control others by controlling prices unnaturally which leads the same men to go into political conventions to dictate platforms and candidates, or to fill the lobbies of legislatures and of Congress with their agents, bullying or bribing the representatives of the people into subserviency to their policies—policies illustrated when two per cent a day is charged on call loans in New York at times when western crops are being "moved."

This is not denunciation. It is not inspired by partisanship of a candidate, a political organization or a theory. Back of its expression is the conviction based on close and familiar observation of such conditions, that no theory, no system, no party-action, no piling up of legislative enactment upon enactment, can avail anything without a radical change from the private morals and the public spirit, which make such things seem tolerable.

To take a piece of paper worth the tenth of a cent; to spread upon it the hundredth part of a cent's worth of green ink and then to market it as "a security" worth a hundred or a thousand dollars—this method of corporation feudalism, supported by enactment, explains such related incidents as have been described, and leaves little to the imagination when the causes of business demoralization and political reaction are being sought for.

Back of all that has been said of the political and social demoralization under the administrations of Grant; back of all that Mr. Bland has said in describing the resistance to his attempt to re-establish a sound and natural system of currency and trade, these conditions of desperate speculation are to be understood. Mr. Bland never compromised with them, and he never misunderstood them. His was not the narrow partisanship which is blind to the faults and crimes of its own party. In 1893, when men representing these conditions and the spirit which produced them had put in control of the cabinet of an administration elected by democratic votes, representatives of the great fortunes accumulated by such methods, Mr. Bland declared that he had come to the "parting of the ways" with them. He spoke without malice, without fear, without reservation. No one has a right to speak for him or of him, who does not deal with such conditions in the same spirit.

Under Grant, the great combinations of corporations which have since been called "trusts," began their operations in the United States, steadily increasing in number and audacity under the administrations of Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, Cleveland, Harrison and McKinley—all of which were controlled to a marked extent in their interests—the Cleveland administration of 1885 being inaugurated with Mr. Daniel Manning, a national banker as secretary of the treasury, and Mr. William C. Whitney of New York as secretary of the navy—Mr. Whitney being closely identified with the Standard Oil Company and later on with other great combinations of speculative capital which have done so much to force existing conditions.



The election of President Hayes was a result of the reaction from the extreme radicalism of plutocracy under Grant. As president, Mr. Hayes represented the idea that government is a commercial affair rather than an agency of simple justice, but he did not believe in allowing the speculative and non-productive element to control the army and use the police and war-making power as they had done under Grant.

The method of his election calls only for such a passing reference here as will attract attention to Mr. Bland's protest against it, and to the demoralization of the times. It was undoubtedly a manifestation of plutocracy, but Mr. Hayes personally was not so thoroughly committed to plutocratic methods as was Mr. Tilden whose immense fortune had been accumulated not by productive enterprise but by his ingenuity as an attorney and political agent for the same corporate combinations in America and Europe which, after forcing the panic of 1893, called in the Rothschilds to "underwrite" the American treasury—rather than pay out five dollars in silver and five dollars in gold to redeem a ten dollar greenback. The issues between Mr. Tilden and Mr. Hayes were vital only as they concerned methods of government. There was no such issue of principle between them as between Bland and Grant or Bland and Cleveland.

The whirling dervish element of the corporation system of speculative and unproductive assimilation did not control the Hayes administration as it had done under Grant and it controlled still less under Arthur, as far as the administrative part of the actual government was concerned. But from Grant to the third year of McKinley's administration, there has been no check on its advance towards complete control of money and trade under restrictive and obstructive laws enacted and sustained as a result of "contributions to campaign funds" and "assistance" to political managers.

Between 1860 and 1870 there was an increase of nearly 100 per cent in the railroad mileage of the country, due largely to the completion of the Union and Central Pacific roads. In 1873, a special committee of the United States Senate, with Messrs. Sherman and Windom among its mem-

bers, reported that the gross receipts of American railroads for 1872 had amounted to \$473,241,058. By 1892, according to Poor's estimates, gross receipts had increased to \$1,171,000,000, and during the same period the futility of the attempt at government regulation had been demonstrated. In the case of railroads, as of all other corporations which were allowed to exercise for their private benefit the delegated sovereignty of the people, it had been shown, as it was asserted by the Senate committee of 1873, that "where combination is possible, competition is impossible."\*

The railroads, the national banks and the protected manufacturing corporations, while they had among themselves an obvious conflict of interests, constituted, as against the public, a "commune of capital," always ready to unite for the purchase of salable politicians and the control of elections. The federal legislation enacted as the result of the crusade led by Allen G. Thurman and Jeremiah Black, merely increased the activity of the railroads in politics. State legislation to check the abuse of railroad, manufacturing, insurance and banking franchises had the same effect to an extent even more marked. In Missouri, Illinois, and other leading states of the west severe inspection laws were passed to restrain monopoly, but they increased the corruption of politics and the power of the combined corporations by increasing the "contributions" to the campaign funds of both parties. These "contributions" represent at all times the elements both of blackmail and of bribery. Corporation managers, whose profits depend on public grants threatened always with public regulation and restriction, would be more than human if they did not seek to control the government as a means of avoiding control by it. But where they did not bribe they were almost inevitably blackmailed by the "practical politicians" of both parties—who, when in charge of political committees, have been known to allow themselves and their friends considerable percentages on funds thus extorted by the menace of the law. In other instances, the fees charged for the inspection of such monopolies as

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\*See Report Senate Special Committee on Transportation, December 1873.

that in petroleum or in the handling of grain and other products are allowed to go to an inspector, pledged to content himself with a moderate salary from them—turning over the rest to the “committee.” The corruption of business through speculation and of politics through bribery and blackmail increased thus *pari passu* with the growth of speculative monopoly in banking, in manufacturing, in railroad building and management, and in the control of western lands. The element of fraud in the speculative assimilation of lands intended for actual settlement was often very striking and it was seldom absent for any considerable period while desirable lands were to be had. A picturesque illustration is afforded by the case of a well known writer and politician, originally from St. Louis, who planned to acquire a principality near Devil’s lake, in what was then the territory of Dakota by building a “shack” on it in which he could give his friends poker parties as many nights of the year as were required to meet the demands of the law for “actual settlement.” Professor Andrews, in his *History of the Last Quarter of the Century*, says that in Montana a representative of the plutocratic method of assimilating land values, “gave a series of balls and dinners at a country house, inviting a large number of ladies and accompanying each invitation with a promise of a \$100 present. At each festival, in the midst of the whirl, each guest signed a claim to a homesteader’s rights in the adjoining lands. When the claims were proved up, each lady received her \$100 and the authors of the scheme got land enough for a dukedom.”\*

The same spirit, with changes of methods suggested by circumstances, governed the operations of the great railroad combinations in securing land grants and special privileges of right of way, so that Mr. Bland could hardly have been surprised when in 1898 those who were attempting to thrust aside the coinage issue so as to make room for the demonetization act of 1900 should have argued the necessity of making concession to the spirit of the people who, as they asserted, “always wanted to grab

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\**History of the Last Quarter Century in the United States*, by E. Benjamin Andrews. Scribners, 1896.

something"—who by such reasoning, were therefore to be encouraged to withdraw attention from the control of the currency and similar reforms at home in order to devote it to the acquisition of Cuba, Puerto Rico and other countries, which a little while before, the United States, in a "War for Humanity," had pledged itself to the world to free from foreign control.

The imperialistic movement under McKinley, as under Grant, was thus the logical and the only logical development of the methods and the spirit of the whirling dervish of the market—the speculative banker, land-grabber, stock-waterer, grain-broker—the parasite of whatever name or class, who seeks to take toll from trade without either producing or distributing what has been produced.

## CHAPTER XV.

The Fundamental Principle of Plutocracy Manifested in Debt Inflation Accompanied by a Demand for a Contraction of the Supply of Cash Issued by Government.—Mr. Bland's Consistency.—Debt Inflation Described by Henry Clews.—Speculative Banks as Holders of Inflated Stocks and Bonds.—The Character of Fiske as Described by William Walter Phelps.—The Imperialistic Movement and the Demonetization of Silver in 1900 a Part of the Logic of What Fiske Represented.



THE fundamental principle of the plutocracy Mr. Bland opposed has shown itself in an enormous inflation of all corporation debts, accompanied by a persistent and often menacing demand for the contraction of the cash currency which is issued by the mints and controlled by the public treasury.

When honesty returns to public life and sanity to business, it will seem incredible that for twenty-five years in America, such a principle should have steadily gained ground in public and private business. But there is now no need to argue a fact so completely self-evident.

At a time when, year by year, the dementia of speculation has been adding one billion after another to the floating debt and the bonded debt of corporations of all kinds; when year by year the business of the country has been forced more completely to the basis of corporation inflation for all values, the demand has been pressed for a minimum amount of cash, though an increasing supply was clearly necessary to meet this debt, to carry on a business constantly increased by new inventions and to stave off inevitable "liquidation."

Accompanying this madness, has been the not less insane insistence on a currency of corporation notes, every dollar of which inflates 100 per cent another dollar of debt—the corporation note itself drawing from business "all the traffic will bear" and the bond on which it is issued drawing another interest from the tax-payer.

In opposing the watering of railroad stocks, the increase of the tariff, the extension of such monopolies as the Standard Oil Company, the renewal of the charters of national banks, the payment of heavy premiums on bonds to London and Wall street bankers and finally the use of the military force of the government for the establishment of "carpet-bag" control in Louisiana, Arkansas and South Carolina as in Puerto Rico, Cuba, Hawaii and the Philippines, Mr. Bland was supporting identically the same principle he supported in advocating the free and unlimited coinage of the precious metals. He was attempting to free the government from the control of speculative and coercive commercialists and to leave trade and distribution subject to the great laws of national evolution.

In his chapter on railroad capitalization Mr. Clews gives his readers a lucid explanation of the methods by which the inflated corporation paper outstanding against cash in circulation has been so increased as to threaten the country with the same constant return of panic which Bank of England control imposes on English trade.

"Perhaps I may best succeed in making myself understood," he writes,\* "by illustrating the way in which our railroads are usually built. Under the laws of the state of New York, which are a fair sample of the laws of other states, a number of persons form a company under the general railroad laws, registering at Albany the proposed route of the road, the amount of capital stock and bonds to be issued and a few other particulars required in the papers of incorporation. The incorporators then proceed to form themselves into a syndicate or company for the purpose of contracting to build or equip the road. Here comes the first step in the system of 'crooked' financiering. In their capacity of incorporators, the same men make a contract with themselves in their capacity of constructors. Of course they do not fail to make a bargain to suit their own interest. They would be more than human if they did. Usually the bargain is that the construction company undertakes to build the road for 80 to 100 per cent of the face value of the first-mortgage bonds with an equal amount of stock and sometimes with a certain amount of second mortgages thrown in, virtually without consideration. The first mortgages are sup-

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\*Twenty-Eight Years in Wall Street."



posed to represent the real cash outlay on the construction and equipment, but as a matter of fact the true cash cost of the work done and materials furnished ranges from 60 to 80 per cent of the amount of first liens transferred to the contractors. The construction company disposes of the bonds partly by negotiating their sale to the public through bankers at an advance upon the valuation at which they received them and partly by using them in payment for rails and equipment. Beyond the profits made from building the road for the first-mortgage bonds, there remains in the hands of the constructors the entire capital stock and any second-mortgage bonds they may have received—as a clear bonus, to be held for future appreciation and to be kept in control of the company and ultimately to be so sold on a market deftly manipulated for that purpose. This is the way in which a large majority of our railroads have been and others still are constructed. It will thus be seen that the actual cash cost of a railroad is ordinarily less than fifty per cent of the stock and bonds issued against the property and that its first mortgage exceeds the amount of the legitimate actual cost of the road.”

The method Mr. Clews is here describing is that of “business conservatism.” In suggesting the methods of such great financiers as Mr. Villard, Mr. Gould, Mr. Fiske, Mr. Ward and others equally well known, Mr. Clews mentions that at the organization of the Oregon Navigation Company its assets did not exceed \$3,500,000, against which there was an original issue of \$6,000,000 in stock followed by an increase of \$3,000,000, a second increase of \$6,000,000 and a bond issue of \$6,000,000—or over six dollars of fraudulently inflated paper outstanding against every dollar of cash.\*

When note is taken of the statement by Mr. Clews that such “securities” as this are disposed of “by negotiating their sale through bankers”—when we remember how corporations interlock, how money thus acquired is invested in national bank stock and how national bank directors speculate in such “investments,” we can see the necessary effect of this reckless fraud on treasury management.

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\*For similar instances of speculative corporation methods confer the evidence of the investigation of trusts by the New York legislature and by Congress.

After such an inflation as this, the men guilty of it invest part of their fraudulent profits in newspapers to denounce as "cranks" men like Mr. Bland who resist their control of the federal treasury.

Their object in seeking political power is primarily to keep the supply of available cash so centralized that it can be "cornered"—if not completely, at least to such an extent as will enable them to influence prices—especially the speculative prices on the control of which their ability to plunder each other and the public depends. In describing one of them—a typical American plutocrat, the organizer of the first great gold corner—Mr. William Walter Phelps, who was minister to Austria under President Garfield and to Germany under President Harrison, said at a banquet in St. Louis, March 24, 1874:

"He was without education, culture or morality. He had respect neither for God nor man. He had no faith in the purity of woman nor the honor of his fellows. But he had the ambition of wealth and he determined to get money at any cost. The markets of a country demoralized by a long war, gave the opportunity and he seized it—unscrupulously using all the agencies which the experience of centuries had discovered. He gained a fortune by robbery and went unpunished. With it, he bought men and women until finally he sat in his gilded palace, boasting—believing that he owned the legislature that made, the courts that interpreted and the governor that executed, the laws of his state. On the base of a great railway which he took from its owners by fraud, he built a pyramid of splendid profligacy so high that the world saw and wondered. The luxury of Sardanapalus, the vices of Nero, were his. The pedlar drove his four-in-hand. The coward marched at the head of a noble regiment. He who knew not his own tongue controlled the artists of a continent. In his own theatre he sought rest, and watched the evolutions of dancing girls and listened to the voices of singing men and singing women. He sent his own steamers out of port and enticed into their lavish hospitality many of the great of the land. He even hired assassins to maim his enemies and drove in the sunlight surrounded by a bevy of his mistresses. The man debauched the moral sense of the young, disgraced his country, and died as the fool dies, shot by a profligate rival for a wanton's charms. He died and left nothing except the contempt of the good and the execrations of the

weak whom his example had ruined.”

Nothing needs to be added to or taken from this masterly delineation of the type of plutocracy produced by the demoralization of civil war and the politics which followed it. The foundations of the fortune laid by this man and his partner in the great gold conspiracy of 1869, grew under the cumulative frauds of others until it found itself represented in millions of the “securities” of railroads in Missouri and other western states, whose managers, interested in national bank control of the currency and every other form of monopoly, were always alert to use their free passes and other modes of bribery to control Missouri conventions against Mr. Bland and to keep the secret enemies of the honesty he represented in control of democratic machinery. The imperialistic movement of 1898 and the consequent demonetization of silver were made possible by such methods.

## CHAPTER XVI.

Superiority of Plutocracy to Party Illustrated by Mr. Jay Gould.—He Demonstrates His "Soundness" by Opening His Safe.—Influence of New York Safe Deposit Vaults in Missouri Politics.—The Growth of Corporate Inflation Accompanied by an Increase of Irresponsibility in Politics.—Banks, Railroads and Boards of Trade as Necessary Agencies of Civilization.—Production and Distribution the Legitimate Ends of all Business Activity.—Result of the Speculative Spirit in Missouri Politics.—The Attempt of Gambling and Railroad Rings to get Something for Nothing. Regulation of Railroad Rates Accompanied by a Complete Absence of Regulation for the Power to Issue Stocks and Bonds Against the Credit of General Business.—Rings and the Ruthlessness of Speculative Politics.—Abuse of the Courts Against the People.



IN NOVEMBER, 1872, Mr. Jay Gould was arrested on criminal charges based on his mismanagement of the Erie railroad. The suit seems to have been intended, not for the purpose of bringing him to justice, but merely to force him to disgorge. In December following he surrendered securities of the face value of over \$9,000,000 and the prosecution against him was allowed to lapse.

It was during the struggle over the management of the Erie that he testified to plutocratic disregard of parties, by saying that he was a democrat in a democratic district, a republican in a republican district and always an Erie man.

The spirit of plutocracy has been suggested by Mr. Phelps in the speech from which an extract has been quoted. His analysis of the character of Fiske illustrates the ethical idea of "unsoundness." The financial idea was illustrated in March, 1882, thirteen years after the gold corner in which Mr. Fiske laid the foundations of his own reputation and assisted Mr. Gould in his first steps toward financial soundness. The report having been circulated that Mr. Gould was sound no longer, he disposed of it at once by inviting a select committee of financiers to accompany him

to the safe deposit vault where he took from a tin box and showed them \$23,000,000 Western Union, \$12,000,000 Missouri Pacific, \$6,000,000 Manhattan Elevated, \$2,000,000 Wabash Common and \$10,000,000 bonds of Metropolitan, New York Elevated and Wabash Preferred. It is said that "he offered to show \$30,000,000 additional railway stocks but his visitors had seen enough."\*

The connection between this incident and Mr. Bland's work in Missouri appears when we recall the fact that the fundamental question in Missouri during the entire time of his public service was the question of the extent to which the politics of this hoard and other hoards like it, held in safe deposit vaults in New York and London should dominate Missouri, and through Missouri, the Union. In January, 1882, Messrs. Gould and Huntington purchased a controlling interest in the San Francisco railroad which intersects the district Mr. Bland represented. The Missouri Pacific, the Iron Mountain, the Wabash and the San Francisco gave the Gould interest a power which, when united with that of the other railroads centering in St. Louis and co-operating with the national banks of St. Louis, Kansas City and St. Joseph, would have been omnipotent but for the steady resistance of those who had Mr. Bland to rely on in emergencies. Often the fiercest fighting, sometimes in actual earnest, took place between representatives of opposing corporations and syndicates, which, after shaping the issues to suit themselves, allowed their representatives on one side and the other, to struggle with each other—for the sake of exercise or of salaries to be paid them as officeholders by the people.

The pretense of antagonism between agents of the same corporations, sometimes admired as the mark of deep and subtle statesmanship, is characteristic of the spirit of those who used their by no means inconsiderable ingenuity in the effort to keep Mr. Bland in obscurity on the ground that he was "objectionable to the business interests"—the "business interests" meant, being the national banks and the holders of such hoards as that ex-

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\*Clews' "Twenty-Eight Years in Wall Street," page 518.

hibited by Mr. Gould.

While the exposure of individual false-pretenses would be an ungrateful task and a useless one in any event, it is a necessary part of the truth of history to show that when Mr. Bland did come to the front in Missouri politics and the politics of the world, it was a result of the working of the evolutionary forces of the people, and in opposition to the wishes and interests of the mere parasitic politicians and professional officeholders of all parties.

As a result of the evolutionary impulses of growth in the people, three decades of Missouri history made during Mr. Bland's connection with the public affairs of the state represented steady progress industrially and socially. If political conditions in 1900 seem to represent the extreme of demoralization, it is hard to say that they are worse than they were in 1870. It is a saying of the late S. S. Cox that it is not always the best men who are best in their relations to public affairs, and while it is not to be conceded that moral irresponsibility in politics is to be tolerated or compromised with, there is no room either for surprise or despair when it is found that a very considerable number of those who become parasites on the public as officeholders or professional politicians, become morally irresponsible under any system in which the *ultima ratio* of government is in fact coercive and the immediate object of "practical politics," is the enactment of laws which will put this power of coercion in the hands of the most astute, aggressive and acquisitive. In Missouri, as elsewhere in the United States, in the thirty years since 1870, the increase in plutocracy as a spirit in government has bred an increase of irresponsibility in practical politics. Many of the men, however, who have been demoralized until they are irresponsible as individuals, are by no means malevolent, and under conditions which will make the moral forces of the people the governing forces in politics, they can be restored to a very considerable measure of constructive usefulness.

Hence it is not to be assumed that logical conclusions from the study





JOHN A. HOCKADAY.




S. W. T. LANHAM.



JOSEPH D. SAYERS.



CHARLES A. TOWNE.



of American politics, local and general, are necessarily pessimistic. On the contrary, they warrant the belief that progress will be continuous and that all attempts to interrupt it or to turn it back will fail.

The railroads, the banks, the manufacturing enterprises, all the varied phenomena of industrial co-operation under free institutions, are themselves collectively and severally, not merely individual enterprises but manifestations of irresistible creative force derived from the people and increasing with the development of the popular intellectual and moral sense. The very opposition to their mismanagement which sometimes is called "enmity to progress" is an essential part of the force which called them into existence. As far as a railroad is an actual agency of distribution, helping to exchange products from producer to consumer, it is a most beneficent and necessary part of that great scheme of liberty and progress into which Mr. Bland's life-work has already been absorbed. As far as a bank is not a mere device for collecting non-productive usury from the products of the people or for inflating debt with its notes issued against the volume of trade; as far as it is actually helping to distribute food and clothing—the necessities and comforts of life to the hungry and the naked, its work is beneficent and noble. As far as the speculator in grain or in railroad stocks, or in the "securities" of the trusts, is helping the actual workers of the world to help each other by exchanging their products and realizing as wealth what would otherwise be mere wasted labor, then he too is a highly useful member of society and every howl he utters, every shriek, every contortion of his body in the "panics" he brings on by his own insanity assisted by that of others like him, helps the work of progress and gives him a claim to survival where otherwise he would have none.

In the unfair use of privileges enjoyed by railroad and banking corporations and in the speculative mania fostered by boards of trade and similar institutions for the promotion of gaming as an incident of business, we can find a sufficient cause of the worst demoralization of Missouri politics and of national politics during the last quarter of the nineteenth

century, but when we go to the roots of every evil in politics, as of every good thing in society, in business, and in government, we find it in the people themselves. The fierceness of civil war in America in general and in Missouri in particular, impeded the operation of popular constructive intelligence. It can not be repeated too often that in the measure in which hate and passion exist as governing forces in the popular mind, fraud upon the people is made possible for those who through self-interest have learned to control passion, whose acquisitiveness does not necessarily involve hate, whose intellectual activity in gaining for themselves what belongs to others does not result in malevolence—except where they are strenuously and successfully resisted.

Except to make it clear that the people, as the source of social and co-operative energy are themselves primarily and finally responsible for all the corruptions and abuses of which they are made the victims, it would be worse than useless to go over again the old story of the obstruction and perversion of the forces of progress. If, however, the people can be made to realize that their whole social and industrial order is at every stage of the world completely representative of their own moral and intellectual condition, the work of denouncing perversion and obstruction will be constructive where otherwise it would stand for negation.

Whether in London, in Washington or in Jefferson City, we can not examine into the practical workings of legislation and of executive government without finding that the radical question under existing economic and industrial conditions is the control of the bonds representing the debts of the states, of municipalities and of corporations operating under the delegated sovereignty of states and municipalities. The "money question" is an incident of this, as the whole struggle over the currency pivots on the question of whether or not corporations shall be allowed to circulate paper evidence of their own indebtedness to take the place of cash issued by the people. In an article in the *London Contemporary Review* (1896) on Mr. Bland and other "American Currency Cranks," Mr. J. R. Lawton made a

statement which illustrates the reality of the objections alleged against bi-metallism as a part of the Missouri demand for popular government in America. "Bank money," he said, "is to be the money of the future. It is already doing nine-tenths of the work of civilization. Metallic money has become a mere appendage to it and the relations of the two demand re-adjustment."

Remembering that the question under a system of industry based on feudal grants to corporations, is necessarily that of accepting or resisting their control of the taxing, money-issuing and debt-making power of the people, we will see that no change of subject is involved in shifting from London in 1896 to Jefferson City thirty years earlier, when the question was one of controlling the future of the state in the interest of the financiers who had acquired possession of its bonds and of the bonds issued in the name of its counties and municipalities.

The value of the property of the state, including slaves, was assessed for taxation at \$317,928,000 in 1860. In 1865, it was placed at \$200,000,000, but in 1868 it was placed at \$468,000,000, against which a bonded debt of \$18,654,000, issued under state authority, was outstanding exclusive of county and municipal debts. More than \$13,000,000 of this state debt represented bonds issued as subsidies to railroads, and the county debts had been imposed largely for the same purpose. Where not actually fraudulent in a legal sense, and therefore void, as they often were, these bonds stood for the principle of communism in its worst form, and every dollar collected on them in interest or principal, meant the hand of the state applied in confiscation to the property of the citizen. Except under the communistic principle, they can not be justified or excused. As they passed into the hands of bankers, they became a part of the same interest represented by the demand for "bank money" instead of coin, made so insistently from London and New York. In the year 1868, in which the struggle over them opened in Missouri, a statue was erected to Thomas H. Benton in St. Louis. It was the "first monument ever erected

to a public man in the state of Missouri," and on May 27, the address dedicating it was made by Frank P. Blair, who succeeded Benton in the Senate as the representative of the Missouri tradition of individual liberty against communism of the corporations on the one hand and the mob on the other. Blair was elected to the United States Senate in 1871. In 1872 the legislature passed a resolution that the state had a right to redeem its debt in legal tender notes and the supreme court decided that the state might prescribe the methods of debt payment. The issues were intensified as popular opposition to corporation control of the state began to assert itself. General John B. Henderson, the candidate for governor defeated when Woodson was elected in 1872, was afterwards publicly identified with the long struggle made by the holders of county bonds for the control of the courts—especially of the county courts without which they could not reach the property they proposed to sell. Rather than levy on the farms of those whose rights had been overridden; whose fundamental principle of government had been supplanted by that of the communism of granting unearned wealth to corporations, county judges spent months hiding in the woods to escape the processes of judges put on the bench of the higher courts by plutocratic influence. Others, when arrested for contempt of such wrongful court orders, spent their whole terms in jail. Such was the persistence of the holders of these bonds, such was the influence they were able to exercise, that this struggle went on for twenty-five years; and even now men are found on the bench who will declare as law the communistic claim of the equal right of all to the legislative use of the private property of each on behalf of any enterprise which can make a plausible pretense of being in the public interest. This dishonesty goes deep. It underlies the worst corruptions in the public and business life of the state and of the country.

In 1875, when Senator Sherman was pushing the bill "for the resumption of specie payments," which was really in its intention a bill for the perpetuation of national "bank money" to take the place both of treasury



notes and specie, the Missouri legislature passed a "funding bill" which satisfied the holders of the state's bonds that they would not have their interest stopped by a too prompt payment of the principal. Unable to inflate the principal by new issues through the state legislature, they continued inflation through the counties and municipalities, but more especially through increase of capital recorded in the office of the secretary of state. The amount of paper issued by Mr. Gould alone against the credit of general business and the industry of the country is enormous. In 1875, an act was passed providing for the appointment of three railroad commissioners, empowered to regulate passenger and freight rates. While they were doing it, the work of inflation went on with increasing activity. While the commissioners saved, or professed to save, a thousand dollars on rates, a million in stock-increases or in new bonds could be issued against the property of the commonwealth and the industry of society, under the authority of the state itself, unchecked and almost unnoticed.

The claim that this enormous inflation of outstanding debt was based on private property is too obviously untenable to be discussed at all among those who are capable of even rudimentary thought. Every dollar of this debt, in Missouri and elsewhere, issued by warrant of the state and by authority of statute, represents the delegated sovereignty of the state and is in its economy as much a part of the public debt as the bonds of the state or of the United States. The interest on every dollar of it must be paid out of the product of public co-operative industry and every dollar of its principal when paid at all must be paid by levies of one kind or another on the private property of citizens whose sovereignty in their collective capacity as a state was abused in its issuance.

The result of this continually increasing inflation was a continual increase in the energy of the attempt to "take all the traffic will bear." In 1880, in order to evade all issues against plutocracy, a handsome and distinguished West Pointer, a chivalric and honest gentleman who declared the tariff a "local issue," was imposed on the democratic party as

its presidential candidate. During the same period, and as evidence of the same conditions, an open headquarters was maintained at Jefferson City for the control by purchase or otherwise, of members of the legislature. It offered free passes, free cigars and free drinks to all comers who could show a pretense of official or personal influence and it promoted the "poker parties" at which it was said that the purchasable were sometimes allowed to win the price of their votes. From 1880 to 1884, the condition of municipal politics in Missouri showed the public demoralization which manifested itself at Washington and in the larger cities of the east and south. St. Louis had a gambling ring as compactly organized as the lottery ring of New Orleans, the Tweed ring of New York or the Shepherd ring of Washington. The whiskey ring of the Grant administration, with headquarters in Missouri, had suggested methods which others equally audacious and unscrupulous were quick to imitate. The keeper of a St. Louis keno room, striving to monopolize the privileges of his business as so many other financiers were doing at the time, secured special privileges which enabled him to dictate the appointment of police commissioners and other officials—the resignations of some of whom he kept signed in his safe so that the dates could be filled in whenever their official conduct displeased him. The chairman of the democratic state central committee—a railroad employee—had been imposed on the honest democrats of the state by corporation influence and the entire machinery of the party was used to support the ring. It controlled the St. Louis courts and the machinery of the city government, but at its worst it was disorganized by an attack opened on it by men who opposed it because of the same impulses which made them supporters of Mr. Bland's policies.

What American political conditions have meant during the last quarter of the nineteenth century is illustrated by the fact—a very commonplace one—that when all other means of controlling those who were found to be the real promoters of this reform failed, they were notified in several instances that they would be "shot on sight." The execution of the threat

may or may not have been intended. "I bluffed him with language and language is cheap," said a witness before the Trust investigating committee of Congress\* The idea that "language" is a cheap means of controlling those who protest against their methods is a favorite one with those who wish to control the law-making power for their own benefit. The threats which are made will not be carried out in many cases even where they fail to intimidate, but that the men who make them are often desperadoes, there can be no doubt. That they often prompt others to commit crimes which would promote their own interest was illustrated by the blowing up of a distillery which antagonized the whiskey trust, by the wrecking of a refinery which held out against the Standard Oil trust and by the ruthless use of violence to suppress objections to the sugar trust's plans for controlling the cane sugar supply in Puerto Rico, Cuba, Hawaii and the Philippines.

In studying the history of political morals, the sequence of cause and effect from the corruptions of ward politics to national and international crimes is unmistakable. It was said at one of the great crises of Mr. Bland's work, when a St. Louis convention was being packed against him nearly twenty years after the exposure of the gambling ring of 1876-84, that if the roll of its surviving members had been called, they would have been found almost without exception on the floor, organizing the convention to promote local frauds which in their turn, were intended to promote national and international injustice so grave as to be impossible of perpetuation except through violence or the always imminent threat of it.

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\*See testimony quoted in Lloyd's "Wealth Against Commonwealth."

## CHAPTER XVII.

The Democratic Party in Missouri as Bland Represented it.—The Idea Which Has Given it Coherence and Efficiency.—The Only Motive Which Can Justify Men of Higher Intelligence in Taking Part in Politics.—Bland and the Courage of Leadership.—Frank P. Blair and His Pistols.—Bland's Steadfast Patience.—The Supreme Test of Fitness for Success.—Bland as the Type of the Highest Possibilities of Missouri Character.—The Military Idea in Missouri Politics.—Growth of Plutocratic Combinations.—Bland and the Transmississippi West Overthrow Malthusianism.—The Struggle for the Largest Possible Production and the Freest Possible Distribution.—Attempts of the Speculative Element to Control in Missouri.—Marmaduke's Epoch-making Stand for Principle.



HE democratic party in Missouri has been held together by an intense if undefined conviction that freedom to grow is the only possible solution of every possible problem.

This idea, which Mr. Bland was honest enough and strong enough to represent, has saved the state and the country from violent revolution, which would have been otherwise the necessary consequence of such immorality as has been touched on in the last chapter.

Devotion to an ideal higher than the possibilities of the present, faith in goodness inherent in human nature and above it as the ultimate solution of all problems, readiness when convinced of duty to make any sacrifice for it—these are characteristics of the best type of Americanism in Missouri, and Mr. Bland represented them in Missouri politics in a way that gave them high efficiency.

The hope of providing a more nearly adequate means of expression for the goodness in human nature is the only motive which can justify a man of common sense and of right impulses in having anything to do with the struggles of politics in a generation as fierce as that which fought the Civil war in America.

At the very outset of his career in Missouri politics, Mr. Bland's life was threatened, and when he spoke in spite of the threat, he risked his life

to denounce what he looked upon as intolerable wrong. When, during the same period, Frank P. Blair\* spoke with a pistol displayed on the stand in front of him, his life was no doubt in as much actual danger as it had ever been in battle. Though conditions slowly improved, the reversion due to the spirit excited by the Spanish war was marked, and it must be taken fully into account in explaining the demoralization of politics in a state where the great majority of the people assimilate distinctly the type of simplicity, honesty, benevolence and steadfastness which Mr. Bland represented.

No matter how often it is repeated by rote that good citizenship requires the extremes of violent contention for this measure or that, for this leader or that, no one who has made the actual experiment can look back upon his experience in meeting the evil in politics upon its own ground, without seeing that the pistol, which Blair displayed or that with which he himself may have worn out his own pockets while waiting the overt act of those who coerce timid champions of right with threats, is itself, representative of the worst forces of opposition to the evolution of justice in Being and liberty in Growing.

The highest citizenship—the only good citizenship—is that of long-suffering and unsundering devotion to principle—such citizenship as Mr. Bland represented when with his life-work done, and his last, long-husbanded vital forces exhausted in the struggle of 1898, he died slowly and patiently, fully realizing that as a result of the defection made possible by the spirit of violence excited during the Spanish war, silver would be demonetized, the national banks given complete control of the currency, the influence of England made predominant in American finances for the time being and the hold of plutocracy on the machinery of society strengthened in America and the world.

To be able to work calmly and persistently through life for an object, not stopping for abuse or changing for opposition, and then at the last to

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\*See Eulogy of Blair by Hon. Champ Clark, in the Congressional Record for 1899.

die defeated, with all the patience of the long struggle—not exhausted by defeat but increased by it—this is the supreme test of fitness for final success and this is the sure means of achieving it where all others fail.

In this Mr. Bland was as much a type of the highest possibilities of Missouri character as Washington was of the highest type of the Virginia character of his day. Nothing is hopeless in a world where men can live so and die so.

In antithesis to the possibilities of achievement for the future thus manifested, we have the actual conditions of the past and of the present, which must be studied patiently and candidly if we are not to go on forever making folly in one generation a precedent for crime in the next.

The struggle over the organization of Kansas and Nebraska as states, evoked in Missouri and Kansas in violent acts what had become the spirit of the national life—a spirit of discord and destructiveness which in its first decade after the Civil war showed itself in violence and fraud in politics.

Missouri, which became a pivotal state in 1820, demonstrated that it was still so in 1861 when, under Blair's leadership, it kept the control of the Mississippi against the Confederacy, and finally in the liberal republican movement and the later movement forced by Mr. Bland, showed that the same causes which gave it power at the beginning were still at work.

These causes are clearly apparent in the three decades of state politics between 1870 and 1900, and chief among them is the keenness of contention between representatives of radically conflicting ideas who lack on both sides the forces necessary to win decisive victory.

The necessity for sharp and continuous struggle is easily recognizable by those who are subjected to such conditions, and as a part of the same necessity they see that frequent compromises are unavoidable. In the "Young Men's Movement" in Missouri, between 1880 and 1890, it was said vindictively that for nearly twenty years, the "Civil War Colonels" on both sides had been adjusting their differences by falling on each other's neck



in public "reconciliation" as a preliminary to dividing the offices in private. If this assertion was prompted as much by a sense of humor as by the bitterness it professes, it is not for that reason less worthy to be taken into account as an explanation of otherwise unexplainable phenomena in American history. In Missouri and in the country at large, government between 1866 and 1896 was distinctly military. The "soldier vote" controlled the doubtful states and its demand for increases of pensions was insistent and menacing. The southern states filled Congress with the officers of the Confederate army who, while they were being constantly attacked as "paroled prisoners" and "pardoned rebels," were in no position to object effectively to what came to be called "pretorianism." North and south, the state offices not less than the federal, were given as the rewards of military service and, as has been said elsewhere, Mr. Bland was almost unique in Missouri public life because of his lack of a war record. In making up the "slates" at conventions the balance was carefully adjusted to give Union and Confederate soldiers equal representation on the ticket. The liberal republican element of 1860, represented by Blair, Bates, Brown and others who helped to prevent the secession of the state, worked to sustain the ex-Confederates as a check on radicalism and out of such conditions came a certain open-mindedness in Missouri which was developed less slowly in other states. Up to 1888, the governors of the state had been chosen as a result of real or apparent compromises between the Union and Confederate elements. After that, though the old sectionalism was still kept at the front, the decisive issues were rather the antagonism between organized capital in the cities and the producers of the country. The great corporations learned to select "Union" or "Confederate" candidates without prejudice as it suited their interests to do so. One of the most heated campaigns ever made for a nomination in the state was apparently between Union and Confederate candidates for a party nomination, each one of whom was supported by agents of the same corporate combination. The only real issue was which

one of two agents of a syndicate should be promoted for distinguished success in serving its interests. The one whose candidate secured the nomination was promoted and the nomination itself was charged to the Civil war account as "Another Victory of the Rebellion."

The era of Mr. Bland's greatest influence in the state dates from the time the syndicated and speculative interests, operating from St. Louis and Kansas City, began this system of trading on civil war sectionalism to accomplish their own ends. Although they may be deceived for the time being in a particular case, the people in communities where political agitation has been so incessant as in Missouri, are very sensitive to the real spirit of politics, and since the campaign of 1884 they have been governed more in their political action by the issue for and against that which Mr. Bland represented than by the politics of the struggle over slavery.

In 1790, two years after the adoption of the federal constitution, only one-thirtieth of the population of the United States were residents of cities. Virginia, which gave Missouri its institutions, represented the average conditions of the country—conditions which favored a strong individualism and the tendency to openness, frankness and boldness in dealing with all social and political problems.

In 1880, the proportion of city residents had grown to nearly one-fourth of the whole and by 1890 it had approximated one-third.

It is unsafe to conclude that this is an unmixed evil. It was an incident of a world-wide movement which extended from Eastern Russia to the Pacific coast of the United States and it was directly due to the forces Mr. Bland represented—the forces of increasing production for breadstuffs, wool, cotton and other necessities and comforts of life.

Mr. Bland's own constituents in Missouri and the agricultural producing states of the west and south were most largely responsible for it. Given a generation of peace after the close of the Civil war and their labor demonstrated the limitless possibility of the soil to sustain human life. They showed that with restrictive influences removed and the power of

aristocracy and plutocracy so checked as to allow free production and distribution, the plutocratic theories of the necessity of war, plague and famine, are as much a delusion as the other oligarchic idea that society is improved by the rack, the thumbscrew and the stake.\*

Between 1880 and 1900, the theory of Malthus, the most nearly infernal theory of economy which the perversion of human intellect had ever originated for the comfort of the most criminal classes, was wiped out of the category of sane systems of economy. Krapotkin and other extreme reformers had attacked it in Europe with force of logic, powerful enough to have demonstrated its falsity, if falsity could be so demonstrated. It was overthrown, however, by the logic of events—not by that of words. Men in America who saw in it the strongest bulwark of the English toryism which was actively operating for the control of America, saw in the “corn-burning era” of Kansas the opportunity to demonstrate that the poverty and suffering of the world are due to waste, to restriction and to oppression—not to the laws of God or of Nature. They advanced to the use of their opportunity without menace, without advertisement of their purpose, but with an intelligent understanding of the vastness of the possibility of beneficent achievement for universal humanity. Mr. Bland was the one man in Congress whose work made possible the success of all other work done by believers in the infinite possibilities of development under liberty. While some others were raising campaign funds and taking their percentages, or quarreling with each other over the possession of the offices, he forced the issue which will shape the twentieth century and insure the continued progress of America and the world against all forces of reaction.

The fight for the largest possible production, the freest possible distribution, is a necessary part if it be not logically the whole of what is

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\*The theory of Malthus, a favorite with English conservatives and commercial imperialists, involves the idea that births increase faster than the possibilities of food, and that under natural conditions of growth, unrelieved by the destructiveness of war, pestilence and famine, the human race tends to conditions of increasing discomfort finally to result in general misery. No other theory could have been logically used to support the policies of the British Empire since the time of Clive and Hastings.

denounced as "agrarianism." The direct producer, having no opportunity for speculative profit, must comply absolutely with the great natural law that only those who give most are entitled to take most. Hence, in Missouri, as elsewhere, we find a non-producing element in the cities attempting to push urban populations into conflict with the natural laws of production and distribution—laws which operate at all times as the forces of progress, the governing influences of civilization.

The speculative element of St. Louis and other Missouri cities, connected with the speculative element in the east and in London by the nexus of "banking credits" and common ownership of inflated securities, began to assert its power to control Missouri as soon as the Civil war spirit had so lost its influence as to make the issue between direct producers and speculative dealers and brokers in products and money a decisive one.

General John S. Marmaduke was the last governor elected in Missouri on civil war issues. It is perhaps true that he was not intellectually a great man, and he had the habit which crippled Grant—the habit of over stimulation which has been the curse of American politics and the ruin, morally and intellectually, of many who might otherwise have been benefactors of their race. But when this is said, it remains true that at a great crisis in the history of the state, the United States and the world, he made a stand for principle which postponed for nearly two decades the reaction towards plutocracy which showed itself after the Spanish war.

Following the great strikes of 1877—due primarily to the fact that the system of finance and trade, supported by the police and taxing power of the federal government, is restrictive and unfit to distribute anything except a minimized product—the holders of great fortunes accumulated by speculative methods, grew frightened and, in their controlling spirit, fierce. They were ready to shoot down opposition from labor and by the use of their money to drive out of public life all who opposed them in their policy of making government the vehicle of the maximum rather than the minimum of coercion.

They met in Marmaduke as they had met in Sumner a representative of the moral forces of the "pride of the gentleman," and it turned them back upon themselves in impotent anger. From 1877, and for ten years thereafter, the plutocracy of consolidated corporations, not satisfied with buying control of courts and legislatures, had begun organizing such bands of feudal retainers as attended the great landholders of the middle ages. These, known as "Pinkertons," were sometimes kept employed continuously from year to year as by the owners of certain Missouri coal mines, or else were hired for the occasion from men who made a business of recruiting them from the broken and desperate men of the cities for shipment wherever they were called for.

Governor Marmaduke died in December, 1887, but in his short official life, he had done that for which he ought to be remembered as long as manly independence is admired and liberty valued. In the great southwestern strike on railroads centering in St. Louis, the speculative element attempted to refuse to deal with the men, preferring rather to "suppress the strike" by the use of Pinkertons and the state militia. They had influence enough to force a resolution through the St. Louis Merchant's Exchange demanding that this policy should be supported by the state administration. When they sent a delegation to Jefferson City to intimidate Governor Marmaduke, they found him such a man as Providence seems to reserve for great emergencies. The weakness of character, for which he had been assailed, disappeared. He showed the strength which can not exist except as it is founded in rectitude. No matter what threats were made, he refused to allow the crowds in the streets of St. Louis to be fired on so long as they remained orderly. He insisted that the police, not the militia, were the proper guardians of the peace until they had exhausted their resources, and that only when there was actual and violent resistance to the authority of the state could the militia justly and lawfully open fire.

While he may not have defined his position in so many words, this



represents accurately what it was, and as he held it immovably, the speculative element was obliged to exhaust its indignation in withdrawing advertising patronage from newspapers which supported the policy represented by Governor Marmaduke. In East St. Louis, however, where the forces of government were actually controlled by plutocratic influences, the streets were filled with "Pinkertons" and the militia was ordered out to reinforce them in "suppressing the strike."

The result was the "East St. Louis massacre" which opened the way for the campaign against the employment of armed bands by corporations—a campaign which was essentially a part of the movement which carried the northwest and forced Mr. Bland into national leadership as a representative of opposition to the coercive policies of speculative commercialism.

Of the speculative spirit of this period as it showed itself in St. Louis, Chicago, New York and other great American cities, W. S. Aubrey, LL. D., an intelligent English student of American conditions, wrote in 1888:

"In 1860, the national wealth was estimated at £3,232,000,000, and in 1880 at £8,728,000,000. In the interval, a million of men had perished on the battlefield or in the hospitals, and an incalculable amount of property had been destroyed. A comparatively few railroad magnates, and money speculators, and contractors, and owners of mines, and political adventurers, and those interested in 'booming up' real estate, have grown enormously rich, but farmers, manufacturers, tradesmen, and artisans have had to suffer. Even where this has not been the case, the condition of the latter classes might have been much better, in the absence of the gambling spirit which seems to possess almost every branch of American commerce. Great cities like New York and Chicago have their produce exchange or board of trade, where 'rings' and 'corners' are formed for mad and reckless speculation in all kinds of commodities. These places are exaggerated stock exchanges, and the scenes are suggestive of Bedlam let loose. The excitement, the clamor, the struggling, the rivalry, the contentions, and the feverish heat and strain with which time bargains are carried on, show how the spirit of gambling has been evoked. A single firm in Chicago, a few years ago, gained control of the pork market, succeeded in doubling the price, and cleared more than a million sterling by the transac-





EUGENE HALE.



R. A. PIERCE.



J. R. WILLIAMS.



B. R. TILLMAN.



tion, the influence of which in advancing prices was felt everywhere. In the New York Produce Exchange alone the members buy and sell (of course, not for delivery) two bushels of wheat for every one that is grown in the country. They deal in five times the cotton crop of the entire south. Pennsylvania yields about twenty-four millions of barrels of oil in a year, but in New York city as much nominally changes hands in a week, and the various petroleum exchanges sold last year two thousand million barrels, or fifty times the total yield.”\*

The importance of such speculative conditions in their bearing on politics, appears at once when it is remembered that men thus enriched became directors in national banks, “trusts” and political corporations of all kinds.

Alarmed by the failure to control Governor Marmaduke, this speculative and non-productive element of St. Louis began the organized effort, which they have since made continuously, to control the state and to nominate the candidates of both parties. Mr. Bland was continuously subjected to their attacks, and they have left nothing undone to control the courts, the executive offices and legislature. The political history of Missouri, from the death of Marmaduke in 1887 to the death of Bland in 1899, is the history of the attempt to supplant American institutions in Missouri with the ideas of men who are in principle not merely imperialists, believing in coercive government to the utmost possible extent, but communists, believing in it for the purpose of using its coercive powers to support themselves in taking what they have not earned.

The “Laissez Faire” Bland stood for, did not mean letting such men alone. It meant with him, and it still means, opposing them in all their attempts to impose on society, as its laws, the intellectual and moral diseases by which, if left to themselves, they will destroy themselves and the government they control.

The “Whirling Dervish” must be reckoned with. He is not necessarily a villain. He may be, and often is, socially, a man of charming traits, and in the sum of things if he is not allowed to have his own way with the

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\*Social Problems in America, by W. S. Aubrey, LL. D., in the *Fortnightly Review*, London. Reprinted in the *Eclectic*, for August, 1888.

universe, he will demonstrate his usefulness. But to give him his own way, would mean to invite the certainty of destruction for all the splendid results of the slow and painful struggle towards civilization.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

“Who Owns the West?”—The Beginnings of a Great Political Revolution.—Western Mortgages and the “Bloody Shirt.”—How Hon. John James Ingalls Retired From Public Life.—A Ten Dollar Fac-Simile and its Far-Reaching Sequences.—The Law of Maximum Production Against Oligarchic Restriction.—The Work of D. M. Grissom in Journalism Complementing that of Mr. Bland in Congress.—Non-Resident Ownership of Productive Bases.—The Centralization of Values and the Demand of Non-Residents for Political Control.



THE laws of nature operate to force a maximum product in return for human activity. The political and commercial system, against which Mr. Bland's life was a protest, operates to minimize the product that it may be more easily controlled by a political and commercial oligarchy. There can only be one result from a system of oligarchic restriction, operating through the gold standard and national bank control of the money supply on one hand and on the other through stock watering, through combinations in restraint of trade, through duties levied to prohibit imports and through speculation at the expense of distribution.

Whenever the laws of nature force an approximation to the maximum product, the oligarchic system breaks down, and unless supported by military force, those who have profited by it, can not sustain it so as to prevent the possibility of reform.

This principle, felt as a decisive fact of politics, if not so clearly defined as it is here, guided the work of those who joined with Mr. Bland in forcing the issues which, after the defeat of Mr. Cleveland by Mr. Harrison in 1888, completely revolutionized “practical politics” in America, ending forever the era during which New York city and Indiana held joint dictatorship over the sections.

The governing cause of the change was a visible supply of wheat, cotton, corn and other agricultural products, so abundant that the restrictive

system, lacking the help of unusual scarcity abroad, was inadequate to distribute them so as to realize the so-called "surplus" as wealth. When Kansas began burning its corn for fuel, Mr. John James Ingalls, a talented and amiable gentleman, then United States senator from the state, shared a common delusion that the whole art and mystery of politics consisted in animadverting in an emphatic manner, sometimes approximating harshness, on the sins of the southern cotton planters—"nigger chasers,"—as in a Pickwickian sense the late Colonel Joseph Medill, of the Chicago Tribune, sometimes called them, at a time when the connection of the Civil war amendments to the constitution and affairs in the Philippines had not been considered as it has been since.

While Senator Ingalls and many other talented statesmen of equally good intentions, if of less striking eloquence, were exercising their talents in this seemingly inexpensive way, the roadsides of Kingman and other Kansas counties were frequently heaped with the chattels of landholders, evicted under foreclosure because their abundant crops could not be distributed and monetized. Mr. Ingalls' name happened to appear as a director on the letterhead of one of the mortgage companies engaged in this work. It attracted the attention of an acquaintance of Mr. Bland—a newspaper writer who shared his belief in the great disadvantages of artificially restricted distribution. He offered jestingly, to retire Mr. Ingalls from politics—"bloody shirt and all"—in return for \$10, to be expended by his newspaper in making a fac-simile of the mortgage company's letterhead, with a finger pointing directly at the name of Ingalls among its directors. The offer was accepted, though with the regretful assertion that Kansas "would probably elect some one worse in his place." The fac-simile appeared, and after the work of corn-burning and evictions had proceeded further, the people of Kansas, supported by the great law that natural production under continuous effort tends to the maximum, did retire him from public life. Presently an ex-Confederate was elected in his stead, and Kansas, no longer "a stronghold of loyalty," began to



be denounced as far east as London as a breeding place for "sockless statesmen" and "long-whiskered cranks." With Kansas the central west and the leading states of the northwest broke from the republican party, and, regardless of the sectional lines drawn by civil war, sided with the cotton planting states against restraint of trade, and the use of governmental force to limit production and distribution.

The two men who did most to give the initial impetus to the forces which wrought this great and most beneficent change were Mr. Bland and Mr. D. M. Grissom, the latter of whom was for many years the brains and conscience of the editorial page of the Missouri Republican.

Between Mr. Bland and Mr. Grissom the perfect understanding existed which can exist only between good and unselfish men of high and trained intelligence. They seldom saw each other, and when they did it was probably to talk of the weather, the crops, the progress of railroad building or anything else rather than of politics. Mr. Bland seldom wrote letters, and to Mr. Grissom he did not need to write. What the one did the other understood, and from the time Mr. Bland forced issues on the Bland-Allison Act, the work of the journalist complemented that of the statesman until at last, after the result had become inevitable, the usual methods of stopping the work were resorted to. Through Mr. Bland in Washington, and through others, it went on without interruption, however, and with gathering force until the result appeared in the campaign of 1896 and the Chicago platform.

Mr. Grissom saw that the restrictions on distribution threatened the producing states with non-resident ownership. He began systematic work to demonstrate this and to check the process of centralization through which the ownership of western values was being massed in the control of a few great bankers and debt brokers in London and the larger American cities—chiefly in New York and Boston. He showed that the safety of American institutions, the welfare of the people everywhere depended on checking this movement; and the figures he collected were so

conclusive, the arguments with which he supported them so unanswerable, that even after it was supposed by some that he had been deprived by their opposition of means of doing effective work, what he had done already forced republicans in Congress—unwilling as they were and knowing it would be disastrous to them—to consent to a census of the farm-mortgage debt of the country.

Through this and similar measures growing out of Mr. Bland's work or the work of others supporting the same principles, the second election of Mr. Cleveland was made possible—as it never could have been had there been a definite issue on the lines of his policies of allowing the national banks to direct his treasury management.

Mr. Grissom made clear, as it had never been before, the effect of stock-watering as a restriction on the distribution of the products of labor. Every dollar of false valuation in the fictitious capital of railroads, grain elevators and other agencies of distribution, calls for "all the traffic will bear" in dividends to be paid by the product of labor before it can be so distributed as to become wealth. This restriction, joined to the restriction of trade by prohibitive tariffs and to the still worse restriction of the medium of exchange by corporation sovereignty over money, inevitably operated to force non-resident ownership of all the bases of production—of land, houses, machinery, and mills as well as of railroads, elevators and factories for secondary production.

Over and over again as this discussion progressed, the question "Who Owns the West?" was emphasized. In 1894, when the same question recurred, Mr. Grissom contributed to the press a series of articles similar to those which had forced the issues on which President Harrison's re-election was so overwhelmingly defeated. In one of these, he showed the connection between the watered capitalization of railroads and the demand of the west for a natural currency so strikingly that the reader will find in the study of it a better means of understanding the underlying forces of the last quarter of the nineteenth century than he could well find elsewhere.

After having illustrated the vicious effects of the unsound and dangerous policy of centralization and restriction as it operates through oligarchic control of bank-credits, money and the visible agencies of production, Mr. Grissom wrote of the centralized ownership of inflated railway capital:

"Money and bank credits, capital and surplus, are not the only great items that enter into the aggregate of wealth of the northeast. That section is very rich also in western property—those kinds of western property that are most available for drawing annual incomes from—railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, real estate mortgages, water works, gas works, electric light works, mines, mills, factories and banks.

If the total of these items of western wealth owned and controlled in the east could be accurately and officially stated, it would startle these western bankers, merchants and business men who are accustomed to accept and adopt eastern theories of finance because they are presumed to be sound and safe. But let us, for the present, content ourselves with those very important and conspicuous earners of incomes, western railroads. The actual and official reports of them are at hand, and strikingly presented in the subjoined tables:

## RAILROAD INVESTMENTS IN ELEVEN WESTERN STATES—1894.

	Capital Stock.	Funded Debt.
Ohio.....	\$ 463,000,000	\$ 480,000,000
Michigan .....	111,000,000	118,000,000
Indiana.....	109,000,000	138,000,000
Illinois.....	430,000,000	545,000,000
Wisconsin.....	117,000,000	193,000,000
Missouri.....	275,000,000	282,000,000
Kansas.....	143,000,000	280,000,000
Colorado.....	116,000,000	91,000,000
Iowa.....	65,000,000	58,000,000
Minnesota.....	294,000,000	351,000,000
Nebraska.....	74,000,000	145,000,000
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	\$ 2,167,000,000	\$ 2,681,000,000
Total investment.....		\$4,848,000,000

## INTEREST AND DIVIDENDS PAID IN 1894.

	Interest.	Dividends.
Ohio .....	\$ 18,386,000	\$ 11,845,000
Michigan .....	6,893,000	1,519,000
Indiana .....	5,830,000	516,000
Illinois.....	25,556,000	15,181,000
Wisconsin .....	9,471,000	2,319,000
Missouri.....	13,521,000	1,913,000
Kansas.....	10,540,000	.....
Colorado .....	3,777,000	473,000
Iowa.....	2,427,000	356,000
Minnesota.....	16,551,000	4,163,000
Nebraska .....	6,545,000	.....
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Total.....	\$ 119,397,000	\$ 38,285,000

"The first of these tables exhibits about five billion dollars' worth of western railroads, and the second shows the interest and dividends they yielded last year. They are western property, but they are not owned in the west. It would be a very liberal estimate to credit five per cent of their value to the states in which they are found. They are owned in the northeast and abroad, and the \$119,397,000 interest paid on their bonds and \$38,285,000 paid in dividends on their stocks—making a total of \$157,682,000—is drained off to swell the incomes of their bondholders and stockholders in the northeast and Europe.

This, perhaps, is not a matter that we have a right to complain of, since the non-resident owners of these western railroads have a right to claim their own and do what they please with it. But it may be suggested that it is a matter of tremendous concern whether this annual drain of \$157,682,000 shall be paid in free coined silver worth 100 cents to the dollar, or in gold or at a gold standard of 200 cents to the dollar. Or, to put it in another way, in wheat at \$1 and corn at 50 cents a bushel, or in wheat at 50 cents and corn at 25 cents a bushel."

Mr. Bland once estimated that of the American values thus centralized in non-resident hands, about five billion (five thousand million dollars) are held or controlled by English or other European capitalists. It never occurred to him that these capitalists ought to be deprived of any right of property representing an honest investment. It did seem to him unreasonable, unjust and in the highest degree destructive of the foundations of political and economic morality, that stocks and bonds issued to represent non-existing values and used to take from the producer a percentage of his product for which nothing at all was given him—that based on such an obvious fraud as this, these holdings in the hands of non-residents should be used to control the domestic politics of America so as to force the payment of dividends in the dearest possible money—that is, in the cheapest possible wheat, cotton, corn and other products sold by America and bought by Europe.\*

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\*In a coinage catechism, "The People's Dollars," issued in 1896, Mr. Grissom gave this illustration of the enormous debt inflation outstanding against American producers—especially against the direct producers of the corn, wheat and cotton states:

## INDEBTEDNESS OF THE WEST AND SOUTH.

Q. Are there any reliable methods of estimating the aggregate indebtedness you speak of?

A. Yes; the census reports, the reports of state railroad commissioners, Poor's Railroad Manual, and other official statements put forth at Washington, and at the state capitals, enable us to make a very close approximation.

There is the national debt to begin with—\$962,430,000—nearly three-fourths of which, say, \$600,-000,000, rests upon the people of the western, southern, mountain and Pacific states, according to population.

The aggregate state, county, city, district and town debts of these states are \$500,000,000.

Next take the railroad and real estate mortgage debts. The bonded and floating debt of the Illinois railroads is \$312,000,000, and the real estate mortgages in the same state amount to \$380,000,000, making a total for Illinois of \$692,000,000.

The Kansas railroads are bonded for \$210,000,000 and the farms and other real estate are mortgaged for \$160,000,000 more—making a total for Kansas of \$370,000,000.

The railroad debt of Missouri is \$142,000,000 and the real estate mortgage indebtedness is estimated at \$100,000,000—making a total for Missouri of \$242,000,000.

The railroad debts and farm mortgage debts of these three states alone—Illinois, Kansas and Missouri, therefore amount to \$1,304,000,000.

The railroad mileage of all the western, southern and mountain states is 134,000 miles, and the bonded debt on them is an average of \$26,000 a mile, making a total of \$3,484,000,000.

Their aggregate real estate mortgage debts would be very moderately estimated at \$2,000,000,000.

Summing up these several items, we have the following statement of the

## INDEBTEDNESS OF THE WESTERN, SOUTHERN AND MOUNTAIN STATES.

Share of the National debt.....	\$ 600,000,000
State, county, city, town and district.....	500,000,000
Railroad debt.....	3,484,000,000
Real estate and mortgage debt.....	<u>2,000,000,000</u>
Total.....	\$6,584,000,000

## CHAPTER XIX.

The Balance of Power in the Electoral College Passes to the Northwest.—Modifications of the Sectional Issue Which Had Been Forced by the Mexican Conquest.—Robert Toombs on the Domestic Consequences of Aggression Abroad.—The Sword as a Title to Territory.—Toombs and Stephens of Georgia Isolated Under Polk's Administration in their Attempt to Prevent Civil War.—Their Opposition to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.—Toombs Accepts War as an Inevitable Result of the Annexation of Mexican Territory and Becomes a Radical Secessionist in 1850.—The South Changes Front in 1889 and Abandons the Struggle for Sectional Equality in the Electoral College.—President Cleveland's First Administration as it Provoked Political Revolution.—"Expansion," the Nicaragua Canal, the Annexation of the West Indies, and the Nullification of the Constitution as Discussed by Mr. E. V. Smalley in 1880.—Effect of the Civil War on Constitutional Interpretation.—The Republican Reaction Against Grant.—Mr. Cleveland as a Representative of the "Better Element."



THE sectional division of the Civil war, as it governed so long in the electoral college, was virtually abandoned in 1889, when the northwestern states were admitted. From the time of the Wilmot Proviso until 1889, American policies had been decided chiefly by the invasion of Mexico and the contest over territory extorted from that helpless republic. In 1850, Robert Toombs, speaking in the House of Representatives said of California and New Mexico:

"These are the first fruits of successful war. We have borne our full share of its burdens—we demand an equal participation in its benefits. The rights of the south are consecrated by the blood of her children. The sword is the title by which the nation acquired that country. The thought is suggestive; wise men will ponder over it; brave men will act upon it. I foresaw the dangers of this question. I warned the country of these dangers. From the day the first gun was fired upon the Rio Grande until the act was consummated by all the departments of this government, I resisted all acquisition of territory. My honorable colleague before me (Alexander H. Stephens) and I, standing upon the ground taken by the republican



party in 1796 against Jay's treaty, voted against appropriating the money to carry out the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. . . . I saw no prospect of adjusting the question which the acquisition would present. I therefore resisted a policy which threatened the ruin of the south and the subversion of the government. And to-day, men of the north, these are the alternatives you present! We demand an equal participation in the whole country acquired or a division of it between the north and south."\*

Toombs, Stephens and other educated men at the south saw as clearly as did Corwin and Sumner at the north, that the dismemberment of Mexico would force civil war, and from 1850, when the issue came on California, Toombs seemed to have accepted war as already begun in everything except the actual operation of armies in the field. Ceasing to plead for peace and justice as he had done in opposing the Mexican conquest, (when, as he said, he had no support at all from the south and only six votes from the north) he seemed to have taken it for granted that the country must suffer the dreadful consequences of its own injustice.† No one, after the issue came on the organization of the first territory acquired from Mexico, was a fiercer partisan of the south than was he. "When argument is exhausted, we will stand by our arms," he said in the same speech from which quotation has been made above.

When, because of the quarrel forced on Mexico, the south had been ruined as he feared it would be; when the old alignment in Congress and the electoral college had become a mere reminiscence of the unrepented injustices of both sections, the old struggle over the admission of new states was continued from force of habit until the question of bimetallism against corporation paper money opened the way to new issues and a new era in national politics.

After the south had been "raided" under Grant by the speculative

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\*Volume IX, *World's Best Orations*, page 3643.

†According to the report of the provost marshal general the total of deaths in battle and from wounds and disease during the Civil war was 413,225—or probably ten American lives sacrificed for every Mexican killed in acquiring the territory which, in the judgment of Mr. Toombs of Georgia and Mr. Corwin of Ohio, made civil war so clearly inevitable that both joined in predicting it and in preparing for it ten years before it came openly.

financiers who used the imperialism (militant commercialism) General Grant represented to bond the southern states wherever they could control their legislatures, the south saw only one recourse—to destroy its own credit so that the process could not be repeated. It is said that, when Alabama was discussing the repudiation of a debt fraudulently imposed by financiers who controlled the United States army as a factor in their operations, an agent of the bondholders, who argued that the “credit of the state would be hopelessly ruined in the markets of the world,” was told that this was exactly what was wanted; that the property owners of the state had no safety from confiscation so long as one bond issue after another could be floated against their property by legislatures controlled by speculators supported by United States troops.\*

Such answers were in their way conclusive, but, disgusted with the south as a field for “investment,” great speculative combinations of bankers, steamship owners and railroads operating from London and New York, deflected immigration to the northwest and used all possible means to populate the Dakotas, Montana, Washington, Idaho and Wyoming rapidly in order to use their votes in the Senate and electoral college in support of plutocratic policies against the agricultural producers of the south.

Hence when the bills admitting these territories as states came up for passage, there was inevitable southern opposition. The attitude of thinkers in Missouri who had been greatly influenced by Mr. Bland’s work was decisive against the continuance of the sectional struggle. It was believed that if all southern opposition to the admission of the northwest were withdrawn, the new states would be forced by the logic of events and their own economic necessities for a maximum distribution, to oppose the minimized

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\*Mr. Henry Clews is almost pathetic in his discussion of such southern ingratitude. “One of the saddest events of my business experience arose from the purest motives on my part,” he says in the twenty-seventh chapter of his valuable book on Wall Street. “I ventured my money and offered my friendship at a time when that section of the country stood in need of both money and friendship. . . . For these kindly offices I was treated with the basest ingratitude by some of the southern states.” Mr. Clews is referring more particularly to Georgia and Alabama, which, when relieved from control by military garrisons, refused to recognize the moral obligation of claims urged on their gratitude by those who had promoted bond issues during the reconstruction period.

distribution insisted on by combinations of corporations which were now showing their determination to become a permanent plutocracy and to supplant republican institutions with oligarchy. Opposition to the admission of the northwest was accordingly withdrawn or made formal. North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Washington were admitted in 1889 and Idaho and Wyoming in 1890—though Utah, as supposably a democratic state, was kept out until 1896; and the people of New Mexico, who were acquired by conquest two generations ago, are still excluded.

The result of the admission of the northwest fully justified this anticipation. The fight from this time on was made intelligently for the breaking down of civil war sectionalism as the first consideration. It was fully understood that the continued support of the democratic party by the "solid south" would not be possible when the republican party was no longer supported by the solid west. Partisanship, however, was the least weighty of the considerations which determined the action of those who, in spite of protest from party leaders, began forcing Mr. Bland to the front, disregarding well-meant warnings that "the east would never stand it."

There was a deep-seated conviction that the refusal of the east to "stand it" would be greatly beneficial to the country at large and finally to the east itself, if it should result—as seemed inevitable—in destroying the dictatorship exercised over the solid south and solid west by capitalistic combinations which controlled New York city and Indiana as a balance of power in the electoral college.

The amount of capital they represented was so great; their influence through their control of banking credits and of railroad privileges so far reaching, that the success of the movement to cut them off from their base in national politics might never have been possible if they had not believed success impossible for it. They ridiculed it as "the rainbow chasing campaign" and except to ridicule it, paid little or no attention to it until the northwest had broken away from them and had established a new balance of power in national politics.

The whole trend of events under the first Cleveland administration was in the direction of political revolution—though Mr. Cleveland himself pursued what his advisers considered a carefully conservative policy.

Politically Mr. Cleveland, though convinced of his own staunch "democracy," was a stubborn, old-school whig, with ideas and sympathies paralleling those of Henry Clay, in most things, though he leaned toward federalism more strongly than Clay or even than Hamilton himself. Probably, however, he was not aware of this himself until he learned it in the Pullman strike when he ordered troops into a "sovereign state"—not merely without the call of the governor, but against his protest. This is one of the class of things pronounced impossible by Alexander Hamilton, in his speeches in the New York convention called to pass on the Federal Constitution. The time had come, however, when the New York politician, who had asked in perfect good faith, "What is the Constitution between friends?" represented not merely the attitude of his own immediate associates toward constitutional government, but that of a majority of the "practical politicians" of the country. Few of them had read it and fewer still cared for it. In a remarkable article, (republished in the *Library Magazine* for 1880) suggesting the movement for new conquests of territory to be held under the colonial system, Mr. E. V. Smalley, a high authority among those who attach no importance to constitutional restrictions in government, said:

"One thing we may be satisfied of at the start. Constitutional restrictions will not long fetter the people in their efforts to realize the ideas of a broader and more potent nationality which are now germinating in their minds. The day of the worship of old forms and instruments has gone by. The old belief in the infallibility of the Constitution, which exercised a profound influence upon the political thought and activity of the country during the first half of the century, no longer exists. It received a rude shock when it was made apparent that the so-called sacred instrument had made no provision for the unity and perpetuity of the nation. It was an open question whether the right of secession existed or not. . . . The time

will doubtless come when we shall make larger efforts, stimulated by a wise government policy, to extend our commerce through the world and we shall seek with prudence, patience and sagacity to bring all lands and regions in North America under our control. In that time we shall foster our mercantile marine, instead of burdening it with imposts and shall give it the protection of a powerful navy. A railroad through Mexico, Central America and the Isthmus to South America, will be constructed with American capital as a national undertaking of immense future importance. The Panama Canal, whether built by De Lesseps or by our own engineers, will be completely under American control. The Canadian provinces, inhabited as they are by people of our own race and language, accustomed to public education and self government, will be brought to see how barren of promise is their colonial condition and how greatly their material and intellectual development will be furthered by a union with us. Without compulsion or unfriendliness on our part, but simply as the result of a wise, persistent policy looking to their voluntary annexation, they will finally become states of the American Union. We shall thus receive an accession of nearly four millions of population and shall obliterate our only long inland frontier, and open to our people whatever resources the extreme north may have hidden behind the screen of Canadian lethargy.

The West India islands and the tropical continental lands of Mexico and Central America, with their degraded mixed populations and their climate working against the development of a vigorous, progressive race, are not likely to be made partners in our governmental system—not, at least, until they can be thoroughly regenerated by fresh blood and the influences of Anglo-Saxon civilization. They may, however, come into a condition of partial union and be brought within the range of our postal and customs system; and thus be fully opened to our commercial, mining, and agricultural activities. There can be little doubt that before the tendency toward gigantic nationalities is exhausted and replaced by another form of development, the whole of North America will be brought under one government, and that that government, imperial in power, though not in form or name, will be the government of the United States.”\*

A special importance attaches to the date of this article. It is so strikingly like the speeches made in St. Louis, at Springfield and elsewhere by

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\*Library Magazine for 1880, Vol. VI.



those who were attempting to force Mr. Bland to the rear in 1898, that it might seem to be re-hashed from one of them. But is merely a part of the sequence of events working uninterruptedly from the invasion of Mexico to Appomattox, from Appomattox to the Grant administration and from the admission of the northwest to the end of the century.

When the struggle for the rehabilitation of constitutional government—for that was its meaning—was begun with due caution after the election of Mr. Cleveland, and in support of what Bland stood for as against the forces back of Mr. Cleveland, it was well understood that the last resort of those whose wrongful privileges would be threatened by it was foreign war and the renewal of the imperialism of the Grant administration. In view of such articles as that from Mr. Smalley, quoted above, it required no special insight to perceive this, nor in 1897 and 1898, when, without a change of issues, the defeat of the McKinley administration on the issue of restraint of trade through high tariffs and the gold standard was certain, did it require a special faculty of divination to understand in whose service speeches, reproducing the “expansion” arguments of the Grant administration, were made.

The logic of this argument is that assuming it can not be demonstrated that there was constitutional warrant for suppressing the southern Confederacy, therefore constitutional government is a failure and the logic of the maximum of coercion is the sole logic of government. Hence, “expansion,” foreign war, acquisition of territory by conquest and “national glory,” was the last ditch of the international oligarchy of corporations which, with its agents working for salaries, fees or political promotion in both the great parties in America, aspired to revolutionize the government and to establish a new order of things, “imperial in power though not in form or name.”

Those who stood with Mr. Bland in 1898 understood this, and when it was proposed to them to “pair” with the republican administration in carrying it out—using the United States army to annex





THE BLAND RESIDENCE NEAR LEBANON.



WHERE MR. BLAND LIVED IN WASHINGTON.



Cuba "by consent" and advancing along the lines of "expansion" to the realization of this "manifest destiny," the reply given was that so long as there was standing room in America to oppose such a policy, it ought to be opposed regardless of personal or partisan considerations.\*

The chain of cause and effect, from the movement for wresting the west for the republican party to that of 1898 which put Fitzhugh Lee and General Wheeler at the front in doing imperial garrison duty in governing Cuba and the Philippines, is not only clear now, but it has been unmistakably clear during the whole course of its development. Hence, we may leave it for the time being, and return to the immediate causes of the political revolution which preceded it.

The republican reaction against Grant carried that party away from the ultra-restrictive ideas of militant commercialism. After Hayes, Garfield and Arthur, there was no violent change involved in seating Mr. Cleveland. He adopted their treasury policies without change, and Mr. Daniel Manning, a national banker, was put in control of the treasury as a guarantee that there would be no change. On the tariff, Mr. Cleveland held the view of Clay, that the duties should cover the difference in labor-cost between the United States and foreign countries. He was thus in principle a protectionist, and by abolishing duties on raw material, he would often have actually increased the percentage of protection given the manufacturer. If anything short of the prohibitive principle, applied through taxation adjusted by themselves, would have satisfied the great syndicated corporations of the republican party, Mr. Cleveland would have done it.

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\*Mr. Bland's own attitude in 1898 was defined in the following letter written from Lebanon, Missouri, on July 22, 1898, and supplied by the recipient for publication in this work:

LEBANON, Mo., July 22, 1898.

W. V. BYARS, ESQ.,  
St. Louis, Mo.

FRIEND BYARS:—

Your letter received. I do not believe there is any danger of our party adopting a platform of principles looking to the jingo politics of island acquisition and colonial greed, to be supplemented and sustained with a large standing army and navy. I do not think the party is ready yet for suicide.

Yours,

R. P. BLAND.

He had held these ideas from the first and had made no secret of them. In 1884, when his candidacy was first announced, his failure to define himself more exactly in accordance with the views of the opponents of restraint of trade, had led to the movement in Missouri to nominate Mr. Bayard, and his celebrated "tariff reform message" involved no change of attitude whatever. It was a document Henry Clay himself, the father of the "home market" idea, might easily have written, and it is now clear that no reform of the tariff was possible along its lines of protecting manufacturers of secondary products at the expense of the direct producer.

The marked feature of Mr. Cleveland's administration, which differentiated it from any other during the quarter of a century to which it belonged, was its freedom from civil war sectionalism. Mr. Cleveland cared nothing at all about the glorious work done by Americans of different sections in killing each other. He had progressed intellectually beyond the stage of merely animal antagonism. He had no desire to kill any one and no admiration for those who did have it. In this, more than anything else, he approximated Thomas Jefferson, and no other quality of intellect and morals he could have had would have been more valuable to the world in his generation. He filled his cabinet impartially with "ex-rebels" and with representatives of the "better element" in the Atlantic states. For the "unwashed democracy" of the masses in the Atlantic states he had a great contempt—looking on them as a corrupt and dangerous element whose share in the government ought to be minimized.

In all the policies to which he was committed by such sympathies, he helped on the great work of breaking down the lines of civil war. He shocked southern democrats beyond expression. "Great God!" exclaimed a Virginia editor, commenting on something Mr. Cleveland had said soon after his inauguration in 1885; "Great God, is this the language of the President of the United States or of a Buffalo tough!" The next day the same editor was writing editorials as strong as ever in support of the administration. He had relieved his feelings and relapsed into his

party allegiance. Mr. Cleveland was not a "Buffalo tough," however, and he was President of the United States. He was so far from sympathizing with the "tough" element of American politics, that at the last analysis, the policies of his administrations will be found to have been dictated by the aristocratic idea that the good and wise, the virtuous, well-fed and "well-soaped" elements of society are, by divine right of their virtue and cleanliness, entitled to administer government "as a sacred trust" under which "fitness is the sole test."

Whatever merits this idea may have, it is in the strongest possible antagonism to the Missouri idea of democracy represented by Benton and Bland, and if it had not been for the race question at the south and the menacing attitude of republican leaders on it, Missouri would have broken away from Mr. Cleveland at the start.

The Missouri feeling towards him was well-illustrated when he "flipped out" M. E. Benton, United States district attorney for the western district of Missouri, for making a political speech to a small gathering of no special importance in politics. Some one had complained (probably to test the merits of Mr. Cleveland's threat to "flip out offensive partisans"), and Mr. Benton was violently evicted as a warning to others. An influential democratic newspaper in Missouri publicly requested the administration to restore Mr. Benton to office at once on the ground that he had never been indicted and that the number of Mr. Cleveland's appointees in Missouri, who had not been indicted, ought by no means to be diminished. It also offered to print for Mr. Cleveland's information the old indictments against appointees who had been left in office as "inoffensive partisans" while Mr. Benton was being "flipped out." This seems to have surprised Mr. Cleveland or his advisers greatly and perhaps to have weakened his confidence in those who sign the recommendations of applicants for office. At any rate he restored Mr. Benton to office after having so popularized him in Missouri that the effects are still evident.

As a result of his sympathy for the "better element" in government

and of his financial policies, Mr. Cleveland broke the "solid south." North Carolina elected a legislature against him, and the opposition to his administration claimed with a show of probability that they had carried Arkansas in the "off year." The third party movement received a great impetus everywhere, and the south would have probably divided permanently but for the republican threat of a "force bill" and for one of the most remarkable phenomena of modern economics.

Up to the close of the first Cleveland administration, the policy of reducing the national debt was carried out with an approximation to good faith. As a result, large sums of money, locked up in bonds as family endowments, were forced to seek investments either in real estate or in productive enterprises.

The extent to which bonds are used as a means of endowing families and institutions, which it is desired to put beyond the operations of the natural laws of redistribution, is hardly realized as yet by students of economics. It has been one of the great revolutionary forces in the centralization of the nineteenth century. Mr. Cleveland, in continuing to pay off the debt, threatened to inaugurate a new era in finance and business as well as in social life. The family hoards released from bonds came west to find safe investment and larger interest in mortgages on real estate, or went south to develop mines and establish factories. The immediate result was "the new south movement" and the unprecedented "boom" in western real estate. The idea of the safety of real estate as an investment had so strong a hold on the believers in permanent endowments that for a time the owners of farms and city lots in Kansas and other western states were actively solicited by the agents of rival mortgage companies to borrow the money of endowed families and corporations. Under the influence of this competition, thrifty and prudent people were so far demoralized by the speculative spirit that new towns in Kansas were fitted out with "palatial" court houses, high schools, electric lighting plants and other modern improvements, which, when the "boom" collapsed, brought



them to the worst possible straits. In one instance it is said that they surrendered the town to their insistent creditors and moved away to another site, leaving their public buildings in the hands of the holders of the mortgages on them.

If, in the given case, this is an exaggeration, it illustrates general conditions which were consequent on the cessation of national debt redemption. When money was no longer forced out of bonds, investments in the south and west began to slacken, and finally, under the Harrison administration, in a year of the most abundant crops, when the west ought to have been adding millions to its wealth, "the boom" collapsed completely, and the whole west was filled with what was ungenerously called "the calamity howl" of farmers evicted for failing to meet interest payments on loans which were fairly thrust upon them—sometimes actually by the agents of the companies, and always by the conditions which these companies represented.

As a result of such conditions, the producers of the west and south, began to turn more and more to Mr. Bland for leadership—the more so as the collapse of agricultural values was accompanied everywhere by a centralization of manufacturing industries, resulting in a decreased number of plants and too generally in the shutting down of plants in the west in order to limit the production of corporate combinations with headquarters in New York and with speculative stocks—"industrials"—dealt in as a mode of gambling.

After his defeat by Mr. Harrison, Mr. Cleveland denounced such combinations as "a commune of capital" but his second administration left them stronger than ever, though in the meantime a law had been enacted giving the national government power to suppress them. The central fact of the relations of the national government to such corporate combination is that its power over them is never likely to be used by one party or the other except to intimidate them in elections and to force them to contribute to campaign funds from which the friends or agents of "com-

mitteemen" who are appointed solicitors may realize their percentages or "commissions" as collectors.

Of such "practical politics," Bland knew nothing. He had deliberately and steadfastly refused to learn. Consequently when the crisis came and the opportunity to make a stand for the restoration of constitutional government by "splitting" both the west and south was clearly present, it was on Bland that it was possible to rely when no other man in public life had so clearly demonstrated the steadfastness of purpose and the simplicity of morals necessary for the success of so great an undertaking.

There was no miscalculation in regard to him. From first to last he never stopped to see whether he would gain or lose by doing his duty. At a time under the second Cleveland administration when the work of his life was at stake—when all the work which had been done in the west for the restoration of constitutional liberty might have been as completely lost as was the work done in the fiasco of the Cass campaign, he stood his ground although almost completely isolated by Mr. Cleveland's power and skill, until he had forced a reluctant party to take the risk from which it shrank—to make the advance without which it would have been at once disorganized.

## CHAPTER XX.

The Fundamental Reality of American Politics.—International Combinations of Corporations and Maximum Coercion in America.—The Demand for Bonds as a Means of Endowing Families, Suspending the Natural Laws of Redistribution and Creating Hereditary Oligarchy.—Restraint of Trade by Tariff Laws not Earnestly Opposed Under the First Cleveland Administration.—No Vital Reform of Any Kind Possible While the Electoral College Represented Civil War Sectionalism.—President Harrison as a More Extreme Federalist than Mr. Cleveland.—His Mistake of Judgment in Proposing New Measures of Coercion Against Southern Planters While Western Farmers Were Using Unmarketable Breadstuffs for Fuel.—“Cheap Money,” Dear Collateral, and Wasted Wealth.—Speculation in Money at the Expense of Agricultural Exports.—Enormous Interest Rates on Call Loans During the “Crop Moving Season.”—The “Calamity Howl,” Its Causes and Its Results.



WE HAVE seen that the reality of American politics is the struggle for the control of government as a means of controlling the products of labor, either directly or by the control of the medium through which they are exchanged—of money, however issued.

- We have seen that under the Grant administration, an international combination of corporations proposed the maximum of coercion in using the power of government for this purpose; that they did actually control politics by the use of the army and add enormously to the public and corporation debt outstanding at interest against production—a debt which when held as endowments for families and corporations inevitably operates to produce a worse oligarchy than that of hereditary succession in land.

We have seen a republican reaction after this under Hayes, Garfield and Arthur, followed by the apparent change involved in the inauguration of the first Cleveland administration—a change conceded by plutocracy not as a means of meeting the public demands for radical reform but of postponing it by apparent concession which would leave power still in the

hands of those who had used the opportunities given them by civil war to usurp it.

The attempts at tariff reform under the first Cleveland administration failed because, on the part of many from the manufacturing states who professed to support them, they were not made in good faith. In the Forty-eighth Congress, the enacting clause of the Morrison bill was stricken out (in March, 1884) by a vote which showed how complete was the control exercised by corporate combination over the then existing machinery of both parties. In 1887, when the Mills bill was presented, President Cleveland had carefully evaded an issue of principle. "It is a condition, not a theory, which confronts us," he said in introducing his argument that the surplus revenue in the treasury, rather than any issue of principle, or of right or wrong, required reduced taxation. "The question of free trade is absolutely irrelevant," he continued, emphasizing the point already made that he did not intend to oppose, *per se*, the system of restraint of trade which at that time involved the tariff laws, the internal revenue system and the issue and distribution of money. Such an argument at such a time could have only one logical result—that of stimulating attempts to remove the condition without confronting the theory. The surplus was finally disposed of by increased appropriations involving the most extraordinary expenditures for pensions ever made in the history of politics, ancient or modern. Mr. Cleveland was kept busy vetoing special pension bills as well as general measures; and with that perverse ingenuity which is so characteristic of American partisanship, his opponents so managed it that not a few of the worst cases of special legislation which he was compelled to veto involved his own supporters—professional statesmen, who, seeing the surplus in process of distribution, were encouraged to remember rheumatism, or other chronic disabilities incident to the patriotic self-sacrifices of their youth. When Mr. Cleveland indulged his sense of humor at their expense as he sometimes did in flagrant cases, what came to be called the "pretorian" element was so infuriated that

when he authorized the return of a number of captured battle flags to the ex-Confederates who originally owned them, the same men who had been actively engaged in promoting the exchange backwards and forwards of such trophies, turned on him and raised such a teapot tempest of newspaper protest that he was compelled to recede from his position of what was thus established as too much sympathy for "rebellion and treason."

As nothing was done under his administration for tariff reform, as his treasury policies were those of his republican predecessors, the "war feeling," incident to the spending of the surplus in increased pensions and other appropriations of not less doubtful propriety, appeared to be decisive in the campaign of 1888, and under the mistaken idea that it had been so, President Harrison began vigorously attacking the southern states on the race issue, as had been done under Grant.

It became clear enough under the first Cleveland administration that no real reform was possible in any direction under the then existing alignment of the states in the electoral college and in Congress. This must be kept in mind when there is a disposition to hold Mr. Cleveland himself wholly responsible for the failure of his four years' work. The southern democrats were at all times kept on the defensive by assertions that they represented "the property party" at the south while professing to oppose it at the north, and whenever they showed a disposition to work for a genuine reform of the enormous abuses of the corporation system, the threat of a new era of reconstruction, involving the complete control of their elections through the use of federal force was made against them and they were "forced back to their entrenchments."

Mr. Harrison, a more extreme federalist than Mr. Cleveland himself, believed in a larger measure of coercion in government than the majority of Americans at that time were willing to sanction. Not only was he ready to deal with the labor troubles of the industrial centers in a highly peremptory fashion, but twenty years after the close of the Civil war, he proposed against the south what would have been, if adopted, new meas-

ures of violent reconstruction.

This policy was attempted at a time when the economic theories for which he stood were demonstrating their logical opposition to the natural laws of production, and it made inevitable such unanswerable sarcasm as that with which Kansas farmers, sitting on the roadside with their goods and chattels, after being evicted by mortgage companies, were invited to go on singing: "John Brown's body lies mouldering in the grave" or "We'll hang Jeff Davis to a sour apple tree," while a new force bill was being enacted against the impoverished cotton planters of the south.

The reiteration of such arguments had an effect which was not diminished by counter attacks involving frequent use of such epithets as "cranks," "lunatics" and "calamity howlers." The increasing poverty of farmers, whose growing crops could not be adequately distributed because of currency and trade restrictions, was accompanied by frequent strikes and labor troubles in the cities and by the growing use of "Pinkertons" as armed retainers of corporations, wealthy and unwise enough to employ them in what was called at the time "private war."

These conditions encouraged the attempt to break away from the restraints of political conditions surviving from the Civil war. The financial conditions which accompanied this surfeit of farm products in the hands of the producer were, to many, unaccountable. Money was "cheap," and a great deal of newspaper space was devoted to exhibiting what was described as a decreasing interest rate.

This meant then, as it has meant since, that the holders of money were reducing credits by demanding increased security. The man who could deposit government bonds, or something approximating them in safety as an investment, might get money at three or four per cent., as was loudly alleged, but the tendency to restrict credit on real estate security after the collapse of the western "boom" and the frequent refusal to lend at all on what in "flush times" had been held as excellent collateral, brought the west to the verge of hopeless bankruptcy. The control of the



money supply of the country, made possible under the existing system, rendered inevitable an excessive interest rate on "call loans" and on other speculative loans made in competition with the demand for money to "move" western crops. Consequently the speculative markets of New York were kept on the verge of panic by demands for usury on "doubtful" loans reaching as high as two per cent. a day. Although this was simply highway robbery, it was asserted over and over in the leading New York papers—including the Herald, which can not be accused of prejudice in favor of calamity-howlers or free silver cranks—that even Mr. Russell Sage himself, though in his personal expenditures the most moderate of men, frequently used such opportunities for "taking all the traffic would bear." No matter who paid these enormous rates first, the crops which were being "moved" under the system of supplanting cash with banking credits and corporation notes, paid it finally.

Hence the question: "Who Owns the West?" was decisive against Mr. Harrison. He was beaten as no other candidate had ever been up to that time, and Mr. Cleveland was re-elected, regardless of what four years before had been his increasing unpopularity.

## CHAPTER XXI.

"The Rainbow Chasing Movement" Begins.—Its Object the Restoration of Constitutional Government Based on the Principles of 1788.—"Winning Without New York," an Incident of It.—Mr. Cleveland's Whig Policies Revive the "Fierce Democracy" of the Jackson Epoch.—Revolt Against Wade Hampton in South Carolina and Ingalls in Kansas.—The Northwest as the Hope of America Against "Floaters in Blocks of Five."—Illinois as a Keystone State.—The Surrender of the Presidency to New York the Only means of Breaking the New York and Indiana Combination.—"The Coat and the Cloak" Both Given up Successfully In Practical Politics.—Results of Forcing Issues for Principle.—Henry George and His Supporters Reinforce Mr. Bland on the "Farm Mortgage Census."—The Issue in Illinois.—"Rainbow Chasers" Not Prejudiced Against Mr. Cleveland or New York.



NDER the Harrison administration, it became evident, that by ignoring the struggle for office, ceasing to consider the question of nominating this candidate or that for any office from the presidency down, and forcing issues strongly for what in the discussion of the federal constitution in 1788 had been asserted as the fundamental principles of free government and human progress, conditions might be created under which it would become possible for the American people to decide for themselves—in spite of the immense power of plutocratic combinations—whether or not they were so far fitted for the forms and methods of government they had inherited as to wish a return to the realities involved by them.

The discontent at the south with the policies of Mr. Cleveland's first administration—which were nothing more nor less than the whig policies of John Quincy Adams and Webster in treasury management and of Clay in most other things—had revived what, in the first half century of the government, was called indifferently "the Fierce Democracy," or the "Dirty Democracy," according to the condition of alarm or disgust in which those so characterizing it happened to be. While the possibility

of "reviving the old whig party at the south" was being discussed, the "old whig party" with Mr. Cleveland as its head was already in office at Washington, and under Mr. Harrison it was succeeded by the new federalists. There was no more of democracy in Mr. Cleveland's administration than there was of republicanism in that of Mr. Harrison. The effects of this negation of principle were quite evident in the "off year" of Mr. Harrison's administration. At the south even before Mr. Harrison's inauguration, the "plow-holders" were in open revolt against the classes which held land and other property as an investment and lived in whole or part on incomes resulting from capitalization rather than from actual individual industry.

The leaders of the revolt were generally ex-Confederate soldiers—such men as those of the rank and file who had followed Pickett up Cemetery hill and planted their colors on the heights crowned by its captured batteries. They spoke a vernacular English which made them seem absurd when it was travestied by their opponents. They did not always shave regularly, and their manners frequently lacked aristocratic repose. But they were not men who could be turned back by trifling objections or minor difficulties, and their unrest represented tremendous possibilities of change. In South Carolina, which had been governed by its colonial gentry since the revolution of 1776, the question was between this uncultured element and the leadership of such admirable gentlemen as Wade Hampton—men of incorruptible integrity, of high capacity for disinterested virtue, of cultivated intelligence and trained fitness for governing. And in Kansas, it was exactly the same question. The old soldiers of Grant and Sherman, rude-looking men with long beards and hard hands, who had never heard of Massillon nor sat at the feet of Bourdaloue to study eloquence, were surrounding the elegant and accomplished Senator Ingalls demanding in menacing tones to know what he stood for—what the future of the country was to be—whether mortgages, the burning of corn for fuel and the enforced borrowing of a national

bank note currency at rates as high as sixteen per cent. on "drouth-belt" farms, were to go on forever.

This made the opportunity for what was called "the rainbow chasing movement."

Its object was to obliterate the lines of civil war sectionalism by forcing the northwest to the front in national politics, and vesting it with the balance of power which had been held by the plutocratic element of New York City and London operating through the purchase of "floaters in blocks of five." To effect this it was necessary to sacrifice the accomplished Wade Hampton in South Carolina to the same forces which would retire the brilliant Ingalls in Kansas. The essential unity of the popular movement in the south and in the west was fully recognized, and it was fully determined in advance to make every possible concession to it in order to break down what had become the ruinous restrictions of the "practical politics" of sectionalism. The key of the entire situation was the political condition of Illinois. It was recognized that whatever forcing of principles to their crucial test would be sufficient to take that state from its long affiliation with the republican party would carry the northwest also.


It has been pointed out already that the civilization of the village commune of rural England, developing towards combination through the corporation, and the related but seemingly antagonistic civilization of the farm and the individualism produced by it, are each strongly developed in Illinois and present a plain line of sectional demarcation. There had not been a time, perhaps, in ten years when by forcing an issue of vital principles, Illinois might not have been carried, but it had never been a part of the policies of interests controlling, to a large extent in both parties, to allow the national balance of power to be shifted from New York City. When it became evident that the attempt to carry Illinois was being made, it might have been checked at once had not objection to it been removed by the immediate concession of the power to select presidential candidates

to the same element which had for so long exercised it. Mr. Cleveland wrote a letter defining his already well-known views of currency restriction, and had he been attacked on it as he was attacked by Mr. Bland in 1893, he could hardly have controlled a single western or southern delegation in the convention which actually renominated him by acclamation. His nomination was conceded, however, chiefly because it was clear that there was no effective machinery for preventing it, but also with a full assurance that it would not interrupt the play of forces which were operating to disorganize the political combinations for which he stood. When it became evident that he would be renominated without opposition and that both national conventions would nominate "safe men," all that remained to the practical politics of corporation feudalism was the usual trading to secure self-constituted leaders of what had now come to be called the populist party. Mr. Cleveland's supporters at the south made strenuous attempts to drive back the revolted element but they were worsted. In Tennessee and South Carolina—the one as naturally a democratic state as the other was naturally aristocratic—the "new issue men" carried everything before them as they did in the northwest. In Missouri they were held to their allegiance to the democratic party chiefly by the fact that much of the work to carry Illinois, Kansas and the northwest was done through the St. Louis press. The idea that the maximum of coercion is necessary and beneficial in government had manifested itself everywhere as an inherent part of the federalism for which Mr. Harrison stood. In Illinois it showed itself not only in the presence of Pinkertons, supplanting the functions of the sheriff, but in an attempt to close Lutheran and Catholic parochial schools, because of their refusal to admit the justice of state regulation of their religious and literary curriculum. An examination of the United States census showed that on this issue alone, the advocates of coercive government might be defeated in Illinois by a sufficiently vigorous attack. As a matter of fact, both in Illinois and Wisconsin, where a similar law against private schools had been enacted, the latent

discontent with the injustice of the whole system of political, economic and social restriction and repression was so great that Wisconsin—a state which was not considered at all in initial calculations—was actually carried by the same contest which carried Illinois, though that fight was made chiefly from St. Louis and apparently at too long a range to be at all effective. So far-reaching is the inevitable result of a determined assertion of these fundamental principles through which the constructive forces of the human intellect are given freedom of action and rendered efficient.

Whenever an issue of radical principle is made, advocates of the most widely divergent methods are united. Thus, Mr. Bland had no special confidence in the land theory of Henry George as a means of "abolishing poverty," and Mr. George was inclined to be impatient with bimetallism or any other issue which prevented a fuller discussion of his land theory. But in fundamental economic principle, Mr. Bland and Mr. George united—each holding direct production from the soil of paramount economic importance. In the east, Mr. George, by his advocacy of free trade, had done more to break down civil war sectionalism than had been done by any one else in that section. When Mr. Bland's work forced the issues against the eviction at wholesale of the mortgaged farmers of the west, it was the followers of Henry George who worked incessantly and strenuously until they had compelled the passage of the law for making a census of farm mortgages. Again, in a few months after the ex-Confederates of South Carolina and the ex-Federals of Kansas had been denouncing each other with a fierceness born of the force of long-standing habit, the power of new convictions, excited in them by the appeal to fundamental principle, had united them for a common purpose and made them efficient for its achievement. Seldom in the history of politics anywhere has there been a more remarkable or more encouraging spectacle than the readiness with which, over a vast territory, divided by seemingly impassable barriers of natural causes and artificial prejudice, men of the most diverse views and antagonistic habits rallied for a common purpose and advanced






A BLAND BADGE OF THE CAMPAIGN  
OF 1896.



MR. BLAND'S LAW OFFICE AT ROLLA, MO.





irresistibly to carry it out.

This was the "rainbow chasing movement" which grew out of Bland's work in Missouri. It is true that at the front of it was a false pretense—that if Mr. Cleveland, whom every student of politics knew to be a representative of antagonism to all it stood for, had not been forced forward as its beneficiary, it might not have been possible at all. But it was not the less remarkable, but rather the more so, on that account. When everything that can be taken away from men of trained intelligence who devote it—as Mr. Bland did his—to serving mankind, has been taken, it leaves their power greater than ever by forcing the quicker development of the hidden realities of politics and by giving the advocates of repression and restriction full opportunity to develop their logic to its necessary *reductio ad absurdum*.

To carry a presidential election without New York and Indiana, to break down the sectionalism of civil war, to break the solid west and "split" the solid south so that the purchase of "floaters in blocks of five" in a dozen wards and counties could no longer control 60,000,000 people—that was the purpose of the "rainbow-chasing campaign," and "rainbow chasers," who knew Mr. Cleveland as a representative man and had no prejudice against him personally because of what he represented, accepted him as inevitable and began preparing for the issue which was unavoidable as a result of his election. That issue Mr. Bland met with moral courage which has seldom been equalled—courage for which the twentieth century owes him more than it owes any other man in the public life of his generation.

## CHAPTER XXII.

Mr. Cleveland's Second Term.—His Attempt to "Restore the Hegemony of New York" Forces His Party to Repudiate Him.—He Defeats Tariff Reform by Supplanting it With a Manufactured Issue Against Bimetallic Coinage.—Mr. Cleveland's Thoroughgoing Whiggery and His Dislike of the Vulgus.—He Attempts to Isolate Mr. Bland in Missouri.—How a National Combination Was Broken by the Assault of a Single Newspaper.—Mr. Bland Boomed for President in Missouri.—Mr. Cleveland's Missouri Supporters in Congress Driven to Cover.—Bland Defeats the Oates Bankruptcy Bill.—The Real Meaning of "Tariff Reform" as Mr. Cleveland Represented It.—He and His Friends Dictate the Protectionist Plank in the Report of the Platform Committee at Chicago in 1892.—It is Rejected by the Convention.—The Standard Oil Company, the Sugar Trust and the Banks as a Political Combination.—Federalism and the Illinois Strike.



R. CLEVELAND was no sooner inaugurated for his second term than, with his usual courage and determination, he proceeded to force on his party as its only hope of escaping complete and immediate ruin, a repudiation of his policies and a radical stand against all that with which, in the public mind, he was most completely identified.

In 1862, Daniel W. Voorhees, and other representatives of the "copperhead element" in the central west, began vigorous attacks on the discriminations of the Morrill tariff, hoping to check abuses in the use of the taxing power for war purposes. They so far succeeded in centering public attention on the subject that in the midst of the confusion of civil war and the period of anarchy which followed it, the feeling of opposition to the restrictive economic policies of the republican party kept the democratic party alive and growing in spite of a position which was logically untenable—a position which in 1866 required it to represent both the conservatism of the landed interests of the south and the radicalism of the "proletarian" masses in New York and other northern cities.

A thoroughgoing whig, with all the prejudices of the "gentleman's

party" against the "vulgar" of his own state, Mr. Cleveland squared issues against himself by forcing an issue for the restrictive control of the currency into precedence of the issue against restrictive tariff taxation on which he had been elected.

The false pretenses of the campaign which elected him were not his. He had announced his position against bimetallic coinage, and having been elected in spite of it, he felt free to follow the dictates of his own sense of duty. He did so accordingly—with far reaching results, which had been by no means unanticipated by those who believed that the future of the country would be worked out by the development of its constructive forces, operating in spite of any and all attempts at checking them.

In issuing what has been called his "panic proclamation" against silver, Mr. Cleveland was logical and strictly consistent with his own record. He looked on control of the currency by national bankers as desirable, and he had no confidence in the ability of the "inexperienced masses" to manage the finances of the government. It is not likely that it occurred to him to apply the same argument against allowing the inexperienced masses to have anything at all to do with government, but his sympathies inclined him at all points to a government of experts and of the "fit," selected, not because they represented the rest, but because of demonstrated superiority manifested in ability to govern rather than to represent others. This is merely saying once more that Mr. Cleveland believed in a government "by the better element," and being firmly convinced that the national banks and other "business interests," represented in his first cabinet by such able men as Daniel Manning and William C. Whitney, were the better element, he adopted their views as his own and supplanted the tariff issue with an issue against silver coinage and an automatic currency.

It has been said that as a result of the anomalous division forced by the "free soil" contest, a reform of the tariff was logically impossible during the twenty-five years which followed the Civil war. But had Mr.

Cleveland forced the issue for tariff reform as he did the issue against bimetallism, he would have ranked still as one of the greatest and most popular leaders of his party. As he did not—as in the nature of things he could not—his administration made a failure to reform the tariff, so complete, so humiliating, so manifestly ludicrous from every possible standpoint at which it could be looked, that it would have been suicide to discuss the tariff and tariff reform at all in the ensuing national campaign. The democratic party had only one hope of survival—that of forcing radically the only other issue with the republican party which remained—that of bimetallism—the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1.

So obvious was this necessity—so clear was it even to men who had united with Mr. Cleveland in attempting to keep Mr. Bland in the background—that Mr. Cleveland, who, at the outset of the struggle under his second administration, had complete control of the democratic party machinery, with only Bland and Bland's immediate following holding out against him—found his influence nullified and his administration openly repudiated.

It was the logic of the situation that it should be so. Nothing could have prevented it, or it would have been prevented at the start. Between the defeat of Harrison and Mr. Cleveland's second inauguration, careful preparations had been made for the work Mr. Cleveland was to do. Leading newspapers had been prepared for it by systematic pressure from national bankers and advertisers influenced by national bankers. It was believed when the Cleveland administration revealed its policies, that Mr. Bland would have practically no support, even in Missouri where a strong combination had been made against him, consisting of members of the congressional delegation and others, some of whom professed habitually the highest reverence for him and made compliments to his "sincerity" and "earnestness," part of their stock in trade before Missouri audiences. No advocate of 16 to 1 coinage had reason to expect contro! of Mr.



Cleveland's postoffices or other patronage, and as a result, Mr. Bland seemed to be completely isolated when Mr. Cleveland began the fight for demonetization.

Mr. Bland at this time was in doubt whether it would be possible to make the contest for bimetallism, or any other reform, within the lines of the democratic party as its organization then existed. He was ready to leave the party if necessary.\* In the meantime, almost wholly without support, he began the struggle which prevented the party from being completely disorganized. He was supported in Missouri from an unexpected quarter. The St. Louis Chronicle, at that time edited by Gen. Morton L. Hawkins, saw in the situation an opportunity for journalism of the highest type and began vigorously "booming" Mr. Bland for president in connection with a strong attack made on those members of the Missouri delegation who had either secretly adopted Mr. Cleveland's views or had assented to them as the inevitable. A circular letter was sent out by General Hawkins to the democratic weekly newspapers of Missouri, Illinois and other states, asking their opinion of the policy which was about to be adopted by the administration. The replies were immediate and were virtually if not wholly unanimous in their indignant condemnation. As one broadside after another of these letters was printed, Washington in general, and the Senate and House of Representatives in particular, re-

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\*"Nothing short of revolution it seems to me can save the cause," Mr. Bland wrote in 1894 to the editor of this volume. His view of party allegiance in general was given as follows in a letter to Virgil Salmon, Mercer University, Macon, Georgia:

"Feb. 5, 1898.

"The question of whether party action is better in politics than independent action must be considered from the standpoint of a government resting upon the will of the people. Parties seem to be indispensable, at least unavoidable, in the conduct of a republican form of government such as ours. Political parties are supposed to represent certain principles of government supposed to be necessary to its proper administration. On these questions people will naturally divide. I have not the time to present the great principles on which political parties have heretofore divided, or on which they are now divided, but suffice it to say that inasmuch as parties seem to be indispensable to our government, therefore party allegiance is preferable to independent action, for principles cannot be enforced without party discipline and party allegiance; yet, I would not be understood to mean by this that, when a political party becomes the mere tool of designing persons for the conduct of a government used to benefit the few at the expense of the many, allegiance is owed it, but rather in this case the party has forfeited its claims upon voters, and thus independent action is not only preferable but absolutely necessary."

ceived the full benefit of special editions of the paper. It soon became apparent that the combination against Mr. Bland could be broken with ease as far as the west and south were concerned, and the attack on it was made with persistent determination.

Mr. Bland, instead of being isolated as it had been hoped by his opponents, found himself supported by the entire democratic press of the west and south, except by a few city papers representing special interests. Those who expected to control him through his disinterestedness and his unwillingness to assert claims for leadership, found that they had completely lost their influence with him. He demonstrated his natural superiority to the merely "practical" politician around him, and in a few weeks he had proven his ability to lead in spite of them. A signal instance of it was given during this period, in the ease with which he forced the defeat of the national bankruptcy bill, which was then held ready for passage, backed by the banks and boards of trade of the country and supplemented with a clause under which debtors on a mere affidavit of "knowledge and belief" could be imprisoned and held until bailed. The Chronicle opened the fight upon this bill with such vigor in St. Louis that Congressman Oates of Alabama who was then in charge of the bill was reported in Washington dispatches as having threatened General Hawkins. No doubt this was an exaggeration, but there was no possibility of exaggerating the radicalism of the element which Mr. Oates had been put forward to represent. The bill, in spite of its imprisonment clause, was forced for passage and it would have passed had not Mr. Bland taken the offensive against it and moved to strike out its enacting clause. Its friends were thrown into confusion and, as some on the democratic side who would have supported it otherwise did not have the courage to do so, it was defeated.

On the issue against the coinage of silver, Mr. Bland, though he seemed to be defeated, won with the same ease an overwhelming victory for principle. When his work culminated in the great "parting of the

ways" speech which defined the issues of 1896, public sentiment in Missouri and the west had become so manifest and so menacing that those who had joined with Mr. Cleveland, in the attempt to "swing the party," were obliged to vote with Mr. Bland in order to keep standing room in Congress as representatives of western and southern constituencies.

After Mr. Cleveland succeeded in compelling the suspension of silver coinage under the Sherman act, Mr. Bland forced him to veto a bill for the coinage of the "seigniorage," and by refusal to concede anything to the policies the administration represented, brought about a more definite public understanding of what they really were.

The end contemplated by these policies was to force the business of the country as far as possible away from a cash basis, in order that the maximum amount of "banking credits" might be utilized. It was proposed to back the credit of the banks with that of the United States, and to this end an elaborate system was devised under the auspices of Mr. Carlisle. It can be characterized without prejudice as tending to exaggerate every evil of the national banking system, by adding the element of the worst speculative insecurity to that of monopoly, through the employment of the delegated sovereignty of the government. This had been anticipated in the democratic platform of 1892, where Mr. Cleveland's financial associates managed to secure complete control of the platform committee.

In the national convention held at Chicago in that year, the results of the second Cleveland administration were clearly foreshadowed. Mr. Cleveland's whig and federalist friends, controlling the platform committee, rejected a democratic plank written in Missouri committing the party squarely to its historic principles of "tariff for revenue only," and substituted for it the compromise idea for which Mr. Cleveland had always stood—the idea of a tariff high enough to protect the manufacturer and to yield revenue in the absence of all protection for raw materials produced in America. It does Mr. Cleveland no injustice to say that the Standard Oil Company and the combined national banking interest of the country were

represented by those who represented him most authoritatively in that convention. The policy of the platform committee, so far as it related to the tariff, was repudiated in open convention, and a plank almost exactly identical in phraseology with that from Missouri, which had been rejected, was adopted by the convention.

The convention, however, paid no attention to an inconspicuous clause under which it was proposed to revive "state banks" as banks of issue, with a national guarantee of their currency. As it presently appeared, this looked to be the issuance of corporation notes to circulate as money on the "security" of the bonded debt of other corporations—even of railroads representing values largely speculative. This was said to be a plan for "retiring the treasury from the banking business"—meaning that with a minimum coinage by the treasury, the rest of the currency needed in business was to be issued chiefly on government credit by private corporations, putting it in circulation at interest to be collected and appropriated by their managers. Under this plan—as indeed under the national banking system—a dollar of bonded debt, outstanding against business, is inflated one hundred per cent. by a note for a dollar "based" on it and put in circulation to do the work of cash. The system was invented by the celebrated John Law, and no rational intellect which consents to consider its realities, can conclude that it is logical, scientific or indeed sane, except as claims of sanity may be made for it because of the facility it gives for the acquisition of unearned wealth at the expense of natural production and distribution.

Along this line of monopoly control of the currency by corporations substituting inflated paper for cash, issues were forced in connection with a tariff bill which, in spite of the national platform of 1892, recurred to the whig basis proposed by Mr. W. C. Whitney from the platform committee at Chicago. In many cases, the Wilson bill, by absolute free trade in raw materials and a duty of over a third against imports of manufactured goods, made the protective difference greater for the American manu-

facturer than it had been before. It was asserted at the time, with a show of probability, that the average duties of the bill were on the whole higher than those of the "war tariff" which the democratic party had been denouncing for so many years. The tax on incomes, as it manifestly tends to restrict investment and to minimize production, was in opposition to the free trade theory of the least possible restriction, but, nevertheless, it was the most popular feature of the bill and when, as was perhaps anticipated, the Supreme Court declared against it, the bill as it had passed was left so odious with both parties, that democrats mentioned it only with shame and republicans with execration—the more violent because it was only thus that they could make or simulate a decided divergence from Mr. Cleveland's now pronounced federalism.

There is little question that his second administration did more to break down popular adherence to the original principles of the government than that of General Grant himself. Mr. Cleveland had most of the good qualities of John Adams and differed politically in no essential respect from Adams in his tendencies and sympathies. Although Illinois had been carried against the republicans in 1892, largely on the merits of the determined attempt made to restrict the tendency of commercial corporations to use force as a business method; although General John M. Palmer, the quondam opponent of General Sheridan, had been selected and forced to the front in Illinois to represent opposition to the Pinkerton system and to the unnecessary intervention of the military in civil government, Mr. Cleveland during the Pullman strike sent federal troops into Illinois to do police duty, not only without the call of the governor, but against his wishes. It is useless to discuss the occasion for this, here. It needs to be considered only as a fact, unprecedented in the history of the democratic party, and in its effects on democratic organization, necessarily revolutionary. Mr. Bland opposed it in Congress, but he was unable to do more than put his protest on record—Congress being controlled at the time by a combination between republicans and those who were known as "cuckoos"



—a name given to them to suggest the promptness and reliability with which the cuckoo in a well made clock responds in voice and action to the movements of the governing machinery.

When a president elected as a democrat, and the first to be seated as a democrat since the Civil war, thus openly repudiated the theories of the federal constitution to which the democratic party owed its first great victory against Adams in 1800; for which southern Confederates had fought four years and northern "copperheads" endured persecution and ignominy for a full generation, it was evident that a new era had come indeed. Unyielding in his conviction of duty, devoted to the welfare of the country as he understood it, and governed as were his intimate associates by a profound distrust of the masses of the people, Mr. Cleveland's patriotism and willingness to sacrifice the last remnants of his personal popularity to what he conceived to be the necessity of leading the democratic party in new directions, worked to make inevitable such a radical change in politics as had hardly been seen since similar issues were forced by the elder Adams.

Among the federalist presidents of the United States, Mr. Cleveland will rank with Adams in ability and in patriotism, but no matter how willing we may be to do him full justice, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that except as it disorganized sectional politics and forced party re-alignment, his second administration was one of the most unfortunate in the history of the country.

His attempt at tariff reform was worse than a failure. His sale of bonds to maintain the gold basis had the effect of making gold itself a part of an unsafe system of credit currency, for if government credit utilized in the issue of bonds must be used to support gold as the standard, it is clear that in economic effect gold is no longer cash (money of final account), but is as much a part of a general system of credit currency as if it were paper promise to pay, unsecured. Every million dollars in gold, held in reserve by Mr. Cleveland through an issue of bonds against it to keep it in reserve, was inflated by the amount of the bonds issued. And



when to this unscientific and unnatural system, was added the resort to such foreign financial agents as Mr. Pierpont Morgan and the Rothschilds to "underwrite the treasury" and support the credit of the country in a time of profound peace, nothing except the use of the army for police duty in Illinois was needed to divide Mr. Cleveland forever from what its opponents call the "bourbon" element of his party. Sixteen to one bimetallism and the work of Mr. Bland made the issue when the crisis came, but long before it came, Cleveland himself had made it through his fundamental federalism—his innate belief in the necessity of government of, by and for "the better element."

## CHAPTER XXIII.

The Financial Policies of Plutocracy and John Law as Their Prophet.—Turgot and Quesnay as Representatives of Sanity and the Principles of Progress.—Mr. Bland's Work Justified by the Strictest Standard of Turgot.—“Hands Off! Let the World Move!”—The Bankers' Panic and Its Causes.—The Tendency to Maximum Production as a Law of Nature and the Fact of Minimum Distribution as a Result of Plutocratic Oligarchy.—Political Economy in Its Last Analysis.—Vest on the Sherman Anti-Trust Law as Humbug.—“Frying Out the Fat” of Lawbreaking Combinations.—Trusts in no Danger From the Collectors of Campaign Funds.—Mills and Factories Closed by Restriction and Under-Distribution.—Necessary Collapse of Restrictive Systems in the Presence of Natural Maximum Production.



THE POSITION taken by Mr. Bland against the Carlisle scheme of credit currency was strictly in line with the best traditions of economic science. Those who will consult Turgot's "Letter on Paper Money," addressed to the Abbe de Cice against John Law's theory of substituting for cash, bank paper issued under government privilege, will find that the issues of the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth century are not new. When Quesnay and Turgot attacked land feudalism in France, the same principles were involved which came to issue when Mr. Bland attacked the abuses of the analogous corporation feudalism in America.

In France the great feudal interests demanded toll of production and distribution without which they refused to allow the progress of the world. *Laissez faire, laissez passer!*—"Hands off! Let the world move!"—that was the rallying cry of the "Physiocrats," led by Quesnay, Turgot and the elder Mirabeau, teachers of Jefferson and Samuel Adams in America!

Their work made possible the immense development of the nineteenth century in America and at the end of the century, Bland stood as a representative of the right of the twentieth to the same development. "Hands

off! Let the world move!"—that was his message also to the men with muck rakes who search in the filth which fertilizes civilization, for that which satisfies them if it is found—who if their search be interrupted, throng with strident cries to threaten progress and to mob its prophets!

In demanding a bimetallic currency, issued and put in circulation by the government without a delegation of its sovereignty to corporations, Mr. Bland stood for the least possible restriction of production and distribution, just as he did in opposing prohibitive duties against imports.

The issue was, and it still remains, clearly defined between minimum and maximum restriction of production and distribution. Mr. Bland stood at all times for the minimum of restriction. He never changed his position or compromised it during his public life. Under Grant, Hayes, Garfield and Arthur, under Cleveland, Harrison and McKinley he opposed a credit currency of corporation paper because it represented the maximum of interference with free exchange of the products of labor—of the necessities and comforts of life. The issue was never between the dollar of gold and the dollar of silver, but between a dollar in cash representing a settling power of 100 per cent. plus, and a credit dollar of corporation paper issued on government guaranty, representing 100 per cent. minus—an inflation of 100 per cent. of its face as an addition to the floating debt outstanding against business, and operating in the direct ratio of its volume to force collapse and panic.

So clear is Mr. Bland in his intellectual as in his moral rectitude, that among all his opponents, there has never yet been one to meet him on the real issue—between the high, constructive principles of Turgot and those of Bourbon despotism and folly in France—of plutocratic despotism and folly in America.

The disciples of John Law in America, organized as speculative banking corporations, have done all that perverse ingenuity supported by limitless means can do to discredit the great truths of progress which inspired Mr. Bland's work, but they are so far from having silenced him that in

the first ten years of the twentieth century—even if they make an armed camp of the world and of America with it, they will still hear more insistently than ever the message of his work, the moral of his life—"Hands off! Let the world move!"

The "banker's panic," created by the restriction of credits for political effect under the Cleveland administration, was an incident of the collapse of a restrictive system of distribution in the presence of production tending to the maximum.

Between 1884 and 1894, this tendency to maximum production as a law of nature, imperative in its results showed itself in manufacturing as well as in direct production from the soil. It is clear that on final analysis, all production is reducible to two classifications (1) direct from the soil in agriculture and mining and (2) secondary, in improving the form of direct products as in changing wheat to flour, cotton to cloth and iron ore to plowshares. Both forms are necessary, and of the highest value to civilization, but it is manifest that Mr. Bland did not err in holding direct production from the earth as of primary economic importance.

As all forms of legitimate industrial activity are reducible to production and distribution and that which promotes them, we have as the agencies of distribution (1) buyers and sellers and (2) carriers of products between buyers and sellers or producers and consumers. Sustaining themselves at the expense of these, but under favorable conditions capable of greatly promoting their activities are (1) dealers in currency and actual credits based on it and (2) speculative dealers in fictitious credits depending on the rise and fall of prices.

In 1894, production, direct and secondary, had increased far beyond the possibilities of the restrictive system of distribution to handle its maximum output. With people starving and half clad in the great cities of the United States and Europe, the producer with food and clothing he could neither use himself nor monetize as wealth by supplying it to the needy, was warned over and over of the dangers of "overproduction." As

demonetized wealth\* accumulated on the farm and at the mouths of iron, lead, coal and silver mines, undistributed and unused, so it did in the great workshops and factories of the country. As this product—far more, in the reality of things and in the strict use of language, “demonetized” than silver had ever been—accumulated as undistributed waste, it was clearly necessary to do one of two things—either to change the whole system and to adopt a system giving maximum facilities of distribution in response to maximum production, or else to form combinations, cease competition and shut down the factories which represented possibilities of increasing production.

The latter alternative was inevitable under the circumstances. “Where, under a restrictive system, combination is possible, competition and the maximum production involved by competition are impossible.” No doubt it was with this in view that Senator Vest of Missouri, when in the Senate the secret service agents of plutocracy proposed to “prohibit trusts” under the Sherman act then pending, pointed out that such action was mere “*brutum fulmen!*”—in English, humbug!—the political economy which governs the Punch and Judy show where the economist behind the curtain puts into Punchinello, to amuse the penny producing crowd in front, only so much reality as can be transmitted through his own thumbs to the cloth and pasteboard of his puppet.

The sugar trust, the standard oil trust and the national banks, through millionaire stockholders combined in various other syndicates, political and commercial, had contributed to Mr. Cleveland’s campaign fund, but this fact was not decisive in controlling the policies of his administration towards them. The complete failure to enforce the Sherman act under two administrations elected as republican and one inaugurated as democratic, is due primarily to the fact that every indictment under it is the indictment of a system, and every punishment under it would be the punishment of a theory of government supported and carried out by the eco-

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\*Wealth of any kind is demonetized when it has lost its exchange value.

monic laws and the executive machinery of the entire United States. As long as distribution is restricted by law, maximum production will result in a demonetized surplus, and no penalty, no system of federal regulation possible or imaginable can keep in operation the mills whose product is thus robbed of its exchangeable quality as wealth and reduced to mere waste.

On this point as on every other of fundamental importance, Mr. Bland was calmly logical. He saw the practical politicians of both parties "frying the fat" of the great law-breaking combinations of manufacturing corporations by threatening them with a justice which there was no power to execute—which seemed formidable to the law-breakers themselves more because of their own consciousness of guilt than of any actual intellectual and reasonable apprehension of being brought to justice. From time to time, an indictment, found in the state or the federal courts by the officials of whatever party happened to have control of court machinery, would create a considerable intellectual disturbance and so stimulate moral self-consciousness in the law-breakers as to facilitate "voluntary contributions" to campaign funds—on their percentages from which as collectors, practical statesmen are sometimes obliged to depend for even the bare necessities of life. But no rational mind can conclude that such methods are capable of restoring or even of promoting free production and distribution under a system which is carefully devised to restrict both.

With mills and factories shutting down, with food stuffs and raw material for clothing "overproduced" in a badly-clad and badly-fed world, the producers of the country, whether farmers or factory-owners, were reduced to the lowest point of productive activity, while the activity of the speculative element, which thrives on the wreckage of business, increased. During this period, the dealers in credits and in speculative values, threw into the hands of receivers, one after another of the great railroad systems on which the producer of the west and south chiefly depend, and re-organized them later on, largely under control of capitalists, having their



headquarters in London. Out of the immense opportunity given by this wreckage, Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan, an able New York financier who is complimented by the Rothschilds with the management of much of their American business political and financial, developed power as a reorganizer which Mr. Jay Gould had never equalled at his best. For his work in this line, he was naturally subjected personally to some reproach, but it was not the result of logical processes of thought. His operations were merely incidents of a system, and they were inevitable under it. As a result of that system, the wreckage of railroads, the collapse of the manufacturing organizations, the failure of economic machinery for exchanging the products of farm and mine, all followed the desperate attack made by the combined currency-dealers of the world on the American system of issuing cash from the mints and the treasury to supersede corporation paper in circulation.

The collapse of the whole restrictive system came when nature gave maximum crops to this country in the same years with crops approaching the maximum in Europe and the southern hemisphere. Under the same system, a similar collapse is as inevitable when similar conditions recur as are the operations of the laws governing the seemingly lawless trade winds and ocean currents. It did not change these laws—it only made their final effects more emphatic, when after forcing panic and compelling further restriction of exchange through the cessation of bimetallic coinage, the “financiers” took advantage of the apathy of the country to go into Mr. Bland’s district in the “off” year and defeat his re-election—accomplishing secretly what no amount of campaign funds behind them would have made possible had it been attempted openly.

This done, announcement solemn and impressive, was made that free-coinage was dead and that the “16 to 1 cranks,” were “no longer in a position to prevent the return of prosperity.”

## CHAPTER XXIV.

"The Right Thing from the Right Man at the Right Time" as the Decisive Factor in History Making.—Mr. Bland Writes a Letter and Sees a Reporter.—Who Shall Bolt: Bland or Cleveland?—Why and How Mr. Cleveland Was Induced to Bolt.—He Himself Forces 16 to 1 Coinage as an Unavoidable Issue.—His Objections to Being "Elected Without New York" in 1892.—His View of "Rainbow Chasing" as Sectional and Dangerous.—Mr. Bland Consummates the Work of the Rainbow Chasers With an Interview Defining the Vital Issues of the Chicago Platform.—The Stand Made Against International Control of the American Treasury Forces the Republican Party to a Change of Base in 1896 and to Open Alliance With English Imperialists in 1898.



R. BLAND represented in 1895 the full strength of the issues on which Mr. Harrison had been defeated in 1892. These issues involved either the immediate re-organization or the complete disorganization of the democratic party. After postponing all legislation on the currency in order "not to embarrass tariff reform," tariff reform had been deliberately put out of sight by Mr. Cleveland as the first act of his second term. In a letter of July 11, 1893, published at the time over a fac-simile of his signature, Mr. Bland made this situation clear.

"During the last Congress," he said, "I did all I could to pass a free coinage bill in the House, the Senate having already passed it. But no—the tariff was the great issue. Now the tariff is brushed aside that silver demonetization may be accomplished. Had we then passed a free coinage bill, the question would have been settled. We would not have been confronted with the British demonetization policy in India. How much longer are we to be controlled by the advocates of a waiting policy? We are now by this dallying brought face to face with the question of total silver demonetization in this, the greatest metallic power the world ever knew. The repeal of the Sherman law unconditionally is all that is necessary now to accomplish this end for which the gold party has struggled from the beginning.

The democratic party promised first of all a reform of the tariff.

Tariff reform is no longer talked of except with bated breath. The east proposes to formulate a tariff policy on the lines of the original Chicago platform, brought forward by the protectionist element of the democratic party and not in harmony with the substitute finally adopted by the convention.\* They now also propose to repeal the Sherman law without granting the free coinage part of our platform.

Our eastern friends seem to regard the democratic platform on the silver question as a mere seesaw. As the Sherman law end goes down the free coinage end must go up in mid-air and remain suspended there.

It is plain to all now that they played a huge bunco game on the democracy of the south and west by lustily preaching tariff reform, a measure so popular here, but at the same time intending to spring upon us, after the election, the sole issue of silver demonetization.

If the representatives of the west and south are true to themselves and the interests of their constituents, this conspiracy will not succeed. If they are recreant, the people will hold them individually, if not collectively, responsible for their cringing cowardice.

To repeal the Sherman law outright and substitute nothing for it would precipitate a silver panic throughout the world and probably cause its universal demonetization, a consummation devoutly wished by the gold party. It seems to me no true friend of silver could advocate such a policy.

If we ever intend the free coinage of silver in this country we must fight for it now—right now."

The recipient of this letter supplied it for publication to the St. Louis Chronicle with Mr. Bland's approval. The impression it produced was profound and lasting.

From this time on, it became more and more evident that either Mr. Cleveland and his supporters or else all those who held Mr. Bland's views of opposition to restriction of the currency and trade must leave the democratic party. Mr. Cleveland had made this inevitable and it was accepted

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\*Mr. Bland here refers more especially to Mr. William C. Whitney who represented Mr. Cleveland on the platform committee of the Chicago convention of 1892, and, with his usual skill in such matters, contrived to have a majority of the platform committee favorable to his views. See preceding chapter. The "plank" in favor of "tariff for revenue only" rejected by Mr. Whitney in the committee was written in Missouri by the same person to whom Mr. Bland wrote the above letter. The knowledge of the situation expressed by Mr. Bland was not theoretical merely.

as inevitable—though he did not seem to have contemplated it as a necessity of the situation until the Chicago convention of 1896 had actually been held.

The pivotal point of the situation was the fact of the then existing international control of the United States treasury. Mr. Cleveland had not indorsed the campaign for carrying Kansas and Illinois against Mr. Harrison. He had regarded objections to New York "hegemony" as sectional and dangerous, and not understanding the realities of opposition to sectionalism involved in it, had written letters to Missouri attempting to check it. He did not succeed in doing so, however, and after his proclamation against silver had defeated tariff reform, the sectionalism of the Civil war was so far disposed of also, that the only logical issue was against the control of the United States treasury by foreign financiers operating through national banks, and issuing currency on bonds owned abroad.

After Mr. Cleveland's policy had been fully developed under his second administration, it was thought that the democratic party, if not relieved of responsibility for it, would hardly carry half a dozen states—that Missouri, Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia and everything west of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio would vote for anything to show dissent from his policies.

As democratic congressmen and senators, controlled by the influence of patronage and by pressure from the national banks, had not checked Mr. Cleveland as they might easily have done, the democratic organization as they represented it had no right to repudiate him and no right to win by repudiating him. But the issue was not one of party. Mr. Bland put principle high above partisanship. He had determined to stand for principle at any cost, and it was clear that Mr. Cleveland and the national banking element he represented, would bolt any platform which stood for bimetallism and a cash currency against one of national bank paper.

Under such circumstances, it was from the standpoint of bimetallism, highly desirable that Mr. Cleveland should "bolt" rather than that the

advocates of bimetallism should be forced to do so. The issues shaped themselves to this end from early in 1895, and Mr. Bland did more than any one else to give them their direction.

This was done to a very great extent already by his "parting of the ways" speech, by similar speeches in Congress and by the letter quoted above as it appeared in the *St. Louis Chronicle*. The results seem to have been made conclusive, however, by a carefully calculated interview which appeared in the *Cincinnati Enquirer* in March, 1895. General Hawkins, editor of the *St. Louis Chronicle* when the struggle opened between Mr. Bland and Mr. Cleveland, had now become managing editor of the *Cincinnati Enquirer* and his influence secured for that newspaper one of the most decisive interviews ever published in America. Before sending to Lebanon, General Hawkins, wrote to an acquaintance of Mr. Bland's that Mr. Bland was not likely to remain in any party dominated by Mr. Cleveland's policies and asked for a schedule of questions, involving the possibility of answers which would not only define Mr. Bland's views, but would direct public attention to the decisive issues of what would become the "new politics" of the coming struggle. These questions prepared in harmony with Mr. Bland's known views, elicited the interview which decided what the Chicago platform of 1896 should be—especially in its crucial feature of protest, direct and absolute, against international control of American mints and the American treasury. As this interview follows below, it has been submitted for revision to the same person who prepared the questions for it:

LEBANON, MO., March 23.—Richard Parks Bland, the great apostle of silver, and one of the most intelligent and forceful advocates of bimetallism in the world, is still a democrat, all reports to the contrary notwithstanding. I found him at his home to-day near this city, and had the highly interesting interview with him which follows. Mr. Bland appeared



to weigh carefully every word he uttered, though he talked with the utmost freedom. The only question he declined to answer was as to what he would advise his party followers to do in the event that the next democratic national convention nominated a ticket and adopted a platform in harmony with the Cleveland administration on the monetary question.

"What is the present condition of the country in regard to debt?" was the first question asked and Mr. Bland replied:

"In speaking of debts we should consider the national debts, the state debts, municipal debts, county debts, railroad and other corporation debts as well as all private debts. It may be stated generally that the national debt is near \$1,000,000,000, and at the present low price of commodities and the products of labor it will take as much of these products generally to pay the \$1,000,000,000 debts at this time as it would have required to pay the national debt when it was \$2,000,000,000. In other words since the demonetization of silver, prices have gone down nearly one half. Our railroad debt alone is probably not below \$5,000,000,000. Mr. Sibley, in a valuable speech in Congress on January 8, 1895, in this connection, said: Nothing can more clearly show the effects of falling prices than the interest charged upon the indebtedness of the people of the Union, as exemplified by the following article from a weekly newspaper, to which my attention has been called. Mr. Walker, a republican member of Congress from Massachusetts, says the people of the United States owe debts, public and private, to the amount of \$32,000,000,000. Now, we take Mr. Walker as authority because he, coming from a New England state and being a republican, will not be accused of placing the figures too high. It is claimed by some that the rate of interest on this indebtedness will average eight per cent. per annum. But to be entirely safe and to be conservative, and for the purpose of giving to the public a birds-eye view of their condition, we will place the rate at six per cent. Now, six per cent. on \$32,000,000,000 amounts to \$1,920,000,000. In 1892 we raised 1,628,464,000 bushels of corn. At 40 cents per bushel we would have \$651,385,600 as its total value. Our wheat crop the same year was 519,400,000 bushels. At an average of 80 cents per bushel we realized \$415,592,000. Our oat crop was 661,037,000 bushels. At 25 cents per bushel we have \$165,259,000. Our gold mines produced \$33,000,000 and our silver mines \$75,000,000.



'Now let us add this together and see what the result will be :

Value of corn crop.....	\$ 651,385,600
Value of wheat crop.....	415,592,000
Value of oat crop.....	165,259,000
Value of gold crop.....	33,000,000
Value of silver crop.....	75,000,000
Total.....	<u>\$ 1,340,236,600</u>
Interest on debt.....	<u>\$ 1,920,000,000</u>
Difference.....	\$ 579,763,400

"I know Mr. Walker well, and know him to be a student of political economy, and he would not be likely to state the amount of debt of our people in an exaggerated sense. Indeed, Mr. Harvey, in his book, called 'Coin's Financial School,' says (page 119) the total debt in the United States, national, municipal, state, county, corporate and private, is now estimated at \$40,000,000,000. The railroad bonded debt is \$5,000,000,000, or one-eighth of the whole amount.

"The interest on \$40,000,000,000 at an average rate of six per cent., is \$2,400,000,000. I have no doubt that the estimate of Coin as given by Mr. Harvey is more nearly correct than that attributed to Mr. Walker."

"How much of this debt is held abroad?"

"Of course it is difficult to estimate or determine the amount accurately. There is such a close connection between the great banking houses of New York, Boston and commercial centers and the banking houses of London, Berlin and Paris that whatever of our securities may be negotiated in our own commercial center we can not determine how much of this amount has really been negotiated for banking houses in foreign countries, with which our own banking firms are usually connected as agents or copartners. It is well known that the principal banking firms of New York and London are branches of the same institutions; in other words, Wall street and Lombard street are twin brothers in finance. Our recent bond negotiations of \$64,000,000 show the close connection between the banking houses of New York and the Rothschilds of London. I may linger for a moment here to add that there is a gold trust; that the gold can be cornered at any time against even a powerful government like our own. This fact was practically admitted by the secretary of the treasury when he recently stated in connection with the negotiation of the \$64,000,000 of bonds that he had endeavored to nego-

tiate his loan in New York, and that also by cable to London, but that he was wholly unable to do so until he had agreed with a bond syndicate or trust composed of bankers in New York and London, and was compelled to negotiate with the trust or syndicate at a loss of over \$10,000,000 to the government. If, therefore, the owners of gold can thus corner the government of the United States, how much more easily can they corner the poor private debtors of this country and the world! And in forcing the negotiations of loans and the payment of loans so long as gold is the sole standard of payment they can force these private debtors into utter ruin and bankruptcy. Even the great railroad corporations of the country can not withstand the pressure of the single gold standard. This is proved by the fact of so many of them being in the hands of receivers.

"To return to the question as to the amount of our debt payable abroad: Mr. Gladstone, as a part of his objection to England adopting bimetalism, claimed that the world owed England no less than \$10,000,000,000 in gold; that bimetalism meant the depreciation of gold or, what is the same thing, an appreciation of all commodities. Doubtless, our debt to England in the way of interest and other charges exceeds \$500,000,000 annually. While we have no means of knowing positively the amount, yet the fact that our exports exceed largely our imports, and that we are constantly shipping gold and losing our gold, would go to show that our foreign debt must be very great.

"In a statement by Mr. George A. Butler, president of a national bank in Connecticut, a strong advocate and a very intelligent man, before the committee on banking and currency last year, he said it is estimated that Americans spend abroad every year \$90,000,000; another \$60,000,000 goes abroad on various investments in this country held abroad. That is \$150,000,000; add to that \$25,000,000 or \$30,000,000 paid out for foreign freight and \$10,000,000 for insurance and sundries, making in all \$195,000,000. Say we receive \$40,000,000 from immigrants, there would be still left \$135,000,000 in the nature of maturing obligations against the country independent of any commercial transactions. Unquestionably the estimate of Mr. Butler as to the interest paid abroad is too low by half. But no matter whether this interest is paid to Old England or New England, it is paid from the products of labor and principally from the products of agriculture from the south and the west. To pay this interest at this time on the gold standard requires twice the number of bushels of wheat

and bales of cotton and double the amount of farm products generally to pay the estimated \$2,400,000,000 interest annually that would have been required prior to the demonetization of silver. In other words since 1873 there has been a fall of prices of more than fifty per cent. The question of debtor and creditor, however, is not the only question involved in the silver question, nor the most important question. Should the owners of gold, and creditors generally, force the whole world into liquidation, and sell out all debtors, even forcing them to bankruptcy, and at the same time consent to the full restoration of the free coinage of silver as it existed prior to 1873, the revival of business and the revival of prices of the products of labor consequent to such restoration would immediately set in motion the great productive industries of the country, and thus enable the laboring people and the impoverished debtors to so prosper to such an extent as would put them in a better condition ten years hence than they would be to forego the foreclosure of mortgages and the liquidation of debts. In other words, the debtors could better afford at this time to give up everything they have to their creditors in exchange for the full restoration of silver than to risk the payment of their debts under the single gold standard, Money being but a tool of industry in one sense and in the greater sense, the restoration of silver would furnish the tool by which to set every man to work and revive the activity of every industry of this country, which would result in an enormous production of wealth, the only remedy for starvation and poverty, and the only way by which debts can be met and paid without confiscation and bankruptcy."

"What have you to say of the desire of foreign bankers for the perpetuation of our national debt? Do you believe they seek to control our currency or prevent the opening of our mints to the free coinage of silver?"

"My observation in Congress for the last 20 years, and ever since the agitation of the silver question, convinces me beyond a doubt that the banking houses of London and Berlin, especially through their branch banks in New York, seek to control absolutely the monetary affairs of this country. I have never seen the free coinage of silver agitated in Congress without the interference of these foreigners. The moment a free coinage bill or any bill looking to the restoration of silver is brought up in Congress the New York papers are filled with dispatches from the banking houses and the press of London and Berlin warning this country against the single silver standard, and to intimidate Congress they immediately set to

work to draw gold from the federal treasury and ship it abroad and charge that the agitation of the silver question is drawing all of the gold out of this country. They return their American bonds and securities with the threat of forcing them on the American market because of an alleged fear of a single silver standard. The New York bankers, the clearing house associations, chambers of commerce and boards of trade take up this foreign refrain by passing resolutions denouncing silver and immediately telegraph blank resolutions to be passed by the various boards of trade and chambers of commerce throughout the country to be sent to Congress protesting against the restoration of silver. The bankers of London and New York deliberately planned and executed a panic in this country to secure the repeal of the purchasing clause of the Sherman act. That fact I think will be generally admitted by every observant man, who will express honestly his convictions. Their power has been felt on every occasion when silver has been the subject of legislation in Congress. That we are at the mercy of foreigners on the money question is admitted by every honest advocate of the gold standard. The fact is, about the only argument they make for the gold standard is based on the theory that we must have the same money that European countries have. Whatever Europe says on the money question we must say, 'Whatever Europe does we must do. Whatever Europe tells us to do we are compelled to do or else we can negotiate no loans in Europe. We are told that we can not live and prosper without European aid; hence our money must be gold because Europe says it must be gold, or else Europe will loan us no money.' Of course we understand that the bondholders of Europe and this country are opposed to the restoration of silver because the restoration of silver will greatly cheapen gold by coming in competition with gold as a money metal of ultimate redemption. Again, it is understood that the cheapening of gold means a rise in the price of commodities and all other things but gold. In other words, instead of the bondholder getting for his dollar two bushels of wheat he would get but one, and so on with all other agricultural products as well as of the factory and mine."

"What connection, if any, do you believe exists between the foreign and home bankers and the metropolitan press of New York?"

"This question may be answered by stating that not only the metropolitan press of New York, but unfortunately to some extent the press throughout the country, seems to be in harmony with foreign banking

institutions and those of this country. The public pretty generally believes that the accommodations and loans furnished the metropolitan press have much to do with this."

"Has the Cleveland administration been under the control of this influence?"

"I have no doubt that Mr. Cleveland honestly believes in the single gold standard, and honestly believing in the single gold standard, of course the gold standard advocates have his ear, to the exclusion of the advocates of silver restoration. Of course Mr. Cleveland believes we must have whatever money Europe has, else we can not negotiate our loans there. If Europe says we must have gold, Mr. Cleveland says we must have gold. If Europe says we should not restore silver, Mr. Cleveland says we shall not restore silver. If Europe and Wall street say we must redeem all our greenbacks and treasury notes, as well as silver dollars and silver certificates in gold, of course Mr. Cleveland says they must all be redeemed in gold. If a silver dollar should be treated as redemption money, the bankers of New York and London say it would immediately bankrupt the treasury; consequently in deference to these gentlemen we must redeem everything in gold. This, of course, forced the Cleveland administration, as it forced all republican administrations before it, to rely upon the bankers of New York and London to run the treasury department as they saw proper, and not as the American people wished."

"What have you to say about the redemption of the silver dollar and silver certificate in gold?"

"The law restoring the standard silver dollar, 'the Bland-Allison act,' intended to make the dollar a dollar of redemption, and not a charge upon the treasury, and it was so understood at the time, and until the passage of the Sherman act. The Sherman act provided that the notes issued in the purchase of silver bullion under said act should be redeemed in gold or silver coin, at the discretion of the secretary of the treasury, declaring in that connection it to be the established policy of the government to maintain the two metals at a parity. This provision was inserted at the earnest dictation of Senator John Sherman, and has been construed to mean by every secretary of the treasury, as well as Mr. Sherman, that, in order to maintain the parity, gold must be paid whenever demanded; in consequence of this, silver has been treated practically as a debtor charge upon the treasury, instead of redemption money. So the



practical effect of this act has been to depreciate silver and appreciate gold—intensifying the strain on gold and lowering prices. That portion of the act especially ought to have been repealed, instead of repealing the purchase clause, but that part of the act was left standing, and is enforced to-day so as practically to outlaw our silver coin as well as silver bullion. The effect of this, as stated before, has been to lower prices and destroy business activities. It has been exemplified to the American people—the impossibility of maintaining prosperity with silver thus outlawed.”

“What is the effect of currency contraction to the gold basis upon our railways, factories, real estate, farms, and farm products, the business of the merchant and the workers generally?”

“I have before instanced the fact of the enormous amount of railroad property now in the hands of receivers. Railroads are public institutions as well as private corporations. As private corporations they have suffered tremendously in consequence of want of prosperity among the people. They depend for their earnings principally upon the products of the soil and the factory and the mine. In the first instance, upon the farm. If agricultural people are prosperous they will consume more largely of the products of the factory and the mine, thus causing producers and consumers generally to prosper. The railroads in transporting and making the exchange of the products of the factories and of the farms and of the mines make their profits. Without prosperity among the laboring people of the farm, mine and factory the railroads can not prosper. The dire distress of railroad investment at this time is an object lesson which must show all attentive observers that the whole country is suffering. In this connection it may be cited as another object lesson of the gold standard that the railroads are now endeavoring by every means possible to save themselves from the disasters consequent to the single gold standard. To this end they secured the passage of a bill in the House of Representatives last winter authorizing them to pool and combine, and thus by a system of monopoly escape impending ruin. The bill failed to pass the Senate. It may be possible for powerful corporations and monopolies in the future to partially escape the effects of the single gold standard by way of special legislation.

“The single gold standard is driving the people of this country to the shelter of a paternal government. The manufacturer seeks his bounty in the way of tariffs; railroads and other corporations by favorable legis-



lation to them on the part of Congress; bankers and money lenders by insisting on legislation that will make their property more valuable from year to year, and insisting that the government shall not issue its legal tender coin silver money, but shall surrender the power to issue money to the banks. The great mass of the working people in all productive industries, however, are neglected, and the whole burden is shifted upon their shoulders."

"Is there not an identity of interest among the farmers, the railroads, merchants, American manufacturers and workers generally against the money dealers here and in Europe?" Mr. Bland was asked.

"As I stated in answer to previous questions," he replied, "the prosperity of the railroads, farmers, merchants, manufacturers and workers generally is mutually dependent. It is to be regretted that they do not work together for mutual relief. Assuming that the restoration of silver will accomplish the restoration of prices and prosperity in this country, it would not be difficult for the vast productive interests embraced in the question to bring about adequate legislation on the subject. This would be a blessing to all and more advantageous to any particular class than special legislation for them would be. Of course, the money lenders of this country and Europe have great power because of their money. It is selfish in them to undertake, as they do, to sit at the tollgates along the highways of all human activities and allow no one to pass until he has paid them their demands. These demands are becoming so exorbitant as to work practical confiscation upon debtors and destruction to the business prosperity of the people. Values are constantly going down, and depreciation is written upon every piece of property throughout the country. The day has come when even bonds and mortgages are depreciating, except such as are government securities. The day is coming, if it is not here now, when mortgages must depreciate because of the utter lack of security upon which they are based. The European money lender may get his pound of flesh, but woe be to him when he exacts one drop of American blood. I can not better describe the situation than was foretold by Hon. John G. Carlisle, now secretary of the treasury, and Mr. Blaine, then a senator of the United States, pending the discussion of what was known as the Bland-Allison bill in Congress. Mr. Blaine, following the same line of argument and thought in the Senate, used this language: 'On the much-vexed and long-mooted question of a bimetallic or monometallic standard,

my own views are sufficiently indicated in the remarks I have made. I believe the struggle now going on in this country and in other countries for a single gold standard would, if successful, produce wide-spread disaster in and throughout the commercial world. The destruction of silver as money and establishing gold as the sole unit of value must have a ruinous effect on all forms of property, except these investments which yield a fixed return in money. These would be enormously enhanced in value, and would gain a disproportionate and unfair advantage over every other species of property. If, as the most reliable statistics affirm, there are nearly \$7,000,000,000 of coin or bullion in the world, not very unequally divided between gold and silver, it is impossible to strike silver out of existence as money without results which will prove distressing to millions and utterly disastrous to thousands. I believe gold and silver coin to be the money of the Constitution—indeed, the money of the American people—antecedent of the Constitution, which the great organic law recognized as quite independent of its own existence. No power has conferred on Congress to declare either metal should not be money. Congress has, therefore, in my judgment, no power to demonetize either any more than to demonetize both. If, therefore, silver has been demonetized, I am in favor of remonetizing it. If its coinage has been prohibited I am in favor of having it resumed. If it has been restricted I am in favor of having it enlarged.'

"The fact that statesmen, when this question was first broached, and before the money power got its hand upon it, expressed not only their honest sentiments, but the true situation, speaks volumes for the sincerity of the expressions then made, and throws a shade of discredit upon any professed change of heart. The further fact that the very things practiced by Mr. Carlisle and Mr. Blaine in consequence of a single gold standard shows that they had a better foresight of the future than the appreciation the same class of statesmen have of present conditions."

"Do you think the workers of New York and New England, and those of the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys have a common interest on this question?"

"I certainly do, and believe if a fair expression of opinions could be had from them they would show unanimity, for as I stated before, money in its greater sense is a tool of trade and industry, and is as much a necessity to the workers of New England and New York, as to those of

the south and west. It is quite evident that the time has come when the American people must make a bold stand for American democracy as against foreign plutocracy. The moneyed plutocracy of the world has interfered with our legislation, as I before pointed out. They are ruining the agricultural people of this country and that means the ruin of the manufacturers, the merchants and all workers. At their dictation and behest we have been driven to the single gold standard. They have done this to procure the products of our soil at one-half their value. Of course, it is understood, that our vast debts abroad and commercial transactions are liquidated not in money, but for the most in commodities. These commodities are measured under the gold standard by gold only. Gold having gone up to nearly double what it was before silver was demonetized and this high-priced gold being the measure of our commodities it necessarily means that it takes twice the amount of our export commodities to liquidate these debts abroad that it took before the demonetization of silver. Thus foreigners have swindled the producers of this country in the last twenty years out of hundreds of millions of dollars annually. It was said in the days of Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson, Benton and the great democratic fathers of our early history that England sought to control this country by controlling our financial system. Among the strongest arguments they made against the old national bank and national banking institutions of their day was based upon the fact that English money and English capital were largely involved in the banks, and the foreigners thus practically controlled the operation of the bank, and that the national bank practically controlled the financial operations of the government and the people of this country; that the foreigner was not satisfied thus to control the financial institutions of the country, but sought, through the instrumentality of the banks, also to control the politics of the country. The Cleveland administration has been run upon the lines of old federalism, and counter to the teachings of Jefferson and Jackson and the great fathers of democracy. And this fact accounts for the utter failure of his administration up to this time. A vast section of his party in Congress would not follow him on these lines. This caused dissensions and utter inability to legislate upon this question, as the people had demanded. It also accounts for the fact that the democratic party has been trodden down in the dust of humiliation and defeat. The party can gain no victory in the future without utterly repudiating Cleveland's policy on the money ques-

tion. The party must get back to its old principles of equal rights to all and special privileges to none; demand the restoration of the old democratic bimetallic standard that existed for eighty years in our history. The rights of the sovereign states and the liberty of the citizen, as taught by our democratic fathers, must be maintained. We must abandon our fight for money and moneyed interests, and take up the fight for man and the interests of the people."

"Mr. Bland, there has been a great deal of newspaper gossip and surmise as to your intentions of deserting the democratic party and leading a bolt from its organization in favor of a new party in the next presidential election. What have you to say to that?"

Mr. Bland answered promptly and frankly: "I am a democrat and expect to do everything in my power as a democrat to bring the party back to its old principles. It is a critical period in the history of the democratic party. I have refused heretofore to follow Mr. Cleveland on the money question. If the democratic party puts up a candidate on a platform in harmony with Mr. Cleveland's administration, I could not consistently support him. I do not say this in any spirit of bolting or threat, but I simply speak my honest convictions of duty, and I believe voice the intentions of two thirds of the democratic voters, especially of the south and west."

This interview defined the issue of the campaign—the same issue against the imperial policies of English commercialism which Mr. Bland stood for in 1898, when the attempt was being made to use "expansion," to divert democrats from their opposition to foreign management of our finances.

Mr. Bland cared nothing for the "practical politics" of what he said, but as a matter of obvious fact the interview, considered merely from that low standpoint, is most remarkable. It not only laid down the lines on which Mr. Cleveland and the national bank element would be compelled to leave the democratic party, but it took from the republican party the pretense of intense Americanism on which it had made so many campaigns since Blaine, Garfield and Harrison had taken up Henry Clay's "American policy" and the "home market" idea he had involved with it.




THOMAS O. TOWLES.




MR. TRUMBULL'S RESIDENCE IN DENVER.



MR. BLAND AND HIS DAUGHTER VIRGINIA.  
(From a Snap Shot Photograph taken in the fields at his Home in  
Lebanon.)



JAMES T. TALIAFERRO.





No party, forced to defend international control of American finances, as the decisive issue of a national campaign, could at the same time glorify itself successfully as the exclusive representative of America against the world on the tariff. In fact, since this interview was published and the issues it presented forced, the phrases "American policy" and the "home market" have disappeared from politics, and the republican party—so violently anti-British under Blaine and Garfield, has become under Messrs. McKinley and Hanna the advocate of Anglo-Saxon unity and the cooperation of the English government with that of the United States in "commercial expansion."

So much does it avail for the making of history if the right man says the right thing at the right time.

## CHAPTER XXV.

Bland as a Leader of a Forlorn Hope.—Forced into the Presidential Contest as the Only Man on Whom the Democratic Party Could Reorganize.—His Candidacy a Matter of Duty.—His Nomination not Expected on Account of His Residence in a Former Slave State.—Popular Demonstrations During His Lecturing Tour.—Missouri Conventions at Pertle Springs and at Sedalia.—Formation of Bland Clubs in Missouri.—His Attitude Towards the Presidency.—Falsity of Assertions that He Was “the Victim of Treachery” at Chicago.



WHEN Mr. Bland gave out the interview republished in the last chapter, he had decided that it was necessary either that he should accept party leadership or give up all hopes of bi-metallism. He was thrust, at first by the pressure of events and afterwards by the deliberate action of the advocates of the principles he stood for, into the leadership of a forlorn hope. His consent was not asked and not a word on the subject of the presidency was said to him until after he had clearly demonstrated his ability to force back and hold in check the enormous power of capital, organized in support of the policies of the Cleveland administration. With him, hopes of the presidency, if he entertained them at all, were never serious enough to be governing motives. The work to which he addressed himself was that of “squaring the issue” so that the people could decide.

“If they will force the issues you represent and nominate you on them, they can elect you, but I do not think they will,” wrote an acquaintance on whose judgment he seemed sometimes to rely, on the rare occasions when he himself was in doubt. It will not be asserted here that he accepted this judgment, for he was not accustomed to define himself in such connections, but it can be said with confidence that in becoming a candidate, he faced and considered the possibility of complete physical exhaustion in addition to the loss of his small competency. He had been publicly reproached for mere physical inertia. His unconsciousness of the possibilities of his own great

intellectual powers was so complete that one of the means used to compel him to take a leadership no one else could take was the public assertion that with the best analytical mind in Congress, he was "too lazy to use it" for what it was worth. It was not known at the time this was uttered how greatly the long struggle against the policies of the Grant administration and the not less arduous contest against the international combination of monometallists organized after the Franco-Prussian war had sapped his strength. He was husbanding his resources for emergencies and using them at the expense of his vitality, when the call was made on him to put forth all his strength of mind and body in what for him seemed inevitably a losing fight. He was called upon to become, seemingly, a factionist; to break away from friends in Missouri, in the east and elsewhere whom he loved and on whose judgment, as long as it was possible to do so, he preferred to rely in "practical politics" rather than on his own. He was a citizen of what had been a slave state—of what among the slave states had been more closely identified than any other with the violent struggle which immediately preceded the Civil war. The manifest probabilities on this account alone were two to one against his nomination in a democratic convention, and at the crisis which forced his leadership against Mr. Cleveland, such manifest probabilities were not left out of consideration. Even had he been nominated, it would have been to lead a party which had been suddenly reformed in presence of the enemy after having been completely disorganized. In such a contest the little money Mr. Bland had saved for his family out of his salary would have disappeared at once and the probabilities were that even under the most favorable conditions he would be left penniless and probably an invalid. Some of these probabilities he discussed from time to time with Mrs. Bland, but they did not deter him when, in 1893 a handful of "extremists" and "cranks" who had determined to do at any cost what could be done to check the reactionary tendencies of the plutocracy which sought to control the Cleveland administration, began—not urging, but actually crowding Mr. Bland into the breach. He did not re-

monstrate. He did not assent. His response was first publicly understood when he made his speech, "At the Parting of the Ways." From that time on, it was manifest that the people had a leader whom no consideration of partisanship, of private friendship, of personal gain or loss, would swerve from his purposes. In their own vernacular, they saw that he "was not a quitter," and as they are continually seeking to find some one they can trust, some one who is "not a quitter" to stand for them, to say what they can not say, to do for them what they do not know how to do for themselves, they relied on him with pathetic devotion. Nothing is more touching than the love of an often-deceived and long-oppressed people for the man whom at the crisis they see to be their friend, honest, simple, and brave. They recognized these qualities in Mr. Bland. They knew that he at least was not a schemer, seeking to market their confidence for money or preferment. In spite of the abuse he challenged—and indeed because of it—they gave him their full confidence. He was never an organizer or a "mixer." Men who have the analytical faculty strongly developed, can not be, in the nature of things. Yet so great was his moral force that within less than four years' time a party so disorganized that it was not certain of carrying any state in the Union—for in 1894 it could no longer count even on Missouri—was reorganized and given such vitality that in 1896, it polled, under the most unfavorable circumstances, a larger vote than had ever been polled before that year for any presidential candidate.

The immediate cause of this was the finesse which took advantage of the disorganization occasioned by Mr. Cleveland's policies to center republican efforts on Mr. Bland's district so that he might be held up to the country at large as responsible for what he had done everything possible to prevent. In spite of the maxim of law and of political economy, that no man is allowed to take advantage of his own tort, Mr. Cleveland's supporters, after their policies had taken the whole country from the democratic party, took advantage of Mr. Bland's defeat in the "off year" to

demonstrate once more to their own comfort, that "the free silver lunacy did it" and that the lunacy was now "harmless forever."

After his defeat, Mr. Bland was forced from his farm to the lecture platform. He traveled through the west and south, speaking on questions of the day, and more especially on bimetallism, to audiences whose enthusiasm suggested for the first time the power of the popular impulses which were to produce the great upheaval of 1896. In Colorado and the northwest, which had so lately been republican strongholds, the spirit of the new politics showed itself as a force paramount to all partisanship. What may be called the first "overt act" in the revolution in the northwest had come under the Harrison administration in a motion from the northwest in the Senate to substitute a free coinage bill for the Harrison "Force Bill" for the control of southern elections. Subsequent events had made this spirit more determined. Mr. Cleveland's proclamation against silver in 1893, and his policy of calling money from commercial and industrial investment by bond issues, had completed the prostration of the west. The "Coxey army," which he drove off the grass at Washington with such indignation was a sadly ludicrous manifestation of what a policy of restriction means in the presence of stringency. The panic under Van Buren had been checked by liberal issues of treasury notes. Mr. Cleveland—who might have claimed this as a New York precedent—called money from western and southern investment by bond issues in order to prevent what he regarded as a too liberal supply of currency—this at a time when machinery and all the improved processes of civilization had so immensely increased the possibilities of products to be distributed that the existing supply of cash from the mintage of all the gold and silver in the world would, no doubt, have been inadequate without at least thirty per cent. of credit currency. But Mr. Cleveland's supporters, demanding ninety-five per cent. of credits on which they could take toll, and insisting on five per cent. of cash as adequate for their system, scorned anything less than the full possibilities of what they imagined to be their opportunities. As they issued bonds

for the New York and London markets, the west rallied on Bland. In Missouri where Mr. Cleveland had what seemed to be a compact organization, it vanished, and outside of the city of St. Louis, there was scarcely a voice of opposition to the policies for which Mr. Bland stood when it was proposed to call a convention at Pertle Springs to formulate them. This convention held in August, 1895,\* made the attitude of Missouri so clear that after it Mr. Cleveland had no declared following in the state, even among those who had opposed the calling of the convention, and in 1893 had attempted to control the state so as to undo the work which in 1892 had created a democratic majority in the electoral college without New York.

Soon after this an organization was formed in the state to "boom" Mr. Bland for the presidency. It was in the main spontaneous and altogether gratuitous as far as he was concerned, though letters written to him at the time show artistic efforts to commit him to co-operation in seeking the place. All such efforts he met with the quiet dignity which characterized his life. He was almost universally known in Missouri as "Dick," and Missourians spoke of him as familiarly as of a member of their own immediate families, but from the first, they had recognized fully that he was not one of those who can be slapped on the back and propitiated to

\*In speaking of what preceded and followed the Pertle Springs convention, Senator F. M. Cockrell said in his eulogy of Mr. Bland, delivered in the Senate, April 9, 1900: "After President Cleveland's veto of the Bland Seigniorage bill bimetalism became an exciting question, and its friends began an earnest, vigorous campaign to secure delegates to the national democratic convention in 1896 who could neither be corrupted nor intimidated to a surrender of that principle.

"It was believed in Missouri that some members of the state central committee were not friendly to the free and unlimited coinage of the standard silver dollar equally with gold at the old ratio. Many meetings were held and a state democratic convention was called, by order of the state central committee, to meet at Pertle Springs, Mo., on the sixth day of August, 1895. The convention met, with strong delegations from almost every county in the state, made Mr. Bland chairman, and passed resolutions strongly favoring free silver coinage equally with gold. There was in the convention a strong feeling to indorse Mr. Bland for the nomination for the presidency in 1896. This movement was strongly opposed by Mr. Bland, and no action in that direction was taken.

"The feeling, however, continued to grow in strength, notwithstanding Mr. Bland took the position that it was not wise for Missouri to have a presidential candidate. His sincerity was never questioned, but he could not control his friends.

"When the state convention assembled at Sedalia, Mo., on the fifteenth day of April, 1896, the delegates were almost unanimous for Mr. Bland as one of the delegates at large to the Chicago convention and for indorsing him as the choice of Missouri for the nomination for president.



more intimate acquaintance by an invitation to drink. He had no personal vanity, and no man was more approachable than he, but, though he did not assert his superiority, his quiet failure to respond to appeals which assumed egotism as latent in him, impressed every one who approached him with a sense of his natural dignity.

His attitude towards the presidency may be stated here with assurance of representing him correctly.

He had never sought party leadership except as it was necessary to do so in forcing issues for principle. In the politics of Missouri, he had been satisfied to do his work in the House of Representatives, refusing to seek even a senatorship, which he might easily have had, which, indeed he would have accepted without hesitation could it have come to him without retiring either Senator Vest or Senator Cockrell—men whom he regarded as fit for the place and fully capable of representing the state.

He looked at the presidency in much the same way, as a place of trust where he would have the power of the people in carrying out policies which he believed to represent their rights and their will. When he was forced into leadership in 1893, it was the first time in his life that he had been called upon to isolate himself openly from those with whom he had co-operated during the two decades of civil war politics which followed his election in the Greeley campaign. Although in 1892 he fully represented

"Mr. Bland's position was characteristic. He said:

" 'If I am the candidate of this state for the presidential nomination, it would not be becoming in me to go as a member of the delegation from this state to the convention.'

"He was consequently not chosen as a delegate, but was unanimously indorsed by the convention as the candidate of Missouri for the presidency.

"He returned to his home, near Lebanon, Mo., and remained there until after the national convention had made its nomination, refusing the importunities of his friends to attend meetings anywhere or to do aught that might be construed as electioneering for himself or promotive of his candidacy for nomination. His candidacy was not of his own seeking. The good people of Missouri had seen distinguished gentlemen of acknowledged abilities and high character, eminent and influential in party councils and intrusted with high official positions, who for years had been outspoken advocates of bimetallism and professed friends of silver, turn their backs upon their past records, and to the money power and executive power, freely exerted, 'crook the pregnant hinges of the knee where thrift may follow fawning.'

"Knowing Mr. Bland's sincerity and honesty of purpose, his uncompromising integrity, his moral courage, and unyielding firmness, and his lifelong devotion to and advocacy of the restoration of bimetallism, they naturally regarded him as the personification of that monetary principle."—Congressional Record, April 9, 1900.

the issues which gave the democratic party the greatest victory of its history, he stood in 1893 as one of a handful who, wherever they openly appeared, were denounced as "fanatics" and "dangerous men," and, if possible, silenced by threats of political ruin—who, where this proved ineffective, were attacked on the theory that no man whose means of subsistence is controlled against him can long maintain an effective struggle for principle of any kind. A more hopeless—and consequently a more disinterested—fight was never made in American politics than that Mr. Bland opened on the Cleveland administration when it had seemingly at its back, and presumably represented by Mr. Cleveland, the forces which had just achieved the unprecedented victory of 1892. Yet if Mr. Bland hesitated at all, if he required to be compelled by force of circumstances to go where he might not have gone otherwise, it was only because of his habitual unwillingness to thrust himself forward and of his desire to make peace, compromise and patience serve ends which to others seem attainable only by violent contention. But when he saw what he regarded as the cause of civilization about to be sacrificed, he did not stop to ask what the consequences would be to himself in loss of friends, party standing or position. He accepted the issue with Mr. Cleveland, and when it made him logically the only presidential candidate on whom, during the next three years, it was possible for the democratic party to reform its completely demoralized lines, he accepted the situation as freely as he had accepted the initial responsibility of making the first open stand against Mr. Cleveland.

The letter referred to above, in which it was suggested that his nomination was improbable, he did not discuss with the writer of it, nor did he ever assume that he was being treacherously dealt with by this man or that as was often charged at the time. He received letters of warning, such as no doubt are written to all presidential candidates, but they did not change his relations to those against whom he was warned. Several years later when he saw manifested in another way the reality of the methods of one of those against whom he had been warned by letter prior to the

Chicago convention of 1896, he smiled and said: "That's his idea of politics." That was all. He accepted men as he found them, judged them by the results of ideas dictated by the habits of their past and then dismissed them to the judgment of their own future.

It can not be too strongly emphasized, however, that he was not the "victim of treachery" in 1896. Missouri was for him. The west and south were for him. All recognized that he alone had made possible that new organization of the party of which the Chicago convention was a manifestation. The one thing which prevented his nomination was his residence in Missouri—a southwestern "slave state." Had he been a resident of Nebraska his nomination would have been made unanimously. As the man who, when Mr. Bland made his "parting of the ways" speech in 1893, had seconded it for the northwest and above everything else as the representative of the northwestern balance of power against the "hegemony" of the lower wards of New York City as they represent international commercial imperialism, Mr. Bryan was nominated—not as a result of mere sudden enthusiasm, but of the forces which had been operating since the south withdrew its opposition to the admission of the northwestern states. Mr. Bland's work made "the logical candidate" a representative democrat—not from Missouri, but from Illinois or Nebraska. No one recognized this more fully than Mr. Bland himself. He asked nothing for himself. In less than four years he had wrested the organization of his party from an administration which at the beginning had reduced him almost to a minority of one. He had done a man's work so well, so manfully, that the office which had been filled by Van Buren, Fillmore, Tyler, Polk and Grant could have added nothing to the dignity of his simple manhood.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

The Chicago Platform Against a Corporation Currency and Federal Invasion of the Province of the States.—These Sections Forced by Mr. Cleveland's Attempt to Undo the Results of the Campaign of 1892 so as to Restore the New York-Indiana Balance of Power.—Great Determination Shown by Mr. Cleveland in This Attempt.—Cleveland and Bayard Compared.—Bayard an Anti-Federalist.—The Democratic Party at its Last Gasp When Restored by the Chicago Platform.—The Balloting for President at Chicago.—Mr. Sewall as a Compromise on the Platform.—The Action of the Convention Deliberate.



THE democratic national convention of 1896 met at Chicago on July 7, and two days later adopted the platform which resulted in the bolt of Mr. Cleveland and those who believed with him in the issuance and control of the currency by national banks or other corporations.

The platform represented the issues as they had been outlined by Mr. Bland in his *Enquirer* interview and in his speeches in Congress. It was adopted after correspondence preceding the convention between Mr. Bland and Mr. Bryan, with others interested in the reformation of politics.

It contained sections expressing unqualified disapproval of bond issues in time of peace and of national bank control of the currency. It had been suggested in advance of the convention that if the section against national bank control of the currency were adopted, Mr. Cleveland and his administration would relieve the party, as far as it was possible to do so, of responsibility for their action. As these two sections without doubt led Mr. Cleveland to "bolt," they may be quoted here as a suggestion of what was the fundamental issue of the campaign.

We are opposed to the issuing of interest-bearing bonds of the United States, in time of peace and condemn the trafficking with banking syndicates which in exchange for bonds and at an enormous profit to themselves supply the federal treasury with gold to maintain the policy of gold monometallism.

Congress alone has the power to coin and issue money, and President Jackson declared that this power could not be delegated to corporations or individuals. We, therefore, denounce the issuance of notes intended to circulate as money by national banks as in derogation of the Constitution, and we demand that all paper which is made a legal tender for public and private debts, or which is receivable for duties to the United States, shall be issued by the government of the United States, and shall be redeemable in coin.

These sections forced Mr. Cleveland's withdrawal. They were not adopted maliciously, but as a matter of necessity, and with them, as a matter of the same necessity, was adopted this repudiation of Mr. Cleveland's action in sending troops into Illinois without the call of the governor:

We denounce arbitrary interference by federal authorities in local affairs as a violation of the Constitution of the United States, and a crime against free institutions, and we especially object to government by injunction as a new and highly dangerous form of oppression by which federal judges in contempt of the laws of the states and rights of citizens, become at once legislators, judges and executioners, and we approve the bill passed at the last session of the United States Senate, and now pending in the House of Representatives, relative to contempts in federal courts and providing for trials by jury in certain cases of contempt.

To understand what these sections mean, we must once more recall the fact that largely as a result of Mr. Bland's work in breaking down civil war sectionalism in the west and south, Mr. Cleveland had been elected in 1892 by a majority of the votes of the electoral college before New York was reached; that this was done by placing Illinois in the position of prominence which for twenty years had been accorded to New York; that Mr. Cleveland's own nomination was the only concession made to New York in the campaign; that the campaign itself was made on principles he did not approve and on plans against which he protested; that as a result of it a democratic governor had been elected in Illinois for the first time since the Civil war began; that Mr. Cleveland had not only overridden this democratic governor, but with all the skill and resources at his com-



mand had endeavored to undo the work of the campaign of 1890 and 1892. As president during his second term he showed rare qualities of courage and individuality. Could any force of individuality or of organization or of resources have undone the already accomplished work of a great and beneficent revolution in the practical politics of America, he would have succeeded. No other man could have done more than he did in support of his principles. It is hard to point out any other one man of his generation who could have done so much. Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, a man of the highest ability and of untainted virtue, was, like Mr. Cleveland, a whig, by birth and tradition a representative of the aristocratic theory of government. But he was by no means so pronounced a federalist as Mr. Cleveland. Indeed, in spite of his family traditions of federalism, he had strongly inclined, during his whole public career, to the theory of state sovereignty which Jefferson had defined in the Kentucky resolutions. In 1884, when he was supported against Mr. Cleveland as a means of forcing the issue of tariff reform more strongly than Mr. Cleveland seemed to think advisable, it was chiefly because of the publication by the New York Sun of a strongly anti-federal speech made by him in Delaware at the beginning of the movement of troops against the south, that he failed to secure a stronger eastern support. No other member of the Cleveland administration could be compared to Mr. Bayard in intellectual grasp, but he lacked Mr. Cleveland's driving force of will, and it is safe to say that neither he nor any other man in public life could have succeeded where Mr. Cleveland himself failed.

As a result of Mr. Cleveland's determined effort to restore the political conditions which had prevailed in the electoral college prior to the change forced by Illinois and Kansas, the democratic party was apparently at its last gasp. No matter what came of reasserting the principles through which Illinois had been carried and the west taken from the republican party, it could not be worse for the party organization than the conditions which the "off-year election" had demonstrated—conditions suggested by the fact



that in Missouri in 1894, eight democratic nominees for Congress had been defeated as a result of party disorganization. As Mr. Bland was one of these, the result was attributed to popular disapproval of his opposition to administration policies, and it is said that up to the very time of the adoption of the platform, Mr. Cleveland's representatives expected to control the convention. If they expected "pairing" from delegates who opposed them, it had been anticipated from the other side also, and provided against. As a result of work inaugurated by Senator Harris, of Tennessee, a convention had assembled such as had not been seen before during the generation. It was largely composed of men who do not attend conventions at all except in great emergencies, and though among the delegates at large there were the usual number of experts, who support themselves by the "ground floor privileges" of politics, the body of the convention consisted of men of Mr. Bland's class who mean what they say and believe that government should be actually an expression of the popular will. They came determined to achieve results. Nothing less than the adoption of such a platform as was adopted would have satisfied them. When it was adopted, and they had voted down a resolution indorsing Mr. Cleveland, they went home and gave it 6,319,000 votes as against 5,554,000 votes polled for Mr. Cleveland in 1892—that being the largest vote ever polled in the United States up to that time. When we remember that this was done without a campaign fund, with practically no working machinery and in presence of opposition representing the combined capitalistic influence of England and America, it is possible to get some suggestion of the moral forces Mr. Bland had called into active operation against plutocracy.

The account of the balloting for president given by Senator Cockrell in the Congressional Record of April 10, 1900, is concise and accurate. The following report of the proceedings was adapted from it:

Most of the nominations for the presidency were made on the night of

July 9, and the remainder on the morning of July 10, when the balloting began.

Fourteen distinguished gentlemen received votes on the first ballot, the result of which for the seven receiving the highest number of votes was announced as follows: Richard P. Bland, 235; William J. Bryan, 137; Robert E. Pattison, 97; J. C. S. Blackburn, 82; Horace Boies, 67; John R. McLean, 54, and Claude Matthews, 37.

The result of the second ballot for the three receiving the highest number of votes was as follows: Bland, 281; Bryan, 197, and Pattison, 100.

The result of the third ballot for the two receiving the highest number of votes was: Bland, 291; Bryan, 219.

The fourth ballot resulted in 241 for Bland and 280 for Bryan.

At the beginning of the fifth ballot one of the delegates at large from Missouri read the following letter from Mr. Bland:

"I wish it to be understood that I do not desire the nomination unless it is the judgment of the free silver delegates that I would be the strongest candidate. If it should at any time appear that my candidacy is the least obstruction to the nomination of any candidate who is acceptable to the free coinage delegates in the convention, or one more acceptable to a majority of these delegates than myself, I wish my name at once unconditionally withdrawn from further consideration. I am willing to waive the state instructions for me, if need be, and let the free silver delegates decide the whole matter. The cause must be put above the man."

Mr. Bland's name was then withdrawn and the vote of Missouri cast for Mr. Bryan, the gifted and glorious son of Nebraska.\*

The nominations for the vice-presidency were made on July 11. Mr. Bland on the first ballot, without having been placed in nomination and

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\*To what is here adapted from Senator Cockrell, it needs only to be added that the managers of the preliminaries of the convention had taken what seems to have been considerable pains to secure deliberate action in the balloting. A letter had been written to Mr. Bland himself protesting against what his friends in a neighboring state were doing on their own motion to secure positive instruction for him. Mr. Bland, who destroyed most of his letters of this character, left this on file among others somewhat similar. In response to it he sent a despatch cautioning his friends, as requested. This letter, written from St. Louis, June 17, 1896, said among other things: "I think the greatest danger you will have to face between now and the meeting of the national convention is the overzealous indiscretion of men inexperienced in politics making a mess of things, in what they imagine to be an effort to further your interests. I have tried to impress upon Allen, Rickey and the rest that the wise policy is to avoid placing you in a position of antagonism to any local favorite, but in such cases to conciliate the favorite's friends and endeavor to make you second choice."

In spite of this caution, of Mr. Bland's telegram and of "local favorites" the state in question insisted on instructing for him, but as Senator Cockrell indicates, "fourteen distinguished gentlemen received votes on the first ballot." This seems sufficient to illustrate whatever arrangements were made prior to the assembling of the convention.

with the votes of Missouri cast for others, received 62 votes.

On the second ballot, when many votes were being cast for Mr. Bland and Missouri was called, the spokesman of the Missouri delegation said: "The state of Missouri presented the name of one of its citizens for the presidential nomination. In the wisdom of this convention another was selected. The delegation has no authority to present the name of that citizen for the second place upon the ticket. If it is done by this convention, it must be done of its own accord, without solicitation by the Missouri delegation—" and cast the votes of Missouri for other names.

On the second ballot 294 votes were given to Mr. Bland. On the third ballot 255 votes were given to Mr. Bland. After the announcement of the third ballot, further balloting for Mr. Bland as a candidate for vice-president was stopped by the receipt of a telegram sent by him to be read to the convention. It was submitted accordingly by the Missouri delegation. In it Mr. Bland said that he thought it "unwise and impolitic to nominate both candidates from the west side of the Mississippi." He requested the delegation to assure the convention of his hearty approval of the nomination of Mr. Bryan and of his hope that the one object in making the nomination for vice-president would be to strengthen the ticket. He prohibited the further use of his name in the balloting and it was dropped accordingly. The balloting then proceeded with the issue between Mr. John R. McLean, of Ohio, and Mr. Arthur Sewall, of Maine. A telegram was read from Mr. McLean protesting against the use of his name, and the nomination of Mr. Sewall followed on the fifth ballot. He was well known in Maine as an amiable gentleman of unblemished reputation, a capitalist, promoter and national banker by profession. His nomination as a representative of a hopelessly republican state has never been accounted for, but it was probably influenced to some extent by the feeling almost universal among political experts in all American parties that whenever a platform of decided principles, candidly stated, is adopted at least one of the candidates placed on it ought to be notoriously identified with principles clearly antagonistic to it. While Mr. Sewall was an advocate of free coinage, holding personal opinions which may not have been

at all antagonistic to the platform, his business career represented a contradiction of it, and his nomination, so far as it had any effect at all, served to break the force of Mr. Bland's work and to prevent Mr. Bryan from "squaring" effectively the only issues on which he could have been elected.\*

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\*Full details of the balloting both for president and vice-president are given in Mr. Bryan's admirable book, "The First Battle" (chapters X to XII inclusive). In concluding chapter XI, Mr. Bryan writes: "It gives me pleasure to testify to the fact that those who were prominent in the contest for the presidential nomination gave loyal and enthusiastic support to the ticket. Mr. Bland, whose vote was next to my own, devoted himself to the cause with voice and pen. Mr. Blackburn visited all parts of the Union and responded to every call. Mr. Boies did effective work upon the stump during the entire campaign. Mr. McLean, as a member of the executive committee of the national committee, was an invaluable counselor and gave most efficient aid. Mr. Matthews was actively at work from the adjournment of the convention to the closing of the polls. Mr. Pattison, while not in accord with some parts of the platform still supported the ticket. Mr. Tillman, who, while his name was not placed in nomination, received the vote of his state on the first ballot, delivered a large number of speeches in support of the platform and ticket. Vice-President Stevenson, who, though not formally a candidate, received several votes in the convention, promptly placed himself at the disposal of the national committee and spoke in several states. Mr. Sibley, who, notwithstanding his refusal to be a candidate, received a large vote for the vice-presidency, was a zealous supporter and untiring in his efforts in behalf of the ticket."

## CHAPTER XXVII.

Charles A. Dana on Bland as the Only Statesman in the American Public Life of the Last Quarter of the Century.—Contrast Between Bland's Manners and Those of Fashionable New York.—He Visits New York with Mr. Bryan in 1896.—Conditions Existing in New York at That Time.—Great Intellectual and Defective Moral Force in the New York Governing Class.—Solidarity of Wealth in 1896.—Starvation in the Presence of Undistributed Fruit and Breadstuffs.—Foreign Dictation in New York Politics.—Will the City be Forced to the Second Place?—Its Possibilities of Progress.—Its System of Free Co-Operation Probably the Best in the World.



HARLES A. DANA once said that Mr. Bland was the only man in the public life of the United States who had reached the level of statesmanship since the reconstruction period.\*

Mr. Dana had done his best to check the "rainbow-chasing movement" in the west. It was his paper which gave it this name. It was he who, at every step of the contest, asked: "What are you going to do without New York?" It was he, more than any one else, who represented the full intellectual force of all that to which Mr. Bland was most opposed and when he saw the great revolution in American politics, made possible by Mr. Bland's work, and effected in spite of his own best efforts to prevent it, he was better qualified than almost any one else to give an authoritative judgment. But when Mr. Bland visited New York City in August after the convention of 1896, no one who lacked Mr. Dana's acuteness of intellect would have selected him from among the crowds in the Fifth Avenue Hotel as the greatest American of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. "Esse quam videri" is the motto on the great seal of North Carolina, borrowed from what was said of Metellus at a time when it was said also that in the politics of Rome, all things except the honor of Metellus were for sale. "To be rather than to seem" a worker of great

\*Amos J. Cummings, Mr. Dana's confidential friend, in a signed article in the Washington Post of Sunday, December 12, 1897.

results—that had become a second nature with Mr. Bland. He thought little of himself or of his personal appearance. With his badly-fitting coat, and trousers which bagged at the knees, he seemed wholly discordant with the civilization of the great and splendid city where even the champion pugilists wear irreproachable silk hats and dine in absolutely faultless evening dress.

He had come with Mr. Bryan's party as the correspondent of a New York newspaper—sending it from station to station along the route, letters or telegrams in support of Mr. Bryan's candidacy.

Nothing could have been more characteristic than his willingness to render such unpretentious service. The Chicago convention, as we have seen, had three times given Mr. Bland a majority of its votes for president with enough scattering votes held out to prevent his nomination. On the fifth ballot his name had been withdrawn under instructions from him which had been secured in advance, and that episode in his career had closed. It had been nothing more than an episode. His great work as a leader had been done in forcing the conditions which made the Chicago platform possible and when he reached New York, it was to witness at close range the intellectual effects on the powerful domestic and foreign capitalistic interests of that city, of the first open and determined revolt against their control of the policies of both parties and of the government through one or the other of the parties put into power as their agent.

The New York City of 1896 was well worth the careful and long-continued study of the patriot and statesman. With great possibilities of evil always involved by the dictation of its privileged classes and with the always imminent menace to popular government and to civilization itself resulting from their habitual use of money in controlling elections, the city represented also what is without doubt the most highly organized system of free industrial and commercial co-operation in the world. It had accumulated, in the hands of a few men of great intellect and no visible limitation of morals, the vast wealth which resulted from a change of economic



system made during and immediately after the Civil war and intended to make the agricultural producers of the south pay a continuous war-indemnity, levied on their products by those highly scientific modern methods, which take from a conquered people in times of profound quiet more than Roman conquest could take when the gold and silver from the public treasuries and the altars of the gods were carried with the private treasures of the conquered to be distributed at Rome. This policy, operating not only against the south but against the direct producer everywhere, had put in the hands of a few thousand men, most of them well read in books and some of them extraordinarily subtle in intellect, a vaster power than any Roman oligarchy had ever exercised. Some of them had grown haughty and in their haughtiness ferocious—ready, as one of the higher type of the class said at about the time of Mr. Bland's visit, to stand "free coinage cranks," or others whom they disapproved, against the wall and shoot them. Their alliances with London were close. Their sympathies were at all times with Europe rather than with America. Their intermarriages with the English landholding nobility, impoverished by western agricultural competition, made their detestation of government by the majority a matter of class pride as well as of the timidity of capital. This timidity was so great that in every strike they seemed to expect a civil war and in every street mob the beginning of a new reign of terror in which the guillotine was to be set up in City Hall park and they themselves decapitated as the first step in the distribution of the vast hoards they held, largely untaxed and untaxable in their safe-deposit vaults. Between such men as Herr Most, who might not object to distribution by the guillotine and by such extra-judicial measures as that by which the southern slaves were liberated—between unscientific revolutionists of that type and statesmen like Mr. Bland who proposed an even more effective redistribution by the slow and unavoidable processes of natural law, they made no real distinction. The adoption of the Chicago platform threw them into such a blind rage as had not been seen in the politics of the country since the

election of 1860.\* They attacked, by every means in their power, any one they could reach who ventured to favor the democratic candidates. They aimed to create and they virtually did create a complete solidarity of the banking, commercial and manufacturing classes against the Chicago platform. When Messrs. Bryan and Bland reached the city, they had already so far succeeded that an acquaintance of Mr. Bland who met him in the corridor of the Fifth Avenue Hotel the day after the great speech with which Mr. Bryan opened the campaign, suggested the absolute hopelessness of accomplishing anything in New York except by appeal to the despised masses of the people.

At this time, among these "masses"—people representing the average goodness and the highest possibilities of human nature—there was much suffering, and as it is a fact well known to all who profit by the status quo that revolutions "come seldom except on empty stomachs," this increased the dread of the future in a country which manifestly could no longer be controlled for "business stability" by buying a few Indiana counties. The prostration of business incident to the bankers' panic and the suspension of silver coinage, had filled the country with unemployed laborers, and many of them had collected in New York City, where already thousands were on the verge of starvation. When it is remembered that at this time, with women dropping dead in the streets of New York from sheer starvation, the west and south had a "surplus" of undistributed food which would have been given away if necessary; when it is a fact that within a range of twenty miles of New York, fruit of so good quality as to be a luxury to the best fed in the tenement districts could be seen rotting under the trees in the suburbs of villages where silver was "boycotted" and where trade was almost stopped by the difficulty small dealers had in changing ten dollar national bank notes; when at midnight around a bakery in the lower part of the city where fragments of stale bread were given away, a long line of men and women would stand night after night

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\*Their action against Banker St. John for entertaining Mr. Bryan is an illustration of their temper.

patiently waiting for that which kept together the souls and bodies of their children—thinking of such things as these, we can the better realize what the benevolence of Mr. Bland's statesmanship would have meant for the comfort, happiness and safety of New York City at a time when the leading representative of its "better element" was openly calling for the fusillade as an economic argument.\*

It is not possible here to do more than suggest New York conditions. The worst of its dangers is foreign control—the dictation of its municipal policies and its national attitude by non-resident financiers, who have their branch banks or their financial agencies in the district below Chambers street. If it escapes this danger; if it refuses to be an European and becomes an American city, its already highly developed system of industrial and commercial co-operation will give it the mastery of the trade of the world. But if it refuses; if it is to be governed by the tyranny of the few square miles between Chambers street and the Battery, it will become a second class American city, sent to the background by forces which its non-resident European magnates can no more estimate than in August, 1896, they could have estimated the moral forces represented by Mr. Bland, as he kept in the background among the crowds of notables who thronged the lobbies and halls of the Fifth Avenue Hotel.

Of the possibilities of New York City for progress, there can be no doubt. It had in 1896 the most effective organization of charitable workers in the country, if not in the world. The work of its religious organizations has been crippled, it is true, by such plutocratic influence as

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\*The moral condition of the idle and dangerous classes of the city at this period was illustrated by the notorious banquet at which an unfortunate woman was hired to dance unclad on the table before the guests. Another characteristic incident was a "disrobing act" in one of the theatres—a scene in which a woman, hired to lose her miserable soul for that purpose, undressed to her last garment on the stage before the mayor of "Greater New York" and according to a New York newspaper report, threw her stockings into his lap. A similar exhibition was given in St. Louis in 1898 just prior to the Springfield convention, and it is something more than a co-incidence that the direct beneficiaries of its proceeds were political experts, long accustomed to packing conventions against what Mr. Bland represented in politics and in ethics. The theatrical posters of New York or St. Louis any day in the season are apt to illustrate the moral meaning of the "New Americanism" which is too "expansive" to be restrained by the constitution or the decalogue.

that which has capitalized one of its great denominations on a business basis of real estate endowment, held permanently in mortmain by an evasion of the spirit of the common law. But in spite of this, the city shows a continually increasing number of intelligent people, willing to do unpaid work for others and capable of organizing with quickness and precision to carry out, through definite and business-like methods, purposes which have their origin in the spirit which alone saves the world from becoming an inferno—the spirit of sympathy of each in the deprivations and sufferings of all the rest, even of those who suffer deservedly. These, whether they spend their lives among the dangerous classes, in the palaces with which the city is so greatly afflicted, or live in more fortunate poverty, sharing their little all to relieve those who have nothing at all—these are the “better element” of New York and in 1896, they had no better representative in the world than the unostentatious Missourian who came among them and went from them almost unnoticed and wholly misunderstood.

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## CHAPTER XXVIII.

Mr. Bland's Years of Greatest Achievement.—The Climax of a Great Career Comes in 1898.—His Stand Against Imperialism.—The Spanish War Used to Turn the Flank of Chicago Platform Democracy so as to Demonetize Silver.—Issues Precipitated by the Teller Resolution.—Sanford B. Dole as the Agent of the Imperialistic Movement.—The Hawaiian Government Employs Sub-Agents to Attack Mr. Bland's Rear.—Hawaii and Cuba Discussed Before the Spanish War.—Far-Reaching Influence of the Standard Oil Company and the "Sugar Trust."—The Attempt to Shape the Policies of Both Parties so as to Prevent an Issue Against Imperialism.—Mr. Bland Forces Open Fighting.

HE years of greatest achievement in Mr. Bland's life were 1877, when he moved to suspend the rules and pass the free coinage bill which became the Bland-Allison Act; 1893-4, when he checked the federalism of the Cleveland administration, and 1898, when he forced issues for American constitutional liberty against the programme of commercial imperialism, which had been revived from the Grant administration.

It happens to many men who have been active in public life to outlive their usefulness. Mr. Bland had the great good fortune to be able to call into play in the last years of his life the full force of his reserve powers and thus to make these closing years the climax of his work. At the crisis which decided the future of the country after the Mexican conquest, Webster, Clay and Benton all three exhausted their last remaining forces and died in the attempt to save the country from retrogression and anarchy. Again, after the Civil war, Sumner, Greeley and Seward sacrificed power, popularity and the possibilities of long life to prevent the complete overthrow of the Constitution by the oligarchy which controlled the Grant administration. When, after the Spanish war, the cause of civilization, of progress, of constitutional liberty once more demanded such devotion, Mr. Bland was ready to do his best simply and steadfastly

as he had always done it. If it happened to him, as it had happened to Benton before him, to seem to stand alone, he had with him still the twentieth century majority for whom he contended, striving that the painfully achieved results of the nineteenth century sacrifice might not be lost to them. Had he died at the close of the campaign of 1896, it might have been truly said of him that no other public man of his generation had done more to break down obstruction and clear the way for the world's future. As he died in 1899, after having made the stand which will save the country from a complete repudiation of the constitutional principles of 1788, it must be said of him by all who will do him justice, that no other public man of the last quarter of the nineteenth century had done so much.

In the campaign of 1896, Mr. Bland was re-elected to Congress after having been elected and re-elected to every Congress since 1872, except the Fifty-fourth—the Congress elected in the “off year” of the Cleveland administration when the democratic party as an organization was practically nonexistent. He was urged to take the governorship of Missouri in 1896, but he believed that his still unfinished work required his presence in the House of Representatives. He was right. The conditions of 1873, which had called him into public life, were about to recur, forced by the same methods, for the same purposes, and developing finally in 1900 the same results—the demonetization of silver and the perpetuation of a corporation currency.

The last resort of plutocracy struggling to prevent oligarchy from being supplanted by popular government, is, in every country, war—foreign war if convenient, civil war if necessary. The unprecedented vote cast for the Chicago platform in 1896 showed conclusively that the people were in a position to re-assume control of the government, unless something decisive was done to prevent it, and in January, 1898, when the combined bimetallists of the Senate, by a vote of 47 to 32, made a demonstration in force by passing the Teller resolution declaring the national



debt payable, principal and interest, in silver at the government's option, the crisis came. In the House where Mr. Bland forced issues with them, the republicans voted against the resolution by 182 to 50, but it was clear that at the "off year" election the House, under conditions then existing, was likely to become two-thirds democratic.

It is now evident that the passage of the Teller resolution was a great tactical mistake. It was in fact a challenge which called the managers of an administration party of great skill and ruthless determination, representing the greatest capitalistic combinations of the world, to do their utmost against a recently organized and at that time not thoroughly coherent opposition.

At the very time this resolution passed, Mr. Sanford B. Dole, "president of the Hawaiian Republic," was travelling in the United States, and "the Hawaiian government" was employing agents with political influence, to open in both parties the work of "expansion," by which the imperialism of the Grant administration was to be renewed. Part of this plan was to get into Mr. Bland's rear in Missouri, and if possible cut him off from his base. For that purpose, agents were employed to travel through the southwest attempting to organize the imperialistic movement in Missouri, Kentucky, Arkansas, Illinois and Texas—a solid block of powerful states, the control of which was rightly considered vital. At this time (February, 1897), the writer was editing a paper in Missouri intended to support Mr. Bland's policies and to prevent the Chicago platform from being abandoned. In this paper of February 17, 1898, the week of the blowing up of the Maine, appeared the following:

"President Dole, of Hawaii, is travelling in the interests of the capitalists he represents in what is more a commercial syndicate than a government. The best possible settlement of the question he is trying to force on us, would be to secure all the port-room we need in Hawaii for naval stations and then to let the islands alone, leaving the Monroe doctrine to take care of them, as it is entirely able to do."

The connection of the question of "liberating Cuba" with Mr. Dole's

mission in the interest of the sugar syndicate was recognized in the paragraph following this in the same issue:

"The question of the fate of Cuba is one of the deepest interest to every American. . . . It is pitiful to see these poor people suffering as they do under Spanish rule, and yet there could hardly be a greater misfortune for the country than the annexation of the island. . . . If we annex them or if we annex Hawaii, we will get servants, not citizens, and we will have to increase our already burdensome navy to a permanent war basis. . . . The annexation of Cuba would be the final decisive step away from the old republic of free and equal states into an imperialism in which a league of the more powerful communities would dominate the weaker and hold them as subject provinces."

As this was written in February, 1898, before the Spanish war and before the blowing up of the Maine it will be accepted, no doubt, as better evidence than anything which could be written now of what was then suggested to Mr. Bland's supporters by the work of Mr. Dole and the Hawaiian sugar syndicate in the interest of what is now demonstrated as a conspiracy to turn the flank of the democratic party, to defeat bimetallism, to refund the national debt on a gold basis, to give the control of the currency permanently to the national banks and at the same time to annex Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, as the base of production for the bulk of the cane sugar output of the world.

The New York sugar syndicate in league with that of the Pacific coast had a direct interest in this, warranting heavy expenditures in contributions to campaign funds and "attorneys' fees"\* to realize it. In 1897, it had been announced in the New York papers that the leading stockholders of the Standard Oil Company had invested so heavily in sugar securities that both these great monopolies were virtually under one political management. In the same newspaper from which the foregoing extracts were

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\*It is said on authority which entitles it to full consideration, that checks were cashed in St. Louis for services rendered in this connection to "the Hawaiian government." The interest of the "Hawaiian government" in employing "attorneys" at large expense to break down the authority of Mr. Bland and of the democratic House caucus against Hawaiian annexation, appeared shortly after the joint resolution seizing the islands on the ground of "military necessity" when it was announced that the sugar trust had assumed control of their sugar output.

W. V. B.

made, and at the same page of the same issue (February 17, 1898), appeared an editorial which is reproduced here in explanation of the forces then organizing attacks upon Mr. Bland, both at Washington and in the west. The editorial in question was as follows:

The committee of the Ohio legislature investigating the Standard Oil Company, learns that it controls eighty-five per cent of the oil production of the country. It is now reorganizing its system so as to evade the anti-trust law more effectively. At the same time, it has done what was a mere child's play for the men in it—taken control of the New York market and forced up the price of its stock \$25,000,000 or from \$420 to \$440 a share.

The trust is without doubt the most dangerous and most powerful monopoly in the world. It illustrates the "communism of capital" as nothing else could. Its stockholders have grown enormously rich as a result of violating the laws, bribing legislatures and corrupting courts. Of course they do not allow the money they draw from the public as plunder—they call it dividends—to lie idle. They reinvest it at once.

United States bonds are a favorite investment with them. In the first place they can deposit them in the treasury at Washington instead of paying rent to a safe-deposit company to take care of them. In the treasury vaults, the government itself takes care of them, and is ready to use the entire United States army for that purpose, if necessary.

It not only guards them without expense to the trust, but pays interest on them. And what is most remarkable of all, it gives the Standard Oil stockholder who deposits a thousand dollar bond, \$900 in crisp, new, silk paper money indorsed by the government and intended to circulate on the public credit.

He gets these 900 new silk paper dollars for nothing. They are a present to him because he is a financier who knows more about money than other people, and is entitled to call other people repudiators and scoundrels if they object. It is true, he is required to organize several of his employes into a "bank" and to sign this elegant new silk paper money with his own name as president, before he lends it to western borrowers at rates which run as high as sixteen per cent. or to hard-pressed New York speculators at rates as high as sixty, but he does this cheerfully. Ink is cheap and when the stroke of a pen is all that is required to put into circulation (where it will stay until it wears out) a hundred silk dollars indorsed by the greatest nation of the most outrageously fooled people on earth, he would be indeed an economical Standard Oil magnate who would grudge

the cost. There are no such. They are all far-sighted men who never step over a pound to save a penny, and there is not one of them but is ready to give by the hundred thousand these silk paper dollars presented to him by the government, whenever they are needed, to campaign funds to uphold the cause of "honest money."

But national banks are only one of a hundred different semi-political money manufacturing enterprises in which the Standard Oil magnates are either controlling or influential partners. They have bought into the sugar trust. They are heavily interested in the steel trust. They control the syndicate iron fields of the northwest. They are deep into steamship companies which (largely through their influence) have been subsidized from the federal treasury on the pretext that they can not carry the mail at ordinary rates. They are partners in the iniquity of the anthracite coal pool which keeps the coal supply of New York City entirely cornered, and forces up the price against thousands of poor families who shiver and freeze through the winter because of it. They have obtained by corruption the most valuable public franchises of New York City. They are back of its gas monopoly. They own the enormously valuable Broadway surface road franchise, and wherever else through the greater city, a franchise was to be grabbed they have grabbed it, until now the streets are more completely under their control and the control of their political agents, than they are of the people. They have begun to use the surplus from other monopolies to control the trolley road franchises on the most frequented routes in the neighborhood of eastern cities. They are going into electric lighting companies, into manufacturing, into banking, into every enterprise for which monopoly can be obtained, or subsidy wrung from the people.

The income for a single day of such men as the Rockefellers, the Flaglers and the Whitneys is more than a king's ransom. They have more money than they can spend, though they build palaces in town and country, buy yachts and racing stables, travel from continent to continent and revel in every luxury that the servitude of mankind throughout the globe can offer to minister to their pride or to pamper them in the indulgence of the luxurious tastes which their immense wealth creates.

If any American dare oppose them in their determination to make the government of this country—which God designed to be, and which will be the greatest and freest on earth—a mere annex of their plutocratic commune, then he is a "fool, a crank, a lunatic, an anarchist." They proceed to smirch his character, to blast his business, to deprive him of his employment, to bring him to want and his children to hunger. In their politics they show no mercy to anyone who opposes them. They buy

or intimidate newspapers, driving out from them every man who dares have a mind or a conscience of his own. They send their money into congressional and judicial districts to force out of public life the congressman who has been brave enough to voice the will of the people against them, the judge who has been just enough to resist the infamous demand for the prostitution of the bench. They invested money not by the thousand, but by the million, to buy the presidency, and they believe that they succeeded. They believe that they can succeed again, over and over, as often as they please.

As an explanation of the polemical tone—too warm to produce the impression of deliberative impartiality—in which this is written, it should be remembered that it appeared as a newspaper editorial at what was manifestly a crisis. There was no intention then nor is there now, of aspersing the private character of Mr. Whitney, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Flagler or any other great "Captain of Industry." As a rule, they are, in their private lives, amiable men. But when all their private amiability is admitted it remains true that no warmth of tone could do justice to the demoralizing and corrupting influences of the corporate combinations from which they draw dividends.

At this time (1898), Mr. Richard Croker, the leading political expert of Greater New York, had been brought home from Europe and restored to power that "a trade" might be made to better advantage with political experts in the south and west—more especially in Missouri, which Mr. Bland's work had made a "keystone state." Mr. Bland was to be sent to the rear if possible—it did not appear how at the time. But it did appear later when the money of the Hawaiian sugar syndicate was used against him to promote not only the annexation of Hawaii but of Cuba and Puerto Rico as well. It was evident that for the time being Mr. Bland would be forced back by the unlimited power of this great combination of corporations. All he could do for the time being was to make the stand which would force an open contest, on the merits of which the people might have opportunity to pass. This he did with decisive success.

As the plan of the combination against him developed with the develop-



ment of the Spanish war excitement, its purpose became clear. It was to shape the policies of both parties so as to prevent a decisive issue on the part of the democrats against what was to be done through the republicans in administration. Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and, if possible, the Philippines were to be annexed. But democratic opposition to imperialism was to be directed, if possible, only against the annexation of the Philippines so that in spite of the pledged faith of the government, the Cuban republic could be suppressed by garrison control and a "carpet-bag" government, set up to seize and hold the island while professing to represent the Cuban people. It was in such a conspiracy as this that Mr. Bland's supporters were asked to join. It was against this that they stood with him when he made his last great contest in the summer and autumn of 1898. He died before the passage of the demonetization act of 1900 which resulted from the loss of the House and Senate in 1898. Had he been more strongly supported this might have been prevented. But he had not lost for he had checked imperialism in Missouri and the west and had once more saved the life of the democratic party.



## CHAPTER XXIX.

The Spanish War as a War for the Suppression of the Cuban Republic.—Mr. Bland Forces Issues With President McKinley and Compels Him to go on Record.—Recognition of the Cuban Republic Openly Opposed by the Administration.—Its Anxiety to Begin War Leads it to Fire on Merchant Vessels Before War is Declared.—“A War for Humanity” Converted into a Movement for Imperialism.—Failure of an Attempt to Turn Missouri Democrats Against Mr. Bland.—The Flag of the Cuban Republic Torn Down at San Luis.—Open Declaration of the Plan to Suppress the Cuban Republic by Garrison Government.—Benevolent Assimilation in the Philippines.—What the Flag Meant for Mr. Bland.—His Work for Higher Civilization Finished.



HOSTILITIES against Spain were begun prior to a formal declaration of war by the action of the administration in firing on and seizing the Buena Ventura, the Pedro, the Mathilde, the Miguel Joves, the Catalina, the Sophia, the Candida, the Saturnina and the Antonio—nine “tramp steamers” then trading with our ports or those of Cuba under the Spanish flag. Between April 20, when Secretary Sherman telegraphed the ultimatum of the United States to Madrid and Monday, April 25, when war was formally declared, this action had been taken in order to make recession impossible and to prevent any change of the lines on which “intervention” had been authorized. In the declaration, the war was “dated back” to legalize the seizure of these vessels, the clause adopted for that purpose being as follows:

“Be it enacted, first, that war be and the same is hereby declared to exist, and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, 1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.”

In the face of the fact that these harmless tramp steamers loaded with fruit, lumber and the like, and trading back and forth along our coast line in the perfect security of the good faith of our government were thus fired on at once as soon as Congress had been brought to the views of the

administration—and in presence of the official concession here made that the seizures were prior to the declaration of war, the assertion that the president was greatly unwilling to engage in war is obviously unhistorical.

The “unwillingness” he showed consisted of unwillingness to proceed for the establishment of a free and independent republic in Cuba. This was the issue which Mr. Bland, with quiet and skillful statesmanship, forced upon him.

What is here said of Mr. McKinley is in no sense personal. He is spoken of only as the representative of forces it was beyond his power to control or greatly to modify—although it must be added that being a free agent, he need not have represented them.

The theory on which Mr. Bland proceeded was based on close study of conditions in New York City since the beginning of the Cuban insurrection. It was simply this—that while the Cuban patriots had been encouraged to fight desperately for their independence, to sacrifice their lives, to lay waste the island and to reject all offers of conciliation from Spain, no matter how liberal—that while money had been supplied them by New York capitalists for this purpose, it was never a part of the intention of the New York combination, which planned the new imperialistic movement, to allow the island to achieve its independence, but rather to seize it, control its street railroad and other franchises, and exploit its sugar production in connection with the control of the sugar supply of Puerto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines.

Mr. Bland recognized that unless the necessity for domestic reforms were kept strongly before the people and that if their attention were distracted even temporarily by this “expansion” movement, the reformation of the currency, the relief of trade from its tariff restrictions and the enfranchisement of the people from the worst evils of plutocratic oligarchy would be postponed probably beyond his lifetime. He had every motive a man of high purposes can have to inspire him to achievement and he did his work well.



HIS FAVORITE CHAIR.




Amanda Black Goody-  
koontz, Mr. Bland's  
half sister.



Mrs. Elizabeth Bland Tetley,  
Mr. Bland's sister.



Mrs. Mary Steinmetz, Mr. Bland's  
Niece and adopted daughter.



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OF THE  
BLAND FAMILY.

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ASTOR, LENOX  
TILDEN FOUNDATION

It was believed that if the recognition of the Cuban republic could be forced on the administration as an issue connected indissolubly with the declaration of war against Spain, the sugar interests in New York and their allied corporations would not allow war to be declared. This belief justified itself in results, for, when the issue was thus forced on the administration, President McKinley sent in his message of April 11, declaring that "it would not be wise or prudent for this government to recognize at this time the so-called Cuban republic," and that such recognition would compel the United States to assume towards the Cuban republic "the mere relation of a friendly ally."

While this completely justified the theory on which Mr. Bland acted in organizing the forces of opposition to imperialism, the working plan which this theory inspired failed at the crisis, not because it had not been justified, but because the democratic organization at the time was not sufficiently coherent to be capable of holding the high level of Mr. Bland's statesmanship. Instead of forcing the recognition of the Cuban republic which there was every reason to believe would compel President McKinley's supporters to fully reveal their plans, a resolution was adopted declaring merely that the "people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent." This was substituted for a resolution that "the United States government hereby recognizes the independence of the Republic of Cuba," which had been supported by Messrs. Clark of Missouri, Williams, Dinsmore, Berry and Howard, the democratic members of the House committee on foreign relations in a report in which they declared that "we have no doubt our simple recognition of the Republic of Cuba will enable the Cubans themselves ultimately to expel the Spaniards from every portion of that island."

Instead of intervention on this basis—which it was said openly at the time the president would veto, the resolutions adopted were "that the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent," and that the United States disclaim any intention of annexing the

island. On Monday, April 18, when the House considered the Senate resolution containing the clause: "Resolved that the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent and that the government of the United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of that island," Mr. Dingley, as the representative of the administration, moved to strike out all recognition of the Cuban republic. The motion carried by 178 to 156 and finally on conference between the House and Senate, the resolution was so amended as to impose on the administration only the opportunity to violate its obligation to enforce the rights of the Cuban people to sovereignty. This resolution did not declare war, but it called upon Spain to withdraw from Cuba and authorized the administration to intervene to secure withdrawal. The method of "intervention" adopted was immediate attack on Spanish merchant vessels before the declaration of war. At ten minutes after one o'clock on the morning of April 19, the conferees of the House and Senate had conceded the administration's point against recognizing the Cuban republic, and between April 20 and April 25, in advance of the declaration of war, the merchant steamers mentioned above had been seized as a means of making all further negotiations impossible.

The connection of this movement with that for the annexation of Hawaii appeared at once. Mr. Bland, supported by the democrats of the House almost without exception, had made the first stand against the imperialistic conspiracy by resisting the annexation of Hawaii on the demand of the sugar syndicate government which had no other title than that of open and flagrant usurpation. He was secretly attacked inside democratic lines on this, but a majority of the House democrats supported him by caucus vote and, in spite of the great power of the combination against him, it controlled only one democrat vote from Missouri. As soon as the agents of this combination saw that Mr. Bland had not succeeded in forcing the recognition of the Cuban republic, they began active work for the annexation of the island "by consent" and for the seizure



of Puerto Rico and its control by "possession of arms." It was rightly reasoned, that if this declaration could be established as democratic against Mr. Bland's position, the issue in favor of self-government and against garrison government could not be squared in Cuba, Hawaii, or the Philippines. There is no doubt that this plan in its general details was originated or vised by the great international financial combination of London and New York which was seeking to establish our national debt as a permanency on a gold basis, and there is no room to question the skill shown in its conception and execution.\*

Mr. Bland met it openly and with far-seeing statesmanship. He so forced issues that the republicans representing the administration were compelled to vote down the measure authorizing the coinage of the silver seigniorage for war purposes, to vote down taxes on the great corporations which had forced the war, and to take their position openly in favor of an obviously unnecessary bond issue, supplemented by stamp taxes on business.

When this policy was reinforced by the immediate vote of all appropriations asked from the democrats of the House and Senate for war purposes, it was obviously too strong to be resisted and the same influences which controlled the administration set out to force recession from it. The result of this was what was called "pairing with the administration on the issues of the war," advocated as a policy by those who had already begun their opposition to Mr. Bland in the case of Hawaii. They favored the seizure of Cuba, Puerto Rico and Hawaii, the construction of the Nicaragua canal in connection with fresh bond issues and appropriations for an imperial navy—including the subsidized auxiliary cruisers of the combination which had inaugurated the "expansion" movement. This attempt to set Mr. Bland aside was joined by the same men who had joined Mr. Cleveland in the attempt to control Missouri in favor of monometallism in 1893. They had no influence whatever with Mr. Bland's constituents.

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\*See Act of 1900, demonetizing silver and refunding the debt on a gold basis.

He was renominated for Congress in 1898 and re-elected on a platform adopted by the democrats of his district, strongly supporting him in the stand he had taken against the policy of fraud and force the plutocratic oligarchy was attempting to inaugurate under cover of what had been declared "a war of humanity," to liberate the people of Cuba.

His position on the issues of the war was defined in a speech delivered at Springfield, Mo., August 11, 1898, in opening a convention held there for the purpose of nominating candidates for state offices.

"We do not intend to-day nor in the future," he said, "to lose sight of the great issues laid down in the Chicago platform because they must be paramount as democratic issues until they are settled. We propose to make this battle in the coming campaign along these lines. We do not propose that plutocratic designs in this country, shall, for a moment disturb the minds of the people, so as to distract and confuse in the coming campaign, this great issue.

"To give liberty, freedom and prosperity to the American people is our first duty.

"Unhappily, as it would seem, though I hope it may be otherwise, we were drawn into war, a war that will cost us some three hundred millions of dollars (if I remember correctly,) with two hundred millions of bonds issued, two hundred millions more authorized to be issued and a taxing system that puts the burden upon the people and refuses to put it upon the wealth of the country. We insisted that in providing for this war an income tax should be placed on wealth as well as internal revenue taxes on business. That was rejected. And why? Why, my friends, the secretary of the treasury had said before the war was supposed to be imminent, that he wanted an issue of bonds. War or no war, they intended to have the bonds.

"My friends, war was declared and declared in resolutions by Congress that placed this nation far beyond the nations of the world and the nations of modern history in its high elevation of purpose and humane and democratic designs. . . . We declared that the war was not prosecuted for the purpose of selfish aggrandizement, but in the interest of humanity. I say such a spectacle as that, such devotion to humanity and freedom in declaration of war is unparalleled in the history of the world. I know the grave questions that are before this convention and our country in regard to this matter. We may differ upon them as democrats and republicans, but I say to you, in my opinion, the democratic party can do only one thing and

that is to follow the principles of our fathers, the Monroe doctrine, the teachings of Washington and Jefferson.”\*

On August 12, 1898, the preliminary peace protocol, which put an end to the war with Spain, was signed at Washington, and in September following, the administration tore down the flag of the Cuban republic at San Luis, using a detachment of soldiers for that purpose. At about the same time, the Cuban patriot troops, who had fought with ours to capture Santiago, were excluded from the city and everywhere throughout the island the republic was suppressed by garrison control. What this meant—how force was eked with “diplomacy” in carrying out the plan of controlling the island against its people, was admitted in a candid article published on the editorial page of the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* (Rep.), of March 27, 1900, from its Havana correspondent, J. D. Whelpley.

“The appointment of Quintin Bandera to an office in this island is a good illustration of the real political conditions which exist on this island,” wrote the *Globe-Democrat* correspondent. . . . . “Bandera is the most virulent type of the unscrupulous, anti-American-Cuban politician. Others are not so dangerous, but are, perhaps, more influential with a better class of people. Gen. Gomez, the military hero of the war, is resting quietly at home, though he, too, in a more intelligent way, is in favor of American withdrawal. Since the Americans came to Cuba Gen. Gomez has received from the public funds on one pretext or another \$17,000 in cash. A temporary quiet is profitable to him under these circumstances even as it is to the others. Gens. Rabi, Lara, Pedro and young Garcia, all these, and many others have taken offices at good salaries and expenses. Giving dinners to their friends and living luxuriously on their official incomes is about the extent of their acknowledgment of the fact that they are in the public pay. In short, the men dangerous to the peace of the island and the success of the American administration have been bribed at heavy cost to behave themselves.

No one can suppose for a moment that these men can change their opinions, their character, or lose their ambitions when they accept the military governor’s shilling. Far from it; it whets their desire for unrestricted

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\*The platform of this convention was not reported finally until the convention was about to adjourn and in the confusion an incoherent section declaring “possession of arms” a title to territory was not eliminated as it should have been. The democrats of Missouri, however, were correctly represented by Mr. Bland.

power. It increases their own estimate of their importance. It suggests possibilities and gives them position and means to work out their schemes. As a temporary policy, it is a success. There will be no serious trouble in Cuba for some time. Any talk of an immediate general insurrection is sensational. Cuba will not force herself to the front with the people of the United States in time to enter as a leading issue into the campaign of 1900. It is a latent issue, however, and one which in time will overshadow in insistency and importance many others which are now absorbing the attention of the American people.

For a time the people of Cuba will be opposed to the annexation of the island to the United States, or, in fact, anything less than complete independence. The American occupation has not made itself particularly popular. The full flush of the possibilities of home rule are upon the people. This feeling is ingeniously fostered and encouraged by those who expect to profit thereby. The Spaniards, the owners of property among the Cubans, and the great mass of the people who are neither politicians, warriors nor adventurers, desire a reign of peace. They fear the possible recurrence of a time of war, and they remember the evils of the Spanish system, but they also recognize the military and restraining character of the American occupation and realize that these Americans are aliens in blood and mind. The Spaniards generally favor an American control indefinitely continued, but their favor is not because of political or social affiliation, but is purely selfish and commercial. The solid class of the natives hope for a Cuban republic, and at present they favor trying it. Knowing their own people as they do, however, they fear for its possibilities. As they say, 'In my heart I want to see Cuba free. In my head I fear this can never be so.'

These patriotic men are right. Cuba never can be free in the meaning they now give to the word. At first a realization of this truth will come as a shock to many able and honest citizens who assisted in driving Spain from their country. Before the inhabitants agree that independence can never come to Cuba, it is even possible that the island will have to pass through another ordeal of fire."

While the conditions referred to by Mr. Whelpley were being brought about, it was announced that the street railways of Havana had passed under control of "promoters" known to be identical with the Standard Oil and Sugar trust interest, and in the Philippines after the islands had been occupied by agents of similar combinations of financiers as able, enterprising and aggressive as Drake or Lafitte, war had been begun with our late

allies, the Filipinos and their flag also was pulled down for purposes described by President McKinley as "benevolent assimilation."

Through all this, Mr. Bland had kept his faith in the principles of free and constitutional government. He returned to Washington, and on January 30, 1899, made his speech on "English Plutocracy and the Liberties of the World," in which he championed the unfortunate people of the Philippines as he had spoken before for those of Cuba, Puerto Rico and Hawaii.

From 1873, when, in his first recorded speech in politics, he declared that the flag of the United States must stand for "liberty and justice to all men whether they be red, black, white, olive or tawny-colored"—from that noble beginning to the end, when, regardless of what others said or did, he still spoke for the liberty of all men, of all races and all countries, he had kept in all simplicity, without malice and without hypocrisy, the faith of an American Commoner. When he died, June 15, 1899, his work was done and it had been done so well that no power of money or of organization or of the shrewdness of those who make selfish advantage their rule of right will ever undo it, or change the least part of its beneficent results. It belongs to the always increasing potency of higher civilization, and it will realize itself in greater things than we can now imagine.



## CHAPTER XXX.

Mr. Bland's Early Home in Kentucky.—The Stock From Which He Sprang.—His Life as an Orphan Boy on a Farm.—At the Plow in Summer and at School in Winter.—He Emigrates to Missouri and to California.—His Life in the Mines.—Cooking and Washing for Orphan Children.—He Studies Law and Returns to Missouri.—His Characteristics as a Lawyer.—His Work Before Election Boards Under the Drake Constitution.—Judge C. C. Bland's Reminiscences of His Mother.

BY JUDGE CHARLES C. BLAND.\*



RICHARD P. BLAND'S father, Stouten Edward Bland, was born July 14, 1807. He was reared near Lebanon, Ky., on a farm which is now owned by Proctor Knott. His ancestors emigrated from Virginia to Kentucky at a very early day. His wife, Margaret Parks Nall, eldest daughter of Richards Parks Nall and Polly Nall (nee Berryman), was born at Hartford, Ohio county, Ky., June 4, 1816. S. E. Bland and Margaret P. Nall were married at Hartford, Ky., October 9, 1834.

Richard Parks Bland, the eldest child of this union was born August 19, 1835, at Hartford. S. E. Bland moved from Hartford to Bland's Mills, ten miles above Hartford, on the Hartford river, in the year 1838. Here he procured the establishment of "Bland's Mills" as a postoffice, and he himself was appointed postmaster by Amos Kendall, who was then postmaster general in General Jackson's cabinet. Early in 1841 Stouten Bland gave up the management of his mill business, because of ill health, and moved his residence to a farm, about midway between the mill and Hartford. He continued to live on this farm until his death, which occurred June 5, 1842.

\*Mr. Bland's brother, presiding judge St. Louis court of appeals. Judge Bland says in transmitting his reminiscences to the editor: "After my tenth year my brother and I were separated for many years and I never saw him until he came to Rolla in 1867. I will add one thing here, that is, that while we practiced together, I never discovered that he was in error as to the law of a case—his judgment on a law point seemed to be unerring at all times."



After his death his widow with four children remained on the farm for a year, when she removed to the home of her mother who was then a widow. In 1844 she married Francis Black, a farmer in the neighborhood, and her son, Richard, went with her to the home of Mr. Black, where he remained until the death of his mother, December 20, 1849. After the death of his mother he worked as a farm hand for wages during the spring and summer and went to school during the fall and winter. Mr. Craig—I wish I could recall his given name\*—who resided near Beaver Dam, was his fast and valuable friend during this period, helping him to attend school, and giving him a home at his house, whenever he chose to make it there. Richard finished his scholastic education at the age of nineteen by graduating from the Hartford Academy, then the best school in that section of the state. After leaving school, he emigrated to Missouri and went to Wayne county, to the home of Robert Fulton, who had married Mariah Nall, the youngest sister of his mother. He taught school for three months in Wayne county, making his home with his aunt. In 1855, Mr. Fulton sold his property in Wayne county, and emigrated to California with his family, by way of New York and the isthmus. Richard accompanied them. After reaching California they engaged in mining, but Mr. Fulton soon sickened and died. His wife followed him in a short time, leaving three small children to be cared for by Richard. He continued mining and took care of the children, doing cooking and washing for them and himself, until arrangements were made to return them to Missouri. They embarked on a steamer for New York with an uncle (Fulton). When the vessel was

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\*Isaiah Craig, who was still alive during the campaign of 1896. Mr. Bland heard from him as a result of correspondence growing out of an invitation to visit his old home in Kentucky, among the signatures to which appeared the name "Isaiah Craig;" supposing this to be the son of his old friend. Mr. Bland wrote:

"That I had many trials you all know, for as an orphan boy I was thrown on my own resources to work my way through life as best I could. Yet I had many sympathizing friends who gave me a helping hand, Isaiah Craig was one. I am informed he has gone to the unknown land beyond the dark waters and if the good and kind are rewarded there for their acts here, then Isaiah Craig is blessed. I take it for granted that the 'Isaiah Craig' who signs this letter is the son of the greatest benefactor of my youth."

On learning that the signature was that of his old friend in person, Mr. Bland opened correspondence with him and sent him money.

about three miles from shore, it took fire and was burned to the water's edge. The uncle and three boys jumped overboard, and undertook to swim ashore, but the uncle and two of the boys were drowned. George (about nine years old) swam or floated ashore and was sent back to Missouri.\*

Mining in California not proving profitable, Richard went to Nevada, studied law, was admitted to practice, and served as treasurer of Carson county. In 1867 he returned to Missouri and formed a partnership with his brother C. C. Bland who had opened a law office at Rolla, Missouri. This partnership continued until 1869 when Richard went to Lebanon, Mo., and opened an office there. He continued to practice law in Laclede county and counties adjacent to it, until his first election to Congress in 1872. After that date, he was not actively engaged in the practice of his profession.

When a boy, Richard was very active and fond of athletic sports. He was ambitious, determined and unfaltering in his purposes. His youth was spent on a farm, with an occasional three months term of school in the winter. He was devoted to his mother, and to his brothers and sisters. Their needs and their welfare were always his first thoughts. His own came afterwards if at all. He was studious, learned rapidly at school, and after he was fifteen years of age never lost a moment's opportunity to improve his mind by reading and study. He was fond of debating societies, joining them whenever he could do so. He never failed to take an active part in their debates. In debate and in every other way, he was fearless. If the element of fear was in his nature, it was never perceptible, but he was not quarrelsome.

With his active mind and body he could not be lazy or indolent, and it was the universal opinion of his elders, who knew him well that he would distinguish himself, if he should live to become a man.

As a lawyer, he was a formidable antagonist at any bar. He was well grounded in the principles and doctrines of the common law. Always

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\*He now resides in Philadelphia.

reasoning out his conclusions from common law maxims and doctrines, it rarely happened that he failed to reach a correct conclusion as to the law of his case. He tolerated no wrong to his client. Making the client's case his own, he was more deeply concerned for the success of right principles in important cases than were his clients themselves. Nor would he submit to unfairness from the opposite counsel or from the judge on the bench.

He first attracted general notice and won his first popularity with democrats in southwest Missouri by defending rejected voters, before boards of revision, operated under the Drake Constitution. He was remarkably fearless but always courteous before these boards and seldom failed to have his client's name put on the list of qualified voters. For these services he would take no fee, declaring that his work against political proscription was a public duty, done for the good of the state.

I know so little about our father that I am unable to give the names of his parents or brothers and sisters. From a neighbor, who was his intimate friend, I learned when a child, that father was a well educated man for his period, was a school teacher when he married mother, that he was a man of great personal courage, and very religious. I have his Bible, which shows by marginal notes and references, which I believe were made by him, that he studied the book with great care. Both parents were members of the Methodist church, and I have been told that father preached occasionally in the little log church near our home. Of mother, I have very vivid memories—so much so, that were I an artist I believe I could reproduce her exact likeness on canvas. She was a patient woman, full of kindness, and in answer to calls for help in sickness, doing more volunteer nursing than any other woman in the neighborhood. When one of her brothers or sisters were sick, no one could nurse them but "Margaret." When a neighbor was sick if it were possible her services were secured. In 1849 an epidemic of typhoid fever prevailed in the neighborhood, and she continued nursing its victims until she was stricken with the disease.

The fever proved fatal in her case, as it did generally in the country at that time. She was a most devoted mother, and a very sensible woman. Her life was one of toil, but one of service spent in doing good, and in making those around her happy. To my recollection she had the kindest face and the most sympathetic eyes ever I looked into, and if I could paint her, I would put a halo of glory around her head, and rays of divine light in her eyes. "Dick" had a heart like his mother's. I could pay him no higher compliment.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

Mr. Bland's Boyhood in Kentucky.—Mrs. Bland Investigates and Interviews His Kinsfolk and Old Neighbors.—Shorthand Report of an Interview Between Mrs. Bland and Mr. Bland's Uncle, Mr. Frank Nall, of Ohio County, Kentucky.—How Mr. Bland Got His Characteristics.—His Truthfulness as a Boy.—The Fights He Was Forced Into.—He is Tempted to Become a Preacher.—Stops Driving Oxen and Decides to use His Intellect.—The Use of Beech Limbs by His School-Master.—The Questions He Debated as a Boy.—His First Speech and the Reputation it Made Him.—Life on No Creek in the Days of Henry Clay.



IN COLLECTING material for this volume, Mrs. Bland spent several weeks of the spring of 1900 in Ohio county, Kentucky, visiting the house in which Mr. Bland was born, the scenes of his childhood and of his youthful struggles, and gathering carefully from surviving relatives and friends who had known him in youth, such reminiscences of him as best illustrate his character. In that country of contentment and good neighborliness, where they speak the English of Addison's time and have not wholly lost the spirit of Queen Anne's reign, they live still in the "story and a half" houses of the colonial era, and know the names of their grandfathers and great-grandfathers as well as they do the pedigrees of their horses.

Out of houses of hewn logs, built when Clay and Jackson were rivals for the leadership of North America, Mrs. Bland might easily have secured authentic pedigrees of the Bland, the Nall and the Parks families, enough in themselves to make a volume larger than this, but instead of doing so, she took a stenographer with her and "interviewed" Mr. Bland's old neighbors and his kinsfolk—asking leading questions with the pertinacity of a veteran interviewer, the stenographer taking down both question and answer in shorthand. These interviews were intended only for the editor's information, but that of Mrs. Bland with Mr. Frank Nall, brother of Mr. Bland's mother, is too interesting in itself, and too valuable as documentary

evidence, to be omitted—especially as Mrs. Bland's questions are often not less informing than the answers themselves. Mr. Nall is now over seventy-six years of age.

#### MRS. BLAND INTERVIEWS MR. BLAND'S KENTUCKY UNCLE.

"Mr. Nall," said Mrs. Bland in opening. "I wish to learn where Mr. Bland got his characteristics. I have an idea that he took his firmness from his father and his goodness from his mother."

"He did—as far as I am capable of judging," replied Mr. Nall. "Mr. Bland's father was a school teacher and I went to school to him. At the time of his death I was about ten years old. We lived close together and I was often at his house. I had a chance to know him as well as any person of my age could have done. He was a man of more than ordinary intelligence, and had a high education for that day. That is, he had a good English education. You didn't find men in those days as well educated as they are now. A man with a good English education at that time was considered a well-educated man."

"You say he was firm?" "Yes, he was a man of firmness. His word was just as solid as a rock. He was a man everybody had the utmost confidence in."

"Do you think he possessed the quality Mr. Bland had of looking into a question and making up his mind, and sticking to it?" "Yes he was true to his convictions."

"Now, about his mother. Was she a firm woman?" "Yes. You know how Methodist people were raised—very strictly. She was raised by a pious mother, and she would regard a falsehood, or anything wrong with as much disfavor as we would a calamity."

"I see uncle J. C. Berryman, of Caledonia, made the statement in the papers that Mr. Bland never told a lie. Mr. Bland laughed at that. But I suppose he was a truthful boy?" "Yes, he was so regarded. The people of Ohio county had the utmost confidence in his father, and in him.



They knew his father, and knew that Dick was of the same quality. Because of his natural intelligence and honesty he never lacked a friend. I can remember when I first saw him. He was a little baby playing on the carpet on the floor, and my mother used to let me go over to Mr. Bland's. It was about a mile. I was very much attached to him. I loved to play with him. It was a great enjoyment to me, always, to see him laugh and enjoy himself. It might have been that I was prejudiced towards him because he was close kin, but others seemed to think as I did. As he grew and got older, he grew more attractive. He had more natural intelligence about him than was common to most children. He was quick to catch anything, and quick to learn anything, and he never forgot anything he got hold of."

"It is said he had fights when he was a boy?" "Yes, that got out in this way, I suppose. He had been tried by the boys. You know it is common when boys get together that some of them always want to get up a fight between others, and don't want to get into it themselves. They always tried to ring him in. They had a way there of trying boys' pluck. I think they tried him once or twice to their sorrow. While he never sought a fight, he would undoubtedly fight."

"I have a general impression that Mr. Bland was a great hand at debate?" "Yes, he used to attend those debating societies. They would take up some theory, and debate it. Dick was a great favorite among the debating societies, and he had the reputation of being hard to turn down. He had a great deal more than ordinary intelligence in that line. He was a natural debater."

"Did Mr. Bland have his hearty laugh as a boy?" "Yes, he had always retained that from the time I first saw him. I never saw him after he left here in his nineteenth year. Up to that time he was always full of laughter and merry. He never seemed to take trouble at all, but was always in a good humor—full of laughter and fun."

"Do you remember any incidents or have any reminiscences about him Mr. Nall? Mrs. Perkins told me about his driving oxen and plowing and sitting on the fence. Do you remember the remark he made on that occasion?" "I don't suppose there was any work to be done on a farm by a boy that he had not done—driving oxen, hoeing, plowing, etc. I think he was some ten or twelve years old when his mother died. He had not gone to school any except what he got through the winter when he lived at Black's. After his mother died, he tried Dr. Downard's a while. He offered him a situation, and he went there to live, but he hired out to Mr. Craig by the month and not to Mr. Downard. Mr. Craig, you know, was a farmer, and as a general rule they rise very early and get their work through before the heat of the day. He would work there through the spring and summer and go to school in the winter, and attend those debating societies, and study at night. Mr. Craig was a very good scholar and he took great pains in tutoring Dick, and he did not require Dick to pay him for anything he could do for him. He seemed willing to help him in any way he could, and did.

"Mr. Bland sent him some money in his last days did he not?" "Yes, a check for \$50. That was a present in remembrance of his kindness to him."

"Mrs. Mitchell told me that he was plowing one day, and that he stopped after he had made one or two rows, and sat down on the fence to rest, and took up a stick and began to whittle on it, and remarked that he could do better than that, and that he did not intend to drive oxen all his life." "Yes, he always said that he never expected to get a living by hard labor—that he was not built that way. That is the reason he applied himself to study. I remember that when he lived at Mr. Craig's and attended school there in the neighborhood, the teacher who taught there was only the ordinary country school teacher. I think Dick got to believe that he could teach the teacher, and I expect he could in some things. I don't think he had gone to school there. I believe he was about sixteen then when he



MR. BLAND AS A YOUNG LAWYER.  
(From a Photograph taken in Virginia City,  
Nevada, Prior to 1865.)



MRS. BLAND AT NINETEEN.  
(From a Photograph taken Shortly before Her Marriage.)



himself began teaching in that neighborhood. It was an old log house, which stood upon a hill—the White Oak schoolhouse. It is on the waters of No Creek, No Creek schoolhouse being further down in a different neighborhood.....I remember that Mr. Ellis lived near me when Dick was living at Craig's. Our farms joined—Craig's, Ellis's, and mine. Craig married Ellis's oldest daughter. Old man Ellis and wife thought there was no one like Dick. Ed Ellis and Dick used to run together. They thought the world and all of each other. He would come up there sometimes, and spend Saturday night and Sunday with Ellis, and sometimes a whole week when he wasn't busy. Dick was very fond of a gun and hunting."

"He used to tell me that there was somebody there that had hounds," said Mrs. Bland. "He said he would go hunting for opossum and 'coon, and that that was the way he made his Christmas money?" "Yes, the boys use to make pocket change selling the hides of 'coons, mink, etc., and at the same time they had their fun. One of the Ellis boys lives up on No Creek now—Alex Ellis, half brother to Ed. I expect Dick was the older."

"Did not Mr. Ellis and Mr. Craig think they would make a preacher of Mr. Bland once?" "Yes, he had some notion of it once. You see they were what we called Campbellites, but they are called Christians here now. You know there is a good deal of rivalry between churches. Dick was raised a Methodist. They would read the scriptures to Dick and explain them to him. I will tell you an incident: While he lived at Craig's he asked my opinion if I thought he was calculated for a preacher. I said I believed he was not. I remember he laughed, and said it was his opinion, and that Mr. Ellis and Mr. Craig had been trying to persuade him to go into the ministry. I asked him what kind of a preacher he would be. He said 'I will be a Campbellite of course.' I said 'you were raised a Methodist.' He said 'Yes, but I have been studying the Bible, and I believe the Campbellites are right.' He said that he would not argue

scripture with me at all, and for me to just do as I pleased. . . . .”

“Was he inclined to argue very much?” “Yes, he was fond of argument, but I don’t think he was any hand to argue for argument’s sake. If he had an idea and was upholding the right, he would contend for his position to the last.”

“Had he any of idea of what he would be when he left Kentucky?” “No, I saw him a short time before he left, and he told me he was going to Missouri, and go to school. Charlie (Judge C. C. Bland) was out there at Arcadia, going to school, and I supposed they had got Dick to come. I don’t know how long he went to school. I think he taught school, and went, too; but I think he acquired most of his education by chance. There are some people naturally smart you know, and I always thought Dick was one of them. He had not many educational advantages.”

“Mrs. Mitchell tells me that his mother was a very good woman?” “Yes, she was my sister, and everyone thinks his own kind are everything they should be. I have seen her tried, and I think she was as good a woman as ever lived. She was perfectly calm, and never took any trouble.”

“Do you remember where Mr. Bland was born?” “Yes. The place is about a mile above the mill. Mr. Armendt lives there now. There were three little places there. My father owned all of them. You know we had no frame or brick houses then. This was a neat log house, and my recollection is that it had one room, twenty feet square. What we would call a nice hewed-log house. It had a white ash floor, and then there was a little porch between that and what was called the kitchen. It had a loft room above. That was the size of the house. After Mr. Bland moved away from there I think a man by the name of Mason became the purchaser, and he lived in the same house, for a good many years. When he died the place fell into the hands of Mr. Armendt.”

. . . . .

When asked to give his reminiscences of the school he attended with



Mr. Bland, Mr. James F. Carson, of Hartford, Ky., said:

"The teacher was Mr. John F. Park who was educated in Pennsylvania. The school was at No Creek. One of the modes of punishment in Kentucky schools then was to use beech limbs as long as room would admit of. Teachers would whip the boys on the legs about half way between the knees and feet. As boys went bare-footed in the summer time the soles of their feet would get quite tough and would generally be used as a fender to ward off the blows. The punishment would cause them to stand first on one foot and then on the other. The girls he would whip on their backs. I have seen them gather pennyroyal and stuff down their backs as a protection. Another mode was to make the convict stand in the corner behind the teacher's chair. That was the funniest mode of all, for when he would be busy I, or the others, would pull one hair of his head at a time to see him scratch. This often caused a laugh and caused us to get the 'rod,' as he called it. The seats were made of slabs with auger holes bored in them with beech limbs inserted for legs, or sometimes they split timber out with an axe, very rudely done, —what might be called 'rustic work.' The tops of seats were at different levels, some low, some high. The high ones were the dunce blocks."

Mr. John S. Thomas, of Hartford, another of Mr. Bland's schoolmates, recalls that boys who were being trained for future masters of America were sometimes lifted bodily from the floor by the ear as a means of disciplining them. In spite of this, the schools were a means of stimulating intellect. Their debating societies made every Kentucky boy a possible statesman, waiting his opportunity to show his talents. Of such debates, Mr. J. S. Fitzhugh said to Mrs. Bland:

"During our schoolboy days we would frequently have debates in the neighborhood, and among the questions brought up for discussion I remember one of them that was stated something like this: 'Who deserves the greater praise, Columbus for discovering America, or Washington for defending human liberty?' "

"One I remember," said a neighbor present, "was: 'Which is the more attractive to the eye, the works of nature or the works of man?'"

"Another," continued Mr. Fitzhugh, "was: 'Which furnishes the greatest pleasure, pursuit or possession?'"

To this, Mr. James A. Sullenger, of Hartford, Ky., adds:

"Mr. Bland and I went to school together. It was about the second school I ever went to, I think. I heard him make the first speech he ever made. There were about fifteen of us boys, and he made the best and only speech that was made by any of us. The balance of us were all scared, except Dick, and he was not scared one bit. I remember feeling ashamed of myself; I did not have the pluck that Mr. Bland had. I remember my uncle who was teacher saying that he did not see why the balance of us boys could not talk as Mr. Bland did. The school was taught after his father's death at what was called the Bland house."

## CHAPTER XXXII.

### MRS. BLAND'S REMINISCENCES—I.

Mrs. Bland Writes Her Reminiscences of Mr. Bland's Home Life.—Their First Meeting When She Was a Schoolgirl.—Mr. Bland as a Confirmed Old Bachelor in Love for the Second Time.—He Tells Mrs. Bland of His Romance at Nineteen.—The Girl in White Apron and Sun Bonnet Who Died After Marrying to Please Her Parents.—Mr. Bland Corresponds With Mrs. B.'s Father.—The Story of a Threatened Elopement.—At Washington Under Grant.—Southern Pianos as Presents.—Mr. Bland's Love of Children.—His Domestic Habits.—Sitting up all Night on His Last Night in Congress.—His Last Illness and Death.

BY MRS. RICHARD PARKS BLAND.



MET Mr. Bland first at Caledonia, Mo., where I was attending the Bellevue Collegiate Institute. He had been to New Orleans to look into the matter of deepening the channel of the Mississippi river by means of jetties and had come to Caledonia to visit his sister, Mrs. Goodykoontz, before returning to Washington.

Mr. Bland had known my father and had practiced law in the same courts with him. When he was first introduced to me I had just passed nineteen—being nineteen in May, and this was the tenth of June. Mr. Bland was thirty-eight the coming August.

I had taught school when I was only seventeen years old and after attending school at Caledonia, I would have continued to teach, had not Mr. Bland, as he said himself, "broken up the school" I expected to teach. When I first met him at the Bellevue Collegiate Institute, the young ladies of our school were making Latin mottoes in evergreens for decoration at commencement. The motto was "I came, I saw, I conquered." I told him if he wished to stay he would have to help with the work of preparing the motto. He did so, staying until we had completed the work. The girls had a literary society, presided over by Professor McKinney, the

principal of the school. I was vice-president. We had an open session and a debate on the subject: "Which influences our lives most, hope or memory?" I led one side and Miss Hatcher, daughter of Congressman Hatcher, the other. Mr. Bland was present that night and said afterwards: "Why did you not tell me you were going to talk? I would have given you the bouquet I promised to another young lady." When school adjourned Mr. Bland accompanied me as far as Victoria, a small town on the Iron Mountain road, near Hillsboro, where I was to visit my uncle, Judge John L. Thomas. My uncle, my aunt, a young lady friend and myself went to Potosi and took the train there. Mr. Bland came out, and helped us on and after managing to put my friend (who was going to visit me) with another young lady, he sat down by me himself. Then he wrote to me at Hillsboro, and soon afterwards I told my father I had met him and asked what he thought of him. Mr. Bland never was effusive in his manners, and my father said he liked him very well, but that he was "as cold as a wagon tire." When he found how much mistaken he was in his judgment, he had to stand a good deal of joking because of this answer.

Mr. Bland had at that time the reputation of a confirmed old bachelor and stories have been published that he had some difficulty in convincing my father that I had made the best choice possible for a girl of nineteen. My father never really objected but he was away from home when Mr. Bland wrote asking his consent to a marriage, and, as the letter remained unanswered, Mr. Bland wrote him that he hoped the marriage would take place—with his consent if possible, intimating half seriously, that it might possibly take place without it. My father, who had by this time returned and found both letters awaiting him, wrote that he would not put him to the test, but would give his consent.\* As I have

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\*Mrs. Bland (Miss Virginia Elizabeth Mitchell, when Mr. Bland met her in 1873) is the daughter of General E. Y. Mitchell of Rolla, Mo. On November 4, 1873, Mr. Bland wrote to her from Lebanon as follows:

"I was at Springfield and saw your father. We had a long talk. He will offer no objections to our

said Mr. Bland was thirty-seven years old at the time and perhaps his friends thought him older. At any rate he had a good deal of trouble in convincing them that he intended to marry. His own brother would not believe him at first. When we were married by Rev. Dr. McAnally, Mr. Bland wore a dress coat. I think his "best man," Mr. Estell McHenry, was responsible for it, as Mr. Bland himself had no special fondness for them and they were seldom worn in rural Missouri towns of that time.

I ought to mention here that Mr. Bland had had his romance before he met me—when he was nineteen years old, and when I had just begun my existence in this world. He was in love with a Miss Moore and she with him, but as she had a suitor who was well-to-do in this world's goods, her parents wanted her to marry this man. They had no objections to Mr. Bland except that he was poor. He started for the far west with his uncle and aunt, Mr. and Mrs. Fulton, asking the young lady to write to him. He never received a letter from her. He told me he believed her parents intercepted her letters to him. She married a year later and died within a year after her marriage. His love for her was very great. She used to wear a calico dress, white apron and white sun-bonnet, and he always liked to see a woman dressed thus, saying they looked prettier so than in any other dress.

I copy here a letter written by Mr. Bland to me October 27, 1873, from Lebanon, Mo.:

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marriage. I am indeed glad of it. I have seldom seen a fortunate marriage, where parents objected. They seem to have a keen perception on such points. I do not say this because of the good luck in our case. I think I told you as much before we knew how the matter would end."

In a letter of October 30, 1873, he wrote as follows, enclosing a letter from General Mitchell, consenting to the marriage:

"I feel proud of the compliments he pays me and I will try to prove them well founded. He says my letter to him contained "a covert threat" and that he admired my courage, etc. What I said was that we had made up our minds to marry and that I thought nothing but death could keep us apart or prevent us from carrying out our engagement—so I hoped he would make no useless objection. It was in the nature of a threat probably . . . but he says he will not put our courage to the test. I never thought he would make any serious objection but I did not know what he might do. I am so glad he has given his consent with so much grace and willingness."

This, then, is the whole history of the "elopement."

"I am no believer in the idea that a man or woman never love but once," he wrote "for I once loved a girl so well that I thought I would never love another, and I suppose my remaining single has to some extent proved that theory, but it is all exploded now."

We were married the seventeenth of the December following our first meeting in June. The wedding was at the residence of Judge John L. Thomas, my uncle at Hillsboro, and two weeks later we went to Washington, where Mr. Bland was serving his first term in Congress. We boarded for about six months, and during that time I met Mr. Dawes of Massachusetts, Hon. Fernando Wood, of New York, Mr. Blaine, Attorney-General Williams, Secretary Belknap and many other well-known people—including even the famous "Boss" Shepherd himself. Of course these were only incidental acquaintances. The Missouri friends with whom I was thrown most at this time, were Hon. Erastus Wells, General John B. Clark, Hon. Thomas T. Crittenden, Hon. William E. Stone, of St. Louis, James B. Eads and their families.

At the time I reached Washington, sectional feeling ran high. "Force Bills" and measures of the same kind, were being agitated in Congress and the discussion grew so heated at our boarding house that Mr. Bland finally changed it on my account.

One of the ladies at the dinner table said to another: "Why didn't your husband send you a piano from the south as mine did me?" They were wives of members of Congress and as they called the people of the south "rebels" and "traitors," I was somewhat disturbed by it, and we went to a place where there was less of that kind of political discussion.

I spent the next winter in Missouri, but during our whole married life I did not miss more than four winters from Washington, and during that time Mr. Bland wrote to me daily.

Mr Bland and I lived together twenty-five years and six months from the time of our marriage at Hillsboro to his death at Lebanon, June 15, 1899. No man was ever fonder of his home and family than he was.\*

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\*The children born to us were: Virgie, born January 18, 1875, in Caledonia, Mo., died April 3, 1876;



He loved children dearly. Often when going to and from the House in Washington he could be seen playing with the children on the way, turning the rope for them or pulling the girls' hair and teasing them.

One day while we were living in Washington, a friend called and said: "I saw Mr. Bland on the avenue with the children." I said, "No, not our children; they are here at home." "I saw him running in and out of Galts' jewelry store after some children or other," she replied.

At another time he was on a street car and took a little girl about two years old on his lap. After a time she went to sleep. The mother sat bolt upright and you would never have imagined the child was hers. When Mr. Bland reached Q street he rose and put the little one on the mother's lap, saying: "Madam, here is your baby, I must get off here." The children in our block used to throw sand and dirt all over him to see him jump and run. Before he was married and when court was in session he said his favorites among the children of Lebanon—about half a dozen in number—would follow him around, and lawyers from a distance would say: "Bland, are these your children?" He would give the children nickels and "match" with them. So one day, Charlie Taliaferro, a small friend of his wanted to match nickles with him in church.

The Indian war dance he learned in the far west was a favorite pastime with the children. In the evening after dinner Mr. Bland would stamp and sing a kind of war whoop and the children would dance or jump as he sang. He used to say that when we were in rented rooms he could not have the Indian dance as people would think we were crazy.

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Fanny, born June 4, 1876, in Washington; Theo, born November 25, 1877, in Lebanon; Ewing Charles born May 17, 1882, in Washington; George Vest, born February 10, 1884, in Washington; Hattie, born November 5, 1885, in Lebanon, died March 3, 1887; Margaret Nall, born December 1, 1887, in Washington, died September 11, 1892; John Lilburn, born July 28, 1889; Virginia M., born in Washington December 19, 1892.

The following from a letter written by Mr. Bland from Washington, December 5, 1894, is characteristic in its suggestion of his tender feelings for children.

"I opened my box and found in it three baby shoes. Now did you put them in the box to remind me of the baby, or did the baby or John store them away? I have them put up on the mantle and they look quite home like. In fact they are better company than a picture would for they remind me of the realities of the baby's life."

We had rented houses for about ten years and he got so he would not board or live in rented rooms. We lived in some very stuffy, small houses, as rents were very high in Washington. He used to get out and run races with the children and he was never happier than when he was on the floor with three or four children climbing over him and wrestling with him. He would get one under each arm and with the rest pounding him and trying to get the others loose and they would keep such a din that I would have to get out and leave them to themselves. He was gentle, kind and affectionate as any woman and his love for home was so great that he hardly went into town except to get the mail or attend to some pressing business and then he always hurried home again. I used to think the last few years of his life that he did not know the people of our own county as he ought to have done as a public man, but at home he was at perfect liberty. He could do as he pleased and take his ease. He had his own favorite chairs and corners and everybody got up and gave these to him when he appeared. In summer he loved to sit under the shade of the trees in a big chair without collar, tie or coat and even with his vest unbuttoned.

He was fond of chewing tobacco but I never heard him swear or use bad language and I never saw him intoxicated in all my life. He could never bear to hear one call another a liar. He rarely ever punished a child, but would do so quickly for this. He said that when a younger man he had to be restrained, in court, from taking a chair to or throwing a law book at a fellow lawyer who questioned his veracity and that he felt like killing anyone who called him a liar. Some said this was "Kentucky blood."

He used to have a time with the boys getting them to work when they were small. He would get a hoe and take them to the garden. For a while you could see the hoes going up and down very briskly, his with the boys', but as soon as he left to go to town for his mail, they would be gone and in ten minutes they would be out of hearing even. When he would

return he would ask where they were and say: "The little rascals; I can't get a bit of work out of them! But that reminds me of Charlie and myself running away to the creek and floating logs all day, where we could not hear our mother calling us."

At other times he would run foot races with them, and the children considered him a boy with them. They would often say things to him that I thought they should not have said and I would correct them for it. I had been taught that children should respect their parents and older people but he was their companion and the children when nearly grown, would hang around him and sit on his knee. When he spoke decidedly to them, however, they obeyed, and when he had writing or other business to attend to, he would go into his office and no one dared to interrupt him—except the babies who would slip in occasionally. He did very little work on the farm, but would sometimes drive the wagon in haying time. He always tried to keep the boys at work, at least part of the time and they always helped in haying time. Often with the help of the hired man they put up the entire crop of hay.

His last day and night in Congress showed how conscientious he was. He sat up that last night all night to watch the appropriations for the district, coming home in a drizzling rain at five o'clock in the morning and returning for the adjournment at 12 o'clock next day. He took cold and his throat was affected again. He was again threatened with tonsilitis, but on returning home in March he seemed fairly well for two weeks. His throat still troubled him and he worried much over my sickness, for I had been sick in Washington for six weeks, and after returning home had relapsed. He was much worried and one day while writing he was overcome with what he called "a dizzy spell" and was unable to speak. They kept it from me for a week, but on the first day I sat up Mr. Bland was talking to me when he took one of those spells and I knew then that he would never get over this and that these spells would prove fatal. They continued for three months growing worse and worse. He grew weaker

and weaker. We begged him to go to St. Louis, but he would not leave our country home. He would not consent to have Dr. Gregory from St. Louis, saying: "If this is anything serious no one can help me. If not Dr. McCombs will bring me out." Finally without getting his consent, I sent for Dr. Gregory but the doctors were unable to stay the disease. That he knew he was going to die is certain for in November he made his will, saying to Judge Holt: "Holt, I am not going to live long and I want to make my will. I may live for some time or I may go at any time and I want to settle up my affairs. I do not want you to mention this, for my political enemies would use it against me."

When he was ill in the spring, Judge Holt came out to see him and when done with him, said: "Well, Bland, let's us old fellows go fishing. Set a time now." He said Mr. Bland looked at him, shook his head and said: "Holt, do you remember what I told you last fall?"

Mr. Bland seemed to sleep so much better all the winter of 1898-99 that we congratulated ourselves that he was growing stronger on this account, but it must have been the beginning of the end, for he died in one of those deep sleeps. He had several of those spells in which he grew cold and stiff—one very severe one on the Saturday before his death.

There was something he tried to tell us for some days before the end, but he could not speak without great effort and the doctors said we must not question him or talk to him—that no new faces must come near and that no one could imagine how much of an effort it was for him to recognize even those whom he had been used to seeing. About a week before he died we took Major Towles to see him. They had been long and good friends. When the major had gone in Mr. Bland put his hand over his eyes and looked at him earnestly for a moment then held out his hand and taking the major's held it very tightly and tried to speak but the major urged him not to do so. When the major came out his voice trembled as he said: "He knew me, he knew me."

On the Tuesday night before his death (Thursday) he whispered something and only the baby could understand him. She said: "He says 'George and John!'" When John came (he is ten years old), his father took his two hands in his, looked at him long and tenderly and finally shook both his hands. On this same day he shook hands with many of us near him and I now know he was telling us good-bye. He would take our hands and hold them so tight we could not get loose without great trouble. On Tuesday night about 7 o'clock he whispered the baby's pet name. She was on the bed by him and this was his last word. He afterward looked anxiously and affectionately at us both. I had little Virginia in my lap. He could not speak and he then went into a deep sleep and never awakened. I hoped so he would and stayed by him almost constantly, hoping. He had asked me a week before not to leave him. About half past 10 o'clock Wednesday night I lay down and got up again at twelve. I found his feet cold and immediately began to rub him and apply bottles of warm water. I sat by his bed all night and rubbed his limbs and arms.

About 2 o'clock, I think it was, his brother came in and one by one the household gathered. About half past 2 o'clock his pulse went up to 150 and the friend who was with us helping to nurse (and she herself was a physician), advised us to send for the family physician. He arrived about half past 3 o'clock and when he took Mr. Bland's hand he looked at me quickly, dropping his eyes. Then he looked in his face and said in a startled tone: "Mrs. Bland, I do not like his symptoms." He endeavored to give him medical aid without avail. All of us were at his side. The end was fast approaching. I and my daughter left the room. We could not stand to see him go. In a few minutes he was dead.

## CHAPTER XXXIII

### MRS. BLAND'S REMINISCENCES.—II.

Mr. Bland's First Speech in Congress and the Piute War.—He Favors Impeaching Grant.—Disappointed at Cleveland's Defeat in 1888.—Crisp's Defection From Bimetallism.—"Those Whom They Can't Bribe They Get Drunk."—Mills Begs Support and Sheds Tears.—Cleveland's Second Administration.—Alarm Over the Coxey Army.—Closets Filled With Loaded Rifles.—Clubs and Government Grass.—Mr. Bland's Indignation.—Mr. Bland's Lecture Tour in the West.—His Acquaintance With Mark Twain.—The Chicago Convention.—What He Said During its Progress.—His Trip to the East and His Visit to Mr. McKinley.—His Logical Mind and His Faculty of Foresight.



THE first time I remember hearing Mr. Bland address the House was when a proposed appropriation was up in the House to pay the state of Nevada for the expenses of an Indian war and the validity of the claim was being questioned. This was during our first year in Washington. Mr. Bland had taken part in the Indian war, having volunteered with other citizens of Virginia City to follow up the Indians and drive them off. This they did, driving them beyond Pyramid Lake. Mr. Bland told me that parts of the dismembered bodies were found scattered all the way to Pyramid Lake over about one hundred miles of the trail. Mr. Bland said the Piute Indians were hard to fight, as they got behind trees. He told me that he shot one Indian and saw him fall. So he spoke for a few minutes in favor of the bill saying he knew it was a just claim.

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When the contest between Tilden and Hayes was pending, Washington was filled with troops, and our old colored nurse said it put her in mind of war times. On the street corners everywhere could be seen squads of soldiers. Mr. Bland was much opposed to this action of President Grant



and was at this time in favor of getting up articles of impeachment against him.

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I well remember the morning on which it was thought that Cleveland was elected the first time. We went into town from Lebanon and an old man about eighty years old, a Mr. Evans, came up and said to Mr. Bland: "Well, Dick, what do you think of the outlook?" "Well, Uncle Billy," Mr. Bland replied, "we have been in the woods a long time, but I believe we are going to come out. I think Mr. Cleveland is elected."

During this time while the truth was still in doubt, a certain democrat of our town, who was very enthusiastic, said to Mr. Bland: "Bland, I don't believe you are a good democrat; you don't seem to believe Cleveland is elected." "I am a good enough democrat to vote the straight ticket and not to scratch," Mr. Bland replied. He knew that this acquaintance had "scratched" during the preceding election.

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It was quite a disappointment to Mr. Bland when Mr. Cleveland was defeated for election in 1888 though he had hardly wanted him nominated. He said that just at that time when the treasury was in good condition, with a surplus on hand, Cleveland's election would have been a better thing for his party than his last election with the treasury empty. When the news of his defeat was confirmed we were sitting in the dining room, looking very blue and Mr. Bland looking as if he had lost a friend. The children would persist in singing the campaign songs, which they had just begun to know very well. They would sing: "Vote for Grover Cleveland early in the morning." Mr. Bland would say to them: "Go in the kitchen," or "go out of doors."

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During the campaign in which William R. Morrison was defeated, a

strong fight was made on several old members, Mr. Bland among the rest. Mr. Simmons (of Simmons Hardware Co.), sent Mr. Bland a check saying he understood a fight was being made upon him (Mr. Bland) and he feared he would be defeated. Mr. Bland thanked him heartily and returned the money, saying: "If I know my people, and I think I do, I will not need it." There was a strong fight made against him, papers springing up like mushrooms over the district and nobody seeming to know where the money came from to start such papers.

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The year Sergeant-at-Arms Silcott ran away with the money in the treasury of the House of Representatives, Mr. Bland refused to accept part of that month's salary. It was found that Silcott had left enough in the treasury to pay \$60 to each member instead of \$416. Mr. Bland would only accept that much, and I now have in my possession, I think, the receipt for the rest of the \$416, from the officer who succeeded Silcott. He (Mr. Bland) said that he and the other older members were responsible for the loose manner in which the office of sergeant-at-arms was kept and that they ought to have to suffer for it, but that the younger members ought to accept their full salary.

. . . . .

At 12 o'clock on the night of March 26, 1892, I was in the gallery of the House when the votes were being taken on cloture. Mr. Bland stood near Mr. Cate, of Arkansas, a member of the banks and banking committee, who shortly afterwards went over to the gold forces. Mr. Cate said to Mr. Bland: "Bland, they are standing by us nobly."

"Yes, those who are able to stand," Mr. Bland replied after Mr. Cate went down. I asked Mr. Bland what he meant. "Why," he said, "those whom they can't bribe they get drunk and eight of our men are too drunk to vote."

Mr. Bland went to Crisp that night about the time of the tie vote, and



MR. BLAND AT THIRTY-EIGHT.  
(From a Photograph in Mrs. Bland's Possession.)

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said to him that he was willing and ready to keep his forces there all night if necessary or as long as it was necessary and Crisp told him to move to adjourn and he would see that a cloture rule was brought in.

The first that Mr. Bland knew of Mr. Crisp's backing out, was when a New York correspondent came to him and told him. He got about a dozen of the members oldest in point of service and took them to the speaker's room. Confronting him Mr. Bland asked if he did not promise that night to see that the cloture rule was brought in and that when he (Mr. B.) went to him he wrote the rule with his own hand. . . . .

When Mr. Crisp was running for senator from his state, they wrote to Mr. Bland asking him if Mr. Crisp had been true to bimetallism. Mr. Bland wrote that it was a matter in which he did not wish to interfere and told them to look to the history of that time.

I was in the congressional library in the capitol, reading on Monday, putting in the time while waiting for the bill to come up. Mr. Bland came in to find me and I knew when I looked up at him that something had happened, he looked so utterly miserable. I said: "What is the matter?" He spoke in an undertone for others were near and said: "Well, we are sold out again; Crisp has gone over to the enemy." Mr. Bland was very angry.

. . . . .

I am sure that it was about this time or on Sunday preceding the Monday of the refusal of Speaker Crisp to bring in the cloture rule, that three free silver democrats called on Mr. Bland and told him that they understood Mr. Catchings had gone to New York to consult with Wall street and that he and Crisp were going to back down. Mr. Bland told me, after they left, of their conversation, saying he thought there was nothing in it. Mr. Catchings afterward went over boldly. Clifton Breckenridge and he were defeated for it.

. . . . .

When the speakership contest was in progress between Messrs. Mills and Crisp, Mr. Bland was greatly worried and he afterwards told me all about it. He had written to Mr. Mills after his speech in Indiana that fall and asked him if he really meant what he had said in that speech. Mr. Bland was much disturbed over it and when he read it in the paper he said: "If Mills said what this paper says he did, he has deserted us." He looked as if some member of the family had recently died and immediately wrote to Mr. Mills and Mr. Mills in reply acknowledged the speech. When Mr. Bland got to Washington he had not made up his mind what to do and the contest became very heated and for three days and nights the newspaper men and friends of Mills haunted his footsteps. In the meantime Mr. Mills had sent for Mr. Bland and told him he would not organize the House or the committee on coinage, weights and measures against silver. Several persons had come to Mr. Bland and informed him that Senator Hill of New York was backing Crisp. He said he knew what that meant; that he was afraid to support Crisp, and that he had known Mills a long time and had his assurance that he would not organize against silver. Finally, going to Mills' room and finding it full of people he said: "Gentlemen, I wish to speak to Mr. Mills alone," and when they went out he said to Mills: "Well, Mr. Mills, we have known each other a long time and have been friends a long time; I have come to tell you I am going to vote for you." Mr. Bland said: "We shook hands and Mills shed tears and I did too." But it was late; the silver men had become scattered and could not be gotten together. So Crisp was elected.

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During the year of the repeal of the Sherman act, at the close of the extra session, a motion was made to vote extra mileage. Mr. Bland took the floor and said he was opposed to democratic members going on record as voting and accepting extra mileage and that he, for one, would not accept it. The motion carried and Mr. Bland would not accept this



mileage although urged by myself and our daughter to do so. There was a question as to whether we could keep her in school longer. Our expenses being heavy and the fear of the defeat which followed overshadowed us all. He steadily refused and on our daughter's insisting and saying: "Oh, papa, take it, it would be enough to finish me at school," he spoke very slowly and said: "Would you have me do a thing that I do not consider honorable?" I well remember that one member from the Far West, who was a near neighbor of ours, accepted the extra mileage of about \$2,000 and never left the city. There was only about six weeks between this session and the regular session and but few members really went home.

. . . . .

In the spring of 1894, I think it was, when some silver measure was up and there was such a large democratic majority in the House, and members seemed indifferent and a full attendance could not be obtained, a resolution was introduced to dock each man his salary during the time he so absented himself (this was the spring of the Kansas City convention), but it seems this did not succeed since members behaved in bad faith and did accept their pay. At this time the New York and New England democrats walked out of the democratic caucus. Mr. Reed of Maine, and Mr. Tracy were working together and it was then that Pence made his speech saying "it is Tommy on this side and Tommy on that"—meaning Mr. Reed and Mr. Tracy. Mr. Bland had charge of the time and after spending several days and accomplishing nothing and becoming exasperated, he refused to allow them to adjourn for Washington's birthday, saying that "if they would not work, they must not play." Finally, several members, among the number General Sickles and some other New Yorker, were summoned before the bar of the House to be censured. They refused to come. Mr. Bland made a speech, in which, he called attention to all these facts and the fact that members would not vote. In concluding he said: "I

call the attention of the people of this country to the state of things existing here. Gentlemen are summoned before the bar of this House and refuse to come. I call attention to the fact that we are proceeding against law and order and gentlemen of this House are but little better than the anarchists who would throw a bomb from this gallery." Mr. Reed was very angry and said: "Yes, Bland would have someone throwing a bomb from the gallery at us." But after that they voted, for they saw that Mr. Bland had called attention to their being the cause of the delay in business. He became so worried over this that he could not sleep and he used to go to the House quite ill. I followed him there, watching from the gallery, expecting to see him carried out. One day after a number of roll calls, in which the democrats would fail to answer roll call and come in from the lobbies just too late to vote, Mr. Bland said: "I am disgusted; I have a mind to resign and go home."

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During the conference between the House and Senate on the Sherman bill, Mr. Bland was a member of that committee. In discussing that part of the bill referring to the paying out of silver or gold on demand, he said to Senator Stewart that that part of the bill was dangerous, since the secretary of the treasury would always construe it to mean gold. Senator Stewart thought not. Mr. Bland added that that part of the bill was put in by Mr. Sherman. He knew, he said, that nothing favoring silver would be put in by Sherman. Senator Stewart afterwards acknowledged that Mr. Bland was right, as the clause was construed to mean "gold."

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The spring Coxe was to come to Washington, the people of that city were much alarmed and even the officers of the government must have been frightened for a friend of ours who was employed in the treasury told Mr. Bland that the closets in that building had been stored with loaded guns

and other arms. Mr. Bland said: "What in the world are people afraid of? These men are a crowd of poor, poverty-stricken fellows who would not harm anyone." "Do you think so," she asked.

"I know so," said Mr. Bland. The lobbies here are filled with people when a public measure is up like the tariff or silver. Why not be afraid of them? They are well dressed and can go all over the capitol; but when a few poverty-stricken men come here to ask relief they are feared and a great noise is made. There is no harm in them."

Afterward, this friend said to Mr. Bland: "You were right, Mr. Bland, I feel very sorry for those poor men, half-clad and so miserable looking, many of them are but youths." The day Coxey had set to make his talk on the steps of the capitol, all Washington was out, and hundreds were walking and running on the grass and the police were not paying the slightest attention to them, but were excitedly talking in groups about what they were going to do if any of Coxey's men undertook to cross the grounds. We were standing on the front side of the capitol. Mr. Bland and I stood with other members and their families when Carl Brown undertook to cross a small reservation on the House side of the capitol, and the police ran at him striking him with their clubs. You could distinctly hear the blows. Mr. Bland said "What a shame! I believe they are killing him!" When the case came up in court Mr. Bland was summoned and gave his testimony which was not satisfactory. He was not questioned at length. He said afterwards that they did not want his testimony.

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During the spring of 1894, several hundred workingmen of Ouray, Colorado, each subscribing twenty-five cents had a set of souvenir table spoons made with Colorado scenery and the head of the Indian chief Ouray, on them. They were sent to Senators Wolcott and Teller to present to Mr. Bland. They were in a case with "R. P. Bland" on it and on the inside they were engraved "To the Hon. Richard P. Bland, Champion

of the People's Money, as a Slight Token of Regard from the People of Ouray, Col." Mr. Bland would not receive them, saying that his enemies were only watching to have an excuse to say that he was working for the mine owners. He felt badly to have to return them, saying he feared the people of Ouray would think that he suspected them wrongly; that they had taken of their small earnings to send the present and he regretted he could not accept it. He took the box back to Senators Wolcott and Teller. I told him I had a mind to slip up behind him and take them from him. Of course I wanted them, but no amount of persuasion could change him.

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Mr. Bland, after his defeat for Congress, and during the time he was out of office, made a lecture tour of Colorado. He was greatly aided by Messrs. Shafroth, Bell, Pence, and Frank Trumbull. He would never travel on a pass while in Congress, as he said he wished to be free to vote as his conscience dictated. But while on this trip he did accept passes and traveled through Colorado on them. He made or cleared about \$3,500 in lecturing which was a great help to him at this time. At Aspen he received his largest sum, \$700, while in Denver it was said he had the largest reception ever given in the state. This was held at the Brown Palace Hotel, one of the finest hotels in the world, and for about two hours a constant stream of people passed through to shake hands with him. Here he was presented with a beautiful silver plate by the Republican Ladies League, of Denver, by whom the reception was given. When Mr. Bland was in California and Nevada, he knew Mark Twain. He said Mr. Clemens was never happier than when telling stories in a crowded place. Once when Mr. Bland was sick, I got Mark Twain's book on "Roughing It," and read aloud from it. Mr. Bland enjoyed it very much. When I read to him about the stage robbers he said: "Why I defended that man and Mark has given him a name. His real name was Brown. I was out there so much earlier than Clemens," he added, "that if I had only saved

data it would have been valuable to me." He also knew the author of "Flush Times in Mississippi and Georgia," whom he first met in the west.

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Mr. Bland believed Mr. Cleveland would sign the seigniorage bill as it was not an extreme measure. The night after it was vetoed we both felt badly over it, and when it was time to go to bed, I said: "Mr. Bland, I hope you will sleep to-night and that you do not feel worse than I do." He smiled and said "he hoped not."

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During the time the seigniorage bill was before the president a delegation of men from New York were in Washington to lobby on the tariff bill. An eastern senator told Mr. Bland that one of these gentlemen had informed him that he had just called upon the president and that in conversation with him, he had said: "Well, Mr. President, of course you will veto the seigniorage bill!"

The president answered: "I do not know about that. I have had no petitions about the matter."

The gentleman said to Mr. Hill: "He will have plenty of petitions in the next twenty-four hours. I go by Baltimore and Philadelphia to-night and he will have enough." Mr. Hill said to Mr. Bland next morning: "Watch and see the petitions and telegrams come in." They did come and the president then said that owing to the poor construction of the bill and the petitions and telegrams from the business men of the country, he could not sign it.

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When the seigniorage bill had passed both houses and had gone to the president for his signature, Mr. Bland called upon him one day on other business, but said to the president: "Mr. President, I hope you will not think of that bill of mine for two weeks." Mr. Bland said the president re-

plied: "Well, Bland, you do give me more trouble than any other good man in the country.\*"

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When, in 1896, they were urging Mr. Bland to go to Kentucky and letters were being received by him signed by old acquaintances and friends asking him to come, he would not do so, saying that Senator Blackburn was a presidential candidate and that if he went to Kentucky it might obscure the issue of 16 to 1 coinage and cause "a contest over men."

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During the Chicago convention, the reporters in Lebanon wondered why Mr. Bland would not go into the "Bland Headquarters" in town. He did so for a single day, but he said he could have no privacy and that if he dropped a word it was misconstrued. The night after the adoption of the Chicago platform when the reporters came out about half past ten o'clock, he was somewhat annoyed. That night our twelve-year-old boy, Ewing, who had worked all day in the harvest field, went in with my father and sat up until news of adjournment came. Mr. Bland would not go in but said to me: "Let us get to bed early for we may be awakened in the night and have to get up, for I believe I will be nominated and they will come out here in numbers."

That night about eight o'clock, Dr. McCombs came out. Mr. Bland had sent me in for him telling me not to go directly to the doctor's office, but to walk around and slip up to the office and tell the doctor to wait until dark and come out. He told the doctor he was feeling very nervous and wanted something to "brace him up." The doctor said, "Do you think you will be nominated, Mr. Bland?" "Yes, I am sure of it," Mr. Bland said. "I do not want it but it seems to be coming my way."

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\*In a letter of 1900 to the editor of this work Mr. Cleveland said Mr. Bland troubled him so little about patronage that he had little opportunity to become well acquainted with him.



The doctor prescribed for him, but the afternoon Bryan was nominated Mr. Bland said: "I feel better than I have for three months." He picked up the bottles and emptying them out said: "I will not need medicine now and to-night I shall sleep all right."

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The night before the Chicago balloting we were talking and he said: "Well, if I am nominated I shall do my best to merit it, but I am not as strong as I once was and it seems strange and too bad that during all these years I could make my campaigns and get through all right, but that now when I could accomplish so much by lecturing and make a competency for myself and family in my declining years I have not the strength to do it." He had been urged to lecture and had been offered large sums to do so, but he said: "If I go I will have to neglect my own people. I am needed here in my own district and shall stay."

. . . . .

That afternoon when he returned from town and sat in the yard he and my father were talking and he said that under no condition would he be a candidate for vice-president. Later on, he sent two messages which my father says he read, saying not to let his name go up for vice-president.

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He knew nothing about their balloting for him for vice-president until the third ballot, I think it was, when they brought out the bulletin. He was very much disturbed. Sitting down he wrote out a telegram handing it to the messenger and saying: "Here, Arthur, get on your horse and run him to town or they will nominate me on the next ballot." Turning to me his eyes flashed and he said: "I would not have the nomination if they gave it to me sixteen times over. If they wanted me on that ticket why didn't they put me where I belonged."

. . . . .

That he did not want the nomination I am sure. On three occasions, I had to use all my efforts to keep him from making a public statement that he would not be a candidate and I know if he had not feared that such a statement would hurt the cause, he would have done so. He said to me that he would not mind losing his home (about all we had) so much or his life for his country, but that not being strong he might hamper his party; that if he lost a night's sleep from illness, the reporters would get hold of it and it would go out to the country that he was breaking down, etc.

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When we were on our way to the New York ratification meeting, we stopped at Alliance to wait for Mr. Bryan. The committee from Pittsburg, who came to our hotel in Alliance, took us up to Canton, suggesting that we go up and call upon Mr. McKinley. This we did. He seemed very glad to see Mr. Bland and came out to the sidewalk to meet us, saying: "Why, Bland, did you not let me know you were here? I should have sent down for you." After the address of the committee, he asked us in to see Mrs. McKinley and we had quite a conversation, he saying to Mrs. McKinley: "My dear, this is Mr. Bland whom Mr. Bryan defeated for the democratic nomination for president." Turning to Mr. Bland he said: "Bland, you should have been nominated; you were the logical candidate and the strongest man your party had."

"I am satisfied if my party is," replied Mr. Bland.

Mr. Bland has remarked to me that he led the fight against Mr. McKinley's famous tariff bill and that often he (McKinley) would come to him and say: "Now, Bland, don't make a fight on this schedule."

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Mr. Bland was very quiet and rarely expressed his feeling, but after Mr. Holman died and while we were house hunting, a certain house was

spoken of for rent. "I will not look at that one," he said; "I could not live there; there is where Holman died."

. . . . .

When the members were all back of the chairs in the House waiting to draw seats in December, 1897, he and Mr. Holman were standing together. Mr. Holman asked him for a chew of tobacco. Often during that session I saw him do the same thing, and a relative of mine said: "Look at the two old cronies chewing tobacco together."

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Mr. Bland often said that if it had not been for the financial question, and the unfortunate disagreement of the party, that Mr. Cleveland's two administrations would have gone down into history as having been the era of much good legislation; that many good bills were passed, but that the financial fight obscured everything else.

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Mr. Bland sent money back from California and Nevada to help educate his sister, Mrs. Tetley (Bettie Bland), and after returning from the west sent his younger half-sister, Mrs. Goodykoontz (Amanda Black), to school at Caledonia, bringing her from Kentucky.

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I do not know why Mr. Bland seemed to shun notoriety. Perhaps it was because he was left early without a father and mother and had no one to confide in or bring him out. He certainly appreciated a kindness and valued his political friends. Others had to do all the approaching and yet, how easily he was to approach when one knew just how to do it. I know I did not fully understand him until we had been married a long time.

. . . . .

Mr. Bland had a logical mind and he had the best judgment I ever knew. He would predict what the outcome of certain bills would be and this always came true. I always found myself in trouble if I went against his advice and always right when I followed it. He was not severe, but as he was older, I generally depended on his judgment.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

### THE FINAL WORD.

This Volume as a Prophecy of Progress.—Evolution a Slow Growth.—Intellectual Development Dependent on Moral.—The Sense of Justice Mr. Bland Represented.—No Justice Without Freedom, No Freedom Without Justice.—The Sympathy of Genius for Universal Aspiration.—Political Economy and the Law of Kindness.—The Greatest Development of Civilization Still in the Future.



SO FAR as this volume is inspired by the spirit which dominated Mr. Bland's work, it is a prophecy of progress. The great evolutionary forces which moved in him and through him as a representative American, are moving still. They will never go backwards. Progress is slow. It can come only as men make it possible by becoming fit for it. When we reach a certain plane of morals, certain things are within our intellectual grasp which were unimaginable on a lower plane. Mr. Bland's life and work, mean that progress is first of all moral—that when once such moral progress is developed, the methods by which it will express itself in constructive achievement in all its diverse forms, will suggest themselves at once to intellects fitted to understand the best possible method of applying them.

Personally, Mr. Bland was remarkable in the public life of his generation for the faculty on which civilization most depends—the sense of justice. Before everything else and above everything else he was “a just man” in the scriptural sense. This gave him the keenness of perception which belongs only to genius. Essentially he was a man of genius, with all the physical symptoms, the sensitiveness and suffering it entails. The spirit of human aspiration—the keen sympathy of genius for the universal suffering humanity undergoes in its upward struggle, moved strongly in him. It tortured him to action. He suffered much for others in attempt-

ing to do his work. He would have suffered more, however, in attempting to evade it. He was driven to it by a high knowledge of the realities of things, in the strength of which he saw increasing peace, increasing civilization, increasing comfort for the world, increasing usefulness for all men in it as possibilities only of increasing justice and of that liberty which, as it begins and ends in justice, is its necessary expression. "No freedom without justice, no justice without freedom"—this is the message of his life.

Back of statute law and the laws of political economy is the law of kindness and helpfulness—of the natural good in human nature. To find methods by which this may be developed; to make men freer that they may express what is good in them; to minimize coercion; to obstruct violence, to humanize government, to energize society with a spirit by grace of which each will desire to help others as much as possible rather than to take the utmost possible advantage of others—for this theory of government and of political economy Mr. Bland stood. It is not original. It is not new. It is the spirit of civilization itself and its greatest development is still in the future.



# SPEECHES





MR. BLAND AT FORTY-EIGHT.  
(From a Photograph in Mrs. Bland's Possession.)

THE NEW YORK  
PUBLIC LIBRARY

ASTOR LENOX  
TILDEN FOUNDATION

## SPEECHES FROM 1870 TO 1899.

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AS AN extemporaneous speaker on any topic which interested him, Mr. Bland has seldom been surpassed in effectiveness. His control of simple and strong English is so nearly complete that his ideas flow into words without attracting attention from his thought to the manner of its expression. The last speech he delivered in Congress—that on the Army Reorganization bill, in January, 1899, and his speech of August 12, 1893, are examples of his spontaneous power over words which can be appreciated at their full value only when they are compared with the plain English of the speeches of John Bright or with the plainer German of the great effort of Bismarck's life, the plea for imperial armament he made in the Reichstag, February 6, 1888. Mr. Bland is always careless of rhetoric and at times he is too loose in his syntax, but when the true perspective of the history made by his speeches appears it will be seen that he was a worthy coadjutor of plain John Bright and the forlorn hope of plain men who, after the Crimean war in Europe and the Civil war in America, held the breach for civilization against the militant commercialism which was seeking to dominate the world through the "Blood and Iron" methods of the mediaevalism for which Bismarck stood in Germany.

In their relation to American history the importance of Mr. Bland's speeches from 1872 to 1899 can hardly be overestimated. It is not too much to say that their meaning, as they represent the upward impulses of the people, must be clearly grasped before it is possible to have a definite appreciation of the meaning of the movement of the nineteenth century in America and Europe. They show the faculty in which perhaps Mr. Bland excelled every other public man in America during his generation—analyt-

ical power habitually used and capable of focusing on any given subject every other power of his mind. By virtue of this power and this habit, he grasped the permanent realities of great questions while others were dealing only with their transitory phenomena. It happened thus that while he was by nature gentle and unaggressive, unwilling to wound, reluctant to punish, and prone to pardon even unrepented injustice, he had a power to force issues which made his influence co-extensive with civilization. His speech "At the Parting of the Ways," on August 12, 1893, is superior in the quality of its thought as it is in manner to the most carefully prepared speech Thomas H. Benton ever delivered, while the only speech on an economic topic which in its effect on American history can be compared to it is that with which Benton opened the debate on the Foot resolution in 1830. Benton's speech in 1830 provoked the debate between Hayne and Webster, and its importance is thus not wholly intrinsic except as it represented the same idea which inspired Mr. Bland—the idea that the worst abuses of government are sectional or class laws enacted at the dictation of those who wish to take unfair advantage of the direct producer. The "Parting of the Ways" speech, which Mr. Bland rightly considered the most important speech of his public life, produced its great results through its own intrinsic force—a force with which Mr. Bland's mind had become electrically charged through his habitual sympathy with the industrious, virtuous and efficient workers of Missouri, of the west and south, of America and of the world. All the powers of his intellect, all the impulses of his life moved him to speak for a cause which he saw others deserting. The crude conceptions of eloquence which so many public men derive from the collection of hyperboles and climaxes in the "Complete Orators" of their debating society days, had no effect upon him. He spoke the English of everyday life with a true Attic plainness of phrase, and with a force above the utmost possibilities of rhetoric. "When public bodies are to be addressed on momentous occasions," says Daniel Webster, "when great interests are at stake and strong passions excited, nothing is



valuable in speech further than it is connected with high intellectual and moral endowments. Clearness, force, and earnestness are the qualities which produce conviction. True eloquence, indeed, does not consist in speech. It can not be brought from far. Labor and learning may toil for it; but they will toil in vain. Words and phrases may be marshaled in every way; but they can not compass it. It must exist in the man, in the subject, and in the occasion. Affected passion, intense expression, the pomp of declamation, all may aspire after it—they can not reach it. It comes, if it come at all, like the outbreking of a fountain from the earth, or the bursting forth of volcanic fires, with spontaneous, original, native force. The graces taught in the schools, the costly ornaments, and studied contrivances of speech, shock and disgust men when their own lives, and the fate of their wives, their children, and their country hang on the decision of the hour. Then, words have lost their power, rhetoric is vain, and all elaborate oratory contemptible. Even genius itself then feels rebuked and subdued as in the presence of higher qualities. Then patriotism is eloquent; then self-devotion is eloquent. The clear conception outrunning the deductions of logic,—the high purpose,—the firm resolve,—the dauntless spirit, speaking on the tongue, beaming from the eye, informing every feature, and urging the whole man onward, right onward to his object—this, this is eloquence; or, rather, it is something greater and higher than all eloquence,—it is action, noble, sublime, godlike action.”

Little in this eulogy of John Adams, speaking for the independence of America, need be changed to make the whole apply with full force to Bland as he rallied a retreating party back to standards which he believed with all the forces of his nature to represent the world's hope of justice and progress. It is not well to attribute too great excellence to any man, and it ought to be remembered when we see Mr. Bland mastering and compelling those who had underrated and depreciated him, that the power he exercised was essentially moral—a power which belongs to every virtuous and manly man in the full measure in which he is willing to exercise it. Asso-

ciating, by the necessity of public life, with that too large class in all parties who are demoralized and emasculated by the deceits of politics, Mr. Bland retained the virility, the manliness, which can come only from virtue. It happened thus, that when "silver tongued orators," made famous by intellectual and rhetorical assumptions of virtue, failed at the climaxes of their careers of false pretense and passed over to the left hand among the fruitless and useless of all generations, he stood "to give the world assurance of a man."

His speeches in congress cover a wide range of subjects, but in one way or another, they all deal with the fundamental causes of progress and reaction. Mr. Bland's mind was so constituted that he found it difficult to deal with any subject without analyzing it until he had mastered its governing principles. As a political economist and specialist he was a believer in progress through the evolutionary power of human nature controlling its environment in the measure of its own freedom to develop. Tracing the source of all wealth on earth to the earth itself, he habitually applied the tests of his principles to every question and so produced in the minds of the ignorant and the prejudiced the idea that he was a specialist whose habits of thought and expression were narrowed to the demands of a single subject. Of that charge, whether made openly by his opponents or insinuated by his political associates, he took no notice during his life, and he needs against it now no other defense than the speeches here presented. They show in their face that, while Thomas H. Benton is the only other Missourian who can compare with him, he is above Benton in power to give clear and definite concepts, a clear and unmistakable expression. Missouri produced during the nineteenth century many public men who belonged to American history, but among them Bland is the only one who belongs unmistakably to the history of civilization—to the world as it is now and still more to the world of justice and generosity, of kindness and goodness, of virtue and manliness that is to be when civilization has made real in trade and politics the fundamental law, that "Right Wrongs No Man."

## ENGLISH PLUTOCRACY AND THE LIBERTIES OF THE WORLD

(Mr. Bland's Last Speech in Congress, Delivered in the House of Representatives  
on the Army Reorganization Bill, January 30, 1899).

MR. CHAIRMAN: It seems that the whole country, the president, and the house are all drifting somewhere, and there is no power as yet to determine where we are going. We are passing a bill increasing the army to 100,000 men without any message from the president telling us for what purpose this army is to be used, nor can any gentleman on the other side inform as to the particular object of this army. We are either deceiving ourselves—and I speak more especially for my friends on the other side—or this is a deep-laid plot to deceive the people and the taxpayers of this country.

If we propose to give free government to Cuba, now is the best time to do it, before an organized system of plutocracy and trusts and combines have been permitted to loot them without their consent. If we intend to hold the Philippine Islands, if it is not the intent to deceive the people of this country, it ought to be avowed right here and now. We are legislating, sir, in the dark. We are told that it is the duty of this government to maintain law and order in the Philippine Islands because we have overthrown on those islands the Spanish government. I deny it. It is true we took the harbor of Manila and now have control of the city; but beyond that the American forces have never gone and American power has never been exercised.

If it is a duty of honor that we owe the foreigners residing in the city of Manila, then let us protect them there; and the city of Manila and the harbor of Manila are all that this country ever needs to protect or needs to occupy. Why not understand the policy that is to be pursued before we proceed to legislate with reference to it? We are not in honor bound to protect the property of the Philippine Islands or the people of those islands, either native or foreign residents, beyond that part that our army has occupied and occupies to-day; and if it is our policy only to perform that part of our duty, then this bill for 100,000 men is wholly and absolutely unnecessary.

But I fear, Mr. Chairman, that we have been led into this thing, not so

much, probably, by the will really of the administration uninfluenced, but somehow or in some way the idea has got control of this administration that we must hold the Philippine Islands for an ulterior purpose. We have been informed of a pressure on the part of Great Britain to induce this government to maintain its authority over the Philippine Islands for the purpose of prosecuting further conquest in Chinese waters and over the Chinese Empire. That is the secret reason of this bill; and yet, Mr. Chairman, the people of the country are not so informed, either by the president or the majority of this house.

The diplomacy of England has always been marvelous. Isolated as Great Britain is among the nations of Europe, with great colonial possessions in her charge, and yet greedily seeking to force her way into China in competition with all Europe, she finds that allies and friends are necessary to accomplish this object. She has sought by every means that diplomacy could devise to commit us to a policy that would bring about the necessity of cooperating with her in order to carry out her designs. If England can succeed in inducing the American government to hold the Philippine Islands at the point of bayonets (and we can hold them no other way), it is quite apparent that the friendship of England and her aid will be necessary to our success.

This is precisely what England wants. England wishes to place the United States in a position of dependency on her. We will then no longer be independent; will no longer have the position of absolute segregation from the broils of the Old World. Dependent upon England to hold Asiatic territory, we must of necessity aid her in her wars of conquest. It may be well to have the friendship of England; in fact, the friendship of all European countries; but it is far better not to need the friendship of any. The idea of a standing army of 100,000 men strikes the American people with horror. It forebodes plutocratic control by the use of the bayonet; it looks to a strong centralized power with an army at its back to subdue the people into silence and to plutocratic methods.

A conservative estimate places the cost of each soldier in our Army at \$1,000 per year in time of peace. At the lowest estimate that can be made with safety an army of 100,000 men will tax the people of this country \$100,000,000 annually. If this army must be utilized in the subjugation of the Philippine Islands, the cost of transportation and ammunition and disease and death, resulting in pensions, will, in all probability, tax the people of this country \$150,000,000 annually. We now pay out about \$150,000,-

000 annually for pensions, which is charged to the military establishment, and to add to it another \$150,000,000 would make a sum of \$300,000,000 a year spent as the result of war and the prosecution of war, as contemplated in this bill. The overtaxed and inhumanly burdened people would cry against it. This army, however, will be used to repress the efforts of the people to throw off their burdens and bring about reforms.

I can not but regard it as a deep-laid scheme to enslave the American people under the present domination of plutocracy. English influence has been thus far successfully exerted in fixing upon our people the English gold standard. The power of the Bank of England, the wealth of that country, over the banks and moneyed institutions of this country has brought to bear the combined power of the capitalists of England and America to control our financial system. The next move is to put our army and navy at the service of England in the prosecution of Asiatic conquest, the end of which no man can see. We have no use whatever for the Philippine Islands. To annex them is practically to abandon the Monroe doctrine.

Heretofore we have asserted our supremacy on the American continent; we have warned the world that we would not permit any aggression or conquest upon this continent. We have assumed to control this continent, so as to dedicate it as fast as possible to free government and human liberty. We now propose to abandon this position and start out upon a policy of conquest and aggression, and inflict upon the people of Asiatic countries a government not of their choice, but compel them to submit to whatever slavery we may see proper to inflict upon them. We not only abandon the idea of America for American institutions, but what is worse, we give the lie to the Declaration of Independence "that all just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed." Against this I protest, and shall vote against the bill. (Applause.)



## COLONIAL IMPERIALISM AND THE SPANISH WARS.

(Complete Text from the Official Report of the Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives, June 13, 1898, the House Having Under Consideration the Joint Resolution—H. Res. 259—to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.)

MR. SPEAKER: In entering upon a discussion of this important question at the present time, we should not forget the situation that confronts us. Whatever may be said with regard to the ultimate policy of this government toward the Hawaiian Islands or as to the importance of that people and that country in relation to our own, this is not the time to enter upon any final disposition of that question. We are now in the midst of a war, the prosecution of which was entered upon for a certain purpose.

The resolutions that passed this House and the other branch of Congress declaring war against Spain committed this government expressly to the sole policy of freedom, disclaiming any intention of an aggressive warfare. Cuba, almost a part of our own territory, the most important island south of us, would be, as a part of our own territory, a means of defense in time of war far more important than the Hawaiian Islands. Yet in order that the civilized world might know, as well as our own people, that we had entered upon this contest in the interest of humanity, in the interest of freedom, and not in a spirit of aggression, we declared that the sole purpose of this war was to relieve the starving and distressed people of Cuba and to extinguish the barbarity of Spanish rule in that island.

Our war resolutions explicitly stated that we entered on no war for conquest, and that we would not annex the Island of Cuba, but would give free government to her people. That was the declared purpose, and that only. For that purpose, and that purpose only, have we voted to supply the army and the navy of the United States. For that purpose, and that purpose only, have the American people sanctioned unanimously this war as being a holy war.

Why, sir, if it had been contended here when we were entering upon this contest that it was intended for aggression, for the seizure of the Hawaiian Islands, the maintenance of our sovereignty in the China Sea, that it was intended to make alliances with other great governments in



order to participate in the partition of China and to make aggressions in the Asiatic waters—meaning thereby not only \$500,000,000 of interest-bearing debt, but probably four times that amount, meaning thereby not only increased taxation upon the people of this country to the extent of \$150,000,000 annually for a temporary purpose, but a debt of at least \$2,000,000,000 increased taxation for a purpose without limit and without termination—I doubt if this House or the Senate would ever have made a declaration of war under such conditions. And, sir, to bring forward this policy now and to urge this measure as a war measure is simply to write on the statute books of this country a falsification of the very declarations that we made in going to war.

A war measure! There is no Spanish fleet threatening the Hawaiian Islands. No one pretends that the possession of those islands is necessary now as a defense of our coast. But, on the contrary, Mr. Speaker, we have assembled to-day at San Francisco a fleet ready to transport troops and supplies to the Philippine Islands; all of our war ships are practically leaving that coast and going to the defense of Dewey in the Philippine Islands because we need no defense on that coast.

If we had any use or shall have any need of a base for coal supplies and a harbor of refuge at Hawaii, we have all that now in the Sandwich Islands. By treaty we are in possession of Pearl Harbor, the only harbor on the Sandwich Islands that is suitable for this purpose. We have the sole sovereign control of this harbor, even to the exclusion of the government of Hawaii. We now own and control a naval station on these islands. We need nothing more. Even admitting that there is or should be a necessity for a coaling station there, we have that as completely and as effectually as we could have it by owning the islands.

Coal has never been found on the Hawaiian Islands, and a coaling station there must be supplied by transporting coal to the islands and storing it in our station there—a station that by treaty we have the exclusive right to fortify and hold against the world, and Pearl Harbor is the only place on the whole coast of Hawaii where such a station is at all feasible. No other nation can get such a station on these islands, for there is no other practicable harbor there to possess.

Why undertake to deceive ourselves or deceive the world by the hypocritical cry that Hawaii is necessary now as a war measure? No intelligent man believes such a statement.

No, sir, we started out protesting against the system of colonization.

We have from the beginning denounced the idea of colonization. We started out for the purpose of wresting one of Spain's colonies from her rule, because our Government is hostile to the idea of people being dominated as a colony. In vindication of our antagonism to colonization and our position in favor of freedom, our flag was to be planted by our army and navy upon the soil of Cuba. Now, on the contrary, that same flag—as a “war measure,” it is said—is to be taken and planted upon the Island of Hawaii without the consent of the people of that island. Such a policy is indefensible; and the plea which is put forward in excuse for it has no foundation in fact at the present time.

The gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Newlands), who addressed this House a short time ago, undertook to put himself right on this question by disclaiming any idea of pressing this policy of colonization into the China Seas or interfering with European complications. But he ought to know that this movement for the annexation of Hawaii is simply an entering wedge for such a policy. If not, Mr. Speaker, why can we not wait until this war is over and the people can take this question into consideration without reference to any of the complications existing at the present time?

The fact is, the government of Hawaii as now constituted—not the people of Hawaii—has been knocking for some years at our doors. During two administrations, or during a period beginning at the close of one administration and extending through the whole of another, that government has been presenting itself here. But up to this hour, Mr. Speaker, there has been a steady refusal on the part of the government of the United States to accept their treaty or their entreaties. In time of peace, when this question could be considered calmly and dispassionately, when no complications were involved, when no pressure could be made under militarism and military aggression, we have refused this offer.

But now, sir, taking advantage of a declaration of war, of a condition of hostilities with the bankrupt government of Spain, under that pressure and in violation of the spirit in which the war was entered upon, a policy of aggression and a policy of territorial acquisition is urged. It will not do, Mr. Speaker. This government, after having made its solemn declaration that this war was a war of humanity and for freedom, can not afford now to pervert it into a selfish policy of greed and oppression. It is dishonorable. It does not become a great nation like ours to perpetrate a deception upon its own people and upon others.

Now, Mr. Speaker, so far as the Philippine Islands are concerned, I do not believe there is a gentleman on either side of this House who is not more than willing and anxious to make complete and perfect the victory so gallantly won by Dewey, the most notable, probably, in the annals of naval warfare. We will not abandon the Philippine Islands until we get ready and in our own good time. But, sir, we do not need the Hawaiian Islands to hold the Philippines.

The Philippine Islands were a part of the territory of Spain. Dewey and his fleet being in Chinese waters, and having no other place where they could go for the purpose of inflicting a crushing defeat upon the enemy and securing a base of operations, went into the harbor and fought that battle and won that glorious victory. That was legitimate war upon the enemy against whom we had declared war, war in the interest of freedom, war in the very spirit of our resolutions. Being Spanish territory, legitimately acquired, we will hold these islands until this war is over, and that problem can then be solved.

Solved how? I may not stop here to argue that question, but there is only one true way to solve it. We can not sell the islands, because we have no right as a free people to undertake to sell a people or a part of a people we have conquered. They deserve the boon of liberty as much as do the people of Cuba; and if, in the providence of God, those islands are also freed and turned over to their own people for self-government as Cuba must be freed, it simply adds to our lustre and does not detract from it.

But we can not honorably do anything else with those islands. We can not profitably hold them permanently, because the holding of them would involve us in all the diplomatic relations with European and Asiatic politics, against which entanglements we have from the beginning protested.

So far as Puerto Rico is concerned, I believe that it is the duty of this government to drive Spain from that island and forever quit her dominion over it. Because we have begun a war against Spain, that is the government which it is proper to vanquish as far as possible in accomplishing our great purposes of liberty, and I say that the driving of the Spanish from the island of Puerto Rico is not only legitimate, but I believe it to be necessary for the peace and security of our country in the future.

Spain is a bad neighbor, but after we have extinguished the last authority of Spain in this hemisphere and practically established the Monroe

doctrine, shall we abandon that policy and start upon the Asiatic seas, among Asiatic populations, in countries devoted to Asiatic civilization, unnecessary in peace, wholly unnecessary in war, and perpetrate the wrongs that will be perpetrated by the passing of these resolutions?

Why, gentlemen tell us that the government of Hawaii favors this proposition. I use that word only as recognizing those having authority there—the representatives of a few thousand—probably three or four thousand among a hundred thousand—the white intelligent race ruling the Chinese, Japanese and Portuguese, as the intelligent white Caucasian race will rule the inferior race wherever they are brought together. You gentlemen on that side who have undertaken to make issues here against some of the southern states upon this proposition show where you stand to-day when you are willing to countenance the government of an island by a few white people at the expense of extreme domination over an inferior race. (Applause on the Democratic side.)

Hawaii is 2,500 miles from San Francisco, the nearest important port on our seacoast. Hawaii has a population of pure and mixed natives, 39,504; Chinese, 21,616; Portuguese, 15,291, or a total population of 101,818 that may be denominated as an inferior race. A large portion of this population we have by treaty and statute undertaken to exclude from our shores because they are undesirable.

There are British residents on the island, 2,250; Germans, 1,432; Americans, 3,080. Of the Caucasian race, which dominates and controls, there are only 6,762.

Under the constitution of Hawaii no one can vote without swearing to support that constitution, and it so happens that this constitution provides for annexing the island to the United States. This constitution was forced upon the people of the island by a handful of Americans, and has disfranchised all the inhabitants of the island who will not swear that they will vote to surrender their native land to another government before they are permitted to vote. This may be called a free ballot, but it has the appearance of a ballot offered to the voter in one hand with the condition of his voting that he surrender his birthright, and if he refuses this condition a sword is held in the other hand to strike down the ballot and to disfranchise the voter. It is a government thus organized that presents the treaty that we propose to accept by the resolutions pending before this House. I deny that the people of the island have been fairly consulted in this transaction. It is a scheme to force a robbery, pure and simple, that

we are called upon to sanction and enforce.

MR. TAWNEY: Will the gentleman allow an interruption?

MR. BLAND: I have but thirty minutes.

MR. TAWNEY: I simply desire to ask whether you know that the Senate of Hawaii which ratified the treaty is composed largely of native Hawaiians?

MR. BLAND: Oh, Mr. Speaker, I am not speaking of natives or foreigners. There are a few white natives. I am speaking of the population of that island, and especially the population to whom that island by nativity belongs. When the gentleman presses that question, it as an admission that he has disfranchised them by the wholesale, and the pretense that they are presenting this treaty here voluntarily is a fraud and a lie upon its face.

MR. TAWNEY: Do you not also know—

THE SPEAKER *pro tempore*: Does the gentleman from Missouri yield to the gentleman from Minnesota?

MR. BLAND: I can not yield any further. I have not the time. The gentleman can speak in his own time.

MR. TAWNEY: I simply wanted to call your attention to the fact—

MR. BLAND: I do not want to be discourteous to the gentleman, but I have only thirty minutes.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I am not here to denounce the American people upon that island for their Americanism. I am here, so far as justice and right will permit it, to uphold them and to turn to them our support for whatever sympathy they have given us in this struggle. If they have violated any of the principles of neutrality, if they have subjected themselves to any claim of damages from Spain, this great government of ours stands ready to foot the bill four times over, if necessary.

When we come to treat with Spain we may have a much larger bill of damages than Spain can possibly present to Hawaii. Gentlemen know, and the ruling powers in Hawaii know, that they are perfectly safe in any favors they give to this great government. Not only that, but they know that in the future, as well as in the past, this government intends that no hostile power shall ever dominate those islands.

That has been our pledge and our policy from the beginning. The resolutions to be offered by us as a substitute for annexation provides that we shall forever guarantee independence to the Sandwich Islands. This is a mere pretext thrown in here under the war spirit to perpetrate



upon the people of this country what I conceive to be a wrong; not so much now in the acquisition of Hawaii as in what it looks to in the future for the acquisition of territory beyond.

Why, they tell us that the acquisition of territory is nothing new. That is very true. The policy of our government heretofore, and its practice, has been to admit territory that was contiguous, until we have become a homogeneous people. All of our territory, except that which we acquired from Russia, is connected by land and subject to defense. The great land power of the world to-day is this country. The next great land power is Russia. No government since 1812 has ever attempted to invade the United States of America.

No one has ever attempted to invade Russia since the disaster that overtook Napoleon in his retreat from Moscow. Here we are pursuing a policy of our own under the teachings of our fathers to abstain from all trans-Atlantic aggressions, complications, or alliances, building up for ourselves a compact territory, as far as honor will permit, remaining at peace with all the world, and we have grown up to be the most powerful nation in the world by pursuing this policy.

To-day we are at war with Spain. And what has been the policy of Spain? Precisely the policy that we, by these resolutions, are invited to enter upon. But a short time ago in modern history Spain was the most powerful nation, probably, on earth. She had her colonies in every land and fronting on every sea. In Europe was her great kingdom and its dependencies. The whole of South America practically was hers, and part of our own North America was under her flag.

These colonies and the support of them have brought Spain to ruin and bankruptcy. She is unable longer to continue that policy. The last of her colonies upon this continent are about to be taken from her, and nearly all upon the other. This is the policy which has brought ruin and disaster to her, so that she is hardly a respectable enemy in a conflict with a nation that has pursued the opposite policy, that has eschewed colonization and eschewed the idea that we must go over the world in order to map out colonies here and there as a place for American settlement and on which to plant the American flag, and by which we will be involved in large expense in order to maintain and defend them.

Here is the contrast of the two nations to-day. Let us not depart from our policy. This is a departure, and a dangerous departure.

Some one asked the question a while ago how these islands would be



governed if we acquired them. It could not be answered. No gentleman has undertaken to answer that question. It is left, I suppose, for the future consideration of Congress.

Suppose you had that question here now, as you will have it if you annex them. How are you going to govern them? Is it to free a people? No. You know you do not intend to do it. Do you intend to give the ballot to the people of Hawaii? You know you do not, although the constitution declares that everyone born in the United States shall have the right to vote, that he is a citizen, at least, and shall not be disfranchised on account of race or previous condition.

Now, the question arises, When it becomes a part of the territory of the United States, and there are those born on that territory, what are you going to do with them? Are they citizens or not?

MR. LANHAM: If the gentleman will permit me to interrupt him, would they not be subject to taxation if annexed to the United States? And if so, would they not logically be entitled to representation?

MR. BLAND: Well, I think as a matter of course, if we are to annex the Hawaiian Islands, and they are to be governed as citizens of the United States, we are bound to permit them to exercise all the rights of citizenship and the right of the ballot; because we have no right to tax them without representation.

The Constitution of the United States provides that every person born in the United States is a citizen thereof. It also provides that no citizen of the United States shall be disfranchised on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. An important question in this connection arises here. There are 39,504 natives on the island, nearly all of whom are of the inferior race. There are only 3,000 Americans. When Hawaii becomes a part of the territory of the United States what shall be said as to the legal status of these 39,000 natives? May they not claim the right of native citizenship, because the territory would then be a part of the United States? They would also be natives of that part of the United States.

It is true that at the date of their birth they were not natives of the United States, but so soon as the territory becomes a part of the United States they would claim and reasonably insist that they are natives of this country. They would insist that the Constitution did not intend to confine nativity to the territory belonging to the United States at the time of the adoption of this amendment to the Constitution of the United States, but

that it necessarily includes whatever territory might at any time come within the jurisdiction of the Constitution.

Also, what will be the status of the children born of Chinese, Japanese, and Portuguese parentage? In other words, will not the native inferior race under the Constitution become voters so soon as the territory is admitted, and will not this fact place the whole government in the hands of the inferior race beyond hope of redemption? Will such a population add to the glory and security of our institutions, or will not the superior race find some pretext to disfranchise the inferiors after they have been admitted, since we know they did that in order to form a treaty of admission?

MR. SMITH, of Arizona: Do not we do it in the territories of the United States?

MR. BLAND: But my friend must remember that in all the admissions of territory and annexation of territories, most of which was done by the policy of Jefferson and his democratic confederates, it had been territory the climatic conditions of which was admissible for the Caucasian race, admitted for the very purpose of settlement by our own people and our own race, and all these admissions of territory of suitable climate and soil, and being contiguous, it was a fit home for the American citizen; and so it is with your territory, and if you are not admitted as a state it is not because you are Chinese or Japanese, but because you produce silver. That is your crime.

But I say the same government would practically be introduced in Hawaii as is there now—a government that you on the other side of this House have denounced upon this floor. That is one where the intelligence and the property-holding element control. And they will find a way to control in that island as they have everywhere. But do you want any more such territories? Have we not enough now of race prejudice and race conflict in this country? This race question is not settled here, Mr. Speaker. It is one of the most perplexing problems in the future of this government to settle, and the more perplexities you add to it the more difficult and the more dangerous it becomes.

But, Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasing thing to jingoism, the idea of planting upon the seas war stations for the American flag! They believe that it is great and glorious; but it may end in a denial of suffrage to the people you acquire, to place them under the control of military governors and improvised congressional legislation.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I have said that the future of Hawaii is somewhat



MR. BLAND ON HIS FARM.



perplexing. Of course we all understand that. We do not propose that they shall fall into the hands of another government hostile to ours. It is not necessary to annex them in order to carry out that policy. It is understood now. There is no danger of it.

The prime movers for the annexation of Hawaii boldly assert on this floor, and we find it everywhere in the plutocratic press of the country, that Hawaii is necessary to us in our new policy. This new policy is defined as being the permanent occupation of the Philippine Islands, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and whatever other territory we may conquer during this war, and more still, they tell us that we must make alliances with England and Japan, if not openly, then secretly, to the end that we may participate in carving up and parceling out the Chinese Empire.

They tell us that this must be done in order to push our trade in the Orient. We are to be brought immediately into conflict with France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and Austria, in these enterprises. We are solaced with the assurances that there are no dangers of war. We are told that even if war should come, that the United States, England, and Japan could hold their own against the world. This is called our new destiny. Every intelligent man knows that all the nations that I have named are armed to the teeth. They present a military camp and they have immense navies. The laboring and producing people of these countries have been taxed in order to keep up these military establishments until they are mere slaves to plutocratic power as represented in militarism. Millions of them have come to our shores because we were exempt from the necessities of military rule.

They love our country because they find freedom here from the enormous burdens and the degrading tyranny of the governments of the Old World. Shall we enter upon a policy that requires immense navies and standing armies and that involves the enormous taxation necessary to maintain them? If we are to prosecute this war for such purposes it will be a source of disappointment to the people who entered upon it in the interest of freedom and not of slavery. Such a policy as this is intended and is urged by its promoters for the purpose of building up in this country a centralized power of wealth with big standing armies and navies to protect this plutocratic control. When our people complain, as the taxpayers will complain, of the burdens thus imposed upon them, plutocracy expects to be able with military power to answer their petition, if necessary, with an array of bayonets.

THE SPEAKER, *pro tempore*: The time of the gentleman has expired.

MR. BLAND: I would like about five minutes more.

MR. DINSMORE: I yield five minutes to the gentleman.

MR. BLAND: And that is where this will lead to. That is why I object to it at this time. It is because the promoters of the annexation of Hawaii foreshadow a policy such as I have alluded to that I most strenuously object to the admission at this time.

I would oppose the annexation of Hawaii under any circumstances, but to annex Hawaii with the avowed purpose of using Hawaii as a precedent, and also as an aid to the acquisition and permanent occupation of colonies everywhere and for the purpose of entering upon schemes of imperialism, meets my earnest and emphatic protest.

You are simply on the road to despotism in this country in trying to free the little Island of Cuba. You are on the road to imperialism, with a large navy and standing armies and oppressive taxation, oppressing labor by putting it down by the military, and adopting a military government instead of republican institutions and constitutional liberty. That is involved in this very discussion.

You may go on for a while under the military spirit and excitement of war, but the day will come for reckoning when your bills are to be footed, when your taxes are to be paid, when bond after bond is to be issued, and when the starving labor begins to "cry 'Peace,' when there is no peace." Your day of reckoning will come, and I call a halt now, for now is the time.

Some gentlemen have spoken to me about leprosy and lepers. Why, Mr. Speaker, I have not time to go into all these questions. No intelligent man here can be deceived as to the population of the Hawaiian Islands. Any intelligent man here knows that they are not our equals in any sense of the word. They do not comprehend our system of government. They are wholly incapable of understanding it. Yet they are entitled to freedom.

It does not matter whether they can govern themselves as well as we can or not. They are entitled to try the experiment of self-government. It belongs to them, or else the Declaration of Independence is a lie in itself. And so it is with Cuba, so it is with Puerto Rico, so it is with the Philippine Islands. We can do no more than to turn over whatever territory comes under our jurisdiction to their people, free to do with it as they please. And if in the providence of God they are capable of self-govern-



ment, they will succeed. Above all, our consciences will be free and our liberties not endangered. (Applause.)

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### IN FAVOR OF LIBERTY FOR ALL MEN.

(Peroration of a Fourth of July Address, Delivered at Lebanon, Missouri, in 1873).

Nearly forty millions of Americans rejoice in the blessings of liberty, purchased by the blood of the truest and the bravest people the sun in Heaven ever beheld. Shall we to-day make new resolves to be worthy of this? Shall we form an enduring link in the chain of our country's history? To us is committed for a short time this priceless heritage. By the memories of the past, by the weighty responsibilities of the present, and all that we hold dear on earth in the future, let us be encouraged to act well our part. No republican government can stand unless the people are educated, morally and intellectually. Upon the virtue and intelligence of the American people depends the last hope of man for self-government. So long as the masses are uncorrupted, there is no danger; for if their servants should prove unworthy, they can easily be displaced. It was not until the people of Rome became money-worshipping and corrupt that Caesar dared cross the Rubicon, and cast the die of his country's liberties in the fortunes of civil war. May the guidance of Heaven shield us from such a fate, or from that of Greece as Byron sings it:

"Twere long to tell and sad to trace  
Each step from splendor to disgrace!  
Enough! No foreign foe could quell  
Thy soul till from itself it fell!  
Yes, self-abasement paved the way  
To villain bonds and despot sway!"

Long, long may our banner float aloft on every sea as the emblem of freedom; and as the stars of Heaven soften with their silver rays the darkness of night's solitude and gloom, speaking in all tongues to admonish the nations that there is a God who rules the Universe with exact justice, so let each star in our flag, moving undimmed and unfettered in its proper orbit, symbolize as that flag waves in every clime, that here under its ample folds, liberty and justice are guaranteed to all; "Whether they be red, black, white, olive, or tawny-colored."

## "THE PARTING OF THE WAYS."

(Delivered in the House of Representatives Saturday, August 12, 1893, in Protest Against the Bill—H. R. 1—to Repeal a Part of an Act Approved July 4, 1890. entitled "An Act Directing the Purchase of Silver Bullion and the Issue of Treasury Notes Thereon and for Other Purposes.")

MR. SPEAKER: I regret to be called upon to discuss this question without previous preparation, when we have just reached an agreement to take it up. I further regret that any gentleman on our side of the House should see proper to read in this presence one part of our platform and to retreat from that part, above all others, which contributed to the vote that gave him a seat in this House. I regret that any western man should turn his face toward the east and his back to the west.

We understood, Mr. Speaker, what that platform meant. The whole democratic party voted against the Sherman bill, and so far as I am personally concerned, I did what little my ability permitted me to do to prevent its passage in this house; but the so-called Sherman law passed, and a better law having been repealed by its passage, it is now the only law on the statute books looking to the use of silver as money in this country.

I know, Mr. Speaker, that the gold-standard elements, the very elements that are in opposition to the free coinage of silver, secured the passage of that act. I knew they would demand its repeal the moment they saw the opportunity. A promise to repeal that act was put in the platform at Chicago, I suppose, to satisfy that element of the democratic party that wants no law upon the statute book for the coinage of silver. But following that, and in the same paragraph, a part and parcel of it at least, was the promise made at Chicago by the democratic party for the use of both gold and silver as money in this country, with equal privileges at the mints of our government. And speaking for myself and for the people whom I have the honor to represent, they understood at least, that the free coinage of silver, in accordance with our platform, necessarily repealed the Sherman law; and it would. (Applause.)

The two laws can not exist together. They are inconsistent, and that part of the platform that pledged us to the free coinage of silver necessarily meant the repeal of the Sherman law by a free coinage bill.

I want, Mr. Speaker, to call attention to this phase of the situation. We have here different propositions that will be voted upon, submitted in

pursuance of the Chicago platform, if you please to call it so. Gentlemen may choose their ratio. They have an opportunity at least to express their own opinions by their votes in this House and by their speeches, and to state what they mean by the free coinage of silver and the Chicago platform.

It is not my privilege nor my purpose to call in question the sincerity of any member upon this floor or to undertake to criticise his attitude; but I do want to call attention to the fact that we are proposing, as I consider it, to try in good faith to conform ourselves to the platform on which we were elected in legislating upon this question.

Why, it is said we have met here under peculiar circumstances, in the midst of a financial crisis. We are asked by the opposite side to legislate in haste. We are asked to forego a part of our duties. We are asked to legislate by piecemeal, and to take our chances in the future.

I want to say, Mr. Speaker, that the great voting masses of the people of this country may get into a panic themselves when election day comes around. The people will not regard our proceedings in the light that gentlemen wish them to view those proceedings. You may proceed in a panic, you may believe that some legislative act is necessary here to stop a panic, and you may vote for it without due consideration; but every vote cast and every word uttered will be reviewed by our constituencies, not in a panic, but in cool deliberation, and you will be held accountable for what you do, whether you deliberate or not.

It is said that history repeats itself, and it seems that the democratic party is especially the victim of repeating history in some way. When a people intrusted our party in 1884 with the administration of the government, when the democratic House of Representatives was chosen, I remember full well, and I see around me gentlemen who remember it as I do, for they were here at that time, that before the inauguration of the president of the United States whom we had elected, the emissaries of Wall street swarmed the lobbies of the House and this Capitol, just as they did last winter, demanding what? Demanding the repeal of the so-called Bland act.

Precisely the same proceedings that we had here last winter. We were told that it was the wish of the executive-elect that that act be repealed, as we were told last winter. We were told that it was his opinion and the opinion of his advisers that this country was coming then to the single silver standard if we did not repeal that law. We were threatened

with a panic, with gold coming to a premium. That House was forced to a vote upon that subject before we adjourned at that time, as we were practically last winter; but it voted the proposition down by a tremendous majority. During the following summer the New York papers, as they have been this summer, were filled with predictions of gold premiums and panics.

The New York *Herald*, one of their leading papers, had every day in its columns, "We are still coining the 70 and 75 cent dollars" as a standing advertisement of a panic.

Some time in September or October, before the meeting of Congress, these generous bankers in New York, who say that they control the finances of this country, and what they demand must be acceded, made arrangement with the then Secretary of the Treasury by which they were to withdraw \$10,000,000 of subsidiary silver coin and to place in the Treasury of the United States \$10,000,000 of gold, in order to secure and maintain gold payments, advertising to all the country that the bankers of New York had come to the relief of the Federal treasury with \$10,000,000 of gold to maintain the public credit.

It was done, Mr. Speaker, to terrorize the people of this country and, if possible, to bring about a panic such as you have to-day, and they know it. And we met in something of a financial panic; not so severe as it is now, however. The whole country was stirred on the silver question. We met in Congress and the question was debated. The result of it all was the refusal to repeal the silver law by over a two-thirds vote of that House; and the panic vanished. That was the end of it. When they ascertained that the free people of this country, through their representatives, could not be driven as a herd of buffaloes on the western plains into a panic, to trample themselves and those depending upon them, they ceased.

The howl against silver and the panic stopped. The country continued in its usual prosperity, whatever that may be. We kept on coining these 70-cent dollars and no disturbance was made of it, practically, for four years. The democratic party in the House maintained it against all assaults. But when, unfortunately, our friends on the other side got the power they enacted another law, repealing the law of 1878.

That law, Mr. Speaker, The Sherman law, I denounced in an article in the *North American Review*, about two months after it was enacted, as a "Janus-faced" statute. A law that provided for the purchase of

4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion per month on which treasury notes should be issued at the market rate of the purchases; that these notes should not be kept in circulation in excess of the cost price of the bullion; that the bullion was to be coined for the redemption of the notes, and that it further provided that in the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury the notes should be redeemed in gold, in order to keep a parity between the two metals.

The face of the gold part of it was turned to the east—the gold standard; the other part, to redeem in silver, looked to the west; and if the statute had included with purchase of bullion and coining it into money, the redemption of the notes in the resulting coin, it would in some respects, at least, be in harmony with the idea of ultimate bimetallism. But I predicted in that article, with the administration then in power, the purchase of silver would probably go on and the law be executed until after the next presidential election, and if an administration hostile to silver was elected, gentlemen who gave it their support would be very sick of their bargain.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I have no defense to make of that law, further than this: We are told by the Herschell committee that investigated the subject of suspending the coinage in India that the repeal of this act, the so-called Sherman act, would cause a heavy decline in the price of that metal. I will send to the clerk's desk and have read the portion of that report I have marked.

The clerk read as follows:

Moreover a strong agitation exists in the United States with respect to the law now in force providing for the purchase of silver. Fears have been and are entertained that there may come to be a premium on gold, and strong pressure has been brought to bear upon the government of that country with a view to bring about an alteration of that law.

In December last a bill was introduced in the Senate to repeal the Sherman act, and another to suspend the purchase, under it. Whether any such measure will pass into law it is impossible to foretell, but it must be regarded as possible; and although in the light of past experience predictions on such a subject must be made with caution, it is certainly probable that the repeal of the Sherman act would be followed with a heavy fall in the price of silver.

MR. BLAND: Mr. Speaker, there is another portion of that report that I will not have read at present, but it is to the same effect. It predicts a fall in the price of silver when we repeal the Sherman act of probably six pence per ounce, and it is said, sir, that it was the apprehension that the Government of the United States would suspend the coinage of silver, would repeal the law, that induced the British Parliament to recommend



to the government of India the suspension of the coinage of silver at the mints of India. We understand that India, while it is said to have a government of its own, is simply governed by a council of Englishmen appointed for that purpose. I said the British Parliament, Mr. Speaker, but I made a mistake. The British Parliament had nothing to do with this measure, and they are even now beginning to criticise it. It was the British council for India.

Now, sir, we are asked here deliberately to repeal this law, and I want to call the attention of my friends on this side of the House, who proclaim themselves to be friends of free coinage at a reasonable ratio—I want to call their attention to this point and to ask them this question: Why do you gentlemen insist that you will repeal this law and send silver down probably fifteen cents an ounce before you fix the ratio? Is that an act friendly to silver? Can any gentleman here face his free coinage constituency and defend his vote subtracting from the value of silver fifteen cents an ounce before he votes to fix the ratio? I dare him to undertake it. He can not do it.

It may be convenient to follow the recommendations of the president, but the president does not elect the members of this house. We do not hold our commissions from the executive, and I am afraid that if some of us undertake to act here upon that line, when our present commissions expire, we shall have all the leisure that we want to study the silver question in peace and quietness at home. (Laughter.) For myself I feel it to be a conscientious duty to carry out my convictions on this subject, and I owe it to my constituents to represent what I believe to be their interests. Why are we rushed in here and asked to repeal the only law that sustains, for the moment, at least, the value of silver, before we fix the ratio?

There is no consistency in it; none whatever. The claim is not sincere that the president expects hereafter to recommend bimetallism, for he does not do it in his message, and that claim misrepresents his position. He recommends the reverse. The concluding paragraph of the message means, if it means anything, that after you shall have totally demonetized silver by repealing this Sherman act, you will be required to go further in the same direction; and I make a prediction here and now, and my friends, I want you to watch the proceedings of Congress in these coming weeks of this extra session, or of the next regular session, to see whether I am right or not.

My prediction is that in order to carry out the recommendations of



that message we shall be called upon to sell bonds to procure gold. For what? To redeem all our pecuniary obligations, according to the very language of that message in that money which is recognized by the principal nations of the world. Why did not the president say "gold?" (Laughter.) We know what his language means. (Laughter.) You are asked to load up the Federal Treasury with gold, to redeem every pecuniary obligation of the government with gold, although the standard silver dollar is the identical dollar on which bond obligations were based when they were issued, because they called for coin of the standard value at the time of their issue, and that was the standard.

But now, I repeat, we shall have to redeem all this bullion, all these Sherman notes, in gold; we shall have to sell bonds to get gold to redeem all our greenbacks, all our silver certificates, and we will be compelled to carry our silver dollars as so much dead weight of bullion in the treasury, so that we might as well dump them into the Potomac. That is what all this means. In other words, every piece of paper money issued in this country to-day, every silver certificate, every greenback, every bond, every Sherman note, is to be redeemed in gold, and we must procure the gold for their redemption.

What, then, are you to do with your silver bullion, and with all your silver dollars, together about \$500,000,000? They are to be demonetized as a base metal, and you know it. I am talking to intelligent gentlemen who have read that message, and there is not an intelligent gentleman here who has read it who can misunderstand it. Why should you go on, then, to try to deceive yourselves and your constituents on this subject? There is no silver in that message, and gentlemen on the other side will simply do themselves and the subject justice if, hereafter, in the course of their debate, they will leave silver out of it, because they are proposing a measure in which there is no consideration whatever for silver.

Mr. Speaker, it may be necessary, and probably is, that I go somewhat into the discussion of the silver question on its merits. I have alluded to these preliminary matters which have been thrown in, and have tried to state that no legislation which we can enact here is going to relieve the panic. This panic has been brought about for the express purpose of repealing this law; there is no question about that. We were threatened last winter with a gold premium. I stated then on this floor, and I state now, that there is no gold premium.

On the contrary I believe the people are now paying a premium for

silver and silver certificates. We were urged that we must issue more bonds, that if we did not we were to have a panic. All the newspapers of the east especially were advertising a panic if we did not issue bonds. We did not issue them. The Secretary of the Treasury was threatened with a panic if he did not comply with the demand, and he refused. Those who were interested in getting up this panic began to refuse loans, to cramp, to draw in currency. Many of the banks which had been engaged in booming real estate, or in other questionable transactions, and were consequently weak, began to fail.

Stocks, called industrial stocks, that had been watered in Wall street, cordage trusts, lead trusts, whisky trusts, railroad stocks that had been watered, began to tumble down to something like reasonable rates, and you had a panic. Banks which were weak began to fail, and the people began a run on banks which were strong. The whole country became alarmed. People began to take their money out of the banks and put it into safe-deposit vaults or into their safes at home. It is said they ought to let their money remain in the banks. Well, probably they ought to do so; but what is the difference? The banks are afraid to let the money go out if they have it. Now, the panic has come; and those who conspired to bring it about have got more than they bargained for. The idea is that we can relieve this panic by the repeal of the Sherman law.

Why, Mr. Speaker, I say right here (and history will bear me out in the statement) that while there was some alarm in the country before, yet the moment the British government demonetized silver in India, then the panic began in earnest—not before; that precipitated this panic in its present shape. We all understand that. In this way desolation was brought into many of the states of this Union, and men who had before been prosperous and happy were by the thousands sent as tramps throughout the land.

All parts of the country have felt the effects. It is this fight upon silver that has precipitated this panic; and the repeal of the Sherman law will only intensify it, not relieve it. The panic will be relieved when everything gets so low that people see they can make money by buying; when they begin to buy prices will go up; and when everybody is buying money will come from its hoarding places and you will have some relief. In no other way will relief come.

Gold is coming to us to-day. Notwithstanding we are told the people across the water are afraid to invest here for fear that we will not pay

in gold, yet these people are sustaining prices to-day and sending here all the money that they can spare. There was a panic in gold-using Australia that has bankrupted that whole people and sent terror to the banks all over England. We know that gold can not be obtained there except by paying for it; yet it is coming here.

Talk about a premium on gold; here is the treasury of the United States that is open to the plunder of every speculator of the civilized world. He can take his Sherman note or his greenback or any other government currency there and get gold without cost. Did you ever notice the names of these gentlemen in New York who are shipping gold abroad, or bringing it back? Every one of those names that I have seen has a foreign termination; every one of those gentlemen, so far as I am advised, is an agent or branch bank of some bank across the water.

If you go to the bank of England to get gold for export you must pay a premium on it; if you go to the bank of France to get gold for export you must pay a premium on it. The case is the same with every other banking house in Europe; no gold can be obtained there without paying a premium. But here is the treasury of the United States professing to be so helpless that it can not prevent every gold speculator from robbing the government of its gold. Our treasury will not pay out the silver which it might pay.

The Bank of France will pay out silver, or will charge a premium on gold if it is wanted for anything but domestic use. But the treasury of the United States, instead of paying out gold and silver in equal quantities and thus preventing its gold (if it is necessary to preserve it, though I see no necessity of preserving it, for all our money is at a premium to-day), lets everybody go there and get as much gold as he pleases. Why not pay out the silver when we have more of it than we have of gold, or pay out gold when we have more of it than of silver, and thus protect ourselves?

It is because the administration is hostile to silver; and thus it is surrendering this country to the Shylocks of the Old World who have made war upon it. The aristocracy of western Europe has absolutely tabooed silver in those countries; driven it away from there. Here it finds its only resting place. The last fight for the white metal is to be made here in this country and in this house, my friends. Will you stand by it now, or will you let the Shylocks come and have their way? It is for you to determine.

I think, Mr. Speaker, that we can trust the people of this country on a question of importance as vital as this. The question is now before us. This is its last resort. Will you virtually demonetize the money of nearly

70,000,000 of people, with a vast empire of 3,000,000 of square miles, a people thirsting for money to open up new railroads, to establish new factories, to operate new places of business, to inaugurate new industries; 70,000,000 of people demanding money, twice what we have to-day, a new people, a new country, a free people, or they ought to be free whether they are or not?

Are you to give up the fight and let this vast body of our wealth go to ruin? I do not believe it. We know well enough that if we repeal this law and give nothing for it, the people of this country will regard it as a total demonetization of silver, which it will be so far as this Congress is concerned, without any question.

Now, my friends—and I do not care whether you are democrats or republicans, or who you are. I appeal to you, especially as democrats—when in 1890 in nearly every state of this Union the democratic party in its platforms demanded free and unlimited coinage of silver, when you embodied it in your great Chicago national platform, when the democratic party has for years stood before the House and the country as the bulwark in defense of the white metal, in the face of all these things are you now to desert the cause and surrender the fight? Can you afford to do it? Will you go to your people and tell them that you are not able to carry out the pledges of your platform, the promises upon which you were sent here, or any part of it, except that which resulted in the total demonetization of silver and the sacrifice of their interests?

What does free coinage of silver mean? It means that the holders of silver bullion, at some ratio to be fixed in the bill, may go to the mints of the government and have it struck into the legal-tender money of the country and deposit the dollars so coined, if the holder so desires, and have a certificate issued to him in place of it. What is the effect of unlimited coinage of silver in this country, and I invite your attention to this particularly, because it is a question of vital importance? It means that the silver coins of the United States at whatever ratio fixed—and I want the present ratio that we have now, 16 to 1, maintained precisely as it is—it means that the silver of the world can come here in exchange for what we have to sell.

Yes, it means that the silver of the whole world can come here. But they say that we will be flooded with the world's silver, that it will be dumped down upon us. Now, let us see about that for a moment. It means that anyone with sixteen ounces of silver can come here from any part of the

world, or with one ounce of gold, and he can buy your grain, he can buy your house and lot, he can buy your manufactured product, and buy the property and commodities of all sorts that you have to sell with either the one or the other; that is to say, he can buy just as much with his sixteen ounces of silver as with his one ounce of gold.

With the billions upon billions of property existing in this country to-day, and being produced in this country every year, we simply offer to exchange that which we have in abundance on a basis of one pound of gold as the equivalent of sixteen pounds of silver. We invite, then, the world to come with its silver and make the exchange. No nation now, it is true, offers in exchange for silver the gold at any fixed ratio; consequently all the silver that is coined is used in the countries where it is coined. And why? Because no great power offers to exchange commodities for one metal or the other at any fixed ratio. That is the trouble with silver to-day.

Now, it must be remembered that France gave an example to the world in this regard, having kept its silver on a parity with gold for a period of seventy years on a ratio of 16 1-2 to 1. It said to the nations of the world, "Come with your gold and your silver, fifteen and one-half ounces of silver or one of gold, and you can buy all of our salable property in France and you can pay us in silver or in gold, just as you choose, on that basis." And according to the report of the British royal commission of 1888 on that subject, France was enabled to maintain the parity of the two metals at that ratio for the reason that she had property enough to effect exchanges on that basis. We are in the same condition.

What is it then that you are asked to do? It is that we, the government of the United States, we as a people, say to all the world, especially to the silver-using people, all of the Asiatic nations and the Great Indies, come here with your white metal if you choose to come, and trade with us on the basis of 16 to 1 and buy your commodities from us at that ratio. When you do that, will not the silver-using people of the world come to our shores to make their purchases rather than go to the European powers, where they demand a ratio of from 22 to 25? There can be no doubt of the answer to that question.

You at once undermine and sap the prosperity of western Europe. You will divert from them all the trade of every silver-using country in the world, because you offer to sell those people property and commodities here that are better, and on better terms, than they can get anywhere else in the world. You say their silver will come here. Suppose it does. It



will go back again, because here is the floodgate that is opened for gold and silver to come and to go with the tides of trade, of free exchange in this the greatest country the world ever saw. It will come and it will go, and so it will continue: because we have opened up the mint, we have opened a sluice for the dam that now blockades the silver tide.

Do you suppose England could stand that for a moment? Certainly not. What has made the manufacturers in Manchester, England, the strongest bimetallists in the world to-day? Simply the fact that they must sell their commodities in India for the India rupee. They are thus interested in the value of that silver rupee. They want to maintain it; and if all the manufactured products of western Europe that are sent here and sold to us are sold for silver, as they must be, or gold at our ratio, do you not see how quickly you will convert them all to bimetalism? Thus you will segregate all the industrial inhabitants of western Europe from those who live on fixed incomes, the aristocracy, the bondholders, and the coupon clippers. That is all there is about it, and we want to segregate them.

You see, then, that when we do this in this country western Europe must come to our standard or abandon commerce with all silver-using countries, and with us. Mark that. We are the best market in the world for manufactured European products. They can not live without this market, and they can not keep this market unless they recognize and take our silver at the same value that we take it; and they know it.

I know that the gold owners in that country and this, the bondholders and bankers, those who are living on fixed incomes, and who are living on interest, and whose business it is to loan money and to have that money increase in value from year to year—they fight this proposition as a matter of course; but I do not think they ought to do it, for ultimately I think they would be benefited, as would the industrial people of the world. They ought not to fight it. They know what I state is true, that if this country gives free coinage of gold and silver at a fair ratio it settles the question for the world and drives the world to bimetalism instead of gold monometallism. They know that, and hence their eagerness and determination to prevent it.

It is a fight between the standards; and this great country must settle it, and you, my friends, must think about settling it here. It is a serious question. It is not only a serious question for the American people, but we are appealed to by the oppressed in the Old World, those who have not the



voice that our people in their sovereignty have.

The oppressed of the Old World are appealing to us to settle for the world this great question, and to settle it not for men who are seeking advantages in the stock markets, not for men who are seeking advantages in bondholding, in interest drawing, in money lending, in seeking to have money increase in value every day and every year, but for the great toiling and producing masses of the other countries as well as our own, for whom it is our proud province here to think about and to legislate. They are in a panic, my friends. I want to remind you of that, and they will remind you of it when you go home if you are not reminded of it now.

The people are watching this thing. They understand that the battle to be fought here is the battle of the standards the world over, and the man who fails now they will brand as a traitor to the cause which is intrusted to his hands.

Now, Mr. Speaker, in this line of my remarks I wish to have read from the clerk's desk an extract from the parliamentary report to which I have referred.

The clerk read as follows :

191. The explanation commonly offered of these constant variations in the silver market is that the rise or depression of the price of silver depends upon the briskness or slackness of the demand for the purpose of remittance to silver-using countries, and that the price is largely affected by the amount of the bills sold from time to time by the secretary of state for India in council.

But these causes were, as far as can be seen, operating prior to 1873, as well as subsequent to that date, and yet the silver market did not display the sensitiveness to these influences from day to day and month to month which it now does.

192. These considerations seem to suggest the existence of some steadying influence in former periods, which has now been removed, and which has left the silver market subject to the free influence of causes, the full effect of which was previously kept in check.

The question therefore forces itself upon us: Is there any other circumstance calculated to affect the relation of silver to gold which distinguishes the later period from the earlier?

Now, undoubtedly, the date which forms the dividing line between an epoch of approximate fixity in the relative value of gold and silver and one of marked instability, is the year when the bimetallic system which had previously been in force in the Latin Union ceased to be in full operation; and we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that the operation of that system, established as it was in countries the population and commerce of which were considerable, exerted a material influence upon the relative value of the two metals.

So long as that system was in force we think that, notwithstanding the

changes in the production and use of the precious metals, it kept the market price of silver approximately steady at the ratio by law between them, namely, 15 1-2 to 1.

When once the conclusion is arrived at that this was the case, the circumstances on which we have dwelt as characterizing the period since 1873 appear amply sufficient to account for the fall in the price of silver, tending as they all do in that direction; and the fact that on any particular day the supply of silver and of council bills may be large while the need of remittance is small, and *vice versa*, would explain the constant fluctuations in the price of silver which have manifested themselves in recent years.

193. Now does it appear to us *a priori* unreasonable to suppose that the existence in the Latin Union of a bimetallic system with a ratio of 15 1-2 to 1 fixed between the two metals should have been capable of keeping the market price of silver steady at approximately that ratio.

The view that it could only affect the market price to the extent to which there was a demand for it for currency purposes in the Latin Union, or to which it was actually taken to the mints of those countries, is, we think, fallacious.

The fact that the owner of silver could, in the last resort, take it to those mints and have it converted into coin which would purchase commodities at the ratio of 15 1-2 of silver to 1 of gold, would in our opinion, be likely to affect the price of silver in the market generally, whoever the purchaser and for whatever country it was destined. It would enable the seller to stand out for a price approximating to the legal ratio and would tend to keep the market steady at about that point.

194. It has been urged that during the earlier of the two periods which we have been contrasting, the conditions which existed from time to time were favorable to the maintenance of the legal ratio; that the great influx of gold towards the middle of this century found France with a large stock of silver, and that this silver, owing to exceptional circumstances, had a ready outlet to India.

But we do not think this affords an adequate solution of the problem without taking into account the existence of the bimetallic system. It may be true that the circumstances referred to were conditions which helped to make the bimetallic system operative. But as we have observed before, circumstances and conditions of a like nature have been more or less operative both before and since 1873, and yet the effect on the relative value of the two metals has been very different.

195. It is said that the altered circumstances since 1873 would have rendered it impossible to maintain silver at the former ratio, even if the Latin Union had not abandoned the free mintage of silver, and that sooner or later the bimetallic system must have broken down and its steadying influence have ceased.

To estimate the force of causes without adequate experience of their effects in the past is a matter of extreme difficulty. But even if it were true that the Latin Union would not have been able down to the present time to preserve silver from falling below the legal ratio, this does not prove that the views which we have propounded as to the causes of the former stability of the gold price of silver and of its present unstable con-



HIS FAVORITE CHAIR AND CORNER.



BLAND AVENUE, LEBANON, MO.



dition, are incorrect.

Whether silver would ultimately have fallen to its present price, and whether the Latin Union could now, by reversing its action and reopening its mints, restore silver to its former gold value, and reestablish the former condition of stability, are questions very material to another part of the case, but the determination of which is not essential to the particular point with which we are now dealing.

MR. CULBERSON: Mr. Speaker, as the time of the gentleman from Missouri is about to expire, I ask unanimous consent that he may be allowed to use such time as is necessary in order to complete his argument.

The SPEAKER *pro tempore* (MR. OUTHWAITE in the chair): The gentleman from Texas asks unanimous consent that the gentleman from Missouri have time as he desires in which to complete his arguments. Is there objection? (After a pause.) The chair hears none and it so ordered.

MR. BLAND: Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas and the house for the courtesy.

If the gentlemen have given attention to the statement just read, I think they will attach all the importance to it that it deserves, especially as I say that it has been promulgated by twelve experts appointed by the British parliament, one-half of whom were gold monometallists and among the ablest financiers of Europe, and I desire to read a brief extract when the document is returned to me.

But I want to call attention to the principle they state. They admit that France was enabled to maintain silver on a parity with gold at the ratio of 15-2 to 1. They admit it, state it, and give the reason why. It is admitted by Herschell, the gentleman who was chairman of this committee that secured the demonetization of silver in India, and it is also admitted by Goschen both of whom are monometallists.

Now, what was the principle laid down? They say in so many words that France had fixed the ratio of 15 1-2 to 1 and that France had told the nations if the world "you can come here with your gold and your silver and you can buy all that France has, and you can buy as much for fifteen and one-half ounces of silver as you can with one ounce of gold." France was able to do that because it was an important country. The report cites the Latin Union, but we all know that France is substantially the Latin Union.

It was because it was a country of sufficient power to make those exchanges by which it could keep the parity between gold and silver the



world over; because the world could come there and exchange it for property at that rate; and why? Why, they say no matter where anyone had silver bullion, wherever it be in the world, the owner would not take any less at that spot for it than he could get in France, less the cost of transportation, and he could hold it for that value.

Now, we frequently hear it said that if we adopt a ratio of 16 to 1 and coin silver it will have no effect except in this country; but if it is coined at that ratio it will affect silver everywhere, because the world would know that they could take it at that rate and get that amount for it in the United States. Now, I will read from the report of that commission:

The fact that the owner of silver could in the last resort take it to those mints and have it converted into coin which would purchase commodities at the ratio of 15 1-2 silver to 1 of gold would, in our opinion, be likely to affect the price of silver in the market generally, whoever the purchaser and for whatever country it was destined. It would enable the seller to stand up for a price approximating to the legal ratio and tend to keep the market steadily about that point.

Why, the gold monometallists here tell us that it will run the gold out of the country. Those monometallists whom I have read from do not say that, and it is not true. They say you will exchange commodities for it, that you will buy commodities for silver and gold at a fixed ratio; and because the holders of the silver anywhere in the world can come here with it and exchange it for commodities, silver will be used as much as gold at a fixed ratio; and it will not matter whether they pay in silver or gold. Then you will see the parity between gold and silver restored and maintained at this rate. France did it, in a territory not so large as the state represented on the floor by my distinguished friend who did me the honor to have my time extended, having 38,000,000 of people.

Now, I say, Mr. Speaker, the contention that we lose our gold and that we have got to exchange gold for silver does not hold good. It is put on the broad proposition of a nation which produces enough wealth; and where is the nation under the shining sun that compares with this growing country of ours in population and increasing development? I believe that I may yet live to see this country with nearly 100,000,000 inhabitants, increasing, as it does, at the rate of over a million and a half annually.

Many now born, by the time they are voters, will compose part of a nation containing perhaps 125,000,000 of people, with unsurpassed energies, with a genius nowhere equaled, and with a vast territory upon which



those energies and that genius can operate. But a short time ago when you looked across the Alleghany Mountains you beheld the western wilderness roamed only by the savage and the wild beast. To-day it is teeming with its millions of civilized people, the great Mississippi Valley, and when you cross the Mississippi you just begin to enter the great domain of this country of ours, for more than two-thirds of it lies beyond the Father of Waters.

And, Mr. Speaker, it is that two-thirds of our territory, rich as it is in gold and silver, embedded together in the same deposits, in the same mountains, so that you can not extract the one without extracting the other—it is that portion of our territory that would give us the money that we need, the money of the world, good money, hard money, democratic money (laughter and applause)—a country that the civilized world must look to for its future monetary supply if it is to continue on what is called the hard-money basis. And yet we are to-day asked to do what? To lay the blighting hand of confiscation upon the millions of people inhabiting that country. to turn them out as tramps upon the land, merely to satisfy the greed of English gold.

O my God, shall we do such a thing as that? (Applause.) Will you crush the people of your own land and send them abroad as tramps, will you kill and destroy your own industries, and especially the production of your precious metals that ought to be sent abroad everywhere—will you do this simply to satisfy the greed of Wall street, the mere agent of Lombard street in oppressing the people of Europe and of this country? It can not be done! It shall not be done! I speak for the great masses of the Mississippi Valley, and those west of it, when I say you shall not do it! (Applause.)

Any political party that undertakes to do it will, in God's name, be trampled, as it ought to be trampled, into the dust of condemnation now and in the future. (Applause.) Speaking as a democrat, all my life battling for what I conceived to be democracy and what I conceived to be right, I am yet an American above democracy. (Applause.) I do not intend, we do not intend, that any party shall survive, if we can help it, that will lay the confiscating hand upon Americans in the interest of England or of Europe. Now, mark it. This may be strong language, but heed it. The people mean it, and, my friends of eastern democracy, we bid farewell when you do that thing. (Applause.)

Now, you can take your choice of sustaining America against Eng-

land, American interests, and American laborers and producers, or you can go out of power. We have come to the parting of the ways. I do not pretend to speak for anybody but myself and my constituents, but I believe that I do speak for the great masses of the great Mississippi Valley when I say that we will not submit to the domination of any political party, however much we may love it, that lays the sacrificing hand upon silver and will demonetize it in this country.

For myself I will not support such a policy here or elsewhere, but will denounce it, and as a democrat I will denounce it as un-democratic and un-American, and will ask the people of this country to condemn it as they ought to have condemned the so-called democrats engaged in it as the agents, the tools—I withdraw that word, but I will say as the representatives, unintentionally, of the money power and the moneyed interests, and not of the masses of the American people. (Applause.)

Gentlemen, you can not hold the democratic party together on that line. You can not pledge yourselves to bimetallism in your platform and ignore it in your legislation. We pledged ourselves in the first place to tariff reform, and the people had a right to expect us to deal with that first. In my part of the country we were told to let silver alone; that we already had a law on that subject. They said to us: "Do not disturb that question, but take up the tariff; we are united on the tariff (laughter on the republican side); let us take up the tariff and reform and reduce it; the tariff is doing us great injury, let us attend to that first." We thought that declaration was sincere and we thought the first thing to be taken up was the repeal of the McKinley bill.

Well, now, my people of the Mississippi Valley believed that you would let silver alone, that you would not try to demonetize it, that you would let it stand where it is; they believed the tariff would be considered first. But when you come to say that you are going to demonetize silver, let me tell you that this is a bigger question than the tariff or anything else. This battle of the standards is a world-wide question. The question is whether we are to be put upon a gold standard; and that question is one which in importance is away beyond the year by year regulation of your revenue.

We voted the ticket in good faith; we expected that the platform would be carried out as was promised—that we would have tariff revision, and that when we came to the money question it would be regulated according to the Chicago platform, that we should have the free coinage of

silver, which in itself would destroy this makeshift. But lo and behold, we find that we were tricked, that we were deceived. (Laughter.) And I use that language advisedly. I believe it is not intended by our eastern democratic friends that tariff reform should be considered first, but their main, if not their sole, object was to put their hands upon silver and demonetize it and let tariff reform take care of itself afterward. (Laughter.) And here we are, just in that situation. Reduce the tariff 25 per cent, yet make money in gold 25 per cent more valuable, the tariff remains as great a burden as ever. It takes the same quantity of wheat, corn, pork, and cotton to pay it as before.

A MEMBER. That is where we are at.

MR. BLAND. Yes; we know where we are at now. Now, I tell you I am not going to submit to it. You may pass your bill and do these things; but if you do we are going to cut loose from you. You may go ahead, but you will never trick us again. I am speaking for my people. Do not charge me with being a radical or a fanatic or with indulging in threats. I speak the sentiment of the masses of the people I represent, and they are resolved upon the policy I have stated. I would not say so if it were not true.

Now, Mr. Speaker, as I have already stated, the silver question, as now presented, is not the question we have had presented to us in the past. It is true that in what has been called the Bland coinage act we passed in this House a free coinage bill (I mean not in this particular body, but in the House of Representatives) by a large majority—by a two-thirds vote. But when it went to the Senate there was engrafted upon it a provision requiring the purchase of at least \$2,000,000 worth of silver each month and not exceeding \$4,000,000 worth and its coinage into standard silver dollars. That was a bullion purchase bill.

But mark the distinction: It required every dollar of that bullion to be coined into money as fast as purchased; and it required the issue on that money of certificates redeemable in silver. To that extent the measure was in the line of bimetallism. The only difficulty was the limitation as to the amount. But the present law repealed that law. You do not propose now to put us back to where we were when you repealed that act, which was adopted as a compromise measure providing for the purchase of from two million to four million dollars worth of silver per month.

You propose to wipe out the act of repeal and to leave us where? You propose to remit us to the demonetizing act of 1873, which in all my

section of country the democratic party on every stump has denounced as the monumental fraud of the nineteenth century. Here is a democratic House proposing to go right back to that act. When you do so you will be guilty of a greater fraud than that act itself. I speak advisedly when I say that if the democratic party, after all the pledges it has made in regard to silver in its platforms, national and state, should take the country back to its condition under the act of 1873, you will have consummated the monumental fraud of the nineteenth century, because we never expected much from Mr. Sherman or his party; they never made many promises, as we have.

If we now violate in the light of day every pledge that we have made, we shall be convicted of insincerity, of betraying the people who sent us here, of bowing our necks meekly to the yoke of Wall street. If democracy means anything, it is that those who come here from the people to represent them should carry out their pledges in good faith. It does not mean that we are to pass an act which (though some people say it will stop the panic) will put a yoke upon your constituencies for probably centuries to come.

I spoke of the British royal commission as having laid down the principles by which bimetallism was maintained in France; and I contend that this government can maintain it upon the same principles, and at the ratio of 16 to 1. Yet the house will have the opportunity to vote on different ratios. My objection to changing the ratio is, in the first place, that the ratio of 16 to 1 is that which now exists. It is the ratio of the standard silver dollar, which is still the standard silver dollar that it always was. It is the law of the land and basis of equities between debtor and creditor.

Some gentlemen say that gold is the unit of value and the standard. What was meant by the unit of value was simply that the dollar was the unit of account from which we should reckon both down and up—down into fractions and up into multiples. It was merely the unit of account for government accounts and private debts and everything computed in dollars and cents. That is what it meant. And that unit was to be coined in silver. That was the original act. Whether the unit of value as it appeared in the act of 1873 was intended to mean anything more than the unit of account, I do not care. If it was, then, according to that construction, the silver dollar was the unit of value until 1873.

It was the only dollar authorized and coined until 1849, when the gold dollar was authorized to be coined. But the silver dollar was the unit.

Now, in the act of 1878, the title reads "An act for the coinage of the standard silver dollar and to restore its legal-tender character." The context refers to the act of 1837, and the coining of the dollar authorized there with the same superscription, which is the same standard dollar, the silver dollar, that has been identically the same in all of the history of our country. That act restored that standard as the standard dollar, and displaced the gold dollar.

There is no question about that. We do not coin the gold dollar at all to-day. It is prohibited to be done by the mints, and the only dollar that is coined is the silver dollar; and I repeat sir, I deny that the gold dollar is the standard of value. When we resumed specie payments and came from the midst of the greenback circulation to coin payments, we emerged with a standard silver dollar coined at the mints, and had been for nearly a year. In all of our business obligations, in all of our contracts since the resumption of specie payments, we refer to the standard silver dollar. We have been coining them, and our contracts rest on silver as well as on gold. But you want to eliminate them altogether and put everything on a gold basis.

But I repeat, sir, I deny the assumption that the gold dollar is the standard. I assert that the silver dollar is now, as it has always been, the unit of value in this country, and therefore that the unlimited coinage of silver will place bullion silver at par at the mints and in the world's markets equally with gold, according to the Chicago platform. It must necessarily do it, and we will comply with the platform and its pledges by coining our silver at a ratio of 16 to 1. For you must take notice that all of the silver in circulation in the world to-day, coined with reference to any ratio to gold, is about 15 1-2, or below that amount. Four billions of silver money is in circulation at a coinage ratio of about 15 1-2, while ours is 16 to 1. We have departed so far from the coinage ratio of the world as to go above 15 1-2. But why? What reason is there for going above 16 to 1.

I say, sir, and the statistics will demonstrate the fact, that if you go back for the last twenty years and compare the production of gold with that of silver, that the ratio of production will be found to be about 15 1-2 or between that and 16 to 1. Of course within the last four or five years the production of silver has increased, but you must take, in making comparisons of this character, long periods and not a few years. Take, then, for this purpose the production of silver for the last twenty years or since the price of silver has begun to fall, and the comparative production of the



two metals is about 15 1-2, or something below 16, to 1.

There is, then, no reason why we should change the existing ratio, except we admit in order to change the ratio that restoring silver to its proper and legitimate function will not restore its value.

MR. JOHNSON of North Dakota: Will the gentleman allow me to ask him a question?

MR. BLAND: Yes.

MR. JOHNSON of North Dakota: Can the gentleman name any country of the world, where they have free coinage to-day, where the coin is not debased exactly to the bullion value?

MR. BLAND: I do not understand the gentleman's question.

MR. JOHNSON of North Dakota: I say can the gentleman name any country with free coinage where the coin and bullion are not exactly of the same value, and that the bullion value of that country is just the coin value?

MR. BLAND: There is no country I know of to-day where gold and silver are coined at any fixed ratio free. I am not going on the hypothesis that Mexico or some weak country like that can, by any of its enactments, have any material effect upon the question.

I am speaking of a system for this country where it is proposed to coin the two metals at a fixed ratio, or of a country which, in the language of this report of the British commission, is of "sufficient importance to be considered," where it has property and products and commerce enough to make exchanges, and that country was France. I am not taking a little country like Mexico, that has no fixed relation between the metals, or even India. I speak of bimetallism, having a fixed ratio, and where the country is strong enough in its products to say we will give as much in exchange for sixteen ounces of silver as for one ounce of gold. This can not be made to apply to single-standard countries. I am speaking of bimetallism, or where a nation of sufficient commerce fixes a ratio of exchange for the two metals with free coinage for both.

MR. JOHNSON of North Dakota: Can you name such a nation now?

MR. BLAND: I say that this royal commission, whose report I read awhile ago, admitted that France did it for some seventy years.

MR. JOHNSON of North Dakota: Any country could have done it then, but no country has done it for the last twenty years.

MR. BLAND: No country has been trying to do it for the last twenty years, and I want this country to try it. (Applause.)



Here is a country which, in the direction of its resources, is larger to day than France, England and Germany thrown together. I say that advisedly. I do not mean that it is larger in population, for we have not got the population. I do not mean greater in its visible wealth, for we have not that; but I do mean in our resources to be developed, in our demands for money as a new people. They are old and effete and worn out, and doomed to particular habits.

We are progressing and demanding money every day. Every new factory that is started in this country is a direct demand upon the monetary supply, and a contraction of the currency to that extent. Every railroad that is built is a demand upon your volume of money and a contraction of the currency to that extent, as compared to everything else. Every farm that is opened is a new demand for money, and a contraction of the volume of currency; and here we are opening up vast territories, and we ought to open up more still. All these things demand money and must draw upon the present supply, and to that extent the currency is contracted, as compared to everything else.

Now, you can not do business on a contracted currency in this country. So that I say we are not to be compared with those people; and when you compare us, in the way of new demands, new developments, in population to be increased, we are greater than all of them combined; and when a gentleman admits that France and England and Germany, or two of them or all of them, could fix the ratio, they admit that this country can do more than all of them together. (Applause.) There is no question about that. You admit all the argument there is in it when you admit that much; and here is a commission composed of the most eminent experts of the Old World, a gold commission, which admits that France did this thing, and practically admits that France could still do it if she wanted to.

We have been befogged upon this subject. We have been misled and misrepresented. It is difficult to get a silver argument into the subsidized press of this country, and it seems that nearly all the metropolitan papers are included in that term. They will talk about nothing but banks and bonds and gold, and they control practically the press; but the great argument is to come at last, and will come unless you settle it here. It will not stop, but it will be settled.

But if you say we are not able to fix the ratio at 16 to 1, we have offered other propositions. I have stated that I will not vote against a free-coinage bill because the house may fix a ratio that I do not like. I do be-

lieve, and I admit the proposition, that the fixing of the ratio is a fair question for discussion and debate; but I do assert that, as a constitutional question, free coinage is enjoined by the constitution, notwithstanding the learned argument of the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Rayner) to the contrary. (Laughter.) The constitution inhibits any state in this Union from making anything a legal tender except gold and silver, and it confers upon congress the sole power to coin money and regulate its value.

Now, does that mean that a state shall make nothing a legal tender, and that congress will refuse to make anything a legal tender? If the states have conferred a power upon congress, the exercise of which is necessary to the life of the states, I say it is treason to the states to deny that right as a legal proposition. The states have given up the power to coin money and to make legal tender, and have conferred that power upon congress. If congress refuses to exercise this power which is necessary to the very existence of the state, it is, so to speak, disunion. We ought to give back, then, to the states the power to coin money and regulate its value and to make it legal tender.

Now, Mr. Speaker, here we are. No state in this Union can coin money or make anything a legal tender except gold and silver. We are denying to them a privilege conferred by the constitution of this country, which says they may make gold and silver a legal tender. Yet we will not coin it, will not conform to the constitution and do our duty. Not only that, but "coin money" means an automatic supply. One of the arguments that you can adduce in favor of coin money in place of paper money is that coin money can be over-issued, and that is the most important distinction.

Another argument is that it is not so easily burned up. The metals are not so easily destroyed. Many other qualities pertain to it which it is not necessary to explain; but the great thought underlying all is that the supply of gold and silver is limited by nature, that contracts are based upon the stock on hand, accumulated for ages, as the world has grown up in business; that the values of contracts are fixed by the money of the world thus accumulated, and that the annual supply is so small in amount compared with the vast stock on hand—hardly one per cent a year—that you can not impair the equity of contracts by largely inflating the volume of money, nor very seriously disturb property values, by lowering the value of the money by a large supply.

But here we want to interfere with that automatic supply. When we

have free coinage and the mints open, the production of gold and silver supplies the volume in the manner I have stated; for you make all the stocks of gold and silver on hand and all that comes in the future a part of the possible monetary supply. Nature limits the supply, so that we can not over-issue it if we want to. Very good; but some wise people about twenty years ago thought that this continuing supply of gold and silver was interfering with those holding bonds and drawing interest, and living on fixed incomes. They thought the production of silver was going to be largely increased, and would probably lower the value of both gold and silver as money, and hence they undertook by legislation to prevent the automatic supply of money and to inhibit the coinage of one of the precious metals in order to protect the volume of money from that increase.

Now we had better be on a paper system than on a system like that. If we are to regulate the volume of money by prohibiting the coinage of one of the metals, why not abandon the metals altogether and go to paper at once? We are asked to believe that the contention is true that we do not need much money anyhow, because ninety per cent of the business of the world is done on credit. Why not one hundred per cent and get rid of money altogether?

The time has come, my friends, when credit goes very slow and a little money very much faster. There is always a day of liquidation, and you must have the money. But, as I said before, if ninety per cent is credit money, why not one hundred per cent? Let us print credit money, but let that money rest upon the credit of the government and not upon the credit of some bankers in London or Wall street. There is about ninety per cent of the American people who do not know anything about credit. They have to do their business on a cash basis. They must have money.

The concluding part of our bill provides that the dollar coined, whatever it may be, may be deposited and a silver certificate issued on it, as now provided by law; so that if you reach a ratio of 18, 19, or 20 to 1, you still have the same right to a certificate that you have to-day.

Now, Mr. Speaker, in closing this argument—and as stated, an argument entirely without preparation, not expecting that I would speak to it at all to-day—I wish to say that the time has come when we will have to decide whether or not this country is to come to monometallism or bimetallism. I think it is the duty of this House, and especially of my associates, to settle this money question, and to settle it on the lines I have pointed out, not by piecemeal, and not by a repeal of an act that sustains

the value of silver, before fixing the ratio, not to demonetize silver and then undertake to restore it afterwards; but we have time now to arrange, according to the principles of bimetallism, a measure in conformity with our promise to the American people; and we ask our friends on the other side of this question—our democratic friends on this side, who are so eager to get rid of the Sherman law, so-called, which I do not defend upon any other principle than that it is the only law which sustains silver until we can fix the ratio—I ask them to come in all fairness and enable us to carry out our pledges to restore bimetallism to this country. If you do not, yours is the responsibility, not ours.

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### GOVERNMENT BY INJUNCTION AS A MODE OF IMPERIALISM.

(Delivered in the House of Representatives, July 16, 1894, Against a Resolution Endorsing the Cleveland Administration.)

MR. SPEAKER: It is to be regretted that a resolution of this character should be thrust here under a fifteen minute rule for debate, because it opens a wide field for discussion—not but that I believe that any member of this House, no matter to what political party he belongs, will indorse the state government and the Federal government, in all legitimate efforts to preserve our institutions, to put down riots, and to preserve the majesty of the law of this country!

I have no sympathy, Mr. Speaker, with anyone who raises his arm in violence to destroy property, or in enforcing what he may consider his rights of work, tries to prevent others from working. No principle of that kind can find indorsement on the part of anyone who has a proper conception of the rights of the people of this country to liberty. But, sir, in great and disturbing times, such as we have passed through, it often happens that acts are done under assumption of authority that we may be called upon to indorse by a sweeping resolution of this character. As a democrat, I am to-day where I have always been; and that is for the rights and the dignity of the people of the states.

I believe in local state government and that the whole arm of the state

authority should be used in suppressing violence before the Federal government should interfere, except to protect its own property and to protect its mails.

I am aware, Mr. Speaker, that throughout this country, even in states where there was no violence, and where if violence occurred at all, the state authorities are ready and able to deal with it without any instructions sent out by the Attorney-General, the whole country was flooded with deputy marshals.\* Sheriffs were arrested, state authority was overthrown, and the strong arm of the Federal government took possession of matters properly belonging to the states. Against that, sir, I protest. I protest against these "blanket" Federal injunctions. I protest against the omnibus injunction. I object to sending deputy marshals all over the country to take the place of state authority. In a measure like this resolution, urged during the excitement of the times, we, as a party, as a democratic party, are liable to do violence to every democratic principle and to surrender here, in these halls, as representatives of the people of our states, the essential democratic principle of local self-government.

If this Union is to be maintained, it is to be maintained by maintaining and respecting the rights and the authority of the people of the states.

If we are to have imperialism let it not come with the assent of the representatives of the people in this House.

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### A STAND IN TIME OF PANIC.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives Supporting a Motion to Strike out the Enacting Clause of the Oates Bankruptcy Bill.—Dec. 8, 1893.)

Gentlemen who are interested in banking rather than in farming or manufacturing, may very properly advocate this bill. At a time of panic and distress, when manufacturers, farmers, mechanics and persons engaged in all branches of industry are simply asking a little time, a little postponement, with an opportunity to secure their property from confiscation and to enter again upon business enterprises, we propose by this bill to put the whole business interest of the country into bankruptcy and let the bankers loot these interests. That is the effect of the measure. Thou-

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\*During the Pullman Strike.



sands of men throughout the country who are in debt, who are a little cramped in their business operations, and desire a little further time will recover themselves if we will let them alone. If we will permit them to go on in their usual way under state laws, without interfering with them, they will finally get out of debt and become prosperous.

But here is a bill declaring all debts practically due at this time, and if a man can not meet his obligations, pay his expenses, or liquidate all of his debts from day to day, he is subject to be declared a bankrupt and his business and property confiscated. It is simply putting in bankruptcy the whole people of the country and subjecting them to be fleeced by bankers and the banking capital of which the gentleman from Illinois speaks.

Mr. Speaker, if there is a demand for the bankruptcy system in the United States at all, it is certainly not a present demand. It is not asked for at this time.

It is not demanded by business men engaged in manufacturing enterprises. It is demanded, if at all, by the mercantile community and by the banking community who desire to go out upon the shores of our financial distress and gather their rich reward from the wreckage of the business and fortunes of the masses of the people. It is pressed here by that class of people, and not by the laboring people, by the manufacturing, the farming or business people of the country. There is no question about that. The vote in the committee of the whole, and the records of the rolls of this House will show the interests which are involved in it.

Now, sir, the gentleman talks about striking out the enacting clause of the bill as though it were something unusual. I have seen it done frequently in this House. I have seen, sir, the enacting clause of a tariff bill stricken out in committee and the bill so reported back to the House.

If the House is not ready for this bill, if it does not wish to pass a bankruptcy bill at this time, why spend the time of the House in further discussion of it? My own experience about these amendments of which the gentleman speaks as perfecting the bill is that it is not unusual in the committee of the whole under the five minute rule, when the members are inattentive, when they are in the cloak rooms or scattered about, the amendments are placed in the bill, making it ten times worse than it was before. For my own part I would rather take the present bill, bad as it is, if we are to have a bankruptcy bill at all, than to run the risk of what may be added to it in the committee of the whole.

All of this special plea, Mr. Speaker, about involuntary bankruptcy



comes from a source that is well understood. We know where the plea comes from. The gentleman from Illinois, when he stated that there ought to be some involuntary bankruptcy proceedings as well as voluntary proceedings, if I understood him correctly, meant—

MR. CANNON of Illinois: If the gentleman will allow me, I will suggest, first, that there ought to be a voluntary system of bankruptcy, and a bill providing for that purpose passed. I think it entirely likely, also, that there might be an involuntary provision, and there ought to be such a provision to catch dishonest men. I think, though, from the little talk I have heard during this debate, that it is altogether likely the involuntary part of the bill is not wise, and I stand ready if it is subject to that criticism to help perfect it. . . .

MR. BLAND: Mr. Speaker, we are now in the beginning of the long session of Congress. If this House determines that it wants no involuntary bankruptcy bill, now is the time to determine it, and the committee on judiciary can then frame and introduce here a voluntary bankruptcy bill, and if the gentleman from Illinois wishes to vote for it, it is in his power to do so. But I take it for granted that the membership of this House want no part of this bill, and that it is dangerous to go into committee of the whole to undertake to amend a bill that has been already condemned by the House.

Now, sir, I do not desire to take up the time of the House in any further discussion of the bill, and if there is no gentleman desiring to speak upon the subject I move the previous question.

## EUROPEAN CONTROL AT WASHINGTON.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, March 31, 1897.)

MR. CHAIRMAN: The effect of this bill known as the Dingley bill will be largely to increase the taxes of the people. It will tend to shut out importations, and in that mode the bill will necessarily interfere with the exportations of agricultural products from this country. The trusts and combinations now organized under the shelter of our tariff system are to be more thoroughly organized and multiplied by the opportunity given them in the high tax schedules of this bill, and they will dominate and control

the markets of this country. They will fix the price of all manufactured products by it, and practically control the prices of all that the agriculturalists have to sell as well as what they have to buy.

It is not the remedy for present conditions. Your purpose, as shown by this bill, at least the effect of it, will be to raise the prices of all articles controlled by syndicates and trusts and at the same time lower the prices of all other things. The democratic party insisted in the last campaign, and still insists, upon raising prices on commodities of the country in a uniform manner. Our party declared a policy of restoring the money of the Constitution. We insisted on opening the mints to the unlimited free coinage of silver and thereby increasing the volume of money. This would have the effect of uniformly raising prices. This policy would benefit all classes alike. But you propose by this bill to increase the prices of the products of a particular class of our people. Your bill is class legislation. It will benefit the class least deserving of favors. The rich monopolists, syndicates, and combinations will be protected and benefited as far as the high protective tariff can do so, but the other producers of the country will be injured in proportion to the benefits you confer upon monopolists. This is not the remedy for our existing hard times.

It is the stock and trade of the republican party to denounce the Wilson tariff bill as the cause of our present business depression. About the only argument adduced in the present debate is to the effect that the Wilson tariff bill lowered duties, and in that way caused foreign competition with home manufacturers, thereby crippling our home manufacturers and throwing labor out of employment and bringing upon our people general distress. The fact is, however, that our importations under the Wilson bill have been less than they were under the McKinley bill; so that argument falls to the ground.

The Wilson bill was not the cause of our financial panics; it had nothing to do with bringing the people of this country or other countries to penury and want. The Dingley bill will be impotent to relieve our present deplorable condition. Anyone familiar with the history of the country for the past four years will not fail to note that prior to the election of Mr. Cleveland, and during the administration of Mr. Harrison, beginning in the latter part of the year 1891, a conspiracy was formed for the purpose of compelling the suspension of free coinage of silver for India and the repeal of the Sherman law in this country. In 1891 bills were introduced in Congress to repeal the Sherman law. In December of



MR. BLAND'S SURVIVING FAMILY.

(From a Recent Photograph.)

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|------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| (1.) Mrs. R. P. Bland.       | (3.) Ewing Charles Bland. | (5.) George Vest Bland.   |
| (2.) Theodric Richard Bland. | (4.) Frances A. Bland.    | (6.) Virginia Mary Bland. |
|                              | (7.) John Lilburn Bland.  |                           |



that year, Mr. Sherman, the author of that law, introduced a bill in the Senate repealing the purchasing clause of that law. The metropolitan papers of the country, and especially those of the east, were demanding the repeal of that law.

All the facts of recent history show that the banking institutions of this country and of England had determined upon the repeal of the Sherman law. Early in March, 1892, a scheme to demonetize silver in India was set on foot in England, which resulted in the appointment of a commission, commonly known as the Herschell commission, to inquire into the Indian currency.

During the summer of 1892 the secretary of the treasury of the United States, Mr. Foster, visited the monetary centers of Europe for the purpose of ascertaining the feasibility of holding a monetary conference to consider the silver question. On his return to the United States, Congress authorized the president to enter into arrangements with other countries for this conference. This conference convened at Brussels on November 22, 1892. It will be noted that the Herschell commission was appointed some months before the meeting of the Brussels conference and prior to the presidential election of 1892. It will be observed that these two monetary commissions were authorized in 1892 prior to the presidential election of that year—the first on the part of Great Britain to investigate the silver question for India, and the second called at the request of the United States for the purpose of effecting, if possible, an international agreement for the coinage of gold and silver. The Herschell commission was at work upon the subject of silver with the suspension of the free coinage of silver for India in view. The proceedings of the Herschell commission, it would seem, were suspended, or at least held back, for the purpose of ascertaining whether anything could be accomplished at Brussels by which gold and silver would be freely coined by the several nations sending delegates to the Brussels conference.

The conference met at Brussels on the 22d of November 1892. A very able academic discussion of the silver question took place during the sitting of this conference, which was participated in by the several delegates from this country and the European countries having a gold standard. The conference accomplished nothing, and broke up, or rather adjourned over to meet again in the following May (1893).

The Herschell commission, it would seem, awaited the second meeting of the Brussels conference before taking final action with respect to silver

in India.

When the time arrived for the second meeting of the Brussels conference, no delegates appeared. It would seem that this government had purposely omitted to provide for the second meeting, having no delegation at Brussels, and that no other government insisted upon a further effort for an international agreement upon the subject of silver. The Herschell commission, about a month after the date fixed for the second meeting of the Brussels conference, proceeded to recommend the suspension of the free coinage of silver for India, and accordingly the British council for India issued a decree stopping the free coinage of silver in India. This caused a slump in the silver market, and silver lost more than twenty points in value as compared with gold.

Following the policy of Great Britain in demonetizing silver for India, the president of the United States in the following August convened Congress for the purpose of repealing the Sherman law, which provided for the purchase of four and one-half million ounces of silver bullion each month and the issuing of legal tender treasury notes in payment thereof.

It may be said that the failure to reach an international agreement at Brussels precipitated the demonetization of silver for India and the repeal of the purchasing clause of the Sherman law in this country. In fact, it seems that every international conference thus far held has been a failure so far as coming to any agreement is concerned, and that the failure of these conferences has afforded pretexts for hostile legislation against silver. It will be further noted in this connection that in August, 1892, the Austrian government authorized the finance minister of that country to sell bonds from time to time to procure gold in sufficient quantity to establish and maintain the single gold standard.

To recapitulate the situation in 1892 and 1893: Austria began in August, 1892, to prepare for the single gold standard; the British government early in 1892 began preparations for the suspension of the free coinage of silver in India, and in December, 1892, bills were introduced in the Congress of the United States for the repeal of our silver law. There seems to have been a concerted movement in Europe and in this country for the total destruction of silver as money. This movement caused a financial panic in all gold standard countries. This panic was upon us before the inauguration of Mr. Cleveland as president; indeed, it had begun in Europe and reached our shores before the presidential election. Doubt-



less Mr. Harrison's administration hoped, by bringing about an international agreement, to stop this feeling of panic and possibly accomplish an international agreement that might save the world from the blow then threatened to be inflicted by Austria, India, and the United States in 1892-93.

As evidence that some of the great financiers of the world had a dread and apprehension of this question, I read the statement of one of Great Britain's delegates at the Brussels conference. Mr. de Rothschild said:

The stock of silver in the world is estimated at some thousands of millions, and if this conference were to break up without arriving at any definite results there would be a depreciation in the value of that commodity which it would be frightful to contemplate, and out of which a monetary panic would ensue, the far-spreading effects of which it would be impossible to foretell.

Other apprehensions with regard to the probable effects of threatened legislation at that time on the silver question might be quoted, but it is not deemed necessary. It is only necessary to remind any intelligent student or thinker upon financial questions of the legislation above referred to in order that he may understand and admit that a monetary revolution such as took place could have no other effect than that foretold by Baron Rothschild.

It is, therefore, senseless as well as insincere to attempt to make it appear that the passage of the Wilson tariff bill was the cause of the financial panic that occurred concurrently with the adoption of the gold standard for Austria, and the sale of bonds to the amount of some forty millions by that country for gold, the suspension of the free coinage for India, and the repeal of the Sherman law for this country. The panic for 1893 was, unquestionably, the result of the silver legislation above referred to. It took place more than a year prior to the passage of the Wilson bill. The cause for this panic occurred many months before the election of Mr. Cleveland. We have not as yet recovered from the effects of this legislation on the silver question. It will be impossible to recover either under the Wilson bill or the Dingley bill. No tariff bill can have such an effect. The effect of tariff bills is to tax the people; to take money from their pockets; to store it up in the public treasuries, or to put in in the coffers of the monopolies. No tariff bill provides for supplying the people with money, but on the contrary, it takes from the pockets of the producer what little money he may have.

In the debates at the time of the passage of the Sherman law, the

author of the bill, Mr. Sherman, stated that the bill would put in circulation annually some \$55,000,000 of money; that this amount of additional currency was necessary to meet the annual increase in our population, wealth, and trade. This was urged by the friends of the Sherman bill as being necessary to the prosperity of the people. The bill was repealed in November, 1893—three and one-half years ago. This repeal has caused a loss or contraction of our currency, according to the theory of the advocates of the bill to the amount of nearly \$200,000,000. This of itself is a sufficient explanation of the financial distress of our people. India coined and put in circulation before the repeal of the free coinage of silver in that country took place about \$40,000,000 annually. It has been nearly four years since the suspension of free coinage of silver for India. We think that we are warranted in saying that the suspension of free coinage of silver for India and the repeal of the Sherman law in this country have up to this time worked a contraction of the world's money to an amount equal to at least \$350,000,000.

History shows beyond doubt that from the day the German government demonetized silver, and the suspension of the coinage of standard silver dollars in this country in 1873, every blow struck at silver by any important nation has caused disturbances in the money market and resulted in the reduction of prices.

To restore prosperity to this country we must retrace our steps; we must restore silver to its time-honored place as a money metal; we must give equal rights to silver with gold at the ratio prevailing—16 to 1—and open up our mints to the unlimited coinage of both metals.

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## ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION DUE TO ARBITRARY POWER AND CIVIL WAR.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, June 25, 1882.)

The republican party in Missouri disfranchised over fifty thousand voters—every man who had sympathized with those engaged in rebellion; prohibited him from voting, prohibited him from holding any office, acting in any capacity of trust, public or private. He could not be the administrator of an estate. He could not sit upon a jury or even preach the

Gospel or solemnize a marriage ceremony. He was outlawed, trodden upon. Under the reconstruction acts in all the southern states, public affairs were no better than in Missouri. Military rule prevailed everywhere. The republican rule in the south gave to that country such worthies as Warmouth, Packard, Wells, Darrall, and Anderson, in Louisiana, and others I might name; Bullock, in Georgia; Ames in Mississippi, and Chamberlain and Moses, in South Carolina, and many others too numerous to mention.

Under that rule the legislature of Louisiana was dispersed with the bayonet. Governors were kept in power by military force against the voice of the people. The same thing was done in South Carolina. It was not until a democratic congress refused to grant military supplies and appropriations until this rule was withdrawn that South Carolina and Louisiana were enabled to see inaugurated governors of their choice. Having inaugurated one president by fraud and force—I say force for it is well known that at the time this capitol was surrounded with military brought here for the purpose by President Grant, whose intention was boasted to be to inaugurate Hayes or plunge the country in civil war—the business interests of the country were paralyzed, and the democrats in this House were everywhere appealed to to give up the fight for the inauguration of Tilden and Hendricks, in order to preserve republican institutions from the military rule threatened by Grant, a republican president. What was the result? Hayes vetoed every measure passed by the democrats for the relief of the country and the curtailing of the power of monopolies and corporate wealth. He vetoed the silver bill; the bill to prevent troops at the polls; the bill that placed the bonds at a low rate of interest and provided for their payment, and the extinguishment of the national banks.

The greed for office, for political power, and public plunder did not cease with the inauguration of Mr. Hayes. This precedent of fraud and force, this example of terror and lawlessness, had its fruit afterward. When the next election for president came, we find the henchmen in the republican party bargaining and intriguing among themselves for the control of office and patronage.

Public moneys stolen by the star-route thieves were poured into Indiana by the million to purchase that state at the October election for the republican party. Thus, by the corrupt use of public moneys, were their candidates elected. General Garfield was inaugurated president. He had

but begun the duties of his high office when it was charged by two of the leading senators of his party that he had violated his pledges and agreements, by which, before the election, he had promised to give to them the control of the Federal patronage in the state of New York. This feud led to the resignation of those senators, and they left their seats and went home to the legislature of their state, asking to be returned as a rebuke to their own party administration. The intense excitement of these events finally culminated in a heart-rending tragedy that startled the world and clothed the republic in sackcloth and ashes.

Need I say that all these crimes—crimes of forcing upon the American people a usurper in the high office of Chief Magistrate, of plundering the treasury by venal office holders, and the stolen moneys used to corrupt the ballot box, of bargaining and parceling out the offices and places of political power as a consideration for support in elections, bore the bitter fruit of political assassination?

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### AGAINST BUREAUCRATIC PRIVILEGE.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, June 25, 1882, Opposing a Civil Pension Bill.)

This bill proposes to pension persons engaged in the civil service, and, as far as I know, it is the first proposition that looks to the general pensioning of those in official positions. It is true that this is confined to postoffice inspectors, superintendents of money-order offices, railway mail agents, and to messengers. But that is the very beginning; if we are to pension the widows of these officers or the officers themselves when they meet with misfortune, why not continue it to all the officers of the government who may meet with misfortune while engaged in official position? If the gentleman, my colleague, a member of congress, should unfortunately contract a disease superinduced by the malaria of Washington and become disabled so that he could not support himself in private business, why should not he be pensioned also? Why not run it through all the branches of the government?

In England and other countries where office holders are a privileged and aristocratic class they take care of themselves and their posterity by

providing pensions of this sort. But this is the first time in free America that a proposition so extended as this has been made to pension the office holders of this government. Our pension list now is enormous and growing every day, made up of army and navy pensions. This we have done before. Our soldiers in the Mexican war, Revolutionary war, and war of 1812 have been pensioned. The American people are satisfied with pensioning those who have suffered in consequence of their patriotic services in time of war. But the idea of pensioning the 100,000 office holders of this government is to place the tax upon the American people beyond endurance. Only two days ago we passed an appropriation of \$100,000,000 for pensions.

It is calculated that it will take \$500,000,000 to meet the requirements of the arrearage-of-pension act alone, to say nothing of the general and special laws with reference to pensions. Yet upon top of all this my greenback colleague proposes that the government shall extend its gratuity to the civil list as well as the army list. He certainly does not mean to hold this out as some extra inducement for gentlemen to seek positions under the government. The pressure now is greatly beyond endurance.

The civil service of the government is now constituted for political purposes. There is a universal and demoralizing scramble for these offices. Hence, there is no necessity for any further pay or inducement for men to seek and accept these positions. Let them do as individuals in private station do—provide for their widows and their orphans by policies of insurance upon their lives, and otherwise.

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## FRAUD AND FORCE IN GOVERNMENT.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, January 26, 1877.)

MR. SPEAKER: This is the first instance in the history of our government that a dispute as to who is the rightfully-elected president of the United States has arisen. It is true that none dispute the fact that Mr. Tilden received nearly a quarter of a million majority of the popular vote, and if he is not declared the president it will also be the first instance in our



history where a candidate who received such a majority of the popular vote was not elected.

Those who undertake to explain or apologize for this anomaly pretend that it is owing to some mysterious defect in our constitutional provisions for the election of president; but such is not wholly the case. Why the country should now be in a state of political perturbation and business paralysis is a question of easy solution. Last June the republican party met in convention at Cincinnati and announced its platform and nominated its candidates for president and vice-president. A short time thereafter the democratic party met in convention at St. Louis and announced its platform and nominated its candidates for president and vice-president. Thus the two political parties went to the country with their respective candidates and declared policy and principles. It was reasonably supposed at that time that the verdict of a majority of the people rendered upon the issue presented would be final and respected by all parties as conclusive.

But Mr. Speaker, when the October elections clearly foreshadowed the victory of the democratic candidates, the question was raised by distinguished republican senators and politicians as to who should count and how should be counted the electoral vote. Republican organs throughout the country gave it to be understood that in case the election of Tilden and Hendricks depended upon the electoral votes of South Carolina or Florida, and especially Louisiana, they would never be inaugurated. Just why the vote of these states, or any one of them should not elect Tilden and Hendricks and yet should elect Hayes and Wheeler, is made clear only when we consider that after the October elections it was reasonably certain that if Tilden and Hendricks carried any one of them they would be elected. The republicans had upheld governments in these states so long against the will of the people that they were considered the property of that party. These states had been so long dragged at the car of the republican party, riveted there with Federal bayonets, that any attempt to relieve them from their bondage was regarded as treason.

It is clear that this controversy was determined upon by republican leaders before the election took place. Whether you call it a conspiracy or what not, all know that this difficulty was foreshadowed by the republican leaders and boldly announced in their leading organs two weeks before the election. They had determined Tilden and Hendricks should not have the electoral votes of any of those states, for the simple reason that



the republican party had in those states unscrupulous tools of their own for returning boards, and knew they could be used to count fraudulently—to count majorities into minorities—that they could and would, in plain words, be induced to count the votes of all those states for Hayes and Wheeler, no matter how the people might vote. Knowing these facts, the declaration was made before the election that Tilden and Hendricks should not be inaugurated, if their election depended upon the electoral vote of any of those states. The republican leaders have made good their threats; hence the fact confronts us that the two if not all three of those states voted for Tilden and Hendricks, but have been counted for Hayes and Wheeler.

Mr. Speaker, it is not my purpose to enter into a discussion of the powers of this House or of Congress to remedy this outrage. I am ready to cooperate in any lawful way to right this wrong, and believing that the bill proposed by the joint committee is the best that can now be devised, I am disposed to give it my support. This bill, however, is intended for this occasion and is not designed as a permanent statute. It only meets an emergency that now exists. No law can be devised that will be so perfect in all its scope and details as to be an absolute check upon rascality like this. We have all the laws upon the subject now that our fathers and fathers' fathers believed necessary. You will amend your constitution, enact statutes, and adopt rules in vain if this sort of politics is to be tolerated in this government. So long as the people shall sustain a party that thus defies law and decency, our country is liable at any moment to be plunged in a shoreless sea of civil discord and anarchy. No law can be enacted that dishonest and corrupt officials will not evade and falsify for political ends.

Fraud has clothed in legal forms the result of corrupt returning boards, and thus sent here in the garments of law villainous cheats in shape of electoral votes from Florida and Louisiana to be counted for Hayes and Wheeler. Force stands ready with Federal bayonets declaring that the men thus elected shall be inaugurated.

Mr. Speaker, as a representative of the people, I am not inclined to accede to anything that in my judgment looks in any other direction than the ultimate triumph of the right. Yet I must admit that there is too much of the appearance of compromising with wrong in this measure not to call attention to the grave dangers in the future. That Tilden and Hendricks were elected fairly, and honestly elected president and vice-president of

the United States in the late election I can not believe any intelligent man doubts. Whether they are to be cheated out of this victory and the people of their choice depends upon the result of this commission. I dislike even to admit that there is a possibility of this conspiracy succeeding.

But sir, there is much here for reflection. The people of this government are yet to decide at the ballot box whether a party that has brought so much fraud, corruption and dishonor upon this country will in the future meet with their favor. If so, I can not see that there is much hope for our republican institutions. We will soon be upon the level of Mexico, where the boldest political buccaneer by force and fraud usurps power and oppresses the people till some other freebooter supplants him. Force breeds fraud, and fraud in turn results in force. Louisiana has been governed by force of Federal bayonets. Federal interference installed a bogus government in 1870 and 1872. Again in 1874. The same fraud and force are appealed to in 1877. Shall it succeed? I think not. It is to be hoped that prejudice and passion will die out; that the fearful crisis through which we are now passing will exhibit to the people of this country the terrible dangers that lie in our path as a nation should we so far depart from the government and principles of our fathers as longer to tolerate the usurpations of such men as Wells, Anderson, Packard, Kellogg, "*et id omne genus.*"

Mr. Speaker, I might compare this Confederacy to the Siamese Twins; each state possessing an independent entity and individuality, all are linked together and thus constituting the Federal Union, bound together with ligaments of flesh and blood, so that no one of them can possibly suffer without affecting all. If poison be inserted in the veins of one, all become contaminated. Thus we see that the fraud and corruption injected into the body-politic of Louisiana by Federal bayonets has at last infected the whole nation with a moral leprosy.

The malignant virus that we have permitted, even fostered, in the bayonet states of South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana, has at last circled the whole body-politic of this government; and now, from the lakes to the Gulf, and from ocean to ocean, the words "fraud and corruption," "force and violence," are on the lips of all. The Louisiana returning board has been condemned in the house of its friends. Its president and leading member was branded as a dishonest man and removed from office as governor of Louisiana by General Sheridan, because of his alleged corruption and dishonesty. A republican committee of this House, two years

ago, condemned the board for doing the very acts for which it is now upheld. Why is it that the frauds condemned two years ago by a republican committee of this House, by the leading journals and statesmen of both parties, should now be apologized for by members on this floor? If it was dishonest to count out a democratic majority then, it is, if possible, more so now; for the majority is larger now than at that time, and the results of vastly greater moment. Our republican friends could afford to condemn fraud when it affected only the result in Louisiana, but now that the election of Mr. Hayes depends upon upholding and apologizing for that fraud we find a different stand is taken. When it comes to this, that a political party of the numbers, power, and influence of the republican party is willing not only to accept, but to hazard a civil war to secure the supposed advantages of such frauds, then indeed may we despair of our country's perpetuity.

As I said before, there is no rule or law, no constitution that can be framed so far-reaching in its provisions as to provide for all the possible tricks of evasion and rascally inventions of corrupt, designing men. If our republic is to stand, it will be because the people will remorselessly frown down the wrong and determinedly uphold the right. Let it be known that corruption shall be visited with the scorn and detestation of every honest man, come from what party or source it may. What can be expected of a man or party that secures position in this government by a false and fraudulent count of ballots? The ballot box contains the voters' will. Where in all this country, or where on earth except in Louisiana, is to be found the man or set of men whose penetrating minds and disinterested, honest judgment can determine the desire of the voter who casts a ballot better than the voter himself as shown by his ballot?

There is no power on earth, and none above it save One, that deserves the title of "The Searcher of Hearts," yet this returning board assumes that divine attribute, and our republican friends swear this board has correctly searched the hearts of over twelve thousand male adult citizens of Louisiana, and has determined from their penetrating, all-powerful examination that this twelve thousand men voted directly opposite to what each of them intended or desired. Mr. Speaker, what greatness must be in the future for a state that has for its citizens four men who can fathom the hearts and minds of every voter in it and determine to a demonstration just how each voter desires to cast his ballot, with power to count accordingly. Why, sir, there is no use at all for an election there, because

these four men know better than the voter how the voter should or would vote or intended to vote. All that is necessary is a census table to ascertain the approximate number of voters, so that of that number each candidate may have his due proportion. Still I hardly see the necessity for census tables. If their intention is such as to know just how every voter intends to vote, the board ought to know how many voters there are, their names, personal and political predilections. The advantage of having such powerful men consists in the fact that, with their knowledge of the will of the people, they can declare that will at the proper time without the voters of the state taking the time or trouble to go to the polls. Thus each one of them will save to himself his day's work, instead of going to the election, and the state will be saved the costs attending elections. A happy state, Louisiana! O, for a returning board in all the states! Millions can be saved the people by this happy invention.

But, Mr. Speaker, why the necessity of any forms of election at all in Louisiana or elsewhere? If these great men can so accurately judge the will of the people of Louisiana, why not of the whole nation? Their penetration of hearts can not be confined to the dangers of that state alone. Being the searcher of all hearts and knowing the will and intent of people in this respect, why not say to these eminent men: Take control of this government; you know the will of the people so perfectly that you will never make a mistake; you can always govern us according to our will without asking us any questions on that subject? May the splinters of this board never grow less, but multiply until it is shivered and splintered from Louisiana to Maine. But we had forgotten Florida. Money and troops seem to have been the means of enlightening the board there. There a Tilden majority was transformed into a Hayes majority. It is true that Governor Stearns said it would require money and troops to accomplish the feat of legerdemain. Chandler was equal to the emergency. So troops were ordered to Florida to see a fair count for Hayes and a fraudulent count for Tilden.

This Louisiana returning board consisted of two white men and two negroes, all republicans, and what is still worse, all rogues. The law made some pretense of fairness by requiring that both political parties should be represented in the board, but that small piece of justice was denied the democratic party. I stated before that this board had been condemned to infamy in the house of its friends. I shall now quote from the report of the select committee on the condition of the south in their re-

port made to the Forty-third Congress. That congress we all know was republican. This committee was a republican committee, Mr. Wheeler, late candidate of that party for the high office of vice-president, being a member of the committee. This committee goes on to say :

The law provides that this committee shall consist of five persons "from all political parties." It consisted at the opening of their last session of five republicans, upon the resignation of one of whom (General Longstreet) Mr. Arroyo, a conservative, was taken to fill the vacancy. After protesting against the action of the board in secret session he resigned about the conclusion of their labors, and his place was not filled; so that, as your committee think, the law as to the constitution of the board was not complied with.

Remember that the same members of the board acted at the last election, and under this same law alluded to in this report. At the last election the democrats requested that the law be complied with by the appointment of a democrat upon the board. This request was persistently refused. We here have the testimony of a republican committee that the law in 1874 and 1876 was not complied with. This same committee further on uses the following language :

Your committee are therefore constrained to declare that the action of the returning board, in rejecting these returns in the parish of Rapides and giving the seats for that parish to the republican candidates, was arbitrary, unfair, and without warrant of law. If the committee were to go behind the papers before the board and consider the alleged charge of intimidation upon the proofs before the committee, their finding would necessarily be the same. It was asserted in Governor Wells's affidavit that the McEnery officials had usurped the offices of the parish, and thereby intimidated voters. Immediately after the 14th of September, when the Kellogg authorities in New Orleans were put out by the Penn authorities, certain changes took place in some of the parishes. When the news from New Orleans reached these parishes the McEnery officials demanded their places of the Kellogg officials, and they were at once given up. When the Federal government intervened and unseated the McEnery authorities, the Kellogg officials demanded and received back their places; but in Rapides some time seems to have elapsed before the Kellogg officials took their places back; indeed, the McEnery register of deeds was still acting as such when your committee were in New Orleans, the Kellogg register never having come to reclaim the place, which is said to be worth nothing.

If the returning board, in the language of this republican committee, acted arbitrarily, unfairly, and without warrant of law in 1874, in counting out members of the legislature, what could we expect of them when the far greater prize of the presidency was at stake? The past conduct of this board as here shown was guarantee sufficient to the republican managers here at Washington that Hayes would be counted in provided the



troops and money were forthcoming. The troops and money were duly on hand as required. The result was that a clear democratic majority of over 8,000 was transformed into a republican majority of near 4,000, making a difference of 12,000 votes as counted by the returning board and as actually cast at the polls. Hence, Hayes is declared elected and Tilden defeated. Is this arbitrary, unfair, and without warrant of law? All honest men, it seems to me, would think it a little arbitrary, unfair and without warrant of law. This report is full of sweeping condemnations of this board.

I can not do better than to read a little further from this same book. On page four is the following:

The action of the returning board in the parish of Rapides alone changed the political complexion of the lower house, but their action in other parishes was equally objectionable. For instance, in Iberia parish it was claimed before your committee that the vote of poll No. 1 in that parish had been rejected on account of intimidation, but the papers produced by the clerk of the board showed no such proof whatever. One of the counsel, Mr. Ray, produced some affidavits which he declared had been submitted to the board by another of the counsel, General Campbell. The conservative counsel insisted these papers had never been before the board. Opportunity was given to the republican counsel to show the papers had been submitted; but the testimony offered for that purpose by them so far, however, from establishing that fact, established the reverse.

On page six, we find the great howl of intimidation disposed of as follows:

Upon the general subject of the state of affairs in the south, and as to whether the alleged wrongs to colored citizens for political offenses are real or were asserted without due foundation, your committee took such proof as the opportunity offered. Both parties agreed upon four parishes as samples of the condition of affairs in that respect in the state. Of these, owing to the impossibility of procuring witnesses from the locality in time, your committee were obliged to confine their especial examination to two parishes most accessible. As to these parishes they received all the testimony that was offered, and, in addition, they received all the testimony that was then on hand in New Orleans, offered by either party, as to the condition of affairs in other parts of the state.

As a whole, they are constrained to say that the intention charged is not borne out by the facts before us. No general intimidation of republican voters was established; no colored man was produced who had been threatened or assaulted by any conservative because of political opinion, or discharged from employment or refused employment. Of all those who testified to intimidation there was hardly any one who of his own knowledge could specify a reliable instance of such acts, and of the white men who were produced to testify generally on such subjects, very nearly all, if not every single one, was the holder of an office. Throughout the



rural districts of the state the number of white republicans are very few; it hardly extends beyond those holding office and those connected with them. No witness, we believe, succeeded in naming, in any parish, five republicans who supported the Kellogg government who were not themselves office holders or related to office holders or those having official employment.

It is clearly shown here that there was no intimidation as charged in 1874. Yet the democrats carried the state then, carried it without any intimidation. If they could carry the state in 1874 without intimidation, why not in 1876? If the returning board in 1874 falsely charged intimidation, for the purpose of counting out a democratic majority, "arbitrarily, unfairly, and without warrant of law," why could they not falsely charge the same reason for an arbitrary, unfair, and illegal count in 1876?

Mr. Speaker, this is too plain for argument, it is too villainous to talk about. And yet we are asked to give full faith and credit to this false count. We are told that there is no power to go behind this action. I had always supposed that fraud made null and void everything it entered into.

But, sir, I shall go on with this very interesting report. On page six we find the following pertinent statement:

On the other hand, it was in evidence that blacks who sought to act with the conservative party, were, on their part, sometimes exposed to enmity and abuse. In the interior one colored man was shot for making a conservative speech, and in New Orleans it appeared from the testimony that colored men who sought to cooperate with the conservatives were subject to so much abuse from the police and otherwise that an association of lawyers volunteered to protect them but without effect.

The radical ox is here gored. It is the republicans who do the work of intimidation, but I suppose the board counted all the intimidation against the democrats and all the votes for republicans.

But, sir, I shall pass on to page seven of this report, made by a republican committee, of which William A. Wheeler was a member, and unanimously adopted:

With this conviction is a general want of confidence in the integrity of the existing state and local officials, a want of confidence equally in their purposes and in their *personnel*, which is accompanied by the paralyzation of business and destruction of values. The most hopeful witness produced by the Kellogg party, while he declared that business was in a sounder condition than ever before, because there was less credit, has since declared that "there was no prosperity." The securities of the state have fallen in two years from 70 or 80 to 25; of the city of New Orleans, from 80 or 90 to 30 or 40, while the fall in bank shares, railway shares, city and other corporate companies have, in a degree corresponded. Through out

the rural districts of the state the negroes, reared in habits of reliance upon their masters for support, and in a community in which the members are always ready to divide the necessaries of life with each other, not regarding such action as very evil, and having immunity from punishment from the nature of the local officials, had come to filching and stealing fruit, vegetables, and poultry so generally—as Bishop Wilmarth stated without contradiction from any source—that the raising of these articles had to be entirely abandoned, to the great distress of the white people, while within the parishes, as well as in New Orleans, the taxation had been carried almost literally to the extent of confiscation. In New Orleans the assessors are paid a commission for the amount assessed, and houses and stores are to be had there for the taxes. In Natchitoches, the taxation reached about 8 per cent of the assessed value on the property. In many parishes all the white republicans and all the office holders belong to a single family. There are five of the Greens in office in Lincoln; there are seven of the Boults in office in Natchitoches. As the people saw taxation increase and prosperity diminish, as they grew poor while officials grew rich, they became naturally sore. That they love their rulers can not be pretended.

Here we have it. The reason for democratic majorities in Louisiana is the same as elsewhere; it is because of their miserable government under carpet-bag rule. As the people saw taxation increase and prosperity diminish, as they grew poor while officers grew rich, they became naturally sore, yes, they became discontented and tired of such government. There is too much of that government in Louisiana and many other places, where officers grow rich while tax payers grow poor. The difference is, that elsewhere the tax payer has his remedy by voting the democratic ticket or some other ticket, and they turn out of place these sleek officers who are growing rich, fattening off the hard earnings of the people; but in Louisiana troops and money attend the count. The ballot avails not as against the rich officer holder. The beaks of corrupt official plunderers are plunged deep in the writhing flesh of the people. Troops and money have kept them down. Bayonets have glistened in their teeth as a warning to be quiet while they are being devoured. Great God! And all this in free America.

Mr. Speaker, I will read one of the last paragraphs of this report, for it is significant. It is as follows:

Indeed, in our judgment, the substantial citizens of the state will submit to any fair determination of the question of the late elections, or do anything by which they can secure a firm and good government. What they seek is peace and an opportunity for prosperity; to that end they will support any form of government that will afford them just protection in their business and personal relations. In their distress they have got beyond any mere question of political party. They regard themselves as practically without government and without the power to form one.



# COLORADO SCENES.

*Photographed by Jackson-Smith Photograph Co., Denver, Colo.*



Now, sir, here is a solemn admission by a republican committee, of which William A. Wheeler was a member, that the people of Louisiana want peace. They want good government. I have shown from this report that they had not a good government, but, on the contrary, taxes increased while prosperity waned. The people grew poor while the officers grew rich. The republican party failed to give them good government. Had they not the right, had they not the duty to perform of voting the ticket of that party they believed would give them good government? Was it not the duty of this returning board to count that ticket or ballot as it was actually cast? But troops and money, fraud and force, stood in the way. Hayes must have Louisiana. He could not be elected without it. This simple fact accounts for many of the supposed mysteries of the late election.

Mr. Speaker, no one can now look to the 5th of March next with a vision clear enough to see who shall be then inaugurated. If Tilden and Hendricks succeed at last, if Tilden then takes the seat to which he is in all honesty and justice entitled, it will be such a triumph of right over wrong, of law and order over force and fraud, as will place this republic on firmer foundations than ever before. As a people, we will enter the paths of political regeneration and business prosperity. On the other hand, if fraud, incased in legal forms and technical terms, thwarts at this time the known will of the people, I believe a sense of justice that always characterizes the American people will set its seal of condemnation upon the party forcing its candidates into office against the known merits of the case.

I shall vote for the bill providing for a mode of counting the electoral vote, because I hope it will secure substantial justice, and because, unless that bill passes there is no possibility of any agreement at all between the House and the Senate. Unless this bill shall settle the dispute the president of the Senate will declare Hayes and Wheeler elected and the House Tilden and Hendricks, thus setting up a dual presidency and a conflict, of authority that will result in all the horrors of civil conflict, the end of which no man can see but, I venture to say would be the downfall of our liberties and the end of the world's hope of constitutional government resting upon the freeman's will as expressed at the ballot box.



## AGAINST CERNUSCHI AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN AMERICA.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, April 7, 1886.)

MR. SPEAKER: We have the advice of Mr. Cernuschi in last Sunday's *Herald* as to the best way out of our difficulty. I can not state his proposition precisely, but in substance it is this: If a free coinage bill should fail to pass, or, having passed, should be vetoed, he proposes that we purchase silver, so much every month and send it to England; that we purchase say \$600,000 worth of silver bullion one month and ship it to London, double the amount the next month, and so on until, within the year, we shall have dumped down upon the London market about \$22,000,000 worth of silver bullion, selling it at a lower rate every month, and in that way make a panic in the silver market and disturb the exchange between Great Britain and India, so that Great Britain will succumb and enter into a pact with France and the United States for the purpose of restoring silver.

Now, if it be true that Great Britain and France and those European countries are getting cheaper wheat and cotton from India with this cheap silver, certainly that would disarrange nothing. But is that statesmanship; is that sensible? If it is statesmanship, if it is sensible, and if Mr. Cernuschi is so anxious to have a pact with Great Britain, France, and Germany—and certainly there is some reason why those countries should have the same money—let France and Mr. Cernuschi go into the market and buy the silver and ship it to England and run the risk. That they do not do it shows the fallacy of the argument. He says that France has got six hundred millions of silver that she wants to get rid of. If that is so, why not dump the silver down on the London market and strike terror into the Englishmen and compel them to submit to French dictation? Suppose this scheme should fail; suppose that (as we are invited to do by the gold advocates) we suspend silver coinage, for the purpose of shipping this silver bullion and disturbing the English exchange and flooding Europe with cheap silver in order to bring them to better terms—suppose that policy fails and we find, after we have demonetized silver and suspended its coinage and adopted this plan that it does not have the desired effect, in what condition are we left?



As to Mr. Cernuschi and his bimetallic school, no matter which way it goes they have won. They do not believe in bimetallism unless it can be international bimetallism; in order to carry into effect their particular views upon the monetary question, they are quite willing that the United States shall step into the breach and suffer all the loss and all the consequences, if their predictions and theories prove to be fallacious. Mr. Cernuschi is certainly a gentleman of education and ability; there is no doubt of his being well versed in financial questions, but, like other gentlemen, and probably myself among them, he may be a little inconsistent at times, and certainly he has changed his views within the past few years. To show this, I propose to read an extract from his statement before the silver commission of the United States in 1876, of which body I was at the time a member.

Hon. Mr. Boggy, at that time a senator from Missouri, asked him this question:

By retaining sixteen here, and fifteen and a half there (in France) our silver of course would go right to France. Would not that compel France to abandon the bimetallic system?

Answer: The policy of France would be not to coin, but to wait. France committed a great mistake when in 1874, after the example given by Belgium, she limited the coinage of silver. It has been a great mistake. If France had continued to coin silver freely the German silver would have flowed into France and some of the gold of France would have flowed into Germany, and silver would have maintained everywhere its value relatively to gold. In limiting the mintage a difference has been created between the value of bullion and the value of coin.

This, gentlemen, is the authority quoted on this floor by the gold advocates; yet he insists, and it no doubt is the fact, that had France continued the free coinage of silver, there would have been no silver question to-day, because for seventy years—so long as silver was coined free—gold and silver were at a parity at the French ratio of 15 1-2 to 1. This is Mr. Cernuschi's statement, notwithstanding he has made a different and inconsistent statement in a little pamphlet which we have all had occasion no doubt to read, copies having been sent to us by Mr. Manton Marble, called "The Great Metallic Powers."

Now, if it be true that France by continuing the free coinage of silver could have maintained the parity between the two metals, what may we expect by free coinage in the United States? Why, Mr. Speaker, we have a

bimetallic union of our own. Under a bimetallic constitution we have a bimetallic union consisting of thirty-eight states in addition to the territories. This bimetallic union includes a population of 60,000,000, and an area of over 3,000,000 square miles, embracing 2,000,000,000 acres of land. Here is a bimetallic union compared with which the Latin union is a mere bagatelle so far as the resources of the future are concerned. Having a population of 60,000,000, increasing at the rate of 1,000,000 annually spread over this vast area, before we could coin the quantity of silver that France has to-day we would have a population probably as large as or larger than that of the Latin Union, whose territory compared with ours is insignificant.

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### MAKESHIFTS AND COMPROMISES.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, January 8, 1895.)

All your makeshifts are but a fraud and a sham. I believe that the American people will soon understand this, if they do not now. It may take a few years more of hard times, of grinding poverty, a few more bank failures, to teach them this lesson. And as my distinguished friend from Pennsylvania (Mr. Sibley) has said in his speech to-day, the men who have heretofore enjoyed the profits of this increased value of their securities are to-day becoming very much alarmed on account of the shrinkage of value of the property or wealth on which these securities are resting. Take your railroad securities. Half of your railroads are to-day in the hands of receivers. I do not like to allude to this railroad question just now, and will not do so for the purpose of giving offense to any members of this house.

You undertook recently to save the railroad monopolies from the effects of the single gold standard and by permitting them to pool, to go into trusts. Why was that done? Simply because the shrinkage of the value of their earnings and their securities was bankrupting those corporations, and they came here for relief. All the banking and railroad monopolies and their trusts come here to be saved. The tariff barons and all of them come, each and everyone seeking, by means of legislation at the hands

of congress, to escape the crash that is coming in the future, by being made the preferred pets of congress.

Mr. Chairman, in the name of an outraged democracy I protest against the whole proceeding. I have been a democrat all my life, and expect to live and die one, battling for the principles of that great party. I believe them to be essential to the perpetuity of the republic. I have seen them trampled on here day by day and month by month. But this House is not the democratic party. Neither is this administration the democratic party. (Laughter and applause.) I will appeal from this presence to that vast yeomanry of this country, the great masses of the people, and I hope that there will be a sufficiency of the democratic party to rally around the great principles of democracy, therefore, in the coming days and reorganize the party on the principles of Jefferson and Jackson, and go back to the ancient days and landmarks on which the party has grown and prospered and made this country great and happy.

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## LAWS TO PROTECT THE STRONG AGAINST THE WEAK.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, January 25, 1883.)

The law is usually made for the strong, when it ought to be made for the protection of the weak. We respond to the demands of capital and legislate for the protection of capital rather than the protection of the laboring man and the poor. When the laboring man of this country is taught to believe that he must rely upon congressional legislation, upon tariff bills to protect him, he is relying upon a broken reed and taught a dangerous doctrine, because all the legislation of congress for the last twenty years has confessedly been in the interest of capital and against labor. To-day I can look around me and see in these galleries, in this lobby, in these corridors, the agents and attorneys of these millionaire manufacturers and corporations, who are here pressing the passage of this bill in their interest, although it is death to the laboring interests of the country. You can scarcely leave one of your committee rooms to come into this chamber without being jostled from your path by this eager crowd. To-day they are swarming in this city, the hotels are full of them. The news-

papers are publishing everywhere the fact that the lobby is here to-day in greater force than ever before. Lobbyists of whom? Of the farmer and the laboring man? Oh, no. It is these millionaires who are demanding the passage of this bill for the purpose of enslaving and crushing labor—of building up monopolies. This bill is full of “infant industries.” These infants, being of royal birth, are to be born and bred millionaires. In a few years they will grow to lusty manhood, full-grown millionaire cormorants.

As I before stated, we are dependent upon the soil for all the wealth of this country. That which might encourage the tilling of the soil would be to the interest of the laboring man and all concerned. Why? Because the price of labor depends upon the wage capital, the wealth to be invested in wages. The wealth to be invested in wages, which keeps up the price of labor, is that wealth which comes from the soil, that keeps up all prices and all business industries. When we diminish that and legislate against it we destroy the wealth and the capital or wage fund to be invested in labor, and to this extent we destroy or reduce the price of labor.

I can illustrate some of the workings of the present tariff system with regard to labor by referring to the “strike” a few years ago. One of the great difficulties of congressional legislation, with reference to the business of the country, is its tendency to build up monopolies, to legislate in favor of the rich as against the poor. Under the stimulus of a high protective tariff we find that capital rushes into these protected branches of industry. They go on for awhile at a large profit, but finally they ascertain that they have manufactured beyond the demands of the market. They have crippled agriculture by reducing its profits. They have reduced the opportunities for a market and the amount of wealth to be invested in wages. What do they do under these circumstances? Why, sir, we are told that sometimes one factory will buy out another or pay it to stop a short time—for five or six months, or probably they will all shut down and wait awhile until prices rise. Meanwhile the laborers are turned out of employment. Thus instead of the laborer working the year round, as he might do on a farm, he is employed only five or six months in a year or not quite so long, and during the remainder of the year is idle. The manufacturer, however, retains his wares and refuses to place them upon the market, in order to maintain his prices and his profits.

We had an illustration of the working of this system when the strike occurred a few years ago—when the city of Pittsburg was almost laid in ashes—when from one end of the country to the other state governments

were called upon to summon out their troops to put down mobs, and even the Federal government was appealed to to shoot down starving laborers who had been turned out of employment. What did these laborers do? They came to our western country as "tramps," so-called; they came there to get bread which had been refused them by these monopolists and manufacturers. They went from door to door. They obtained bread, and finally obtained labor. Many of them to-day are prosperous farmers on our western prairies. But the monopolists follow them there and by protective tariffs rob them to further swell their own profits. . . .

To sum up, protection does not increase the wage of labor, but decreases its profits. These bounties or advantages are first utilized by capitalists. They are in a position immediately to avail themselves of the favorable situation and at once accumulate large fortunes. Thus being made strong and powerful, they are able to dominate and control the home market. Poor men or laborers can not become proprietors, because capital has beforehand absorbed these bounties. They crush out all competition at home by their sudden wealth and prevent all competition from abroad by legal enactments. In this manner they dictate prices and levy tribute upon consumers and fix prices for the laborer so low as to make him a mere slave for whatever his wages may be. His cost of living is so great that he has nothing at the end of the year.

Protection is a species of robbery perpetrated on the farmer, because the farmer is taxed to swell the profits of the manufacturer. Protection compels the farmer to buy of the protected manufacturer at the price fixed by the conscience of the manufacturer, for law has prevented foreign competition, and the advantages this law gives have enabled a few rich companies to control the home market to the exclusion of the competition the poor manufacturer would give if he was not crushed out by powerful and rich corporations. That is to say, a company of poor laborers might organize for the purpose of carrying on business for themselves; but they would soon find that their neighbor who had already grown rich through protection, and who understood the law and could have the law changed to suit him, would bankrupt the laborers who had presumed to compete with these barons.

All wealth comes primarily from the soil. Two total failures of crops succeeding each other would bankrupt the country; would put out the fires in the engine and the furnace; would throw all labor out of employment and bring starvation to our doors. This proves that the soil is the origin



of all real wealth. It takes wealth to pay for labor. The more wealth we have the greater the wage fund; the greater the wage fund the greater will be the price of wages. Whatever, therefore, decreases the profits of the farm decreases the wage fund and thereby decreases the price of wages.

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### STOCK JOBBING CONTROL OF THE TREASURY.

(From a Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives, February 25, 1893.)

MR. CHAIRMAN: It will be observed that before the resumption law went into effect in 1879, the congress of the United States had passed an act known popularly as the Bland-Allison act, restoring the silver dollar. That was in February, 1878, nearly one year before the resumption was to operate. That act provided that that dollar should be a legal tender for all debts public and private, except where the contract otherwise stipulated, and it is as much a resumption fund, under the laws of this country, as the gold dollar for the greenbacks and all other currency in this country not specifically payable by contract in gold.

We are told, Mr. Chairman, that our difficulties to-day arise on account of what is called the Sherman act. I am not in favor of the Sherman act, and never was. I did not believe at the time it would accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted. I believed when that act was passed that we would have the very difficulties we have to-day, because it limited the coinage of silver bullion purchased to the discretion of the secretary of the treasury.

Again, it declared that the secretary of the treasury could use gold, in his discretion, in redeeming the notes used in the purchase of silver bullion. And to-day what have we? Notes issued for the purchase of silver bullion are held to be exclusively gold notes. They are being redeemed in gold and thus depleting the gold in the treasury, instead of paying them as they ought to be paid and as the law contemplated they should be paid, by the coinage of the bullion purchased. That is one of the vices that I see in giving the secretary of the treasury the power to pay in gold the notes issued under the Sherman act.

Mr. Chairman, we are now told that that act is alone responsible for the depletion of the gold in the treasury. But let us think for a moment.



Since that act was passed, if my memory serves me correctly, we have paid about \$250,000,000 of public debt, and that has gone far to deplete the treasury of its gold. Since the passage of that act, the congress of the United States has increased our appropriations from about \$800,000,000 every two years to over a thousand millions in every two years; and by the extraordinary appropriations of congress the Federal treasury is drained of all its money, gold, silver, and greenbacks; and they are scraping the tills, I am told, now for the subsidiary coinage.

Now, that is the objection I have to the proposition. I am not willing to sell bonds for the purpose of putting into the treasury sufficient money to run the government in its ordinary expenses; but what I want here is to reduce the appropriations of the public money so as to have means to resume or to provide that the surplus revenues shall become a surplus fund, and let it go into the treasury for that purpose, and not be drained out by extravagant appropriations of congress. There is our objection.

First, the Sherman law that provided silver certificates should be paid by gold certificates; second, the extraordinary appropriations of congress that have drained the treasury of all its reserve except that set apart by the act of 1882. Are you going to submit to that, Mr. Chairman? Now, you may as well, as I have said awhile ago, take \$50,000,000 of your gold and buy bonds, and those bonds could be paid for again by \$50,000,000 of silver certificates.

Take for instance the New York Clearing House Association, which is so closely connected with the treasury department that that department always keeps an agent there to deal with the Clearing House Association. Now, suppose these associated bankers take \$50,000,000 of bonds, pay the gold into the United States treasury, and next day present greenbacks or bullion notes and draw out this same gold. These legal tender notes thus paid in for gold become surplus revenues in the Federal treasury and can be paid in the ordinary expenses of the government, so that you are not holding the proper amount in reserve, but making a way to increase the bonded debt of the government for no other purpose than to pay out the extravagant appropriations made by the Federal congress.

I do not know whether this amendment is intended for that, or what it is intended for. I do not know whether it means that the treasury has been so depleted that they have not money enough to run this government and pay its ordinary expenditure until congress meets again, and that therefore it is necessary to get funds in this way, or whether it is meant to prop up

stocks in New York and convince Europe that we are financially sound. We all remember that about a month ago we were threatened with a financial panic in Wall street.

Stocks were running down, especially the trust stocks, the sugar trust, the lead, the cordage trust, all the various trusts and combinations which are organized conspiracies against the free trade and commerce of this country for the purpose of putting up commodities against the interest of the people, the combinations that have watered their stocks and desire to maintain them at high prices. They desire this legislation, and they may succeed in maintaining those watered stocks at high prices if they can induce the Federal treasury to load itself up with gold so as to satisfy Europe, I suppose, that there is no danger but that the interest will be paid in gold.

In that way they can float their inflated stocks and thereby doubly rob the people of this country. (Applause.) Take the Reading Railroad, which formed its combinations, a syndicate of roads and monopolies, with its large coal fields, with its coal and iron trusts, with its endeavor to put up the price of coal to the great detriment of the suffering poor of this country, that combination got into trouble. How? Through the inflated stocks and their rascally manipulation of the money market. They were threatened with a slump in their stocks and they came here to Washington.

They did, I believe, induce the secretary of the treasury to go to New York to investigate the matter, and, if current history is true, they induced him to believe that an issue of bonds was necessary in order to prevent a financial panic, but when the matter was submitted to the president of the United States he simply put his foot upon it. And, although I differ with the president of the United States in politics and as to a great many of his public measures, yet I say that in that instance he did exhibit that integrity of heart and that backbone which this house ought to emulate and to follow. (Applause.)

He refused, and if current history is true, he assigned as the ground of his refusal that this was a mere stock-jobbing operation, and the consequence was that the Reading Railroad, with its inflated stocks, went to the wall,—where it ought to go, and where all these stocks that have been watered and inflated and all these combinations organized to rob the people of this country ought to go, and will go if the congress of the United States refuses to come to their relief by issuing gold bonds.

And I stand here, Mr. Chairman, to appeal to the patriotism of this

House. I appeal to you gentlemen upon this floor, if you are opposed to organized trusts, to inflated stocks and to a gold trust, I appeal to you to stand as men against this scheme of Wall street. When the elections come round we go home to our constituents, and to them we are in the habit of denouncing trusts and the inflation and watering of stocks; we talk to them about, fifteen, twenty, or thirty thousand men in this country owning the great mass of the wealth of the country, but when we come back here we seem to get into a different atmosphere altogether.

When we go home and face the free people, the toiling masses of this country, who have to bear these enormous burdens; when we appeal to them for their support we are their friends, and we remain so until after the election; but when we come here to Washington we get under the shadow of Wall street—we get into poisoned atmosphere that fills these lobbies with the gamblers of Wall street, demanding all possible kinds of legislation in their own interest. We are told that we are to have a panic; we are told that we must come to the rescue, and, I am sorry to say, that, forgetting the interests of the great people who send us here and the promises that we have made to them, we bow the knee to the golden Baal, and, so help me God, I hope that every man who does it will be remembered by his people when he again asks their votes!

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#### AGAINST BANK NOTES AND FIAT PAPER.

(From a Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives, June 22, 1882.)

I propose to allude to what I conceive to be the difference between the greenback theory of money—and what I mean by the greenback theory of money is fiat paper money—and those who hold to the doctrine that all paper money issued by the government should be made redeemable—that is to say, when the government issues paper money it should make it legal tender for public debts, should make it a promise to pay, make it redeemable in coin, and make it convertible or redeemable in the money of the government. That I take it to be the democratic doctrine, because it was so declared in their Cincinnati platform.

In that platform the democrats declared that gold and silver coin and paper convertible into coin should constitute the money of the government,

and it will be noticed here that the democrats in that platform expressed themselves fairly and squarely in favor of silver as well as gold whereas the republican party demonetized silver. In their national platform they never declared themselves in favor of silver; but, on the contrary, the secretary of the treasury, the president, members of the House and Senate, in fact the majority of the leading republicans are opposed to silver and in favor of gold, and they reported to the House under the advice of the secretary of the treasury a bill to stop the coinage of silver. So that the republican party is a gold and national-bank party; on the other hand, the democratic party is in favor of silver as well as gold and of paper that is convertible into coin and has a promise to pay. The greenback party is in favor of what they call fiat paper money, paper money that is not redeemable or convertible into coin, that has no promise to pay and no redemption to support it. It is this sort of money that they propose to compel the business interests of the country to take, to compel the plow-holder to take, but not the bondholder.

Now, what is the difference between a piece of paper stamped by the government as money resting upon act of congress that declares it shall be received as a legal tender for all debts public and private, but having no promise of redemption or convertibility, and a piece of paper that is made receivable for all public debts, or, if you please, for all public and private duties and which also has a promise of redemption or convertibility upon its face like our present greenbacks?

Our present greenback dollar is not only legal tender, but it is a promissory note of the government. You will read upon it the words "The United States will pay to bearer one dollar." There is a promise to pay. It is more than a fiat paper dollar or legal tender. It is a promise of the government that it will pay this dollar in whatever may be money at the time for redemption, impliedly in coin. Hence it is the money contemplated in the democratic platform. It is convertible paper money—a promise to pay. All the wealth of the government is pledged to make this a good dollar. The faith of the nation is expressed upon the face of it in the words "The United States will pay to bearer one dollar." So that if the act of congress be repealed that makes it a legal tender, it is still a demand against the government for a dollar, and is good money, because the faith of the nation is written upon it that the government will redeem it and pay a dollar for it; and should congress to-day repeal the legal tender act, or should the Supreme Court of the United States decide it not competent for

congress to make it a legal tender in time of peace, it still would be good money, because the government has promised to redeem it and to make it good, and it is a demand against the government.

The good faith of the government must respond to it, and it will be redeemed by the government in whatever is money at the time, whether gold or silver or otherwise. But the fiat paper dollar is not a promise to pay; it has no promise of the government upon it to redeem it, but rests solely upon an act of congress that declares this piece of paper stamped as a dollar shall be a legal tender for all debts, public and private. Should congress pass such an act and issue, say fifty million dollars of this money, and it should go into circulation, my greenback friends would tell their constituents, "This is all good money, good as gold, good as silver; it has been issued by the government, stamped by the government, like a piece of gold or a piece of silver, and therefore is as valuable as metals." Their constituents believe this doctrine.

One of them, Mr. A, for instance, sells his farm or other property for ten, fifteen or twenty thousand dollars of this money. He lays away his money, not having immediate use for it. He relies upon it as being as good as the gold and silver the greenbackers have told him it was. He expects his money to be distributed at some time for the benefit of his family. He makes his will at his death; so much shall be given to John, so much to Tom, and so on. But the next election comes around; the congress is elected that is opposed to fiat money. They repeal the act of congress making it a legal tender; consequently it is no longer money. It can no longer pay a debt, and no one will receive it for any purpose whatever. It is worthless paper. It was created by an act of congress; it was destroyed by the same power that made it. The government has not promised to redeem it, so that the owner of the money, if he goes to the treasury or elsewhere and demands its payment, is told that there is nothing upon the face of it which promises its payment. Consequently, the faith of the government is not written upon it and no promise of the government is connected with it.

It rested solely upon an act of congress which declared it to be a legal tender, and when the act was repealed it was no longer of any validity, so that this bequest that was made to Mr. A.'s children proved to be a delusion and a snare, and instead of his being worth \$15,000, which the heirs should have received as a legacy, they received so much waste paper. And this is the sort of money that our greenback friends propose that the plow-



holder should take, when, in the same breath, they declare that the bondholder is to have coin.

Now, it so happens with gold and silver that they are precious metals, and made so by the consent and usage of the civilized world. They find their utility as money throughout the world and in the arts. So that if congress to-day should declare that neither gold nor silver should be a legal tender in the payment of debts in this government it might slightly depreciate their value, but they would be money all over the world the same as they are money now. The business man who had a piece of gold or a piece of silver in the bank that was declared no longer money by this government could go to his merchant and make his purchase with it the same as with his wheat, or his corn, or other products, for that merchant would take it to the money centers of New York, or other cities, and purchase all of his goods there with gold and silver; because the merchant in New York could go to London and Paris and use this gold and silver in all of his purchases made there of goods, stores, and merchandise that we use here, for in that country it would be the only money by which he could make these purchases. So that we see that gold and silver is international money by consent of mankind.

We demonetize these metals here and they will be shipped abroad the same as other products and bring in return their value. Practically speaking, the man who owns a silver dollar or a gold dollar, if it were demonetized here, would simply ship it to Europe and get a dollar's worth for it, but no one would pretend to say that he could do so with a piece of paper that had nothing upon it but the stamp of the government; and the act of congress declaring it to be money having been repealed, no one would pretend to say that such a piece of paper as that would be worth anything here or elsewhere. So we see the distinction between the fiat paper dollar and the fiat of the government stamped upon gold and silver. One has an international, world-wide intrinsic value, the other has a value given to it solely by an act of congress, and when that act of congress is repealed the value is repealed and goes with it.

I make these illustrations for the purpose of showing the difference between a treasury note that is redeemable by the government, a treasury note as contemplated by the democratic platform, and a fiat paper dollar as contemplated by the greenback platform.

Our greenback friends rest their doctrine of fiat money upon the decision of the supreme court in the legal tender cases, in which they say



that the supreme court decides that congress has a right to issue a piece of paper and stamp it as a dollar and make it a legal tender. The supreme court in the legal tender cases, as is well known by those who have read them carefully, rested their decision mainly upon the ground of public necessity existing during the war, and that it was a war measure, and as such congress had the right to stamp a piece of paper, to issue a promise to pay a dollar and make it a legal tender the same as the dollar promised. They did not decide that congress had the right to stamp a piece of paper the same as gold and silver and make it a legal tender for private debts. The following extract from that decision shows the position of the supreme court:

It is said there can be no uniform standard of weights without weights or of measures without length or space, and we are asked how anything can be made a uniform standard of value which has itself no value? This is a question foreign to the subject before us. The legal tender acts do not attempt to make paper a standard of value; we do not rest their validity upon the assertion that their emission is coinage or any regulation of the value of money; nor do we assert that congress may make anything which has no value money. What we do assert is that congress has power to enact that the government's promise to pay money shall be for the time being equivalent in value to the representative of value determined by the coinage acts or to multiples thereof.

It will be observed by this extract that the courts say:

We do not rest their validity upon the assertion that their emission is coinage, or any regulation of the value of money, nor do we assert that Congress may make anything which has no value money. What we do assert is that Congress has power to enact that the government's promise to pay money shall be for the time being equivalent in value to the representative of value determined by the coinage acts or to multiples thereof.

In short the supreme court simply declares that the Government's promise to pay a dollar can, by an act of congress, be made equivalent to the dollar promised; and therefore a promise to pay a dollar can be made a legal tender as well as the dollar promised, but they do not decide that a piece of paper that has no promise upon it to pay a dollar can be made a legal tender.

The evident meaning of the report is that congress should have no power to issue such a piece of paper. So that our greenback friends bottom their theories of fiat paper money upon a decision of the supreme court, which, if it means anything, means that congress has no right to issue such money. We see in many of their papers throughout the country quotations from Jefferson, from Calhoun, and others in support of their theory.

I take one extract from a speech delivered by my colleague (Mr. Hazeltine) in the House May 6, 1882; as follows:

Mr. Calhoun also said:

I now undertake to affirm, and without the least fear that I can be answered, that the paper issued by government, with the simple promise to receive it for all its dues, leaving its creditors to take it or gold or silver at their option, would, to the extent it could circulate, form a perfect paper circulation, which could not be abused by the government; that it would be as uniform in value as the metals themselves, and I shall be able to prove that it is within the constitution and powers of congress to use such a paper in the management of its finance, according to the most rigid rule of construing the constitution.

The extract from Jefferson is as follows:

Thomas Jefferson, in his letter to Mr. Epps, said:

Bank paper must be suppressed, and the circulating medium must be restored to the nation to whom it belongs. It is the only fund on which they can rely for loans; it is the only resource which can never fail them, and it is an abundant one for every necessary purpose. Treasury bills, bottomed on taxes, bearing or not bearing interest, as may be found necessary, thrown into circulation will take the place of so much gold or silver, which last, when crowded, will find an efflux into other countries, and thus keep the quantum of medium at its salutary level.

These extracts from Jefferson and Calhoun nowhere state that treasury notes can be made a legal tender for private debts; but they speak only of public dues and taxes; money issued by the government and bottomed on taxes, that is made receivable for all government taxes, bearing or not bearing interest, could be thrown into circulation as money. For, as Mr. Calhoun said, leaving its creditors to take it or gold or silver at their option would, to the extent it could circulate, form a perfect paper circulation, etc. This shows that they meant not to force it upon private creditors or make it a legal tender for private debts, but only for debts due the government and from the government to others. No one denies the proposition, or ever has denied it. In fact, it is one that the democratic party has always contended for, that congress has a right to issue a government note payable and receivable for all government dues not otherwise prohibited by law; it has done so in time past, and treasury notes thus issued will circulate as money. But they have always been issued in the form of a promise to pay, the same as our greenback.

I also take the following from what is claimed to be a speech of Mr. Calhoun:

Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, said in the Senate, September 19, 1837:



INTERIOR OF MR. BLAND'S OFFICE.



THE OLD SCHOOL HOUSE, YET STANDING ON NO CREEK, NEAR  
HARFORD, OHIO COUNTY, KENTUCKY, WHERE  
MR. BLAND TAUGHT SCHOOL.



It appears to me, after bestowing the best reflection I can give the subject, that no convertible paper, that is, no paper whose credit rests upon a promise to pay, is suitable for currency. \* \* \* I would ask, why should the government mingle its credit with that of private corporations? No one can doubt but that the government credit is better than that of any bank, more stable and more safe. Why, then, should it mix it up with the less perfect credit of those institutions? Why not use its own credit to the amount of its own transactions?

I have searched the records of the Senate of September 19, 1837, but I find that Calhoun made no such speech upon the subject at that time, nor am I able to find any such language; but even if he used the language, it was used with reference to notes issued by the national banks then existing, which rested simply upon their convertibility and were not receivable for taxes, as spoken of subsequently by Calhoun. They were like many of our state bank notes, that were simply private promises to pay, redeemable in coin, and were not authorized to circulate as currency in payment of taxes. He therefore objected to that form of money, and he objected to mingling the government credit with that of private corporations. He did not speak in this with reference to treasury notes issued directly by the government and made receivable for taxes and redeemable for a promise to pay on the part of the government, for he says that "No one can doubt but that the government credit is better than that of any bank, more stable and more safe. Why, then, should it mix up with the less perfect credit of those institutions? Why not use its own credit to the amount of its own transactions?"

And that is the democratic doctrine to-day of the government credit. Treasury notes, paper money, must rest upon the credit of the government, and as opposed to national banks, he favored the issue of treasury notes redeemable by the government and payable for all government dues and debts, and receivable in like manner for all government taxes.

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### BIMETALLISM AND BONDED DEBT.

(Delivered in the House of Representatives, January 31, 1898, in Support of a Resolution (Concurrent Resolution No. 22) Declaring all bonds of the United States Payable in Gold or Silver at the Government's Option and that to Restore the Coinage of Silver is not in Derogation of the Rights of Public Creditors.)

MR. SPEAKER: Ten minutes can not be utilized so as to discuss this question as it ought to be, nor can one day or two days, if allotted to this



House, be sufficient for that purpose. The gold standard advocates of this country have driven bimetallists to the position of introducing this resolution. You charged that we undertook to disturb the public credit—"playing politics," in the language of the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Dingley)—when your side of the House and your administration have called forth an expression of the representatives of the people upon this subject. You are violating your record in opposing this resolution. You say by your vote to table this resolution that this government shall not continue the coinage of silver, either the free coinage or limited coinage or any other kind; and you know it.

Every man who does that practically condemns the secretary of the treasury for coining silver in the last eight months, as he has coined some \$10,000,000 in that time.

Your president announced at a banquet a short time ago that all the public debts must be paid in gold. Your secretary of the treasury made the statement before the committee on banking and currency in which he said your party must be committed to the single gold standard and effectually rivet it on the people of this country; and yet when we meet you with a proposition of bimetallism, a proposition that your party once professed friendship for—when we make that protest, this resolution, the gentleman from Maine says it is "politics." What are you doing by your politics?

Now, Mr. Speaker, what is this resolution? Simply a declaration that by the law which authorized the issue of these bonds they may be paid in standard silver dollars of 412 1-2 grains of silver or in gold. No one disputes but that is the law to-day, as it was when this resolution originally passed the Senate. No one denies the fact that the silver dollar is a full legal tender in the payment of all debts, public and private; yet here you are to-day by your votes to declare that every silver dollar coined of the \$460,000,000 is not to be used to pay the public debt.

You are to declare by voting down this resolution that no coinage that may proceed under the Sherman act shall be paid on the public debt, notwithstanding the law. You are to declare all other creditors of the government, the great mass of the American people, are to receive this silver money, but by some arrangement, I know not what, the bondholders are to be elevated as a class in this community whose rights and whose interests are to be subserved, notwithstanding it may be against the interest of the taxpayers, the people of this country. You are to pay the bonds in gold.

Where are you to get the gold? Your Chief Executive has announced



to you that there is not one dollar of tax in all this country, by the law of the land, that is payable specifically in gold, and the only way you have to get gold when it is needed is by selling bonds for that purpose. Now, do you propose to inaugurate a policy in this country by which one bond is to be liquidated by the sale of another? If so, when are you to extinguish the public debt? How long before the people of this country, instead of groaning under nearly \$1,000,000,000 of interest bearing debt, will have it amount to twice that sum? That is your policy and that is where the republican party is drifting—to adopt a policy that means that all the bonds of the government must be paid in gold, whereas you have no way of procuring that gold except by still further bonding the people of this country for the purpose.

Mr. Speaker, if I had the time I would like to show where from the very beginning of this fight for restoration of silver the interest of the bondholder has been held up against the interest of the taxpayer. In all the difficulties we have had upon this subject the bondholder and the national banker alone have had the high consideration of public honor and public faith. When you declare it is contrary to public honor and public faith to pay these bonds with silver dollars, you stultify yourselves; you accuse yourselves of dishonor and bad faith when you make everybody else take it. If it means anything, it means to carry out your idea of public honor and good faith, that you are to relegate silver to subsidiary coinage and no longer recognize it as standard money in this country.

We come here in protest against all this, and you raise the false and hypocritical cry that we are trying to ruin the public credit and the people of the country. Your bonds never stood better than while we had 450,000,000 standard silver dollars recognized as money until recently by every administration except those of Benjamin Harrison, Grover Cleveland, and William McKinley. When you have all of that money now in circulation, are you to strike it down and demonetize it by voting to table this resolution?—for that is what it means.

No, Mr. Speaker; I remember in the Fifty-third Congress, the congress when this same question practically was up for consideration, when the administration of Mr. Cleveland had asked congress to pass a bill authorizing the negotiation of a loan to be paid in gold, the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hopkins), whom I now see in his seat, led the republican party in opposition to it, and nearly every republican from the west went on record declaring his opposition to making those bonds

payable specifically in gold.

The distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Grosvenor) declared that that was a move of the Rothschilds; that the Rothschilds were willing to pay \$16,000,000 in order to have the American government change its policy, and ridiculing the idea that we could not maintain bimetallism in this country. I have not the time to read the *Record*. Then the gentleman from Ohio cited his own platform in opposition to making the bonds payable in gold. His party was pledged to bimetallism—bimetallism, that gold and silver should have the same rights of coinage in the mints. There should be not only concurrent circulation but a concurrent and equal coinage and concurrent and equal use of the money silver in the payment of debts.

Nearly the whole of our interest bearing debt is refunded under the act of July 14, 1870, which made bonds payable in coin of the standard weight and fineness of that time. Our interest bearing debt now outstanding amounts to \$847,365,130, exclusive of the Pacific railroad bonds. A copy of these bonds will show under what authority they were issued, and that holders of the bonds had due notice of the terms and limitations of the law, to wit:

#### THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Are indebted to ———, or assigns, in the sum of one thousand dollars. This bond is issued in accordance with the provisions of an act of congress entitled "An act to authorize the refunding of the national debt, approved July 14, 1870, amended by an act approved January 20, 1871," and is redeemable at the pleasure of the United States after the first day of September, A. D. 1891, in coin of the standard value of the United States, on said July 14, 1870, with interest in such coin, from the day of the date hereof, at the rate of four and a half per centum per annum, payable quarterly on the first day of December, March, June and September in each year. The principal and interest are exempt from the payment of all taxes or duties of the United States, as well as from taxation in any form by or under state, municipal, or local authority. Transferable on the books of this office.

The act of January 20, 1871, referred to as amendatory of the act of 1870, only provided for a larger issue of bonds, but did not in any manner amend or change the law of 1870, providing for the payment of the bonds in coin of the standard value of July 14, 1870. At the date of the passage of the act authorizing the issue of these bonds the mints of our government were open to the free coinage of silver into standard silver dollars of 412 1-2 grains. These silver dollars were then, and had been since 1792,

the unit of account or value in this country.

Our first mint act established the silver dollar as the unit. It was to consist of 371 1-4 grains pure silver. It continued the unit until 1873, when the silver dollar was dropped from our coinage and the gold dollar made the unit of account or value. We have never had bonds issued payable in gold only. We have always recognized that this government was a bimetallic nation; consequently our obligations called for coin, not for gold specifically, nor for silver specifically. The contract under which these bonds were issued, as shown upon the face of the bond itself, calls for the payment of the bond, principal and interest, in coin of the standard value of 1870.

Since silver was the unit of account in 1870, it could be more consistently claimed that the bonds are payable specifically in silver than to insist that they are payable only in gold. The fact that the silver dollar was dropped from the coinage in 1873 did not change the contract in respect to these bonds. So soon as it was known that the power to coin silver dollars had been withheld by an act of congress, efforts were immediately made to restore these dollars to the coinage, and in 1878 the coinage of the standard silver dollar was resumed by the act of February 28, 1878. The restored silver dollar was made a legal tender for all debts, public and private. This is statutory law to-day.

In 1878 the same arguments were made against the restoration of the silver dollar that are made against this resolution. It was contended then that it would not be equitable or just to compel the bondholder to receive the standard silver dollars in payment of his bonds. Indeed, the fight from the beginning has been to compel the bondholders and the fund holders in general to live up to their contract with the people. The bondholders seek to control the action of congress upon the money question, but the interests of the bondholder, or, more properly, his greed, should not be permitted to interfere with the constitutional rights of congress to coin money and to regulate the value thereof.

This is a sovereign power conferred upon congress by the constitution. This power ought not to be controlled or limited by or on account of the interests or demands of any one particular class. Had these bonds been made payable specifically in gold, still congress, under the constitution, would have ample right and authority to restore silver to legal tender and free coinage. In compelling the bondholder to accept it notwithstanding his contract for gold Congress would violate no law nor would it be

unjust. It would violate no law, because congress would be exercising its constitutional duty in coining money of both silver and gold. It would not be unjust, because under the free coinage system the silver dollar would be of equal value with the gold dollar, so that, notwithstanding the contract, had it been made payable in gold, which it was not, congress would have the rightful power under the constitution to restore silver to free coinage and to compel all creditors, public and private to receive it.

If under the system of free coinage of silver the silver dollar should not be equal in value to the gold dollar, the contract payable in gold might present a case of equity. Being submitted to the people it would no doubt receive fair consideration and treatment. The American people do not wish to take unfair advantage of the public or private creditor; they wish to deal fairly with all classes. They believe in equal rights to all and special privileges to none. But we insist that no unfounded fears and false prophecies, or extortionate greed shall be lugged into this discussion simply to control the action of congress in the interests of the creditor class.

Let the constitutional power of congress be first executed by the opening of the mints to the free coinage of silver as well as gold. After this shall have been accomplished it will be time enough to discuss the question as to whether anyone has been injured, and if so, what remedy would be necessary. But the bondholders of the government, of all others, would have the least cause to complain, because the government holds a specific contract with them to pay the interest bearing debt of the government in either gold or silver of the standard value of July 14, 1870.

As before stated, the president of the United States at a banquet given by the Manufacturers' Club of New York a few weeks ago declared that the bonded debt of the government, no matter what the contract called for, should be paid in gold, or the best money in the world. This catch phrase, "best money in the world," is very fashionable nowadays with our republican friends. They have abandoned all idea that silver in the near future is to become the best money in the world, according to the interpretation of what the best money in the world really is.

Their argument insists upon payment in the money that the world shall establish for us and not the money that we may establish for ourselves. They would change our contracts with our bondholders so as to comply with the demands of the creditor. They advocate the policy that we must permit other nations to dictate our monetary system and the manner in which we shall pay our debts. Against this idea the democratic

party protests. We are patriotic enough to believe that this country is quite able to manage its own financial affairs and to have a financial system of its own independent of other countries.

We believe, as our forefathers, that bimetallism is a better system than monometallism. We know that our country was constituted bimetallic and that it so existed for over eighty years. The constitution enjoins upon congress the duty of coining money and prohibits the states making anything a tender in the payment of debts but silver and gold coin, thus establishing for the states of the Union a bimetallic system and conferring upon congress the power to coin money for this system.

Congress has no lawful power under the constitution to demonetize silver or to refuse silver the same privileges at our mints that it gives to gold. The bondholders nor any other class should be permitted to thrust their special interests into the discussion to influence congress in disobeying a constitutional command. As before said, the power to coin money and to regulate the value thereof is a sovereign power conferred by the constitution upon the congress. One congress can not waive or limit this power so as to bind a subsequent congress. No congress can bind its successors so as to prevent succeeding congresses from exercising the constitutional requirement to coin silver as well as gold.

It was exercised for over eighty years, as before stated, and no contract, public or private, can deprive the congress of the United States of the lawful right to coin silver freely as a full legal tender for this country.

The resolution under consideration is as follows:

*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring therein),* That all the bonds of the United States issued or authorized to be issued under the said acts of congress hereinbefore recited are payable, principal and interest, at the option of the government of the United States, in silver dollars of the coinage of the United States containing 412 1-2 grains each of standard silver, and that to restore to its coinage such silver coins as a legal tender in payment of said bonds, principal and interest, is not in violation of the public faith nor in derogation of the rights of the public creditor.

These resolutions were introduced in the Senate in 1878 by Senator Stanley Matthews, of Ohio, during the presidency of Mr. Hayes. Senator Matthews was an advocate of the restoration of silver to free coinage. He was a distinguished republican senator. He was afterwards appointed a justice of the supreme court by President Hayes. Stanley Matthews was a prominent republican. His ability as a lawyer can not be questioned by our republican friends. The resolutions are concurrent resolutions declar-



atory of the sense of the Senate and House.

They did not then and do not now require the signature of the president, consequently the only effect of the resolution is the expression of the opinion of congress. They do not have the effect of a statute. The resolutions are historical evidence of the fact that at the time they were first introduced by Stanley Matthews in 1878 the bondholders were determined, if possible, to defeat the free coinage of silver. These resolutions were passed by both Houses of congress in 1878, before the passage and adoption of what is now known as the Bland-Allison act that restored silver to a limited coinage.

From that day to this the interests of the bondholders and national banks have been held up as a scare crow to deter congress from the restoration of the free coinage of silver. Our republican friends at this time admit that under the law all our bonded debts and other government obligations are payable in standard silver dollars. Admitting this, they pretend that they have no objection to the first part of the resolutions, which declares the law to be that all public debts are by law payable in standard silver dollars. They now, as they did in 1878, object to the coinage of these dollars for the purpose of paying these debts.

While admitting the lawful right to pay in silver, they are putting themselves on record as protesting against the exercise of that right by coining silver dollars so as to enable the government to discharge these bond obligations according to law. "They favor the war but are opposed to its prosecution." If these bonds and other government obligations are lawfully payable in silver as well as gold, it becomes the duty of congress to coin silver as well as gold to pay our debts. It is the duty congress owes to the taxpaying people of this country who are burdened with this debt. They have some rights in this controversy. Their interests should be considered as paramount.

They ought not to be saddled with the burden of paying these obligations under the single gold standard when they have a specific contract to pay under the bimetallic standard. At the time of the passage of the act refunding the public debts in coin bonds the taxpayers had the right to draw on two sources of monetary supply. They had the right to look to the gold supply and also to the silver supply for the money.

The opportunity thus to draw from two monetary supplies protected them from monetary famine and from monetary monopoly. The cutting off the silver supply has so enhanced the value of gold that it now takes



twice the amount of commodities to pay a debt it would take to pay in gold or silver according to contract. The demonetization of silver has about doubled the value or purchasing power of gold; hence to pay debts, public or private, under the gold standard, it requires twice the amount of labor and the products of labor to pay a dollar as would be required under the bimetallic system.

Our interest bearing debt has been reduced from about two thousand millions down to less than nine hundred millions. To pay this nine hundred millions under the gold standard will require more labor and the products of labor than would have been required to pay the whole two thousand millions under the bimetallic system. In other words, while nominally we have reduced the debt more than one-half, the burden of paying what remains, if paid under the single gold standard, would be as great as the original two thousand millions would be under the bimetallic standard.

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### EVILS OF USING CORPORATION NOTES AS MONEY.

(From a Speech in the House of Representatives, May 13, 1882, on the Bill to Enable National Banks to Extend their Corporate Existence.)

MR. SPEAKER: In discussing this question I shall undertake to answer some of the points made by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Crapo) in favor of the national banks. One of the arguments last made by the gentleman from Massachusetts in favor of the national banking system, and against the proposition submitted by other gentlemen as well as myself of adopting treasury notes for bank notes, was that there is a danger of overissue on the part of the government if the matter of issuing treasury notes is confined to congress alone, and that it is better to transfer this power of regulating the volume of paper money to corporations, to gentlemen whose interest it is to subserve private ends, instead of holding that power in the representatives of the people for the public benefit. And he eulogizes further the national banking system because, he says, it has furnished the government and the people with a paper currency secure and valid everywhere. And why so? What is a national bank note other than a treasury note? When gentlemen come to argue this question I

want them to answer that proposition. What is a national bank note to-day other than state paper? Nothing. It is not redeemable in anything but state paper. It is not based upon coin, but upon paper. It is redeemable in a treasury note, which is state paper. It is made receivable and payable for all public dues, with certain exceptions, and is therefore essentially nothing more nor less than state paper issued by the government, and handed over to corporations to circulate and receive the profit of the issues.

From that proposition there is no escape. Under this system is there no danger of banks contracting and expanding the currency, the very danger that the gentleman warns the country against with reference to treasury notes? Is there no danger with reference to bank notes in the same direction? Why, when the funding bill was up at the last session of congress we remember that the national banking institutions, in order to dragoon congress into passing such measures as they thought would redound to their benefit, secured the veto of the bill by bulldozing the president with threats of contracting the currency and inviting a financial panic.

Let gentlemen who are favoring national banks here to-day remember what took place in the Forty-third Congress. That congress assembled in the midst of a panic greater probably than this country ever experienced before. It was under this national banking system, and it was determined here upon the part of those favoring the national banking system that instead of increasing the volume of legal tender notes or treasury notes the banking law should be extended and amended so as to permit banks to issue the money without limit. Banking was made free, and other measures and amendments of the bank law in their interest were made at that congress. And to-day the same proposition is here. It is contended by the treasurer that the banks contract and expand this currency in their own interest and not in the interest of the people. And if congress can overissue treasury notes, if there is danger of congress making these overissues without the intervention and the coercion of banks, then there is certainly still greater danger that this money which we turn over to our banking corporations for their benefit and use may be contracted and expanded at the behest of these corporations, where we know they demand their own terms as to our legislation, or, failing to get their demands, paralyze business with forebodings of financial disasters.

When we are told there is danger of centralization also in the proposi-

tion to substitute treasury notes for bank notes, I reply, Mr. Speaker, that the danger of centralization and revolution in this government comes not from the people or their representatives here untrammelled by corporations. The danger of centralization, the danger of revolution, the danger of changing our republican form of government to that of an aristocratic form of government, arises from the vast power of the corporations that congress has built up in this country; among the greatest and most powerful and most to be feared are these banks.

Why, sir, the danger of centralization when the people's representatives are left free to act upon public subjects,—when banking corporations that we build up in this land have the power of threatening panic by bulldozing congress, by saying to us if we do not pass this bill to-day or another bill to-morrow in their interest the country will go to ruin, and they will bring panics and financial disaster upon us,—the danger of centralization is in the power of those institutions, and not in the power of congress representing the people of this country.

The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Crapo) in his argument for the continuance of the national banks, and in defense of the national bank system, referred to the great benefits rendered by the banks during the war. Suppose we admit for the sake of argument that at that time they worked great benefit. But there were other patriots in the land besides those engaged in national banking; there were other capitalists who should be considered as well as these bankers. The great mass of the producing people of the country, who must pay all the expenses of these corporations, should be considered as well as the banks; for the people were as patriotic as were the banks.

What was the effect of banking institutions during the war, and what has been their effect since in demanding legislation on the part of congress? What have been the influences brought to bear by the banks? During the war they purchased bonds for legal tender notes, when those notes were worth but sixty cents on the dollar in coin. They converted into bonds bearing coin interest paper worth but sixty or seventy cents on the dollar—bonds to full amount or face value of this depreciated paper.

Had the government gone into the markets of the world and offered its bonds to be sold for coin, and had sold them for sixty or seventy cents on the dollar, we would then have understood the transaction. We would have seen that we were losing thirty or forty and, in some instances, probably fifty cents on the dollar in that transaction.

Yet we lost the same amount by converting these paper issues into bonds; paper money that was depreciated on account of the issues of the national banks themselves. The legal tender notes issued during the war, had there been no other issues, had bank notes not been issued, might have stood near par all the time. But every bank note that was issued came in competition with the legal tender notes, and depreciated them to that extent. These banks and their circulation depreciated the paper of the government for which the bonds were sold, and instead of being a benefit to the government during the war they cost it not less than \$500,000,000.

More than that. When they had secured these bonds at a low price and had control of them, they came into the halls of congress and demanded that bonds thus payable in paper money below par should be made a coin bond. By the act of 1869 congress pledged the faith of this nation to redeem its public debt in coin. This is a specimen of the influence brought to bear by the national banks upon the legislation of this country in the past. Instead of being a public benefit these banks have been a public curse; instead of being in the interest of the people they have been the grandest robbers of the taxpayers of this country that ever existed under any government. Yet we are asked now to continue them. Why? Because the comptroller of the currency says that their circulation is gradually going out, and that this objection to them is not longer to be urged. He suggests furthermore that we should not consider what shall be substituted for these national banks when they have ceased to exist; that some time in the future will be early enough to consider that question. But, sir, we are paying off the national debt at the rate of over \$100,000,000 a year, and, unless we cease to pay off this debt, unless this bill means, as I think it does, that when we have continued and rechartered these banks the next legislation asked on the part of congress will be to cease the payment of the public debt in order to maintain the banks, the basis on which the national bank currency has rested must shortly pass away. The indefinite continuation of the national debt is what the comptroller of the currency invites us to, although he has not the hardihood to say so; for it is confessed here that the banking system can not exist much longer unless we stop immediately the rapid payment of the public debt. This bill is simply the preliminary and forerunner of other legislation looking to the perpetuation of the national debt in order to perpetuate the national banks. Otherwise this bill means nothing; it is a mere *brutum fulmen*, because the banks whose charters it continues and the very system it seeks to uphold

are expiring—are dying from day to day, and in a few short years must go out of existence.

We hear it proclaimed throughout the country to-day that a national debt is a national blessing. There are in this country, and have been since the formation of our government, those who believe that the nearer we pattern after the government of Great Britain the nearer are we to perfection. They believe in aristocratic government; a government controlled by wealth and power as against the people; a government in which the aristocratic classes shall control the masses. It is the class who thus believe, who proclaim, that a national debt is a national blessing. Why? Because in accordance with the English system we can bank upon a perpetual debt. It is this species of legislation which in a few short years has raised up in this country millionaires by the thousand, when, before the war, scarcely one was heard of. The great contrast between extreme poverty and extreme wealth in this country is steadily and surely marking the line between the aristocratic and the laboring classes of our people. . . .

No man goes to the bank counter and demands the redemption of a national bank bill. Why? Because it is practically government paper, and is as good as the paper in which it would be redeemed. The pending bill proposes to extend the charters of these banks for twenty years and thus give them for the term of forty years the use of the government paper without costing them a dollar. That is one of the objects of the pending bill. It proposes to extend the time for the banks to redeem their circulation, and they know it. Yet they come here and claim that they are acting for the benefit of the people. This is one of the swindles to be perpetrated.

If they are compelled to redeem their circulation at once in lawful money of the government, and if this money be deposited in the treasury we can use it as other surplus revenues are used, in redeeming the bonds upon which these banks are doing business; and in order to take up their circulation we can issue treasury notes having the same monetary functions as the bank notes. As these bank notes come into the treasury in the payment of taxes and otherwise the bill which I have prepared provides that the secretary of the treasury shall issue circulating treasury notes to take their place. . . .

Sir, in the days of Benton, in 1834, when this same subject was up, rechartering the national bank, the national banks were very much opposed to his proposition to so amend the coinage laws as to induce gold as



well as silver to flow to this country to take the place of bank notes. They denounced gold then as they do silver now. They ridiculed gold and ridiculed Benton. And because we to-day seek to bring silver back to where it was before its demonetization, because we desire coin in this government that is contemplated in the constitution, these same institutions that denounced gold in Benton's days are denouncing silver now, and denouncing those who favor it as silver humbugs as they called him a gold humbug. This proposition is intended to accommodate them. They would demonetize gold to-day if it was necessary to do so in order that their paper should circulate. For the purpose of supplying the vacuum that would be occasioned by withdrawing the coinage of silver and silver certificates—for the purpose of supplying that vacuum with bank paper they ask this congress to stop the coinage of silver and the issue of silver certificates. And that is the sort of legislation that we are asked from year to year to enact in order to accommodate national banks.

Mr. Speaker, while upon this silver question, I desire to submit a few reflections in reference to it. In the first place, a few days ago congress abandoned its duty in reference to the tariff and turned that over to a commission. We are asked now to abandon our duty in reference to the state paper of the government and turn that over to a banking commission. We have been asked heretofore with reference to silver to stop coinage and turn that over to another commission to meet with foreign governments and ask their aid. When we talk of bills regulating railroad corporations there must be a commission for that also. When it is sought to perpetuate these enormities and iniquities and to increase the power of these vast corporations that have grown up here, they are afraid to trust the representatives of the people and ask to turn over everything to commissions to be controlled by them. No, Mr. Speaker; we want no commission to meet with foreign governments on this silver question. It is simply cowardice to talk of sending agents to foreign governments to ask them to restore silver to circulation as money. As the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reagan) just now remarks to me, it is worse than that; it is corruption. And why? You take Great Britain, France, and other European countries, and their production of silver is simply nothing. You take the American continent, and here is the production of that metal. In the United States one-half of the annual supply of the silver of the world is produced. There were in the year 1879 about eighty millions of dollars' worth of silver produced in the civilized world, and forty millions of that were produced in



our country. That being our product, we ought to protect it, because the constitution requires us to do so, by making money of it. We produce one-half of the silver produced in the civilized world to-day, and yet we are too cowardly to take hold of our own product and establish its value in the market. We must go to nations who produce nothing of it; we must ask their cooperation to rehabilitate it!

Why, Mr. Speaker, all this is the demand of the national banks. It does not come from the great mass of people of this country. Not at all. When the Senate struck from the bill we passed in the House the unlimited coinage feature of the silver bill it infringed every principle of monetary science. It was that act that depreciated silver. And why? Because it laid an embargo upon it. It said to gold, "You can come into the mints and the treasury, and go free in and out every door; you are here recognized; you are here honored." But it said to silver, "You can come to the mints in limited quantities only; and if you come in greater quantities than that we will barricade the doors and shut you out; we will go into the market to depreciate you and purchase you at cheap rates." And worse than that, it violated the very theory of metallic money.

What is the idea of metallic money? The theory upon which metallic money is based is simply this: That gold and silver being produced in limited quantities, by consent of mankind have become money, and that if both are taken to the mint and given unlimited coinage—you may charge something for the coinage; that is not the question; but it shall be coined unlimitedly—and thus nature supplies the demand for money. That is to say, all the jurisdiction congress has over the coining of gold and silver is to declare the relation existing between the two as to value, to declare what shall constitute a dollar in silver and a dollar in gold, and open the mint to both. When it has done that its functions cease. I do not pretend to say that it is even necessary to declare it to be legal tender, for I believe it to be so under the constitution. Usually we authorize its circulation, we declare it to be a legal tender, and there we stop. Nature, through the labor of mankind, in his industries in opening mines, in carrying on trade, supplies the volume of money more regularly than does the legislation of congress when applied to the regulation of paper money.

Nature will supply these metals to this nation and to all nations alike; and hence the volume of money will be steady; it will not be contracted to-day and expanded to-morrow for the purpose of enriching a few at the expense of the great mass of the people. It will come in in a steady volume,

so to speak. You will have all the stock which has been dug from the mines for centuries back, and all the products of the future to draw from, which has been relied upon and upon which contracts have been based heretofore. Hence it becomes a national and international money, and is supplied to all peoples alike.

When you do away with that argument, you knock from under it the foundation upon which it rests. And when congress undertakes to say that it will regulate the volume of metallic money by demonetizing gold or demonetizing silver, or by limiting the coinage, it infringes every principle of metallic money and does violence to all true monetary theories. You may as well go upon a paper basis and do away with the monetary metals entirely.

When you throw open the mints to gold and silver of the world then you will have a parity between the metals in this country and in all countries. We are able to maintain it ourselves without the aid of foreign governments. They are not able further to demonetize silver. On the contrary, the last monetary conference showed that they had gone as far in that direction as it was possible for them to go, and a little further than it was safe to go.

I say, then, that this nation, with its vast extent of territory, reaching as it does from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the lakes to the Gulf, with its fifty millions of busy people handling and transacting all kinds of business, with a population increasing by immigration at the rate of a half a million annually, this great nation is able to utilize our own product of the precious metals without asking the permission of foreign governments.

Hence I denounce as a crime the attempted demonetization of silver or its limited coinage as embraced in that bill. I denounce it as a swindle; I denounce it here upon this floor as being in the interest of the banks and other corporations in this country and against the interests of the people; I denounce it as a species of robbery which ought to be kicked out of this legislative hall; and I hope it will be, and the authors left at home the next election.

I mean no disrespect to the gentlemen of the committee who have reported the bill. I may have said a little too much in making that statement; but I will admonish them of one thing; they must answer for this before the people of the country.

If silver and gold had been in circulation in 1873; if we had then been on a coin basis as we are now, and the proposition had then been made to

demonetize one or the other of these metals, the people would have understood what it meant, and the proposition would have been denounced from one end of the Union to the other. It never could have been accomplished.

And now that the people of the country have silver in circulation, although in limited quantities, you never can take it from them until the national banks shall step into the hall of this house and into the other end of the capitol, and, by threatening panics and otherwise, induce the representatives of the people to obey their behests and their will. . . .

From the beginning of this government there have been two opposing theories, one represented by Hamilton, the other by Jefferson. Hamilton represented the idea of an aristocratic government; he advocated national banks. Jefferson represented a republican form of government; he did not favor national banks. The democratic party in all its history never established a national bank, while it has always been in favor of the free, unlimited coinage of gold and silver. The democratic party never oppressed the people of this land by legislation for the creation or extension of banking corporations. It has never built up institutions of this sort, but has always done what it could to put them down. In the days of Benton this war was waged; and now to-day, nearly one hundred years from the formation of the government, we meet the same issues and the same doctrines that prevailed and divided parties at that time.

We are called upon to-day to defend on this floor the doctrine that ours is a government of limited powers, against centralization of power in the Federal government. Wealthy corporations seek to centralize power for their own aggrandizement. This idea of centralization is dangerous to the interests of the masses of the people. Centralization may protect wealth, but it destroys liberty. Following Jefferson and the teachings of the democratic party, I am opposed to building up corporations in this country upon theories of centralized government. . . .

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## THE DEBT PAYING POWER OF WESTERN PRODUCTS.

(An Address to the Senate Committee on Finance, Delivered in 1897, to a Delegation of New York Bankers.)

I did not come here with the expectation of making any remarks whatever; I came as a listener; but as a matter of course, when the gentleman

was figuring there awhile ago, I took this position—and I think it a tenable one—that, admitting, as he did in his figures, that our debt abroad and at home, under the law is payable in silver, and that a bushel of wheat is worth a dollar and eight cents in silver and a dollar in gold—that the farmer in the west, who pays his eastern debt in wheat, will gain eight cents over that measured in gold. His debt was contracted when you had an inflated currency; he never borrowed of you one solitary cent of gold, nor even of silver, but what you call a depreciated currency—a fraud—when it was inflated; and to-day the farmer of the west who with a hundred bushels of wheat five or six years ago, in your inflated currency, could pay \$200 of that debt, to-day can pay but \$75. That is what he complains of. It is a plain proposition. His debt stands him so many dollars. His debt never comes down from that. It is measured in units, in dollars, in mortgages calling for dollars. He got greenback dollars when they were far below gold. You now undertake to make him pay you in gold by contracting and doing away with the money that he borrowed of you, and you claim now that you are not satisfied even with silver that has been the money of this country ever since this was a government; a money that is incorporated in your constitution by your fathers as the coin of your country, and was so until the act of 1873 that dropped it from the coins; the money of the constitution, the money denominated in your bonds which provide that it was to be payable in coin at its present weight and fineness—that is to say, the silver dollar of 412.5 grains. Then, if you recollect, it is the producers of this country who pay all your debts; you gentlemen in Wall street do not pay one dollar of it; it is the great producing element of this country that pays you and pays these debts; debts, I say, that were contracted in paper, and now you want to compel them, by doing away with that paper, withdrawing it, contracting the currency, reducing the value of the commodities in which you are to be paid; that is the complaint they make, and it does seem to me it is a very just one. If I was in debt five years ago \$100—my labor—the wages were worth \$1 a day, \$100 paid that debt. To-day, after the reduction of the volume of the circulating medium, you have reduced prices so that this labor is worth only fifty cents, and instead of buying in \$100 it takes \$200; that is plain. These are plain propositions that the people want to understand, and they can not be satisfied by any such propositions as that you can borrow a little money a little cheaper somewhere when you have a gold standard than when commodities are measured by gold and silver. These

commoditiés will pay so much more than when measured in gold alone; and, having contracted debts on a paper basis or inflated prices, you now ask them to pay you on contracted prices. You take two bushels of wheat, whereas you give them but one, and I want to say now, with all due deference here, you had better accept the proposition—if I know the people that I represent, and I think I do, throughout all the west and south! And we had a little experiment of it last summer, when there was an uprising of it throughout the Union, and promises were made that this financial matter would be attended to, that these people would have some relief; and these men went home and are looking to congress to-day. But I tell you if you “put on the screws” much further, and reduce these people yet further to the necessities, when the uprising comes again there is no power in this government to put it down; and instead of the interest of your bonds being paid in gold, they will be wiped out as with a sponge; and I stand here as a conservative man when I say so. I am willing to pay it as demanded in the bond, and for what the contract calls, but unless this measure is adopted you will see men in the next congress that will place you back where you were in 1869, making your debt payable in paper. I speak to you as a friend and not as an enemy, as a friend to my country, and I urge you now sincerely and honestly to take that warning.

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### MASONRY AND ITS SECRET CHARITIES.

(From an Address on Masonry Delivered at Lebanon, Mo., June 24, 1870.)

The manner of Masonry is secrecy—silence! It works love and charity. Times of broils and battles, blood and carnage, that “try men’s souls,” causing widows to mourn, and orphans to hunger, are specially the occasion for this secret work of charity. When fathers and sons mistrust each other, when confidence flees from men, when rapine and murder infest the land, Masonry, with its unseen but trusty hand dries the widow’s tears, feeds the orphan, soothes and heals the sick and wounded, and buries the dead.

To those who wish to become Masons for these noble purposes, the portals are open. No others should seek to enter within those sacred veils



"where incense burns upon the holy altars day and night."

When we view Masonry in this light we agree that it should be perpetuated. In this manner it has been and it will be perpetuated. Nations, age after age, and one after another, have sprung into existence to awe and dazzle the world with their deeds of valor—their learning, their poetry, eloquence, science and art; cities, with their lofty towers and spires piercing the heavens, have grown up like magic. And in all this, operative Masonry played an important part.

But dissensions, wars and pestilence have swept away the people while time has toppled into decay their cities and towns. Fertile plains become a desert waste. Mountains, where the shepherd in the soft moonlight of a summer's eve, watched with peaceful heart and pastoral care over his sleeping flocks, and offered up his sacrifices to the one true and living God, have been shaken by earthquakes and leveled to the lowest plain. Nothing earthly remains of the warrior, the poet, the builder, save the solitary monument that marks his dust. . . . .

Nations of people perish and are forgotten. Masonry is preserved and transmitted from father to son, from generation to generation, as a rich legacy, a precious heritage.

"We have seen the lightning write its fiery path upon the dark cloud and expire. So the genius of man amid the shades of mortality, glitters a moment through the gloom, and vanishes from our sight forever."

The cloud, unlocked by the thunderbolt, opens its gates, pours out its torrents, and floods the earth with its destructive elements, sweeping along the forests, plowing and twisting from their aged roots the tallest oaks. Yet the cloud spends its force and melts away into the air. The thunder's roar dies away in soft echoes among the distant hills. The flood foams and frets and rushes headlong into the eternal sea. Thus rushes away into eternity nation after nation, age upon age, generation after generation. All are elements of time, but the principles of Masonry are a part of true Divinity. It is that part of the eternal in man which will survive the flight of time the wreck of matter to receive a reward in eternity that Time denies and can not give.





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